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A CLINICAL STUDY OF SENTIMENTS: I. .
By Henry A. Murray and Christiana D. Morg....

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A CLINICAL STUDY OF SENTIMENTS: I*

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*Because of the war, the publication of this monograph has been delayed for more than a year. The manuscript was finally received in the Editorial Office on May 23, 1945. All references are to the bibliography which is found at the end of the second half of these studies. The second half will appear in the November, 1945, number. The studies will, therefore, comprise an entire volume.

I. INTRODUCTION

In the fall of 1941, with the nation wavering on the verge of war, the staff of the Harvard Psychological Clinic embarked on a long-arranged-for study of undergraduate personalities. Our five-year plan called for the continuation of the researches of 1934-1936, outlined in *Explorations in Personality* (17), with a revised scheme of concepts as well as some additional techniques suitable to the investigation of certain areas of personality neglected in the previous study, the areas, namely, of sentiment, belief, and ideological conviction.

This supplementary direction of interest and aim, dictated by the lopsidedness of our earlier formulations, was consonant with the need keenly felt by those who were alive to the impending crisis, to estimate the nation's spiritual resources, to know what attitudes and assumptions flourished in different sections of the population, how forceful they were, how flexible to circumstance. Could it be truly said that there existed here in America a common heritage of values to which young men, whose destiny it has ever been to bear the brunt of war, were so attached that to enlist in their defense would be no more than second nature? How and to what extent, we asked ourselves, would the participation of American youth in the war-and-peace effort of this era be affected by the possession of this or that ideology or of no ideology at all?

As it turned out, the acceleration of world events compelled us not only to terminate the whole project after the personalities of 11, instead of 100, individuals had been explored, but to abandon our comprehensive plan for studying the genesis of ideologies, and to limit our researches in this sphere of personality to one aspect of the problem—the operation of basic sentiments. Thus, the facts, theories, and reflections presented here are derived from observations of an extremely small sample of the population, though not extremely small for a comprehensive study of the mutual relations of sentiments and their place in the total structure of personality. Indeed, as far as we know, no complete study of the affective organization of a single individual is to be found in the whole literature of academic psychology, though many pages of theory have been written on the subject.

The examination of sentiments was but a part, say a fifth part, of the total study, but the facts that were turned up seemed sufficiently plentiful, interesting, and significant to warrant separate publication. Data pertaining to other areas of personality will be reported in later papers.

Sentiments for or against 80 or more objects or abstractions were examined,

each in respect to its intensity, its stability, its interrelations with other sentiments, and, when feasable, its chief determinants. But the bulk of the data to be reported here pertains to sentiments towards war, religion, own parents, and sex,[1] these four having been studied with more thoroughness than others. The subjects' reactions to political issues and other matters will be mentioned whenever these are pertinent to the topic under discussion.

Being mostly of the sort called clinical, our data lack the nice precision and apparent conclusiveness of results obtained by more formal methods, although in some other respects, in their exposition of subjective realities and of the relations of these realities to observable behavior, they seem to be closer to the facts of human personality than could have been arrays of figures turned out by the grand-scale use of standardized procedures. It seems to us, in any event, that our findings can serve as temporary fillers of the empty space pointed out by Newcomb and the Murphys when they said, "There are few investigations in which data concerning both attitudes and 'total personality' are to be found—except those, useless for our purposes, in which each has been inferred in circular fashion from the other." These words were taken as an encouraging "go-ahead," if not a challenge, from authorities in the field, despite their declaration that "American psychologists have not, until recently perhaps, been hospitable even to the more objective methods of 'total personality' study" (16).

The reader may have noticed that in the above quotation from Murphy, Newcomb, and Murphy "attitudes" was the word used, whereas we have been talking all along of "sentiments." Now, as far as their statement is concerned it is justified whichever term is used; but the discrepancy raises a question of usage. In simple lay language our clinical task was to discover "how certain men felt about certain things," about their own participation in the war (situations of a certain kind calling for activities of a certain kind), about religion (beliefs of a certain kind), about their parents (two concrete objects), and about sex (activities with objects of a certain kind). Judgments as to how they felt about these situations, activities, and objects were based on what they said they felt, on what they did when confronted by them, and on how they responded when faced by certain specially designed tasks and tests. Now, the consistent recurrence of the same feeling towards a certain entity is evidence of a more or less enduring disposition of personality, a disposition which has been termed an "attitude" by some and a "sentiment" by others. These are the only two terms for such a disposition that have wide currency today. Broadly speaking, they are more

[1]Most of the data on sentiments towards sex had to be omitted due to lack of space.

or less synonymous. To be sure, each has been defined in such a variety of ways that it is possible to find several definitions of attitude which are quite distinct from several definitions of sentiment, but still there are some definitions of attitude that are scarcely to be separated from some definitions of sentiment. One cannot be dogmatic on this point, since neither concept has been honored with an operational definition, but, anyhow, after a thorough examination of the literature, we concluded that we were free to use either term provided we listed the manifestations accepted as evidences of the entity referred to.

Our way was simply this: to define the hypothetical entity that the facts seemed to demand, and then to give this entity the name that applied best. Our reasons for choosing "sentiment" instead of "attitude" are given in the next chapter. Whoever objects to this choice can substitute "attitude" from one end of this monograph to the other without losing his bearings. In arriving at our definition of the construct, we were, of course, greatly assisted and influenced by the facts assembled and set forth by the British psychologists, Stout (23), Shand (21), McDougall (13), and Cattell (7), as well as by the more recent writings of G. W. Allport (2), Murphy, Murphy, and Newcomb (16), and others.

Hovering in the background of our minds was a half-formulated program for applying psychological methodology to the study of specified human values and so establishing pragmatic grounds for their tentative acceptance or rejection. There is nothing very unusual or revolutionary about this plan, though at first blush it may bear the look of heresy.

Since, by definition, the object of a positive sentiment is a *value* to the possessor of this sentiment, to investigate the one is to investigate the other. Thus ours has been a study of human values as much as it has been a study of sentiments. Now, in any adequate sample of the population, the strength of any given sentiment, or value, as manifested in feeling and behavior, will be found to vary from low to high, and these variations will make it possible for the psychologist to find answers to the question: In what significant respects do the subjects in whom this sentiment is high differ from those in whom this sentiment is low? or, What difference does it make whether the sentiment is high or low? Attending to all the forms in which the given sentiment manifests itself, the psychologist can also collect data bearing on these questions: How has this sentiment affected the happiness of these individuals? How has it affected their development? What abilities have been acquired as a result of it? How has it affected other sentiments? Finally, in making his thorough studies of the past histories of his subjects

the psychologist will disclose by clinical and statistical methods the forces, constitutional and environmental, which have contributed to the development of the given sentiment, and so will be in a position to answer the question: What factors have facilitated and encouraged and what factors have hindered the establishment of the sentiment?

Thus, without losing all the while his rôle as a scientist, the psychologist should eventually be able to provide foundations for a pragmatic system of values.

This conclusion seems to fly in the face of the axiom that science is not concerned with value. Science describes and explains events but it does not pass judgment on them. It says, "This is what happens; take it or leave it." Arguing from this creed, people have concluded that science can be of no service to man in his search for a satisfactory philosophy. As we see it, however, the exact opposite is true, at least so far as psychological science is concerned.

Since there is only one acceptable method of testing the value of anything and that is by experience, there will never be a sound basis for a philosophy of life until the experiences of a vast number of different types of men and women have been accurately reported, assembled, and formulated in general terms. As things stand now only those who can write well enough to have their works published are in a position to make their experiences available to others. Since writers are not a representative sample of the population, it is necessary that records of experiences be obtained from other classes of people; and for this who should be better qualified than psychologists? Furthermore, what most writers have to say about value is highly unreliable; their conclusions are a mixture largely of what they have been told, much of which is superstition, what they have imagined, and finally—the least part—what they have actually experienced, often inaccurately interpreted. A value must be measured, say, according to its proximal and distal effects upon the happiness and development of the individual and of others; and this is a measurement which the individual himself is very seldom fitted to make. The average person is scarcely more capable of interpreting and estimating his own experiences than he is capable of understanding and curing his own neurotic symptoms. This function falls within the province of psychology—and within the province of no other discipline. But this is not to say that psychologists are ready as yet to undertake such researches. The latter call for special techniques and therefore special training, if not an entirely new conception of the rôle of a psychologist.

In the present instance circumstances prohibited the carrying out of the

above outlined program beyond the first preliminary stages, but we have mentioned it here in the hope that others might be stimulated to undertake investigations along these lines.

What the reader will find in this monograph are: (*a*) the results of an effort to organize the field of sentiments a little more precisely than it is at present (Chapter 2); (*b*) an account of several new methods of revealing sentiments (Chapter 3); (*c*) clinical reports of the sentiments of 11 Harvard undergraduates in the winter of 1942; (*d*) certain tentative conclusions based on these clinical findings.

II. THEORY OF SENTIMENTS

A. Definitions of Sentiment and Cathexis

The concept of cathexis and the concept of sentiment are merely two different ways of describing the same phenomenon; the first points to the persisting power of the object to stimulate the subject, whereas the second points to the disposition of the subject to be stimulated by the object. Consequently, almost everything that is said about cathexis is equally applicable to sentiment, and *vice versa*. Cathexis is the more useful term when attention is to be focussed on the object and its attributes, the nature of its *appeal* or its *repellence*, especially when the object has *demand-value* or *aversion-value* for a great number of people. Sentiment is the more useful term when you are analyzing the character of a single individual or attempting to explain his unique susceptibilities in terms of past experience.

1. *Definition of Sentiment* (Snt)

A sentiment is a more or less enduring disposition (predilection or readiness) in a personality to respond with a positive or a negative affect to a specified entity.

2. *Direct Manifestations of Sentiment*

Affect[2] in the above definition refers to an hypothetical physical process (an excitation, say, in the region of the hypothalamus) which, when *positive*, manifests itself *subjectively* as a feeling of attraction or sympathy, of liking, desiring, valuing, enjoying, loving, admiring, favoring, or approving of, a given entity (in actuality or in the imagination); and when *negative* manifests itself *subjectively* as a feeling of aversion or antipathy, of disliking, not wanting, not valuing, not enjoying, hating, scorning, being disgusted, annoyed or bored by, dreading, or wishing to escape from, a given entity (in actuality or in the imagination).

The subject may be unconscious of the affect (he may not feel the feeling), but the latter is nonetheless apt to manifest itself *objectively* by minute reflexes or gross movements expressive of attraction or aversion, of liking or disliking, of sympathy or antipathy; or by autonomic reactions, evident to

[2]For "affect" the reader may substitute one of its synonyms, "feeling" or "affection" (in the narrow sense), provided he is willing to use the latter to refer to a physical excitation which may or *may not* be conscious to the subject. We prefer "affect" to "affection" because the latter has other common meanings (goodwill, malady), and to "feeling" because some readers become confused by the paradoxical notion of an unfelt feeling.

the eye or measurable by instruments; or by spontaneous verbal exclamations indicative of such feelings.

It should be clear that by this definition the concept of sentiment is related primarily to those psychological processes which have been subsumed traditionally under the heading of affection. A sentiment is a more or less stable connection between an entity and an affect (e.g., love or hate), the diagnosis of which is *always an inference* (affect being an intervening variable) based on *subjective criteria* (feelings and/or *objective criteria* (expressive speech and movements).

In searching for subjective evidence (evidence based on conscious feelings) the subject may be instructed to adopt any one of several introspective sets. Perhaps the simplest is the endopsychic process described by Bridgman (*The Nature of Physical Theory*, 1936) in illustrating what he meant by an operational definition.

> As a matter of self-analysis I am never sure of a meaning until I have analysed what I do, so that for me meaning is to be found in a recognition of the activities involved. These activities may be diffused and nebulous and on the purely emotional level, as when I recognize that what I mean when I say that I dislike something is that I confront myself with the thing in actuality or in imagination and observe whether the emotion that it arouses is one with which I associate the name "dislike". The emotion awakened which I call "dislike" permits of no further analysis from this point of view, but has to be accepted as an ultimate.

3. *Indirect Manifestations of Sentiment*

These are equally valid indicators, since affect, though separable in our thoughts, is in reality but one aspect, the "flavor," of an experience; an integral part of a total psychological event which usually includes both conative and intellective elements. In fact, so often and so characteristically is affect combined with drive that the two may usually be taken as a single unit, following the example of McDougall. A certain kind of affect, we know from experience, is very commonly associated, not so much with a particular set of instrumental movements, physical or verbal, as with a certain kind of trend (directional behavior impelled by the tension of a drive) which may be identified by the effects achieved, no matter how, or by the effects which the subject says he has in mind or appears to be striving for. Thus we have numerous behavioral manifestations of sentiment. Indeed the probability of gross error is not great if sentiment be defined operationally as a more or less enduring disposition to respond to a specified entity with a positive or a negative conative trend.

A *positive conative trend* is exhibited (*a*) by verbal or physical activity that brings the subject closer to the entity in order to enjoy it (adient vector), or (*b*) by verbal or physical activity at a distance that promotes the welfare of the entity. A *negative conative trend,* on the other hand, is exhibited (*a*) by activity that separates the subject from the entity (abient vector), or by activity that brings the subject closer to the entity in order to belittle, injure or eliminate it (contrient vector); or (*b*) by activity at a distance that is antagonistic to the welfare of the entity.

A *positive intellective trend* is exhibited by a thought process which associates or rationally integrates the given entity with entities that are appealing or respected; whereas a *negative intellective trend* is a thought process which associates or rationally integrates the given entity with entities that are repellent or condemnable. Such thought processes are manifested in word associations, in discussing, characterizing, or analyzing the entity, or in arguing for or against its significance or worth.

4. *Consistency of Reactions*

Such reactions, direct or indirect, must recur several times and to a notable degree before one is justified in speaking of a sentiment, since the latter is not a response as such, but an enduring predilection that accounts for the similarity or dynamic harmony of responses in relation to a specified entity. A sentiment, though manifested by an affect, is not itself an affect, since the latter is a process, an oftentimes fleeting process, whereas the former is a more or less stable structure, acquired through experience and training, by which affect is linked to a certain entity, as well as to its symbols. It is an enduring state of heightened susceptibility to a given object. Thus sentiment is an hypothetical construct, an explanatory fiction, to account for the persistence of certain affective regularities, subjective and/or objective.

5. *Focus of a Sentiment*

The word "entity" in the brief definition given above is meant to cover everything that it is possible to like or dislike. Such an entity is usually called the "object" of a sentiment, but since "object" is more often and more usefully used in a narrower sense, we will propose the term *focus* as a synonym or alternative. The most common focus of a sentiment is a concrete individual object (thing or person) or a concrete group or organization, or a specified kind of individual or group; and it is mostly entities of this sort that we have had in mind in wording this account of the concept "sentiment." What we have written may not apply so aptly to other foci embraced

by the word "entity," for example, an irreal object (character in fiction or figure of fantasy); or a trait, attribute, or sensation; or a particular symbol, ideology, or theory; or a certain class of abstractions; or—and here the concept is stretched almost to the breaking point—a certain form of activity, for the self, or for others, to practise.

It has seemed advisable to us to extend the term "sentiment" to include the association of affect with a specified form or pattern of activity when the latter is enjoyed for its own sake. Thus a passion for swimming, for mountain-climbing, for sleeping, for the game of bridge, for solving cross-word puzzles, or for creative thought might properly be called a sentiment. Sentiments involving activities such as these are *tastes* according to McDougall's terminology; but we have decided not to follow his example here, because in countless cases activities and objects are so inseparably interlocked that it seems arbitrary and confusing to distinguish the subject's consistent delight in one by the word "taste" and his consistent delight in the other by the word "sentiment." One would have to speak of an individual's *taste* for sailing, but his *sentiment* for the sea and for his yawl; and of another's *taste* for reading and his *sentiment* for books. Judged from the point of view of English usage, McDougall's terminology seems more appropriate than ours; but for the sake of a consistent psychological theory the common meaning of the term "sentiment" can be extended, we hope, without hurting the sensibilities of anyone. Another reason for preferring "sentiment" to "taste" is that a man's response to another human object is largely determined by the degree to which he likes or dislikes the patterns of behavior habitually displayed by the other person. For example, he may hate to observe bullying, gambling, smoking, drunkenness, spitting on the floor, or speeding on the highway, and in consequence dislike individuals who indulge in these activities. Here the one word "sentiment" seems suitable: a sentiment against gambling, a sentiment against gamblers, and perhaps a sentiment against the gambler Mr. Z. If we can entertain sentiments towards activities as practised by others, why can we not entertain sentiments towards activities as practised by ourselves? If experience proves that this usage of the term is confusing, we shall abandon it and adopt another.

6. *Ad*

To indicate the connection between the affect and the object we recommend as a convenient linguistic device the expression "a sentiment *ad* X," *ad* meaning "directed towards," "focussed upon," "involving," either "for" or "against."

7. *Sign and Strength of a Sentiment*

Sentiments vary in respect to *sign* (plus or minus, positive or negative, pro or con) and *strength* (stability and intensity). The possibilities may be represented on a single scale running, say, from con five (—5) through zero (the point of indifference) to pro five (+5). Since a great many objects (perhaps most human objects) are ambivalent, that is, are liked at one time and disliked at another, or are liked for some traits and disliked for others, one often has to deal with a compound of two opposite affects, the strength of each of which must be estimated and separately recorded (*cf.* sentiment ad Mr. Lewis: con 2, pro 3). In representing the strength of a sentiment the fluctuations of which are limited either to the con or to the pro side of zero, a single figure, the average of the points (or the mid-point of the *range*) is accurate enough for most purposes.

Depending on its initial position, a *shift* of sentiment may be pro-upward, pro-downward, con-upward, con-downward, pro-con (meaning pro-downward and, crossing the zero point, con-upward), or con-pro (meaning con-downward and, crossing the zero point, pro-upward).

For the present we will do well to confine ourselves to the division of sentiments into positive and negative, leaving the common varieties of each to be described in a later section.

8. *Perceptive, Affective, and Intellective Integrations of a Sentiment*

The formation, growth, and persistence of a sentiment are dependent not only on the actual qualities of its focus, the harms or benefits incurred in dealing with it, but also on the endopsychic processes that transpire during the intervals between these actual experiences. Particularly important is the period that immediately succeeds a person's first encounter with an object. In some cases this stage deserves to be distinguished as the *incubation period* of a sentiment.

Even in the case of a sentiment that has resulted from a single encounter with an object, one does not find the image of the latter appearing as an isolated replica in the mind, first, because no object is encountered in *vacuo*, but always as an embedded part of a total situation, and, second, because the object as perceived is immediately assimilated to one or more preexisting integrates which affect its features and meaning in one way or another, and, finally, because the image will subsequently undergo all manner of trial-and-error reintegrations and reevaluations. The image of the entity will become integrated with images of entities that have similar physical features, with

images of entities that evoke similar affects, and with images of entities that belong to the same abstract category. You are introduced to a stranger and told he is a Hungarian violinist, a refugee; and instantly he is assimilated to the concept "refugee," the concept "Hungarian," the concept "musician," and perhaps tentatively, too, the concept "impoverished." The feeling that the person evokes then and later will usually be much affected by such associations.

Here we would like to highlight affective associations, because these, though fundamentally important, are often disregarded by psychologists. We have in mind associations that are governed by the nature of the reverberating affect evoked by the entity in question. (One can conceive of a feeling as a fluid in which images of a certain kind are soluble. When the mind is flooded with anxiety, images of danger, of injury, of disapproval, of punishment, of failure will go into solution. Images of a different kind will dissolve and run together in a feeling of love; still different will be those that dissolve in anger or in disgust, and so on.) In any event, the affective process will give rise to a loosely integrated matrix of similarly toned images and ideas. The contracting brow and harsh voice of an enraged man may get connected with an image of thunder and lightning, or the feel of the morning sun to a trace of the beneficent atmosphere created by a devoted parent. Contrariwise, some of the images arising in the stream of thought will evoke feelings that are somewhat different from, though mostly consonant with, the initial affect, the result of such permutations being a blend of feelings, or cluster of discrete feelings, combined at various points with the integrates to which the entity has been assimilated.

Such elementary operations of the mind are most strikingly exemplified in the conscious thinking of children and of poets, in the dreams of civilized adults, and in the hallucinations of the insane. The process, occurring unconsciously for the most part, is of fundamental significance, since it throws together things that have similar effects, and so builds basic personal knowledge of what is beneficial and what is hurtful. Herein lies the foundation of emotional logic, of psychosomatic wisdom, the supreme product of which is the perfect metaphor. As Aristotle has pointed out, a metaphor can be the most potent force on earth. The same may be said of myth.

It is emotional logic that will influence a patient to dream of his analyst in the guise of a priest, a judge, or the devil; and emotional logic that will lead an aviator to refer to his plane as "sweetheart." Read, for example, the following avowal of a strong pro sentiment reported in *Queens Die Proudly* (*Reader's Digest*, April, 1943).

> Only if I begin here, maybe nobody would understand what his plane and his crew mean to a pilot; that it's like his home and his family. The plane isn't something that belongs to the government. It's Old 99, the beautiful *new* Flying Fortress that belongs to all of you. It's more than your home—it's, well, a kind of sweetheart. All of you picked her up off the assembly line at the Boeing plant where she was born—a beautiful smooth, shining naked thing. Then all of you took her up over the clouds and wrapped that star-spangled gown of the skies around her, which is the way every Fortress ought to be dressed, because they're queens of the high skies.

This is an excellent illustration of *aggregation*, the clustering of affective images; of *focalization*, the concentration of interest and emotion upon one entity; and finally of *magnification*, the enhancement of the object's significance by associating it with already highly valued objects—home, family, beauty, sweetheart, a newborn child, the American flag, the sky, a queen.

Aggregation. This has already been sufficiently described. It refers merely to the assembling in the mind of many images with similar affective meaning.

Magnification. This is a special type of aggregation, one that greatly increases the positive or the negative value of a specified entity by assimilating it to a matrix of images which are already either highly appealing or highly repellent.

Focalization. This is a special type of magnification, and so of aggregation. It is a process by which a particular entity becomes the center of attention, interest, and passion, and thereby seems to gather up much of the affect previously associated with the other entities with which it is integrated. In magnification the entity is merely assimilated by a powerful integrate; in focalization the entity seems to have the force to attract around it other entities or to subordinate the entities in its sphere, as well as to bind some of the emotion previously attached to these other entities.

Focalization occurs whenever an object, by fully satisfying (or holding out a promise of satisfying) or by seriously hurting (or threatening to hurt) an individual, becomes a most highly desired or a most highly detested point of orientation for thought and action. It is best illustrated by people who, after a long period of emotional frustration, come upon an object that seems a fitting focus for all their pent-up thwarted passion, be it hate or sexual desire, as in scapegoating or love at first sight. Historically, the three mutually dependent processes—aggregation, magnification, and focalization—have been exhibited on the greatest scale and scope by individuals in their responses to images of God and to images of the Devil. As an

illustration of focalization and magnification through affective links—the governance of associations by emotion—nothing could be better than selected passages from the *Book of Psalms*, such as:

> The Lord is my rock, and my fortress, and my deliverer, my God, my strength, in whom I will trust. . . .
>
> The Lord is my shepherd; I shall not want.
>
> He maketh me to lie down in green pastures: he leadeth me beside the still waters. . . .
>
> Who shall ascend into the hill of the Lord? or who shall stand in his holy place? . . .
>
> The voice of the Lord breaketh the cedars; yea, the Lord breaketh the cedars of Lebanon. . . .
>
> The Lord sitteth upon the flood; yea, the Lord sitteth King for ever.

Just as the writer of these wondrous lines gathered up all the images of majesty and beneficence, and of them composed one supreme object of awesome reverence; so, contrariwise, did Captain Ahab of the *Pequod* lump together every imaginable experience or presentiment of evil and attribute the origination of it all to the White Whale, his bitterest enemy. The process of projection is beautifully described in the following passage from *Moby Dick*:

> The White Whale swam before him as the monomaniac incarnation of all those malicious agencies which some deep men feel eating in them, till they are left living on with half a heart and half a lung. That intangible malignity which has been from the beginning; to whose dominion even the modern Christians ascribe one-half of the worlds; which the ancient Ophites of the east reverenced in their statue devil;—Ahab did not fall down and worship like them; but deliriously tranferring its idea to the abhorred White Whale, he pitted himself, all mutilated, against it. All that most maddens and torments; all that stirs up the lees of things; all truth with malice in it; all that cracks the sinews and cakes the brain; all the subtle demonisms of life and thought; all evil, to crazy Ahab, were visibly personified, and made practically assailable in Moby Dick. He piled upon the Whale's white hump the sum of all the general rage and hate felt by the whole race from Adam down; and then, as if his chest had been a mortar, he burst his hot heart's shell upon it.

"Sentiment" was initially defined as a dynamic connection between a specified entity and an affect. Clearly this is an extreme abstraction, necessary perhaps as a starting point, but yet an oversimplification that requires detailed elaboration, such as we have attempted in this and in succeeding sections. Besides the vast complexity of integrations already mentioned, there is the fact that in most cases the focus of a sentiment is encountered over and over

again, and, consequently, one cannot speak, as we have been doing, of a single image as focus but rather of a multiplicity of images forming, say, a *composite image* capable of arousing affects over a certain range. Some of the images, or event-traces, forming the composite are derived from direct personal experience, whereas others constitute indirect knowledge (true or false) obtained from other sources, the subject's curiosity prompting him to pay close attention to everything that is said about the entity, and to ask questions or read in books about it. Such ideational acquisitions organized and reorganized by reflection and speculation constitute an intellective, or cognitive, integrate which represents the subject's idea of the object, this idea being more or less realistic, more or less conceptualized, and more or less provocative of emotion. The idea *is* the object as the subject sees it, a point which has been well expressed by Proust, in *Swann's Way*:

> Even the simple act which we describe as "seeing some one we know" is, to some extent, an intellectual process. We pack the physical outline of the creature we see with all the ideas we have already formed about him, and in the complete picture of him which we compose in our minds those ideas have certainly the principal place. In the end they come to fill out so completely the curve of his cheeks, to follow so exactly the line of his nose, they blend so harmoniously in the sound of his voice that these seem to be no more than a transparent envelope, so that each time we see the face or hear the voice it is our own ideas of him which we recognize and to which we listen.

Thus, instead of a simple connection between an image and an affect, we get an immense web of images and ideas connected with a *range of feelings*. The entire integrate is equivalent to the subject's emotional knowledge and appraisal of the object, the appraisal being very often rationally justified in his mind by a loose array of seemingly valid facts, assumptions, and arguments. The connections between the aggregate of images and the aggregate of feelings constitute a *compound sentiment*. Most sentiments that are worth mentioning are of this class.

9. *Conative Integrations of a Sentiment*

Since many common affects (*e.g.*, McDougall's primary emotions) are inseparably linked with the energy of one or another drive, a sentiment—something which disposes an individual to react affectively to a certain object—will necessarily dispose him to *behave* in a directed manner ad this object. On this ground a sentiment might be defined as *the differential readiness of a drive*[8] *to respond to a specified entity*.

[8]Since the objective criteria of need are the same as those of drive, the two terms

As outlined in the two previous sections, the part that sentiment plays in the dynamics of behavior is to maintain the connection between the object and the affect, to increase the power of the object for better or for worse during the incubation period, and to solidify its position in the affective organization of the personality by relating it to a whole aggregate of images and ideas. As a result of this last factor (aggregation) the subject will be more often reminded of the object, being led to it by many trains of thought, and in consequence the object will figure more prominently in his anticipation and in his plans. Thus his encounters with the object, if it has appeal, or his avoidances of it, if it has repellence, will be more frequent. Magnification and focalization will raise the relative status of the object, thus deciding, in the case of an already active drive, that *this* object, rather than all those other objects, will be selected as the goal of striving. In the case of a need that is latent or partially refractory, magnification may, by elevating the object above the threshold of stimulation, be the factor that determines the arousal of the drive; and, furthermore, will often serve to increase the strength of the action once the drive has been aroused. Finally, a sentiment, by maintaining the association of object and affect, is responsible for consistency of reaction, which is the basis of character, as well as the basis of all enduring worthwhile relationships between people.

According to this formulation sentiment is an important dynamic concept, explaining as it does in part the enduring specificity of drives (focal drives). It is *not the energy of the drive itself,* but it determines in many instances whether or not the drive will be aroused, and in relation to which object, and with what intensity.

By conceiving of sentiment in this way, always associating it with drive, and insisting on perceived behavior as proof of its presence, we obtain *the only adequate operational definition of a sentiment that can be applied to dumb creatures*—animals and very young children. It is also a necessary auxiliary definition when judging human beings capable of speech. Behavior is an excellent criterion of the real importance of a sentiment.

But overt action cannot be accepted as the sole index of a sentiment, since it is only too clear that not all affective dispositions give rise to observable

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are here considered to be synonymous and will be used interchangeably. They both refer to a hypothetical *state of tension in the organism* which is quieted as soon as the exciting situation is changed in a certain way. This concept of drive, which agrees with those of Tolman, Lewin and others, is different from that proposed by the Yale School. For the latter, "drive" points to the stimulus (stimulus-drive), the assumption being that there is a one to one correlation between the intensity of the stimulus and the strength of the directional tension in the brain which determines, in conjunction with other factors, the force of the behavior.

conduct. There are feelings about objects which lie outside the range of possible overt activity—remote places, historical characters, unattainable goals—feelings about objects that are available but with which the subject is not permitted to have dealings. Because of the prevalence of such foci, the associations of which with manifest behavior are non-existent, unknown, or problematical, we believe that it is necessary to recognize unobjectified as well as objectified sentiments. The fact that a sentiment is unobjectified, however, is no proof that it is not connected with a need (drive); it may be connected with an inhibited or latent need. Needs may be overt or covert.

It might be held that the notion of a focal need (17), or focal drive (a drive that is consistently directed toward a single object or a very few objects), is all that is required, the concept of sentiment being superfluous, since a list of all the overt and covert focal drives of an individual will necessarily include every important sentiment, each in its proper place. The variety of the sentiment (*e.g.,* sentiment of hate, disgust, affection, pity, *et cetera*), and so its sign (positive or negative) are given by naming the drive. Some focal needs, indeed, are conventionally designated by special names: phobias such as claustrophobia, for example, which is equivalent to a need for Harmavoidance ad closed spaces. There are also specific hates, such as a focal Aggression ad own father or ad male superiors; and specific affections and specific disgusts, as well as specific hungers, such as a focal hunger drive ad salt. (The latter would be called an appetite by most psychologists.) If the objects that have become the focus of several different needs are indicated, and the integrations among needs properly represented, what more can be added to the picture by introducing the concept of sentiment? Probably very little, if anything, can be added; but the concept of sentiment is nonetheless useful.

It is useful when one wants to abstract from the dynamic systems that constitute personality the entities towards which and away from which the subject is oriented. In cases in which a whole cluster of needs are directed towards a single powerful object, the designation of the sentiment and its intensity conveys the bulk of the required information. And then it is often profitable from a diagnostic standpoint, to do as we have done in dealing with each of our 11 subjects—to list all the principal sentiments, disregarding their behavioral concomitants, and then compare them, noting similarities, connections, and discords. Also, it is much easier to discover a person's major sentiments than it is to be certain of his determining needs; because he will speak freely of many of the former and, for a variety of reasons, his own estimates of the latter are apt to be less reliable. And then,

the need may often be inferred from the sentiment. If the subject, for instance, announces that he likes tomatoes we do not have to ask him whether he likes to eat them; nor, if he admits disliking thunderstorms do we usually bother to inquire whether he avoids them when possible. Finally, it is still questionable whether certain classes of sentiments are connected with needs at all, and until this point is cleared up there will always be some sentiments that must be treated as if they were more or less isolated dispositions.

10. *Dynamic Systems*

We conceive of personality as composed of numerous *dynamic systems*[4] each of which contains at least four different kinds of elements: (*a*) one or more sentiments, (*b*) one or more needs, (*c*) knowledge of the goals and the subgoals which lead to them, and (*d*) a host of actones, mechanisms, or abilities.

McDougall applied the term "sentiment" not only to the association of an entity with an affect (this he called a *mere sentiment*), but chiefly to the large compound of cathected entities, propensities, and mechanisms which we have termed a *dynamic system*. It is confusing, it seems to us, to call a large compound by the same name as one of its elements; particularly if a great number of these elements are present. In one of McDougall's sentiments there are many sentiments.

11. *Definition of Cathexis* (*C*)

Cathexis is the more or less enduring power of an entity to evoke relatively intense and frequent reactions, positive or negative, in a person.

A positive response is first of all a *positive affect* manifested *subjectively* as a feeling of attraction and of liking, and/or *objectively* as a gestural, verbal, or autonomic reaction expressive of attraction and of liking. Secondarily, a positive response is a *positive drive* manifested *subjectively* as a wish or intention to approach and enjoy the object or to promote its welfare, and/or *objectively* as an overt trend manifesting a drive of this sort.

A negative response is the reverse of this, first, a negative affect exhibited subjectively and/or objectively, and second, a negative drive manifested subjectively and/or objectively.

This is what we have been talking about all along, since cathexis, as thus defined, depends for its endurance upon the establishment of a sentiment. Here, however, the word "cathexis" directs one's attention to the object;

[4] In *Explorations in Personality* these were termed *need integrates* (pp. 109-112).

and with equal cogency one might claim that if it were not for the affective attributes of the object no sentiment would develop. But then, without doubt, one can go back a step further and say that, but for some elementary want or aversion in the subject, the object would acquire no cathexis, since all its power rests on its capacity, experienced or imagined, to satisfy wants, on the one hand, or to excite aversions, on the other.

The term cathexis can be properly applied to an activity, a function, an ability, a belief, an ideology, or any other focus of a sentiment. We can speak, for example, of the cathexis of socialism, of a high tariff policy, of discipline, of intuition, of sports, of the C.I.O., or of Marlene Dietrich, as rising or falling during 1940 among a certain class of people. Thus the concept of cathexis might be useful to sociologists who wish to represent the appeal or repellence of a specified object to the members of a society or special group, and the fluctuations of appeal or repellence that occur over a certain period of time.

Cathexis is also useful when one wishes to portray the subject as a social stimulus, as an evoker of feelings and drives in others. There are *varieties of cathexes,* just as there are varieties of sentiments. For example, one can speak of a subject's (or of an object's) "cathexis for deference," meaning his power to excite respect or admiration; or of a person's cathexis for sex (equivalent to "sex appeal"), or for affection, or for disgust, or for hate, and so forth.

It is often convenient to use the verb "cathect," to say that "the *S* cathects this *O*,"[6] or to speak of "the cathection of these objects by the *S*." For the most part, positively cathected (valued) objects are both satisfiers and benefits, and negatively cathected objects are dissatisfiers and harms.

If the power of an object to evoke emotion and action be measured continuously from day to day it will be found to vary, in many instances, due to changes in the object, in the subject, or in the total situation. The prevalence of such variations requires us to distinguish between (*a*) *momentary cathexis,* or *valence,* the power that is exerted by the object during the short period in question, and (*b*) *cathexis,* the more or less enduring power of the object to evoke responses at certain times under appropriate conditions. Valence, the term used by Lewin (11), Tolman (27) and other experimentalists, is estimated by observing the objects that are approached and avoided, and noting the speed, force, and persistence of the action, the endogenous sources of the drive being kept constant if possible.

[6]Henceforth *"S"* will mean the subject (the personality that is the center of concern), and *"O"* will mean any object in the subject's environment, or life space.

Cathexis, like a sentiment, can vary in respect to *sign* (positive or negative, plus or minus) and *magnitude* (say from 0 to 5 degrees). Thus the statements, "Artists, $C+3$," means that most artists appeal quite strongly to the subject for one reason or another.

12. *Operational Criteria for Distinguishing and Estimating the Strength of a Sentiment or of a Cathected Object*

Before listing operational criteria, several convenient, if not indispensable, terms must be defined—first, *frontal* and *non-frontal* behavior. By frontal behavior we shall mean the reactions of the subject when he is confronted by, or within clear sight and hearing of, the object. It is either a response to a stimulus emanating from the object or it instigates responses in the object, usually both. *Non-frontal* behavior refers to the activity of the subject *relative to the specified object* which occurs when the subject is separated from it, out of sight and hearing. The terms are useful in view of the frequent necessity of contrasting what a man feels, thinks, does, and says in a person's presence, and what he feels, thinks, does, and says about him at a distance. For example, is it a case of "out of sight, out of mind," or does the image of the object appear constantly in the subject's stream of consciousness? Or again, does the subject by any chance flatter the object to his face and belittle him behind his back? As noted above, one distinguishing fact about a sentiment is that it disposes the subject to dream and think about the object, to talk about it, and read about it, and perhaps to *do* something that is beneficial or antagonistic to its welfare when the object is absent. All this, which comes under the head of non-frontal behavior, is commonly neglected by the extreme positivists who limit their observations to situations in which subject and object are overtly interacting.

When the focus is an activity, such as swimming, public speaking, reading, frontal behavior refers to the subject's conduct when he is afforded an opportunity to engage in the activity; non-frontal behavior is what he feels, does, and says when there is no such opportunity. There is no frontal behavior when the focus is an idea or an abstraction, such as God or the Second Law of Thermodynamics. But in the case of a governmental form or ideology (Democracy, Communism) we think it would be proper to refer to the reactions of a person who was actually exposed to the conditions resulting from the acceptance of the specified policy or ideology as frontal behavior.

We are calling one important type of behavior *promotive*, and its opposite *contramotive*. The first describes actions (usually non-frontal) which further the welfare, happiness, acceptance, or reputation of the given entity,

such as doing an errand for someone, buying him a gift, praising him to others; or speaking publicly in favor of some measure, philosophy, or theory. Contramotive behavior is the opposite; it includes depreciating, slandering, opposing, or in any way frustrating the plans or ambitions of the entity.

Another distinction to be made is that between *public* and *private* behavior, either frontal or non-frontal. What a man does or says openly before the world, at formal gatherings, or in the company of total strangers; what he is willing to admit to all and make no secret of, opinions expressed and circulated widely—all this is classified as *public behavior*. *Private behavior*, on the other hand, refers to those activities which are manifested only when the subject is alone, or with one or two companions, or with a small congenial group of like-minded friends; what the subject will admit to only a few people, if at all. It is our practice, when expedient, to rate a sentiment on the variable *publicity* (0-3), indicating thereby the extent to which it is objectified or avowed before the world. This is important in many cases because of the striking contrast between the way the individual behaves under conditions of publicity and the way he behaves under conditions of privacy.

Behavior and avowals that occur under conditions of relative privacy are generally considered to be better indicators of sentiments than behavior and avowals that occur when the individual is within sight and hearing of a large audience, especially if the audience includes critical, straight-laced superiors who are in a position to advance or oppose his endeavors. Also, we are apt to give more weight to consistently displayed behavior than to repeated avowals of feeling, although we entirely agree that "actions are frequently designed to distort or conceal 'true' attitude quite as fully as verbal behavior. . . . *All* behavior is subject to modification in the process of execution from considerations of courtesy, expediency, or other social pressures" (16, p. 912).

Before going on, let us clear up one more point, the nature of self-expositive behavior. The basic theme of a diagnostic interview situation is that of an examiner representing the press (17, pp. 115-123) of dominance, or persuasion subsidiary to the press of cognizance, or curiosity, and a subject who commonly responds with the need for exposition (information-giving) subsidiary to the need for compliance (coöperating), the second of which, in turn, is usually subsidiary to some other need, such as the need to get cured of a neurotic symptom, to get paid for serving as an experimental subject, or what not. There is first of all the interpersonal behavior of the subject *vis-a-vis* the observer. To what extent, say, does he resist the investi-

gative drive of the examiner? And then, within this dynamic framework, there is the subject's endopsychic self-exploratory drive imposed by the examiner, the findings of which will be given to the latter, provided there is no interpersonal resistance on the part of the subject. Thus we are dealing with behavior on two levels: behavior, in the usual sense, which consists of the subject's reactions to the examiner as a person, and *self-expositive* behavior, the activity of introspecting and then reporting the results, both phases of the latter being influenced by reactions on the first level, the subject's attitude toward the examiner.

It is important to distinguish between sentiments (veritable sentiments) and *assertions of sentiment*. The latter, we grant, may very often, perhaps generally, be taken as sufficient evidence of the former; but the two are not one and the same thing, and to assume they are, as so many testers do, is to distort or disguise the affective life of numberless individuals in a way that prohibits understanding. Formal and reactive assertions of sentiment, such as are given in response to statements on questionnaires, or to questions in a formal interview, are always open to suspicion, particularly when the examination touches on sentiments, the honest confession of which might endanger the subject's reputation. In contrast to such responses are the *informal* and *spontaneous* assertions of sentiment made during a private conversation by an obviously honest individual to a respected examiner with whom he has established an enjoyable and confidential relationship. A sentiment (veritable sentiment) is a hypothetical construct pointing to an endopsychic structure, the nature and potential strength of which can be inferred reliably only by taking several criteria into account.

Operational Criteria

1. *Frontal Behavior*

a. Emotional reaction: expressive signs of liking or disliking, approving or disapproving, wanting to participate or not wanting to participate, enjoying or not enjoying.

The *S* is aware of an affect and acknowledges it, as such, to someone.

b. Directional behavior (physical or verbal): an adient trend in order to meet, accompany, enjoy, praise, or oblige the object; or a contrient trend in order to attack, condemn, or oppose the object; or an abient trend in order to reject or escape from the object; or, if the focus is an activity, to engage or not engage in it.

Clinical methods. The list of objects that can be realistically presented to a subject in a clinic or laboratory is not a long one. In our study the subjects' attitudes to the women examiners were compared to their attitudes to the men; also their reactions to electric shocks, to the various

tasks and to the abilities tested, also to cartoons and to pictures of aesthetic value.

2. *Nonfrontal behavior*

a. Directional behavior: evidences of a desire to be near the object or to engage in the specified activity, such as the subject's making plans to meet the object, or the reverse: the *S* shows that he wants to avoid the object or avoid taking part in the activity.

b. Emotional reaction: signs of interest or emotional excitement when the focus is mentioned or a picture of it is seen. The *S* is aware of an affect when he contemplates the focus and acknowledges it.

Clinical methods. An apparatus that measures minute tremors or autonomic excitement (*e.g.*, psychogalvanometer) is useful.

c. Mental preoccupation: the *S* dwells on the focus in thought and speech; has reveries and dreams about it, introduces it as topic of conversation, engaging in absorbed and prolonged talk; reflects upon it, developing arguments pro or con; builds a network of rationalizations.

Clinical methods. A variety of methods are available for exposing mental preoccupations that are conscious as well as those that are unconscious: such as word associations, free associations, analysis of fantasies and dreams, projective techniques. The Argument Completion Test proved particularly effective in exposing the intellective integrations of a sentiment.

d. Promotive or contrapromotive behavior: the *S* works for or against the interests of the focus, object or ideology; attempts, perhaps heatedly, to persuade others of its worth or worthlessness. He preaches or writes books about it, seeking the best arguments and the best phrases to represent its virtues or vices.

e. Self-expositive behavior; (i) Reminiscences: the *S* tells or writes of his past reactions to the specified entity, describing affects, segments of directional behavior, mental preoccupations, *et cetera.*

(*ii*) *Spontaneous or confidential assertions:* in this class belong those confessions which are made under the best conditions of rapport, to a trusted friend, a physician, or a priest, in secret, or under the inhibition-dissolving influence of alcohol; also obviously sincere, spontaneous expressions of opinion unprompted by questions. There are inseparable gradations between this and the next category.

Clinical methods. Reminiscences constitute the bulk of an autobiography; they occur naturally in the course of free associations; and they may be obtained by asking for them in an interview. In our study the examiners became intimately acquainted with the subjects during the two-months' period of testing, and we believe that a general atmosphere of mutual goodwill and trust was created which, in most cases, was conducive to the best rapport. Consequently, it was our impression that we observed a great many spontaneous avowals.

(*iii*) *Requested formal assertions:* behavior of this sort has usually constituted the sole basis for the judgments which psychologists have

made about the sentiments or attitudes of their subjects. Self-expositions obtained from questionnaires and the like are never spontaneous, informal, and private, but always reactive to standard stimuli, fairly formal, and somewhat public (except when measures are taken to conceal the names of the respondents).

Clinical methods. A host of standardized techniques are available: attitude scales, questionnaires, polling procedures, formal interviews, and so forth.

These criteria taken together constitute a crude operational definition of sentiment.

As we conceive it, then, sentiment is an *acquired psychophysical disposition to respond affectively to a certain entity or to entities of a certain class.* Since affect almost invariably leads to trends of thought and action, the latter are acceptable indirect indicators of sentiment.

A sentiment may be *conscious* or *unconscious.* The subject is not only unaware of the origin of an unconscious sentiment (most of us are unaware of the origin of the majority of our conscious sentiments), but, as Cattell (7) has pointed out, he is unaware of its existence; he is unconscious of his true feelings towards the object. He may deny that he feels what much evidence goes to prove that he does feel. Morbid, symptom-producing unconscious sentiments are called *complexes.* But most unconscious sentiments are not morbid and these had better not be called complexes. Psychologists have not adopted the policy of inventing a different term for an unconscious drive or an unconscious affect, and there is no good reason for doing it here. The practice is confusing because a sentiment may be unconscious one day and conscious the next, or the subject may be vaguely, but not clearly, aware of it. In the latter case we would have to say that we were dealing with half a complex and half a sentiment, which would amount to a compound of foolishness.

B. Sentiment and Attitude

Authoritative sources support the opinion that the construct defined in the last section would be called a "sentiment" by some psychologists and an "attitude" by others. Why have we chosen "sentiment"? "Attitude" has shown considerable upward mobility in recent years; it is one of the most widely advertised terms on the market. And yet we have decided, with some reluctance to be sure, in favor of "sentiment," first, because it is a better word to denote the fundamental construct that is required by the facts (and tradition does not oppose the choice); and second, because many of the advocates of "attitude" have been claiming that the entity they refer to by this

term has all the attributes of a drive, and this notion, as we see it, is a trap which must at all costs be avoided.

Our first point comes down to a matter of taste found in common usage: the connotations of "sentiment" are more to the point than the connotations of "attitude," the point being that we are dealing, or should be dealing, with a basic factor which lies at "the very heart" of personality, determining, as it does by definition, every persisting regularity of feeling and emotion in connection with any object. Now "sentiment," we submit, is better than "attitude" to denote this basic disposition because the former is more suggestive of a "deep" structure which may last a life-time, influencing unconsciously all manner of inclinations, preferences, choices, tastes. Hearing the word "attitude," a great many people will think of something that appears on the surface: a posture, a gesture, a facial expression, a form of greeting, an expression of opinion, a *bearing* of the body or of the mind which might change at any moment. Such things are not thought of when the word "sentiment" is mentioned. An attitude can be adopted or assumed at will; one can "strike an attitude," "copy the mien and attitudes of Truth." Webster says that "attitude is a position assumed to serve a purpose." To "attitudinize" is to practise theatrical and self-conscious poses in order to produce an effect upon spectators, this being the very opposite of unstudied expressions of feeling and emotion. Sentiment, on the other hand, seems to refer to something that is firmly rooted or imbedded in a person's nature, something he cannot manipulate as circumstances dictate. For example, in describing an individual who puts on a show of friendliness and courtesy when addressing an acquaintance, though inwardly consumed with hate, one of those "which speak peace to their neighbours, but mischief is in their hearts," the statement, "X's attitude is friendly, but his sentiment is one of hate" seems much more fitting than the statement, "X's sentiment is friendly, but his attitude is one of hate." Thus, when the two terms are compared in a critical case, "sentiment" will be unanimously chosen to indicate the underlying, and "attitude" to indicate the overlying, structure. Thus, even when "attitude" is defined as an enduring psychophysical structure organized through experience, people persist, and one can hardly blame them, in thinking of it as a *set* which can be adopted or abandoned at will. Indeed, there is no word that more faithfully describes such a set, a man's bearing as it appears on the surface; and we should propose that the term be limited to this designation, with no necessary implications as to how truly it reflects basic sentiments or drives.

Furthermore, "sentiment" suggests feeling, whereas "attitude" has more

of the flavor of opinion and thought; and, although thought has the power to influence feeling, it is feeling that ultimately decides pro or con; feeling is more basic. Indeed introspection teaches us that even the scientist's conviction of truth is, in the last analysis, founded on feeling, the "sentiment of rationality" as William James called it.

Our second reason is that the word "sentiment" will lead psychologists to investigate matters that are more important to the development of their science than will the word "attitude." Despite the commandment, "Never quarrel about words," any realist must acknowledge that, willynilly, scientists being human, the word that is selected will make a difference, regardless of how rigidly it is defined. In the present case, it seems clear that the word "attitude" has prompted psychologists to construct opinion scales of one sort or another *ad infinitum*. These have proved their usefulness in many ways, in revealing trends of judgment in the country at large and in different groups, in discovering some of the public facts determining these trends, in predicting the outcome of political elections; but the results obtained, though of considerable interest to sociologists, not to speak of historians, politicians, and the literate public generally, have not contributed appreciably to our understanding of the psychology of individuals. Here it would seem that unfruitfulness has been due largely to the dearth of investigations in which standard techniques have been combined with thorough explorations of the personalities of the respondents. The word "attitude" does not seem to demand such explorations; the word "sentiment" does—at least as we hear it.

Perhaps the greatest defect of American psychology today is superficiality, and the widespread use of the word "attitude" to signify a basic element of personality can only serve to encourage the trend.

Not all psychologists, however, hear words with the same ears. "Sentiment" is no doubt anathema to some, because, as Murphy (16) says, it "has unfortunately been used generally in literature to describe a tendency to linger over the subtle or plaintive aspects of one's past." This is what a season of reading in romantic literature might do to anyone, but then as a corrective there is always Pareto, the anti-romantic, who speaks constantly of sentiments. Or one might turn to Peirce, the father of pragmatism, who wrote: "But what after all is sentimentalism? It is an *ism*, a doctrine, namely, the doctrine that great respect should be paid to the natural judgments of the sensible heart. This is what sentimentalism precisely is; and I entreat the reader to consider whether to contemn it is not of all blasphemies the most degrading" (*Chance, Love, and Logic*, 1923).

Our other reasons for preferring "sentiment" are based, not on linguistic considerations, but on differences of definition as exemplified by the fact that the number of authors who attributed motivating power to attitude was sufficient, in 1935, to justify Allport's (2, p. 817) reference to "the tendency in contemporary social psychology for the concept of attitude to displace the concepts of need, instinct, and drive." Then and since, Allport himself has been among the most persuasive advocates of this displacement, maintaining that attitude is *the* dynamic factor in developed personalities. Thus attitude, as some conceive of it, is designed to supercede not only sentiment but drive, and therefore is not fitted to stand for an entity which must, we are convinced, be kept distinct from drive. Attitude, as now used, blurs all the edges of discrimination.

By defining attitude as a neuropsychical readiness to respond to objects of a certain class, the impression is conveyed that it is a motivating entity that stands on its own feet. But every entity with which the psychologist has to deal is a neuropsychical readiness to respond and unless the nature of the response is defined the concept is not useful to us. But no champion of attitude has ever defined the veritable actions which this entity gives rise to, and so we are left hanging with the abstract and amorphous idea that behavior of some sort is likely to occur, but what it will be, it is impossible to say. Consequently, in its present state, the concept of attitude cannot displace the concept of need, since the latter *does* define, at least in a general way, the kind of effects, or goals, toward which the behavior will be directed. Thus our third reason for rejecting the concept of attitude is that its acceptance might lead to the confusion of two interlocking but distinct concepts, sentiment and drive.

As we have defined sentiment, the response to the specified object is an affective one—a feeling of liking or of disliking, of approval or of disapproval. Knowing the sentiment—that *X*, say, is favorably disposed toward *Y*—one can predict that *X*'s behavior will generally lead to his enjoyment of Y's company, will generally be favorable to the welfare of Y, *et cetera;* but beyond this one cannot go, and even going so far is problematical, since *X*'s sentiment may be entirely unobjectified.

If, however, we know the need (or needs) with which the sentiment is integrated, and this need is not repressed, we can predict the kind of tension that will occur and the kind of effect that will quiet this tension, and, therefore, the general direction of the behavior. This, though still abstract, takes us one step further towards concreteness. For example, if we are told that *X*'s sentiment for *Y* is integrated with the need for Nurturance (the goal

of which is the relief of another object's distress) we will be able to predict that X will go out of his way to help Y, express sympathy, give money, defend, encourage, or console; but we will not be able to say which of these various forms X's behavior will take. To predict this, one must know the situation confronting X and know the need-forms that have characterized his behavior in the past. If Y is a rich friend and the situation is that of his having a severe headache, one would not predict that X would give him money, but if one knew that "doing errands" was the commonest channel of expression of X's need for Nurturance then we might guess that X would go out and buy Y some headache powders, or something of the sort. But even this does not give us a picture of X's actual concrete behavior. To predict this we must know the structure of the situation in great detail, what knowledge X possesses of this structure, what subneeds and actones (habits) he has exhibited very commonly in the past, and what agency objects he usually employs. With this information at hand we should be able to guess whether or not X will ask someone the way to the nearest drug store, whether he will walk there or go on his bicycle, whether he will pay for the drug or have it charged, *et cetera*.

As now defined, attitude would inform us that X has a disposition to act positively toward Y, but it would not give us ground for predicting any of the behavior described, since X's sentiment might not be integrated with the need for Nurturance; he might, for instance, admire Y immensely and might emulate his mode of life, and yet not feel prompted to go out of his way to help him.

If, however, attitudes were defined so as to describe the direction of the evoked behavior, then they would be synonymous with drives; and the question of terminology would rear its head again: is "attitude" a better word than "drive" to denote the tension that gives rise to trends of action? Here the answer is a clear "no," first, because "drive," or some synonym, such as need, propensity, wish, will, is quite generally accepted, and second, because "attitude" does not in any way suggest the hypothetical entity that has been termed "drive" or "need." We require a term that points to a tension (disequilibrium, dissatisfaction) which will not let the organism rest until it has attained a goal which reduces the tension, thus describing or accounting for the original inner excitement, the completed act, and the satisfaction attending the completion. Both "need" and "drive" suggest this, but "attitude" does not. "Attitude is seldom used to point either to an excitable underlying tension or to the immediate cause of a completed act, but rather to something that occurs between the two—a tentative act-in-

the-making, a fragment of incipient behavior, an "as if" action, perhaps a feint, a little shadow boxing. Who says of a dog devouring his dinner, "he has a hungry attitude"? or of a German aviator dropping bombs on London, "he has an aggressive attitude"? or of a man rescuing a child from drowning, "he has a tender attitude"? These are *actions*, resultants of strong drives, not attitudes. The realities of societal life are concrete acts, not mere opinions, or sets, or preparations for action.

It seems proper to speak of a hungry or of an aggressive attitude in connection with the first tentative or preliminary manifestations of a drive, but not in connection with the completed performance. In our opinion, an attitude, a behavioral trend, and the attainment of a goal are three distinguishable manifestations of one tendency, commonly called drive. An attitude is a drive that barely shows itself, a drive that is undecided, partially restrained or just getting under way. As soon as there is real action you cease speaking of an attitude. Drive is the more basic tendency, a tendency which may manifest itself in dreams or in fantasies, in secret unobjectified desires, in hesitant and furtive glances, in well-governed speech, or in violent physical action carried to its completion. Psychology requires, we should say, a concept that will take care of this entire range of phenomena, differences in degree of objectification being attributable to the operation of other forces.

All this notwithstanding, "attitude" is undoubtedly a very useful word, probably an indispensable word. It meets the pragmatic test: people find themselves using it all the time. Is there, in fact, a better term to describe what is observable when several people meet together and converse, to describe the social situations with which psychologists themselves are most familiar? Here the word "drive" seems less appropriate. The participants, especially if they are intellectuals, seldom complete a single action. They exchange a little information, tell stories, feel out each other's opinions, avow a few tepid sentiments, cautiously set forth suspended judgments on certain issues, and in their facial expression, tones of voice, and words spoken, display approval, friendliness, animosity, mirth, scorn or boredom. To represent the interpersonal relations between members of the group the word attitude seems most descriptive, since, as a rule, the drives aroused are fleeting and tentative, restrained by the need to conform to the rules governing such meetings. The attitudes are discernible; the drives may only be inferred as potentialities that might perhaps manifest themselves in full force on other occasions. And then to represent the discussion that takes place, the expression of opinions, the arguments pro and con, the word attitude

again seems most descriptive, particularly for polite conversations in which no one comes "full out" for an object or an idea, the participants merely giving voice to slight preferences and aversions.

But the "need" concept is also very useful in depicting and interpreting serious discussions, provided that one recognizes the intellective (ideational or cognitive) forms of needs. Since no attention at all has been given to this class of directional operations, something may be gained by briefly reviewing the scheme set forth in *Explorations in Personality*. It grew out of the simple observation that purely intellectual processes may be readily classified in the same fashion as overt trends of behavior are classified, but in place of the object in the external world we have the idea—an image of the object, a concept, a definition of the situation, a program of action, a policy, a moral code, an ideology, a religion. Toward this idea the subject may act intellectually along the same lines as he acts physically toward an environmental object. The ideational (cognitive, intellective) drives are assigned the same names as the behavioral drives, but the prefix *ideo-* is added to distinguish them. Thus we have:

> *Ideo-cognizance:* intellectual curiosity; the desire to understand the ideas of others, to know what they think about this or that, and why; to ask questions. Goal: to arrive at a full understanding of the theories and beliefs of others, to find answers to certain problems.
>
> *Ideo-acquisition:* a hunger for ideas; to acquire, remember and possess as many as possible, to read everything, to know everything. Goal: to possess a great fund of information, ideas of all sorts.
>
> *Ideo-affiliation:* an hospitable attitude towards the ideas of others; the desire to include them, if possible, in one's system of thought; to discern resemblances and resolve differences. Goal: to incorporate harmoniously as many ideas as possible in one's philosophy or theoretical system: eclecticism.
>
> *Ideo-deference:* a reverential attitude towards an ideology or creed; deference to the best ideas of others; admiration of certain great conceptions. Goal: to appreciate, honor, properly represent and exemplify in thought and deed great truths.
>
> *Ideo-nurturance:* to invite and encourage young ideas in others; to nourish speculation, giving freely of one's own ideas: to discern the potential value of half-formed thoughts, to add supporting evidence, to defend them. Goal: to further the growth and development of conceptions which may some day prove valuable, to defend them when they are attacked.
>
> *Ideo-succorance:* to turn to the written or spoken words of great men for sustenance and inspiration; to seek helpful ideas from others in attempting to solve one's intellectual problems; to rely on the knowledge and wisdom of an older men. Goal: to gain a secure philosophy

of life, a faith that will not fail, or an incontrovertible theory, by getting help and assurance from others.

Ideo-exposition: to explain an idea in detail, to give a complete account of a theory; to teach without seeking to persuade. Goal: to share one's knowledge with others, to satisfy the curiosity of others.

Ideo-dominance: to argue in favor of one's own convictions and beliefs, to prove that one's own theory is the best, to try to persuade others, tactfully or dogmatically. Goal: to have one's conceptions triumph, to have the right and true idea accepted by everyone.

Ideo-aggression: to attack the false ideas of others; to belittle, depreciate or prove the worthlessness or harmfulness of an idea. Goal: to destroy false doctrines, to eliminate error.

Ideo-rejection: to reject scornfully the conceptions of others; to secure one's mind against the intrusion of false, repellent, ignoble or irrelevant ideas; to maintain a high standard of excellence, refusing to entertain ill-considered notions. Goal: to rid one's mind of trash, to accept only the best or most congenial thoughts.

Ideo-autonomy: to react against the dogmatic imposition of a system of ideas, to break out of established patterns of thought, to think and express freely new, rebellious and perhaps irresponsible ideas. Goal: to attain liberty and self-sufficiency of thought.

Ideo-creation: to invent new concepts, to conceive a theory, to build a system, to combine familiar elements into a new philosophy.

Sentiments ad governmental forms, policies, theories, beliefs, and ideologies are the sentiments which focalize these ideational needs. Knowing the strongest pro and con sentiments and the most potent needs, one can predict fairly closely which ideas will be rejected or attacked and which will be honored, advertised, or promoted, and with what intensity.

C. Varieties of Sentiments

After determining the sign and intensity of a sentiment, one can take a step towards greater concreteness and realism by discriminating the kind of affect or feeling that is involved. This is tantamount to identifying the drive with which the sentiment is most commonly associated. On the *positive* side we would list:

I. *Positive Somatic Sentiment* (objects of positive viscerogenic needs, excepting sex): ad foods (hunger), drinks (thirst), warming objects, cooling objects, shelters, comfortable supports.

II. *Sentiment of Sentience* (aesthetic pleasure): ad tastes, odors, sights and sounds, an artistic composition, scenery.

III. *Sentiment of Sex* (lust): ad an object with sexual appeal.

IV. *Sentiment of Affiliation* (friendship and love): ad congenial persons or groups with whom the *S* likes to work or play; cherished friends,

a clique, club, team, or regiment to which the *S* belongs; also ad congenial activities, traits, and functions.

V. *Sentiment of Deference* (admiration): ad a person of character, ability, or courage, or persons of high status, or persons performing important roles (superiors, authorities, officers); ad God; also ad worthy or successful groups, institutions, nations; also ad certain sensory patterns (art), functions, abilities, attainments, governmental forms, conceptions, beliefs or ideologies.

(N.B. Sentiments of sentience and deference are frequently evoked to an extreme degree by a work of art.)

VI. *Sentiment of Succorance* (dependence): ad a person who aids the subject when he is in distress, who does favors for, advises, instructs, defends, protects, feeds, heals, encourages or consoles the *S*; those to whom the *S* feels grateful; reliable and indispensable persons or groups or animals or even physical objects such as a drug, a gun, an airplane. God is the best example of a focus of succorant sentiment.

(N.B. Sentiments of succorance and deference are often combined in a child's affection for his parents.)

VII. *Sentiment of Nurturance* (tenderness): ad a person or animal who excites sympathy or compassion, a person in distress who suffers and is benefitted by the subject's aid and gratefully depends on him; weak or helpless people who need the *S*. This may apply even to groups, institutions, ideologies, lost causes.

VIII. *Sentiment of Recognition:* ad a person who respects and admires the *S*, who pays attention to what he says and recognizes his abilities and accomplishments.

IX. *Sentiment of Dominance:* ad persons who comply or agree with the *S*, who follow, obey or co-operate with him, or trustfully take his advice—children, pupils, employees, privates in the army, also domestic animals.

X. *Sentiment of Creation:* ad an object which the *S* has built or composed with his hands or his brain: a house, a boat, a machine, a book, a painting, a quartet; also ad a group which the *S* has organized and developed according to some plan of his own; also ad persons whom the *S* has influenced, reared, taught, molded, converted. The archetypal example is the mother's sentiment toward the child she has produced.

(N.B. Sentiments of creation, dominance, and nurturance are often combined in a parent's affection for his child.)

XI. *Sentiment of Erotic Love.* This perhaps deserves a separate heading, because, although no new element is added, it is apt to be a combination of almost every sentiment, each to an extreme degree—always sex, sentience, affiliation, deference, nurturance and recognition, and very often succorance and dominance in varying proportions.

XII. *Sentiment of Cognizance* (curiosity): ad objects which excite the subject's enduring interest, objects of a certain kind to be explored, investigated, analyzed and finally understood. The physical scientist

is interested in substances, the naturalist in animals, but the majority are interested in the actions and works of people, if not in people themselves, in history, political events, literature.

XIII. *Sentiment of Achievement* (power): ad an activity or task which the subject performs extremely well or better than he does any other, something that gives him a sense of power, or which brings him praise and prestige; also ad situations which test the subject's skill, courage or endurance, situations of conflict and exertion.

XIV. *Sentiment of Advocacy:* ad an idea, policy, program, theory, moral imperative, ideology or system of values of which he approves highly.

On the *negative* side we would list:

I. *Negative Somatic Sentiment* (objects of negative viscerogenic needs): ad conditions of hardship and exposure, great cold, great heat, lack of sufficient food or water, or lack of opportunity to rest.

II. *Sentiment of Harmavoidance* (physical fear): ad an object that is physically hurtful or a situation that is dangerous; phobias of various sorts.

III. *Sentiment of Noxavoidance* (disgust): ad an object that irritates the senses; a nauseating odor or taste, ugly sights or sounds, physically repellent human beings.

IV. *Sentiment of Rejection* (contempt): ad a person who is socially, morally, or intellectually defective, people who are unattractive, boring, stupid, mean, false or cowardly; also ad vulgar habits and traits.

V. *Sentiment of Aggression* (hate): ad an object or group who arouses anger or resentment, people who annoy, humiliate, insult, oppose, or frustrate the *S*.

VI. *Sentiment of Opposition:* ad policies, programs, theories, values, moral imperatives, ideologies of which the subject disapproves.

D. Foci of Sentiments

It is proper to speak of the "object" of a sentiment, but since "object" is continually being used more narrowly to refer to a concrete thing or person, we have adopted the term *focus* as a substitute for "object" in the former sense. A focus may or may not be an object in the latter sense.

A classification of the different kinds of foci of sentiments is presented here with the intention of illustrating the wide scope of sentiment as we conceive it and of calling attention to certain problems. Under each heading are listed the foci of sentiments of this class which were measured by the battery of techniques employed in the present study.

Class I. A specific object or place, such as own self, own brother, own home, a particular place, a dog, a picture, a stamp collection.

Foci included in the present study: own father, own mother, own sister, own brother, as well as other concrete objects mentioned by the subject in his autobiography or in the course of interviews.

Class II. A specific group or institution, such as own family, a particular school, college, club, business organization, church congregation, or nation.

Foci included in the present study: own family, Harvard.

A large majority of the actual entities about which people feel strongly fall into one of these categories. From one or more of such specific foci the subject arrives by one generalizing step to foci of the third and the fourth categories.

Class III. Objects or places of a certain kind, such as meat, dogs, lilacs, automobiles, machinery; or a class such as people of a certain age, sex, social status, nationality, profession, creed.

Foci included in the present study:

Fathers, mothers.

Males: older, same age, younger; upper class, middle class, lower class; feminine, masculine; athletic, military, intellectual, artistic.

Females: women in general; older, same age, younger; upper class, middle class, lower class; masculine, athletic, artistic, professional.

Businessmen, politicians, scientists, artists, churchmen, philosophers, creators of values.

Negroes, Jews.

The masses (the great majority of the public).

Nature, animals, food, machinery, money, outdoors, solitude.

Class IV. Groups or institutions of a certain kind, such as college fraternities in general, social gatherings, universities, religious sects.

Foci included in the present study: marriages, families, college clubs, labor unions.

Here we are dealing largely with concepts, sometimes hardly more than labels, because no man can be acquainted with *all* children, *all* upper class people, *all* Russians or *all* religious groups, but such wholesale affective judgments, or prejudices, are nonetheless important since they predispose a person to look with favor or disfavor on each freshly encountered representative of the given class. A girl who has had an unfortunate experience with one young fellow becomes a man-hater. A woman whose Swedish cook stole money from her pocketbook swears she will never have another person of *that* nationality in her house—"Swedes can't be trusted." A student who was not elected to the fraternity he favored starts a movement to abolish all fraternities, and so forth.

To know merely the names of all the specific entities and of all the classes of entities that an individual cathects is of little scientific interest. What *is* of interest are the qualities of each object that are attractive or repellent. Noting these one can arrive at certain inferences about the personality of

the subject which will make it possible to predict how he will react to objects not yet encountered.

An object is a compound of attributes not all of which possess cathexis of the same sign and magnitude. Most human objects, in fact, are ambivalent, being liked for some traits and disliked for others. As a rule, there is a predominance of one or the other, of likeable or dislikeable qualities, and as a result the subject will experience a current of feeling in the presence of the object that is reliably positive or reliably negative, although he will continue to be susceptible to temporary affects of opposite sign, excited by something that the object does, annoying or pleasing as the case may be. If such discordant actions on the part of the object become frequent or extreme, the sign of the subject's prevailing current of feeling will change: a friend will become an enemy or an enemy a friend. Generally, however, the *S* merely says, "I like that guy very much but he certainly does get my goat at times," or "I hate Smith but I can't help admiring his courage." In instances of unequivocal unity of feeling the predominance in the object either of attractive or of repellent attributes is so great that contrary affects excited by subordinate features are obliterated or repressed. Here the repression is largely effected by the endopsychic need for Rejection, the function of which is to exclude conflicting ideas and feelings and thus to facilitate the establishment and maintenance of inner harmony and a unified outlook. The rejected side of the total affective reaction may appear in dreams. Sometimes it will incubate, increase in intensity, and come to the surface, now and again, in an emotional outburst, or, taking possession of the ego, it may even bring about a sudden dramatic conversion of sentiments—an atheist will become a Catholic, a Republican will turn Communist, and so forth.

Neither the establishment nor the endurance of a sentiment, nor the shift of a sentiment into its opposite can be understood without some knowledge of the positively and negatively cathected attributes of the object. Although this is not the place to discuss the genesis of sentiments, in listing the kinds of attributes that may become foci we shall inevitably include some of the determinants of sentiments. The kinds of attributes that are listed are commonly cathected not only when embodied in another human object but also when embodied by the self, although the sign of the cathexis may be positive in the one and negative in the other. For instance, the trait of self-assertion may be disliked in others and yet valued in oneself. The following classification of attributes amounts to an analysis of personality (the subject's or the object's) into elements of different kinds, each of

which may become the focus of a sentiment. The categories are not at all distinct; there are many overlappings.

Class V. Sensory quality or pattern, such as a taste, odor, shape, color, texture, sound, form of movements, and especially a pattern or arrangement of these qualities.

There are numberless sentiments having to do with the appearance of the human body and its apparel: attributes such as tallness, fatness, manner of doing the hair, baldness, texture of skin, body odor, bushiness of eyebrows, distance of eyes, shape of mouth, amount of lipstick, breadth of shoulders, odor of breath, size of genitals, as well as gracefulness of bodily movements, timbre of voice, color and cut of clothing, and a hundred other items, not to speak of the total sensory *ensemble.* Some people are visually attractive, others are not. A great many of these qualities are race-linked or culture-linked: a young woman who is considered fascinating in New York may be repellent in New Guinea. Tastes may also vary radically from class to class within a single culture, and, for the majority, from year to year: a Greta Garbo can change the fashion of an entire generation. But whatever the other determinants, the truth seems to be that a factor as slight as a sixteenth of an inch added to or subtracted from the end of a lady's nose can decide a sentiment that will change the course of history.

Attention to sensory patterns is the basis of aesthetic appreciation, whether it be the enjoyment of nature, delicious sauces, rare wines, painted landscapes, sonnets, or symphonies.

> *Foci included in the present study:* Each *S* was questioned as to his aesthetic appreciations, his tastes in literature, art and music. The degree to which aesthetic sensibility governed his choice of pictures in the Picture Selection Test was noted. But no subject was tested in respect to his responses to specific sensory patterns.

Class VI. Specific habit. Here we include a great variety of specific mannerisms, behavior patterns of short duration, stimulus-response units, such as clearing the throat, pursing the lips, spitting on the sidewalk, biting one's fingernails, chewing gum, going without a hat, wearing rubbers, dressing very neatly, flicking cigarette ashes on the floor, leaving one's desk untidy, hoarding trinkets, answering letters very promptly, adopting slouchy postures, playing practical jokes, and so forth.

In this category we also include the doing of certain things at certain times and certain places: drinking whiskey before breakfast, turning on the radio in the morning, putting one's feet on the table in someone else's office, carrying a cane to work, whistling when others are working, and so forth.

Most of these habits are culture-bound and status-bound. They are the

things which children are brought up to do or not to do, some being considered good manners, evidences of gentle breeding, others as bad manners indicative of a vulgar, coarse, or underprivileged family background. Probably because of their connection with class status these habits are the foci of strong sentiments. Many items that might be classified here belong to other categories as well. For instance, talking loudly through one's nose might be classed as a noxious sensory quality as well as a trait (*e.g.*, exhibitionistic self-assertion).

Foci included in the present study: none.

Class VII. Activity. Here we would list recreational and vocational choices, the kinds of things that people enjoy doing, such as sleeping, lying in the sun, swimming, riding, hunting, fishing, plowing, gardening, automobiling, dancing, drinking, attending parties, playing bridge, watching ballgames, going to the theatre, conversing, shopping, buying and selling bonds, public speaking, arguing a case in court, performing surgical operations, playing the piano, visiting art galleries, reading, composing sonnets, performing scientific experiments, working out mathematical problems.

To be included here as the focus of a sentiment is the attribute of frequency or intensity associated with one of these activities. For example, many men feel that a little poker playing is all right but too much of it is bad. Thus the Cathoilc Church named gluttony among the seven cardinal sins, not implying by this that eating and drinking moderately were evil.

Foci included in the present study: physical activity, athletics, mental activity, studying, hedonism (pursuit of bodily satisfactions), frequenting night clubs, drinking, sexual activity, interpersonal relations (friendships), fighting, warfare, traveling, repose.

Class VIII. Mental function. Here we would include all the distinguishable kinds of mental functioning, differently valued by different people, such as perception (the accurate observation and reporting of external events), intellection (conceptual thinking, understanding, explanation), feeling (in the special sense of sympathy, love, and the establishment of binding relationships), sensation (in the specific sense of aesthetic and dramatic appreciation and communication), and action (manipulation of the external world, physical, mechanical, social). One might add imagination, intuition, introspection, intellectual self-criticism, faith, will, and so forth. These are of interest in connection with age-old diversities of opinion as to the relative worth of different mental "faculties." Many philosophers, naturally, have glorified reason; some have spoken a good word for intuition; others have stressed aesthetic sensibility; love and loyalty have had their advocates, and some

philosophers have argued fervently for the supremacy of the will and practical action.

Foci included in the present study: fact (realism, empiricism, experience); fact (as opposed to theory); reason (intellect, theory, logic, thought); skepticism; self-discipline (planning, method, habit); action (as opposed to theory); will (voluntary control, conscious direction); spontaneity and impulsiveness; intuition; emotion and passion; fantasy and imagination; submission to the irrational; faith and beliefs; subjective values (as opposed to public achievements).

Class IX. Ability, Attainment. Foci of this class run parallel to the activities (VII) and mental functions (VIII) just reviewed, but here, instead of a person merely enjoying a certain kind of activity or sympathizing with others who enjoy it, he strongly cathects the skill involved and greatly admires those who exhibit it or who have achieved conspicuous success by using it. These abilities are so many forms of power, and power is always valued in oneself or in others. Contrariwise, *disabilities,* such as physical weakness, social ineptitude, and mental dullness often excite sentiments of contempt.

Foci included in the present study: physical ability, mechanical ability, leadership ability, social ability, economic ability, erotic ability, entertaining ability, observational ability, memory ability, mental efficiency, scientific ability, intuitive ability, artistic sensibility, artistic performing ability, self-directive ability.

Class X. Motive, purpose. Under this heading we would list all the proximal and distal purposes, specific and general, that are commonly pursued. Especially important are the interests that excite the needs for cognizance (curiosity) and understanding; the goals toward which the needs for achievement and recognition are directed; and the social causes or institutions which have excited the needs for deference and nurturance (the desire to support, defend, build, advance something). There are aims of medium generality such as the reform of party politics, the preservation of our national forests, the prevention of cruelty to animals, the spread of progressive education, the acceptance of the theory of relativity *et cetera;* and there are more general aims—the development of character, the discovery of truth, the creation of beauty—some of which, such as the desire for health, economic prosperity, friendship, fame, wisdom, are purely personal. Most of these pursuits involve activities, functions, and abilities belonging to classes VII, VIII, and IX, respectively.

Foci included in the present study: friendship, scholarship, idealism (distant purpose), singleness of aim.

Class XI. Trait. Since the word "trait" is almost as general and indefinite as the word "attribute" or "quality," and since there is a trait name for many of the foci (qualities, habits, activities, functions, abilities) listed under other headings, there will be a tendency to classify many entities here instead of where they more properly belong. This category is meant as a catch-all for human qualities which cannot be assigned elsewhere, although we have especially in mind such general traits of temperament and character as energy, zest, persistence, laziness, talkativeness, suspiciousness, trustfulness, cautiousness, and so forth.

Foci included in the present study: intensity (as opposed to moderation), optimism, competitiveness, cooperativeness, self-reliance, nonconformity, ideological exclusiveness (as opposed to tolerance). Also males—sad, gay, aggressive; and females—sweet and innocent, humanitarian, glamorous, lewd, mysterious, sad, gay, aggressive, rejective (aloof).

Class XII. Sentiment. Sentiments themselves can be the foci of sentiments. For example, a man can be disgusted with his own fear of snakes, or approve of and revel in his hatred of Fascism, or be in love with love. It is when such sentiments are embodied in other people, however, that their importance as determinants of attraction and repulsion is most striking.

Foci included in the present study: none.

Class XIII. Press. Up to this point we have been considering the principal attributes of human beings as these are manifested when the person is dealing with the world in general. Much more pertinent to our present purpose than any of these, however, are the forces, the motives and actions of the object, that are *directed specifically toward the subject.* What does the object do, or try to do, to the subject? How is the subject treated by the object? The question is answered by naming the drives, or attitudes, which the object commonly manifests when confronting the subject, taking some account of the object's ability to produce the desired effect, his success in benefitting or harming the subject. Such a trend emanating from the object and directed at the subject is called a press (17, pp. 115-123). Press is a very useful concept, describing as it does the psychological meaning of the stimulus to the subject as apperceived by impartial observers (alpha press) or as apperceived by the subject himself (beta press). The following are examples of press: companionship, guidance, assistance, instruction, interrogation, praise, respect, compliance, resistance, indifference, rejection, dominance, coercion, restraint, abuse, ridicule, belittlement, pity, appeal for help, fear, abasement. The affect that is aroused in the subject, and the sentiment

that is subsequently formed, will depend largely on which of these press is manifested by the object. If the subject is a target of positive press from a great many people he can be as discriminating as he likes in choosing his friends, can take into account other factors—sensory qualities, habits, activities, functions, motives, traits, sentiments. But if he experiences a positive press from one person only, his need for companionship may prompt him to accept the opportunity regardless of the object's other qualities.

The positive and negative foci of this class will define how a man most likes and most dislikes to be treated by the world at large. If greater concreteness and realism is desired one must discriminate further; discover what treatment the subject especially likes and especially dislikes from members of his family, from intimates and from strangers, from the opposite sex, from superordinates and from subordinates, and so forth. This information, if accurate, will go a long ways towards explaining the foci of Class I, the human beings to whom the *S* feels most attached.

Foci included in the present study: none.

Attributes for self, attributes for others. Class XIII (press) is restricted to human responses manifested by an object in dealing with the subject. Classes V to XII, on the other hand, are not so restricted. Each of these classes consists of attributes of a certain type which the subject may favor for himself or for others, or for both. He may, for example, highly cathect and cultivate for himself litheness of body (sensory quality), taking a walk before breakfast (specific habit), reading (activity), the exercise of reason (function), intellectual precision (ability), the discovery of philosophic truth (distal purpose), cautious understatement (trait), and his esteem of wisdom (sentiment); and yet he may be drawn toward a person possessing qualities of another sort entirely. He may be enormously impressed, say, by a public figure who is rather fat (sensory quality), takes a nap in the middle of the day (specific habit), eats and drinks excessively (activity), manifests extraordinary intuition in solving practical problems (function), displays unusual oratorical powers (ability) is dedicated to the preservation of the nation (distal purpose), is passionately expressive in his advocacy of certain policies (trait), and so forth. The cathection of attributes in others which are different from or opposite to those cathected for oneself is most strikingly illustrated in love relationships and to a less extent in friendships. Because of this, because some men respect attributes in others which they neither possess nor strive to acquire, it is necessary to distinguish between (*a*) foci (attributes) for the self and (*b*) foci for others. This means that each of

Classes V to XII, inclusive, must be divided into two subclasses: Class XI, for instance into Class XIa, Trait for self, and Class XIb, Trait for others.

In a very clever experiment Frenkel-Brunswik (8) has shown that people who behave in certain objectionable ways are likely to be the very ones to criticize others for manifesting these habits. By her subjects, presumably, the habits were negatively cathected for the self as well as for others, but lacking self-insight, each individual did not perceive that it was a part of himself rather than a part of others that deserved his condemnation. The sentiment when applied to the conduct of others would lead a subject deficient in self-insight to suppose that he was free of any such noxious trait, and when applied to himself it would be a powerful aid in overcoming the habit. By either technique the subject might rid his consciousness of the unacceptable tendency, delusionally by the first technique and actually by the second.

This is the end of our list of attributes relevant to human objects, most of which are applicable to animal objects as well (*e.g.*, sensory qualities, specific habits, activities, abilities, traits, sentiments, press). A few of these characteristics are shared by inanimate objects: sensory qualities, utility (instead of ability) and press (how they affect the subject's body, whether cooling, warming, hunger-satiating, thirst-quenching, *et cetera*).

Now it remains to list four other kinds of foci of sentiments; these are:

Class XIV. Governmental form, regulation, law, including here all the rules—conventional, moral or legal—that are designed to control the behavior of members of any group, such as a family, a school, a business organization, a nation. Among these, moral codes and political policies are apt to excite the most intense and widespread sentiments.

> *Foci included in the present study:* centralization of government, measures promoting economic equality, racial equality, classless society, compulsory military training.

Class XV. Intergroup policies. The previous category is limited to laws regulating activities within a specified group; here we would list programs that commit the group to certain lines of action toward one or more other groups. These may be matters of foreign policy which involve such questions as free trade, imperialism, the Monroe Doctrine, war, federation of nations, and so forth.

> *Foci included in the present study:* none.

Class XVI. Theory, belief, such as the theory of evolution, theory of relativity, economic determinism, belief in immortality.

Foci included in the present study: theory of free will (vs. determinism).

Class XVII. Ideology. An ideology may be defined as an explicit, more or less organized system of sentiments and assumptions such as Epicureanism, Christianity, Fascism, dialectic materialism.

Foci included in the present study: Americanism, Communism, Fascism, individualism (vs. totalitarianism).

The class to which a sentiment is assigned will depend somewhat on how the focus is conceived or represented in words. In testing a subject's sentiment ad science, for example, one might include foci of the following classes: *Class I, Specific object:* Newton, Lavoisier, Gibbs, Einstein; *Class II, Specific group:* American Association for the Advancement of Science; *Class III, Objects and places of a certain kind:* laboratories, apparatus, machinery, physicists, biologists; *Class IV, Groups of a certain kind:* scientific organizations; *Class VII, Activity:* field work, laboratory experimentation, reading, mathematical calculation; *Class VIII, Mental function:* perception of fact, conceptual thinking; *Class IX, Ability:* observational ability, conceptualizing ability, mathematical ability; *Class X, Motive:* intellectual curiosity, discovery of objective truth; *Class XI, Trait:* scrupulous accuracy, integrity, humility; *Class XVI, Theory:* theory of evolution, theory of relativity; *Class XVII,* Ideology: pragmatism, operationism, scientific humanism. In some instances it is apparent that by wording the focus in a slightly different way one can change the class to which it belongs.

E. Regions of Sentiments

There are several other ways of classifying sentiments, one being according to the region, or area of concern, to which the sentiment is pertinent. This takes account of divisions of interest determined by psychological as well as by sociological factors and can be recommended as an intelligible scheme for ordering the data in writing a case history.

(i) *Family region:* sentiments ad parents and siblings and ad principles governing kinship relations of all sorts.

(ii) *Region of sexual and marital relations:* sentiments ad sexual practices of all kinds, and ad principles governing interpersonal relationships of married and unmarried couples.

(iii) *Region of general human relations:* sentiments pertaining to friendship relations, and to the social interactions of men generally, defining morals and manners in connection with statuses and rôles.

(iv) *Vocational region:* sentiments ad this or that occupation, and ad

principles defining the proper conduct of members of a profession (businessmen, politicians, lawyers, doctors, *et cetera*).

(v) *Recreational region:* sentiments ad this or that way of spending one's leisure time, this or that interest, hobby or amusement, aesthetic and intellectual pleasures; as well as sentiments ad rules governing games and sports.

(vi) *Political region:* sentiments ad this or that political platform or party, this or that form of government, type of legislation, or international policy.

(vii) *Ideological region:* sentiments ad basic assumptions about man and his place in nature, religious beliefs, scientific theories, aesthetic standards, fundamental principles of conduct, abstractions of all kinds, slogans (*e.g.*, "war to end war"). This region necessarily overlaps and interpenetrates all other regions.

The case histories published in this monograph include data pertaining to four of these regions: family region (own parents); region of sexual and marital relations (sex); vocational region (own participation in the war); and ideological region (religion). In discussing the last two regions of sentiment most of the subjects' political sentiments were covered; but the region of general human relations and the recreational region have been disregarded.

F. Attributes of Sentiments

One's understanding of the affective organization of an individual will be facilitated by examining each of his more important sentiments in respect to the following attributes:

(i) *Intensity* (O-5). This is measured on the basis of the operational criteria given above: emotional reactions, directional behavior, promotive or contramotive activity, mental preoccupation, private and public avowals. The examiner must attend to the frequency and vigor of these expressions of sentiment.

Some correction should be made in the case of those subjects whose usual speech is characterized by marked understatements or overstatements, or those whose avowals are made at moments of emotional agitation.

It should be understood that the intensity of a sentiment corresponds to the potential energy of the affect involved. It is usually estimated by recalling numerous recent reactions to the specified object and making an over-all judgment. One has to deal here with a range of feelings within which the *S* varies, depending on his mood, the context of his thoughts, his current purpose, the conditions under which the object is encountered, and so forth. In rating intensity our practice is to set down one figure representative of the average of fluctuating likes or of fluctuating dislikes. In the case of antipolar sentiments (ambivalence) when the two extremes are separated by 4 points or more, we habitually

list both sentiments (one positive and one negative) and rate each separately.

(ii) *Endurance* (0-3), the length of time the sentiment has existed. The mark of 0 = less than four months; 1 = four months to one year; 2 = one to seven years; 3 = over seven years.

(iii) *Stability* (0-3), the resistance of the sentiment in the face of opposing pressure. As a rule, the mark of 3 should be given only when the sentiment's constancy has been tested by experience or experiment; but if a sentiment has endured for a long time with but few fluctuations, and is closely contingent upon other stable sentiments, when it seems to be established, rooted, imbedded in the personality, it may be given a 2 or even a 3.

(iv) *Concordance* (0-3), the number of important sentiments with which the sentiment is dynamically coherent or logically consistent. The mark of 0 on this variable signifies *no concordance*, i.e., isolation; it does not imply discordance (which is measured separately). The chief types of concordance are (1) determinance, (2) dependence, and (3) attachingness.

(iv)*a*. *Determinance* (0-3), degree of influence of the sentiment as measured by the number of the sentiments dependent on it.

(iv)*b*. *Dependence* (0-3), degree of dependency of the sentiment upon the stability of one or more determinant sentiments. The mark of 0 is assigned when the sentiment might stand alone, the entity being valued for its own sake, not as means to a distal end or as the mere part of a cathected whole. When two sentiments are mutually reinforcing and it is impossible to say which is the more stable, each may be judged to be partially determinant and partially dependent.

(iv)*bb*. *Attachingness* (0-3). This is a special form of dependence which is measured in terms of the extent to which a valued human relationship is sustained by the persistence of the sentiment. Many a friendship, and many an association, for example, is founded on mutuality of feeling ad a certain goal or policy; the sentiment determines the relationship. But it often happens that the latter becomes in time more highly valued than the former; and the order of determinance is reversed. Tho subject's original sentiment will now be resistant to opposing pressures because a shift would jeopardize the security of his attachment to the cathected friend or group.

(v) *Discordance* (0-3). This is measured in terms of the number and importance of the sentiments with which the given sentiment conflicts. If the sentiment is radically opposed to the accepted affective pattern of the personality, discordance is marked 3.

(v)*a*. *Antipolarity* (0-3), a special variety of discordance which occurs when a single entity is the focus of two sentiments: a *strong* positive sentiment and a *strong* negative sentiment; the object is ambivalent.

(v)*b*. *Disattachingness* (0-3). This is measured according to the extent to which a sentiment interferes with the establishment or maintenance of a secure relationship with a cathected person.

(vi) *Publicity* (0-3), the degree to which the sentiment is openly practised or avowed. The mark of 3 = acknowledged or practised before all; 2 = practised in secret; or practised or avowed before a few trusted acquaintances; or confessed to a doctor or to a priest; 0 = never, or very, very rarely practised or avowed.

(vii) *Consciousness* (0-3), the degree to which the *S* is aware of the existence of the sentiment and of its strength. A sentiment inferred by the examiner on sufficient grounds, of which the *S* is completely unaware, is marked 0.

(viii) *Unacceptability* (0-3), the degree to which the *S* dislikes the sentiment or disapproves of it. He may be fully aware of it as an element of his personality (Consciousness 3) and yet hate it, wishing that he felt differently. Unacceptability is usually a sign of the sentiment's discordance with the *S*'s accepted pattern of sentiments, of the presence of an antipolar sentiment on a higher level of integration. As a rule, an unacceptable sentiment is low in Consciousness and Publicity.

(ix) *Objectification* (0-3), the degree to which the sentiment is manifested in behavior, regardless of whether the behavior is public or private. Measurement is in terms of the frequency and intensity of directional behavior, the extent to which conduct conforms to feeling. The term "behavioral pattern" (of sentiments) is used to describe a cluster of sentiments commonly objectified in conduct.

Since objectification = objectification in the present (within recent months), it may be important in some cases, where the sentiment was once but is no longer expressed in action, to speak specifically of objectification in the past.

(x) *Imperativeness* (0-3), the degree to which the sentiment is felt as an obligation, a "must" or "ought," something the *S should* feel or do, either for moral, social or personal reasons. There are three kinds of imperativeness.

(x)*a. Moral Imperativeness* (0-3), the degree to which the sentiment is dictated by the ethical standards of the individual. Very often it is a case of the *S*'s approving of himself when he acts in a certain way rather than liking the action *per se*. These sentiments are constituents of the superego.

(x)*b. Adjustive Imperativeness* (0-3), the degree to which the sentiment is dictated by the necessity of getting on with other people, and so of following the conventions (customary behavioral patterns) of the community.

(x)*c. Achievement Imperativeness* (0-3). Degree to which the sentiment is dictated by the ambitions (need for achievement) of the *S*, by his need for self-respect. These sentiments belong to his idealego.

In reading this list of attributes, the reader will be reminded of the fact that a sentiment may be conscious or unconscious, publicly avowed or never admitted, expressed or not expressed in action.

We have found it convenient and clarifying to divide personality into

layers and to speak of two *levels* of activity. The principal *layers* are named outer, middle, and inner; but if necessary each of these can be subdivided into three: outer outer, middle outer, inner outer, and so forth. The divisions are dependent for their existence upon boundaries on inhibition and repression set down during the course of the socialization process. The three main divisions parallel the attribute *publicity*, as defined above: *outer layer personality* consists of those actions and words which are exhibited to the world at large, what the subject does when he is out on the street, at a meeting, party or formal gathering, his professional and public self. *Middle layer personality* consists of those aspects of a man's character which are known only to his family, his intimate friends, his physician, or a few strangers who reside in a region isolated from that in which the individual ordinarily resides. This middle layer may be divided into an outer and an inner middle to distinguish (*a*) those actions and avowals which the *S* shares wth his intimate associates, and (*b*) those acts and feelings which he keeps strictly to himself. The inner middle layer corresponds to what the subject calls his "inner life." The *inner layer personality* consists of sentiments and drives of which the *S* is unaware as such. They are either entirely inhibited and repressed, or they appear in disguised forms so that it is possible for the subject to misinterpret them in a way that satisfies his need for self-respect. A psychoanalysis of some critical emotional experience may reveal the outer inner layer to him, but the inner inner layer can only be inferred on the basis of dreams, projections, fantasies, childhood reactions, conduct under the influence of alcohol, and so forth.

First level activity includes everything the subject actually does, muscular or verbal effect-producing behavior; whereas *second level activity* refers to everything the subject thinks, whether he confesses it or not. Thus first level sentiments are practised, publicly (outer layer) or privately (middle layer); and second level sentiments are avowed, publicly (outer layer) or privately (middle layer). Sometimes there is concordance between first and second level sentiments, and sometimes there is discordance.

This scheme is very convenient in formulating the organization and relations of sentiments in the personality. The usefulness of it is not illustrated in the case studies reported here; first, because the scheme was not devised until after the cases had been written up, and second, because limitations of space forced us to eliminate rather than to add material.

III. THE ESTIMATION OF SENTIMENTS

A. Factors Which Interfere with the True Avowal of a Sentiment

The major problems confronting a student of affective dispositions are those that pertain to the genesis, growth, interdependence, and manifold operations of sentiments; among the minor problems are those that pertain to the factors, other than the nature and intensity of the specified sentiments themselves, which determine what assertions of sentiment are made. In this section we shall devote ourselves to problems of this latter class, the aim being to list and appraise the factors which commonly interfere with the direct and true avowal of a sentiment.

For the purposes of this exposition we may limit ourselves to positive and negative sentiments, setting aside for the present the question of which varieties of positive and negative sentiments we are dealing with. We shall say that a man's positive affection (liking) for a certain object constitutes one sentiment and his negative affection (disliking) for the same object, if such exists, constitutes another sentiment, separable in thought though often blended in experience. Then, if we define a non-existent (inappreciable or inoperative) sentiment as one having an intensity of zero, we can say that between different individuals, or between different phases in the life of a single individual, a given sentiment can vary only along a single scale (say 0 to 5), and also that the only measurable effect that a distorting factor can have is to deflect the avowal of that sentiment upward or downward on this scale.

A *true avowal,* or an *avowal without deflection,* is an assertion which accurately represents the true nature and intensity of a sentiment. This includes the assertion by a subject that he has no sentiment of the specified kind, if it is actually true that the sentiment is non-existent in his personality. An *avowal with upward deflection* is an assertion which overestimates the intensity of an existing positive or negative sentiment, and an *avowal with downward deflection* is one which underestimates the intensity of an existing positive or negative sentiment. A *false avowal* is an assertion of a positive or negative sentiment where none exists, that is, an upward deflection from zero; and a *false denial* is an assertion of the non-existence of a positive or negative sentiment when such actually exists, that is, a downward deflection to the zero point.

When investigating affects connected with a critically important human object it is better to look for evidences of positive sentiment and then for

evidences of negative sentiment, and to estimate the intensity of each separately. There is a tendency in most subjects when speaking publicly of a socially or imperatively valued object to deflect avowals of positive sentiment upward and avowals of negative sentiment downward; and when referring to an object negatively cathected by their society to deflect avowals of negative sentiment upward and avowals of positive sentiment downward.

All this represents an over simplification of the facts, but it is pragmatically justified for experimental purposes. It permits, among other things, crude measurements of the *deflecting power* of various factors in the situation that exists at the time the subjects are examined.

In simplest terms, the usual procedure in measuring sentiments consists of two operations: (*a*) the operation executed by the examiner in confronting the subject with a specific stimulus (a statement on a printed questionnaire, a picture, a question during an interview) which calls for an avowal of an affective judgment; and (*b*) the operation executed by the subject in contemplating the stimulus and arriving at a decision. In many instances the topic of the question is one that the subject has often thought about, perhaps discussed with his friends, and he has already reached certain conclusions which he can deliver from the top of his head without even so much as an inward glance. But, when asked his opinion of certain other entities, he may have to review his experiences at some length before giving an answer. The focus of a sentiment is rarely represented in the mind by a single unchanging image but rather by a punctuated succession of images representing different guises of, or separate encounters with, the focus (if it is a concrete object), or images representing separate encounters with different guises of different samples of the focus (if it is a class of objects). Since the feelings adhering to these imaginal processes will vary in intensity, the numerical expression of them will be either (*a*) two numbers indicating the range of intensities on one scale (negative or positive), *and*, in the case of an ambivalent object, two more numbers representing the range of intensities on the opposite scale; or more crudely (*b*) one number representing a blend or average of these intensities. Usually the instructions call for one number.

It is peculiar that a single number can convey revealing information when one considers the extreme fluidity and variability of the feelings and attitudes that constitute the data on which the number is based. Montaigne, the first conscientious expert introspectionist that we know of in history, claimed that he, for one, was incapable of conveying anything of himself in one word (*Essays*).

> Not only does the wind of accidents stir me according to its blowing, but I am also stirred and troubled by the instability of my attitude; and he who examines himself closely will seldom find himself twice in the same state. I give to my soul now one face, now another, according to the side to which I turn it. . . . I can say nothing of myself absolutely, simply, and steadily, without confusion and mixture, nor in one word. . . .
>
> And there is as much difference between us and ourselves, as between us and others.

Despite the truth that lies in this statement, there is another truth which is disregarded here, namely, that if one overlooks the incessant minor fluctuations and even the occasional acute discrepancies of affect, one can usually discern a general over-all trend or consistency, the strength of which may be roughly indicated by a number. Montaigne's essays teem with avowals of sentiment, and it is noteworthy that most of these remain steady and uncontradicted throughout the whole length of his wondrous autobiography.

Much profitable effort has been devoted to the identification and control of variables involved in the design and administration of tests which may deflect avowals of sentiment from their true course. There is reason to be relatively satisfied with the standardizations obtained in many specific instances. It is rather the much neglected, though more significant, personality factors which now demand intensive study. Not that these can ever be eliminated or systematically held in check, but once their modes of operation are clearly understood their occurrence can be predicted or inferred, measured and corrected for, or subtly circumvented.

A. *Factors in the situation which can interfere with the true avowal of a sentiment*

1. The examiner fails to create a situation which engages the interest and full participation of the *S*. Sometimes it is a matter of not presenting a definition of the purpose of the interview or task, which is clear, rational, appealing and convincing enough to stimulate serious effort by the *S*. As a result, the *S* responds carelessly, facetiously, or guardedly. He may try to shock, mislead, or mystify the examiner.

Here are some of the definitions which a subject may give to the situation: (i) "this is an important scientific experiment and I have been asked to coöperate"; (ii) "this is one of those routine things that psychologists do and I am just a guinea pig"; (iii) "this is a test of my character and ability and I will be judged by the result"; (iv) "he is trying to read my mind and find out about my private life"; (v) "this is an opportunity to express myself, it will be interesting to see how I come out compared to other people"; (vi) "here is a chance to discuss my problems"; (vii) "this is foolish, a sheer waste of good time."

2. The examiner as a person fails to inspire the respect and trust

of the *S*. It may be the examiner's age, sex, race, status, appearance, striking traits, supposed sentiments, attitude or lack of professional competence which produces an unfavorable impression; but, in any event, the *S* is not inclined to coöperate.

3. The purpose of the session (task or interview) is to judge the subject's fitness for admission to an organization, or his fitness for a certain position, and the examiner cannot, or does not wish to, hide this fact from the candidate. The usual result will be that the subject will give what he believes to be the right or the wrong answers according to whether he wants to be accepted or rejected.

4. The topic of the question has a very high *collective cathexis;* that is, it is the focus of very strong sentiments, with power to evoke violent feelings of approval or disapproval, especially anger and moral indignation, in a great many people. As viewed by the "respectable" majority, or by one or another large partisan group, there is a "good" response and a "bad" response. The average *S* is likely to deflect his avowal in the direction of the "good" response; but an exaggerated "bad" response is fashionable in certain circles.

5. The situation involves an audience of more than one person; or the examiner fails to provide sufficient guarantees of anonymity or secrecy, the usual result being that the *S* will assert sentiments that conform to the impression he wishes to make on others. These asserted sentiments may or may not diverge widely from the subject's true sentiments. A few self-respecting people of exceptional integrity, humble before nature, prefer to represent themselves as truthfully as possible, at least to those whom they respect.

6. The examiner gives the impression of being a man with a certain decided pattern of sentiments, incapable of sympathizing with, or justly appraising, those who hold opposing views, or of being one who, because of youth or emotional retardation, is incapable of appreciating standpoints beyond his own. Such an examiner is apt to get true avowals only from those who share his prejudices and limitations.

7. The procedure employed does not seem suitable to the purpose defined by the examiner. The instructions or questions strike the *S* as absurd, trivial, stupid, repellent or irrelevant and he ceases to take the matter seriously; he may become defensive or antagonistic or indulge a propensity for wisecracking.

8. The question or test item is beyond the range of the *S*'s knowledge or experience; it means nothing to him.

9. The question is very general, vague or ambiguous; it does not refer to anything in particular. As a result, the *S* will often take it as meaning something different from that which was intended by the examiner.

10. The wording of the question introduces irrelevant elements which modify the response. Either a strikingly clever or a strikingly banal manner of phrasing can become the stimulus to which the *S* is veritably responding.

11. The question is worded in such a way as to suggest the answer that will be most acceptable. The question is leading or misleading, weighted with the bias of the examiner. If it is a spoken question, the expression and tone of voice of the interrogator will be liable to influence suggestible respondents.

12. The nature of the preceding questions may be such as to produce in a summative fashion an affective or intellective set which will deflect the subject's natural response to a given question.

Most of these 12 factors can be controlled wholely or partially by the examiner. He cannot change his personality very radically (Factors 2 and 6), but he can at least learn to fulfill his function in a competent, unobtrusive, and unobjectionable manner, keeping his own sentiments and limitations in the background.

B. *Enduring factors in the personality of the subject which can interfere with the true avowal of a sentiment*

1. The *S* has a strong need for conformance with a positive sentiment ad the respectable majority, or ad some special group or class of people (Harvard clubmen, Republicans, scientists, Catholics). As a result, he will think of himself and want to represent himself as a highly moral man, or as a fitting member of the admired class; and, instead of reporting his own personal feelings, he will think of the proper thing to say, or of what a hundred per cent American would say, or a true Marxist, or a loyal Presbyterian, as the case may be.

2. The *S* has a strong need for autonomy (independence, self-sufficiency, uniqueness), and his responses are influenced by determinant *aversions rather than by attractions: he wants to prove at all costs that* he is *not* like all the others, not an ordinary Harvard man, not a Babbitt, not a run-of-the-mill writer, but a full-fledged individualist without ties or allegiances of any kind.

These two factors (Nos. 1 and 2) are combined in subjects who have selected rebellious individualists as exemplars. They imagine themselves as *conforming,* say, to a type of radical agitator, or romantic genius, and at the same time as *not* conforming to any conventional class or group.

Running parallel to these are two other forms of the needs for conformance and autonomy:

3. The *S* has a strong diffuse need for conformance and affiliation, hates arguments, is inclined to answer "Yes" to most questions, and to agree with, or at least to temper his opinions so as not to provoke the person with whom he is talking at the moment. As a result, his avowals of sentiments will be deflected in the direction of those to which the examiner supposedly adheres.

4. The *S* has a strong diffuse need for autonomy (resistance, negativism, contrarience), enjoys disputes, and consequently is inclined to say "No" to most questions and to disagree with the opinions of almost everyone he meets. What emerges is a sentiment con conformity rather

than a sentiment pertinent to the focus of discourse. In the following illustration, for instance, it is negativism, not a sentiment pro or con Radcliffe College, which shows itself consistently. It is a fragment of an autobiography:

> In fact I often find myself disagreeing with *him* (father) when I really agree with *his ideas*. It amazed me one day to find that I was quoting to one of my friends my father's views he had expressed in a discussion I had just had with him to which I had taken the opposite stand. It was about the relative merits of different colleges. I had told my father that I was considering Michigan; he conceded that it was a good school, but not like the Eastern colleges. That made me angry. I told him that he was prejudiced because he and all our family had gone to the Eastern colleges and started to point out the merits of Michigan. The next day one of my friends told me she was going to apply to Michigan, and I advanced the same arguments against it that my father had used: not as good as the Eastern colleges, no tradition, *et celera*.

5. Other needs of the subject's personality which are worth mentioning are: need for self-consistency, to abide by an opinion once definitely expressed; need for rationality, to assert sentiments that are logically coherent with some strongly imbedded sentiment; need to assert sentiments which will facilitate the conduct of a necessary enterprise, or which, if adopted by another person, will promote his welfare.

Account should also be taken of certain general traits which affect the *S*'s avowals: suggestibility, emotionality of judgment (the tendency to exaggerate the intensity of an affect), cautiousness or restraint of emotion (the tendency to underestimate the strength of all sentiments); reticence with a high need for inviolacy (manifesting itself as an unwillingness to discuss private feelings and actions).

6. The *S* has little capacity to inspect and faithfully report his own affective states; his span or inward consciousness is limited, his self-insight deficient. His responses will be inaccurate.

7. The *S* knows or cares very little about the topic of the question; he has given no thought to it; and yet he feels that some answer is nevertheless required.

C. *Temporary factors in the personality of the subject which can interfere with the true avowal of a sentiment*

1. The *S* comes to the session in an exceptional affective state (anxious, tired, irritated, buoyant, dejected) because of an upset in his routine, a recent occurrence, or an anticipated event. His mood is apt to color all his responses.

2. The *S* adopts an intellective set, regardless of the examiner's instructions, which will increase the incidence of a certain kind of response. He may, for example, attempt to deal with each question in an impersonal, objective and rational manner, or he may respond according to the feeling that is immediately and spontaneously evoked. He may set himself to recall, as basis for judgment, either his recent feelings or his recent conduct towards the specified object.

3. The images and thoughts that happen to be evoked by the question may not be those most typical of the subject's whole knowledge of the object. A recent frustration or quarrel, for instance, may so fill his mind that many agreeable earlier events are temporarily forgotten.

4. The *S* may like the examiner at first sight and be prompted to answer in a way that will supposedly please him; or he may dislike and distrust the examiner for one reason or another, and so adopt a protective or refractory attitude. In friendly conversations there is an underlying tendency for both parties to move towards some agreeable middle ground.

Any one of the factors listed under *B* and *C* may cause considerable deflection in the avowal of a sentiment. Some of these deflecting factors can be exposed by having different tests given at different times by different examiners. A thorough knowledge of each personality is necessary to expose others.

B. Techniques Used in the Present Study

In an investigation of the affective configurations of individuals that aims to be relatively complete the limitation of available time will generally forbid the use of an instrument as precise, say, as one of Thurstone's attitude scales (24, 25, 26) for each of the sentiments about which information is required. Perhaps the best scheme is to measure a few of the more critical sentiments as exactly as possible with standardized tests, followed by interviews, and make a quick cursory examination of the others. This is the procedure we would adopt were we to embark on another investigation of sentiments, but in the present study no use was made of the four or five excellent scales or questionnaires suitable to our purpose, such as the *Study of Values* (Allport and Vernon), because the technical task which we set ourselves was that of devising and testing the efficacy of indirect methods, methods which conceal the examiner's intent, and the hours available for this task were barely sufficient.

of two months, being devoted to the examination of each subject. The hours specifically allotted to the sphere of sentiments added up to about one eighth (five hours) of the total experimental time. But since many facts about sentiments were obtained as bi-products of other procedures, the latter must be included in listing sources of information. Here are all the exercises which in any way contributed to our final formulations: (An asterisk * signifies that the test was specially designed to reveal sentiments.)

1. Autobiography
2. Interview on Childhood Fantasies
3. Interview on Sexual Development
4. Interview on Parental Relations
5. Interview on School Activities
9. Abilities Questionnaire
12. Interview on Abilities and Emotional Control
*13. Aphorisms Test (40 minutes)
*14. Sentiments Examination, Section A (1 hour)
*15. Argument Completion Test (1 hour)
17. Reactions to Cartoons
*18. Sentiments Examination, Section B (1 hour)
*20. Sentence Completion Test
21. Thematic Apperception Test (Standard pictures)
22. Thematic Apperception Test (Wyatt pictures)
26. Dramatic Production Test
32. Conversations
33. *Interview on College Activities*
39. Behavioral Questionnaire
*35. Picture Selection Test (1 hour)
*36. Pressey X-0 (20 minutes)
*37. Public Questions Test (10 minutes)

Leaving out the well-known Pressey *X*-0 (18), and the Sentence Completion Test which were given to one subject only, all the procedures marked with an asterisk are briefly described below. The Picture Selection Test [No. 35] was given to but one of our regular subjects (Finch), but since trials with others have demonstrated its usefulness a short account of this technique is included here.

Aphorisms Test [13]. This was the most conventional of our techniques. Each of 63 foci of sentiment is covered by four aphorisms (two pro and two con) culled from books or invented by us, each of these 252 aphorisms being printed on a separate card. Arranged in a random, though fixed, sequence, the pack of cards is presented to the subject, who is asked to sort them according to the degree of his agreement or his disagreement. Before him on a table is a wooden stand consisting of a row of six receptacles labeled

from left to right: No 3, No 2, No 1, Yes 1, Yes 2, Yes 3, respectively. The printed letters and numbers increase in size as they depart from the midpoint, No 3, for example, being almost twice as large as No 1, and Yes 3 about twice as large as Yes 1. (It was Dr. Jurgen Ruesch who suggested to us that putting a card into a box had more of the quality of a definite commitment than making a pencil check on a sheet of paper, and the results obtained seemed to warrant this modification of the customary procedure.) There being four statements about each focus of sentiment, the lowest obtainable score is —12 and the highest is +12.

Scoring is facilitated by having two numbers on each card, one indicating the numerical order in which the card is presented to the subject, and the other indicating the order of the statement on the scoring sheet, and thus the category to which it belongs. The cards can be rearranged and scored very quickly. The scoring sheet is so designed that the two negative statements appear first under each heading, and the positive statements in the third and fourth positions. For example:

5. Older Men

17.	284. The trouble with most older men is their unshakable conviction that their judgment is unerring.	con....
18.	272. When a man has passed forty he has lost the power to sympathize with youth.	con....
19.	220. Look to older men for guidance and counsel, and you will be spared many mistakes.	pro....
20.	137. Better than an inheritance is the friendship of an older man.	pro....

6. Older Women

21.	285. Older women are adept at softening a man and thus spoiling his character.	con....
22.	280. Most older women are boring and tiresome.	con....
23.	3. For a young man there is no greater blessing than the unobtrusive influence of a sympathetic older woman	pro....
24.	226. Choose an older woman for true understanding and real companionship.	pro....

Besides computing the respondent's score on each of the 63 foci of sentiment and comparing this to the standard for his age and sex, two other ratings are obtained: the ratio of total positive to total negative responses, irrespective of category, and the grand total of all marks given, irrespective of sign, as an indication of the intensity of affective avowal.

By means of this simple form a wide variety of sentiments are tapped and the broad outlines of the individual's affective structure are set forth. When administered to subjects with an *IQ* above 120, the scores have agreed sur-

prisingly well with the findings obtained by other methods. The procedure might be classed as quasi-indirect since the average subject who takes the test gains the general impression that his attitudes are under observation, but instead of being asked a direct question, such as *"Do you respect your father?"*, he is asked to pass judgment on the truth of an aphorism which states that a father is or is not worthy of esteem. Then, the aphorisms confront the subject in such rapid and varied succession that it is impossible for him to hold to any fixed idea as to which sentiments are being measured. For example, he cannot very well say to himself, *"They are trying to discover whether I am a Communist,"* because the four statements on this topic are scattered irregularly among statements on 62 other topics. Finally, most aphorisms are expressed in emotive language which is more likely to evoke an affect than is the customary referential statement, and although this evocation of affects leads to inconsistent results the inconsistencies probably reflect more truly the variability and range of the sentiment involved than do the consistencies that are found when the wording of the questions calls for judgments that are more purely intellectual.

The Aphorisms Test will have to be revised and standardized before it is fit for publication and general use.

Sentiments Examination[6] [14, 18]. This procedure consists of two sections, each of which is composed of three parts.

Section A, Part 1. Here the examiner reads off a list of 48 words (Father, Communism, Religion, Negro, *et cetera*) to each of which the *S* is asked to respond by giving the most descriptive adjectives he can think of, the *S* being led to believe that the examiner is interested in testing the range of his vocabulary. The cathexis of the focus is estimated according to the ratio of appreciative to depreciative adjectives.

Part 2. The examiner asks 11 questions to each of which the *S* is asked to respond by saying what he thinks the majority of people believes. The questions are these:

i. What are the 3 most popular things to do?
ii. What are the 3 most important qualities of friendship?
iii. What are the 3 most worthy ambitions?
iv. What are the 3 most admirable qualities for a wife?
v. What are the 3 most embarrassing situations?
vi. What are the 3 most enjoyed topics of conversation?
vii. What are the 3 most important influences in the development of a person's sentiments?

[6]This test was designed by Dr. Elliott Jaques and administered by him as well as by Dr. Silvan Tomkins.

viii. What are the 3 most admirable qualities in a person?
ix. What are the 3 worst things that can be said about anyone?
x. What are the 3 most important aspects of an ideal social system?
xi. What are the 3 worst things that can happen to anyone?

Part 3. The *S* is asked to complete phrases begun by the examiner, all of which have this form: *As* (adjective) *as* ..... The adjectives used are: pathetic, delightful, artificial, exciting, conspicuous, deceptive, meek, dangerous. The *S*, who is led to believe that verbal ability is being tested, gives as many similes as he can think of for each of the eight adjectives. The findings consist of a list of positively and negatively cathected foci.

Section B, Part 1. The examiner reads the same list of words as in Section *A*, Part 1; but this time each word is followed by four adjectives (two appreciative and two depreciative), the *S* being asked to respond to each adjective by saying "Yes" or "No." The sign of the entity's cathexis is estimated in terms of these responses.

Part 2. The examiner reads the same questions as in Section *A*, Part 2; but this time he asks the *S* to give his own answer to each, rather than the answer which the world would give.

Part 3. Here the *S* is questioned in an informal manner as to the factors determining the development of the sentiments so far revealed. The interview begins with a consideration of the subject's answer to Question vii, Part 2.

The Sentiments Examination requires thorough revision. Part 1 (Section *A*) is worth retaining, but Part 2 should be replaced by Part 2 of Section *B*, since nothing significant is gained by asking the subject to answer the questions as the world would answer them. Questions ii, iv, viii evoked stereotypes. We believe that Part 3 would have been more useful if other adjectives had been selected. We would suggest the following 10: agreeable, disturbing, admirable, contemptible, satisfying, annoying, likeable, hateful, interesting, dangerous.

Argument Completion Test [15]. Here the *S* is given a card on which is printed a brief description of two young men (*X* and *Y*) who are engaged in an argument. The *S* is asked to continue and finish the argument, adhering to the form of a realistic dialogue. There are 10 cards, each of which presents a different topic of discussion. The *S* spends about five minutes on each. Being led to believe that his powers of argumentation are being tested, the subject quickly becomes involved in the controversy he is inventing and ends by exposing more of his own sentiments than he might otherwise have done.

Two of the 10 unfinished arguments run as follows:

4

In order to achieve the high and distant goal of his ambition, *X* believes that most of the easy pleasures and comforts of life must be renounced. But his best friend *Y*, who has made a practice of accepting whatever stimulating opportunities for enjoyment are nearest at hand, is convinced that *X* is carrying his ascetism too far.

"Look here," says Y, ". . . . . .

5

X, who has grown up in the belief that war never settles anything, is contemplating with some misgivings the probability of being drafted. He meets his friend *Y*, and they stop to have a beer together.

Y has been accepted, and is on his way to camp. He tells *X* that he expects to be sent to the Pacific. He is buoyant at the prospect, and says that he will be glad to take his shirt off and get into it all.

"How is it possible," asks *X*, "that . . . . . .

In most cases it is not difficult to discern to which side of the argument the subject's own sentiments belong, but it is nevertheless advisable to allow a few minutes at the end of the hour in which to remind the *S* of the different topics of debate, asking him in each instance whether he would agree with *X* or with *Y*.

This technique has proved very useful. But more data will have to be accumulated before we can feel certain of the value of the rather elaborate scheme that has been worked out for dealing with the arguments presented.

Picture Selection Test [35]. Although this technique was suggested by the Szondi Test (19), its rationale is based on a simpler principle. The material consists of 225 pictures depicting 45 foci of sentiments, such as Old Men, "Fast" Women, Athletic Girls, Children, Laborers, Intellectuals, Negroes, Jews, Nature, *et cetera*. Each focus is represented by eight pictures. For this it was not necessary to find 360 pictures since more than half of the illustrations portray two or more different foci. A picture of a sad, middle-aged, upper class woman, for example, stands for three categories: Sad People, Middle-aged Women, and Upper Class People. The pictures are mounted on bristol board and are of three sizes: Set *A*, 135 pictures (5"x7"); Set *B*, 65 pictures (7"x9"); Set *C*, 25 pictures (8"x10").

The *S* is seated at a large table and presented with the pictures of Set *A*, five at a time, and then in a similar manner with the pictures of Set *B*, and finally with those of Set *C*. He is asked to select three pictures out of each group of five—either, two he likes and one he dislikes, or, two he dislikes and one he likes. He is also asked to comment as he makes his choices,

giving the reasons that occur to him for his stronger likes and dislikes. After this has been accomplished, the *S* is given all the pictures of Set *A* which he has designated as "liked" and asked to choose the *three* he likes the most. Then he is given all the pictures of the set which he has designated as "disliked" and asked to pick out the *three* he dislikes the most. This is repeated with Set *B* and Set *C*, but for Set *B* he is asked to select the *two* pictures he likes the most and the two he dislikes the most; and for Set *C* he is asked to select only one picture in each case. Finally, the *S* is asked to arrange the six most liked pictures in order of preference, likewise the six most disliked pictures, and to give his reasons for so arranging them.

Each picture selected is tabulated as positive or negative, as the case may be, under its appropriate category, and the ratio of positive to negative responses noted. The ratio of total positive to total negative responses, irrespective of category, is also computed.

The utility of this test is based on the fact that most people in judging pictures of nearly equal aesthetic worth will be guided largely by the appeal or repellence of the subject matter. Our findings go to show, in any event, that if a subject repeatedly selects pictures belonging to the same category it is highly probable that a strong sentiment is operating.

The 225 pictures which comprise this test were cut out of various and sundry illustrated magazines and the possibility that permission could be obtained to publish the whole collection is indeed slight. Furthermore, the cost of reproduction would be prohibitive. Consequently, the most that we can do, convinced as we are of the efficacy of the procedure, is to advise others to collect and standardize a similar set of pictures for their own use.

Public Questions Test [37]. This was not a test so much as it was an expensive device for studying the effects of an audience and the pressure of time upon the sign and magnitude of responses, rationalizations and facial expressions of subjects who are required to express opinions on topics charged with collective cathexis.

The subject is seated in a chair facing a wall 10 feet away on which is screwed a very large picture of an audience at the Metropolitan Opera House, New York City. In the middle of the picture a piece of black silk, stretched smoothly, covers a small rectangular aperture in the picture and in the wall behind it. Behind this aperture in the wall is a gramophone which plays a record consisting of a series of eight questions in different voices, one every 45 seconds, the intent being to produce an illusion of questions being asked by various members of the opera house audience. On a low table before the subject is a row of imitation microphones and pointing

at him from the side is an imitation camera; the microphones and the camera are obvious fakes. In front of him on the floor is a row of footlights and hanging from the ceiling above his head is another brilliant light. Thus the subject is placed quite literally "in the limelight," with a thousand faces gazing in his direction. We expect him to say to himself, "This is all a fake," but nevertheless to be disturbed and rattled by the illusion of publicity. Actually there is a real microphone concealed beside him and a real moving picture camera with a sound track behind a camouflaged window in the confronting wall. We expect that a few subjects will guess that some such device is operating.

The examiner reads the following instructions:

> This is a test of public speaking ability. You are on the stage of the Metropolitan Opera House, having just delivered an address on "Harvard and the War Effort." Members of the audience will now be given the opportunity to question you on certain points. After listening attentively to the question please respond with a clear "No" or a clear "Yes," followed by some number from 1 to 5 to indicate the degree of your conviction. Thus you will be using a ten-point scale running from No 5 to Yes 5. Do you understand? After giving this immediate numerical response you will be allowed 40 seconds in which to give as many reasons in support of your opinion as you can think of. Stop talking as soon as you hear the buzzer; it comes as a warning that in 2 seconds you will be asked another question. You will be rated according to the number of persuasive reasons you can present in the time allowed. This, as I have said, is a test of public speaking ability. Do you understand? Look at your audience, listen closely to the question; answer "Yes" or "No," one to five, then quickly back up your opinion with as many good reasons as you can produce in 40 seconds. Stop as soon as you hear the buzzer.

After a pause the examiner continues:

> Imagine yourself speaking to this exceedingly critical audience. Imagine that here is a newspaper man about to take a flash-light picture of you, and here are microphones which will carry your words over a national network. You will be heard by millions. To be persuasive you should look straight at the audience. Are you ready?

The gramophone record, which is turned on at this point by an assistant in the adjoining room, begins with the sound of loud applause, followed by the words of an announcer telling the audience that the speaker is ready to answer questions. The questions which are asked at 45-second intervals, some by men, some by women, are as follows:

1. Is Harvard the greatest college in the country?

2. Tell me, does war ever settle anything?
3. Should the club system at Harvard be abolished?
4. Are you satisfied with the leadership of President Roosevelt?
5. Do you believe in free love?
6. Do you think that Labor is trying its best to win this war?
7. Do you believe sincerely in religion?
8. Have you any hope of an enduring peace after this war?

The examiner, who sits to one side, prompts the *S* if he forgets to give a numerical response by saying, "Yes, how much?" or "No, how much?" He also counts the number of arguments as the *S* gives them and after the buzzer has sounded announces the total: "Four arguments. See if you can do better next time." From the fourth question onward the examiner announces as heretofore the number of arguments given by the subject but omits the "See if you can do better next time."

The permanent record of the session consists of a six-minute talking movie which permits a detailed study of the nervous mannerisms, expressive movements, and modes of speech, as well as of the modes of thought, the reasons and rationalizations, presented by the subject when he is under stress.

Summary. In designing our methodology, the course followed was that of listing the more important common foci of sentiment, up to 100 or so, and then introducing as many of them as possible into each test, so that the principal sentiments could be tapped by several different techniques. Sixty-three foci were incorporated in the Aphorisms Test, 48 in the Sentiments Examination, 45 in the Picture Selection Test, 10 in the Argument Completion Test, 8 in the Public Questions Test. Thus some foci—war, religion, sex—appeared in five different guises. Another time we shall achieve even more overlapping by adding items to the Aphorisms Test and to the word list in the Sentiments Examination (Part 1).

Of equal worth in exposing sentiments was the whole series of miscellaneous procedures listed in the beginning of this section, particularly the autobiography, the five interviews, and the projective techniques. The latter were singularly useful in furnishing evidence of the existence of sentiments belonging to the middle and inner layers of personality. Clearly there was plenty of opportunity for the expression of sentiments not included in our original list and so there was little danger of our losing sight of the uniqueness of each individual under observation.

A great many more facts were collected from these multifarious sources than could be included in the case studies reported in this monograph.

C. Characterizations of the Eleven Subjects as a Whole

Nine of our subjects were picked out for us by a physician at the University because (*a*) he judged them to be interesting *normal* personalities, and (*b*) he believed that the money which they could earn by taking tests at the Clinic would be an incentive to them. The other two subjects came to the Clinic initially because of bothersome symptoms. Thus there was some loading on the side of low economic status and of neuroticism. As a group they were not representative of the total college population because not one was unquestionably a member of the upper social class, not one was a major sport athlete, not one was a Jew. Four of them, however, had spent one or more years at a private school before coming to college, and one of these was elected to a large social club at Harvard which includes about 12 per cent (the "upper crust") of the student population. Three of the subjects engaged successfully in minor sports; and one had one grandfather who was a Jew. The scholarship of our group was well above the college level; eight graduated with honors. Thus we were not dealing with clubmen and athletes but, for the most part, with middle class intellectuals, most of whom were unusually ambitious.

It did not take long, in the informal atmosphere of the Clinic, for the examiners to get on a familiar and friendly footing with the subjects, and, in consequence, their barriers of self-protectiveness became more permeable than is usually the case, and their answers to direct questions could be more often trusted.

IV. SENTIMENTS TOWARD WAR

Since the sentiments of our subjects were explored three to four months after the attack at Pearl Harbor, the press of war was foremost in the thoughts of most of them. College men throughout the country had been urged by representatives of the federal government and presidents of universities to continue their studies until called for service, and although some, disregarding this counsel, were prompted to enlist immediately, the majority—among whom were all of these 11 subjects—remained in college, their minds largely occupied with the problem of which they should choose among several possible courses of action. Thus our examinations occurred during a period which for many was one of disquieting indecision, as anyone who reads these case histories will appreciate.

While conducting the examinations our sole purpose was to discover the range of each man's sentiments ad war and related matters, and to correlate the findings with other elements of his personality. Only later did we decide that it would have been better to focus attention on the sentiment ad *own participation in the war effort,* this sentiment being of value to the integrity of American society. Since this was an afterthought, the data in our possession are not sufficient to permit precise ratings of the strength of this particular sentiment, but, rough as they are, our estimates will nonetheless serve the purpose of illustrating how human values can be investigated by psychological techniques.

The hypothetical assumptions that we are making here are: (*a*) that the integrity of American society with its cultural activities and potentialities is worth preserving, and (*b*) that in the event of war instigated by an aggressor nation one way that an American can be of social value is to dedicate his energies to the war effort. Leaving aside the extent of the man's capacity to fulfill a useful function, his value to the war effort can be estimated in terms of his sentiments ad own participation; his desire to serve, his volunteering, his willingness to undertake whatever tasks are assigned to him, his expression of opinions favorable to the national endeavor.

These assumptions are hypothetical. Perhaps American culture is not worth preserving. Perhaps there are better ways than warfare of preserving it when it is attacked by powerful nations aiming at its annihilation. These questions can be debated elsewhere.

Furthermore, we must understand that in rating an individual according to his dedication to the war effort, no assumption is made that this mark is a measure of his total social worth. It is merely an estimate of his worth in this particular region of activity. There is no denial of the possibility

that an individual who points his energies at another target may by so doing make a most valuable long-run contribution to society.

The focus of the sentiment that is being measured here is a *goal* (Class x)—to accomplish something which contributes to the winning of the war—, and, for most men of military age, a special *type of activity* (Class vii)—some form of combat. The strength of the sentiment is measurable largely in terms of overt behavior (first level of expression) and in terms of sincerely expressed feelings and opinions (second level of expression). Since we are dealing with college men not yet enlisted in the armed forces, the only kinds of overt behavior on which estimates of first level sentiments can be founded are trends *towards, away from,* or *indifferent to* participation.

A. Criteria of Strength of Positive Sentiment Ad Own Participation in the War

1. *First Level (Behavioral) Criteria*

a. Sincere efforts on the part of the subject to find his proper place in the war effort, some rôle for which he is fitted, favoring (i) a course of training that will get him into action as soon as possible; (ii) a rôle that will bring him as close to the fighting front as possible; (iii) a rôle involving dangerous combat duty.

In making judgments on these points the physique and special aptitudes of the subject were given their due weight. We did not give the man who chose laboratory research a lower rating than the one who enlisted in the air corps, if it was perfectly clear that he was peculiarly competent and trained to perform the former functions and had few of the requirements necessary to perform the latter. Additional criteria on the behavioral level are these:

b. The selection of college courses by the subject that will prepare him for the rôle he is to play, working unusually hard in these courses; and

c. Participating in various extra-curricular activities connected with the war effort.

2. *Second Level (Verbal) Criteria*

a. Expression of sentiments by the subject in favor of this nation's war objectives. Agreement with ends.

> As objectives we would include (i) the elimination of Fascism from the earth, on the ground that it is an evil ideology; or, as an option, the defeat of Germany, Italy, and Japan because they attacked us and because they are aggressor nations which have committed countless crimes

against helpless peoples. A second objective would be (ii) the preservation of Democracy (Fascism and Democracy can not exist peacefully together in the same world); or the preservation of this country's integrity, honor and independence (national defense, maintaining the American way of life). Another objective might be (iii) the attainment of some positive value: a new world order, a federation of nations to end wars, extension of the principles of Democracy.

Determinants. Positive sentiments towards one or another of these might be dependent upon an individual's (i) hatred of all that Fascism represents (the doctrine that might makes right); (ii) sympathy for the victims of Nazi aggression; (iii) certainty of the value of freedom, of Democracy and American political principles; (iv) love of his native-land, his home, his fellow-countrymen and his accustomed way of life; (v) realization that the consequences of defeat—humiliation, privation, subordination—would be intolerable; (vi) belief that something positive would be gained by fighting, that his nation, the class to which he belongs, the ideology he holds, or humanity at large would benefit by victory.

b. Expression of sentiments by the subject in favor of war as the only resource in the present situation. Agreement with means.

Determinants. This sentiment might result from (i) a realistic appraisal of the situation, or from (ii) confidence in the ability of our leaders, the President and Congress, to decide what is best for the country. A positive sentiment in favor of fighting might come from (iii) a need for physical adventure and excitement, and/or (iv) a need for recognition, the apperception of war as an opportunity to win glory and renown, and/or (v) a need for aggression; an individual, say, who is full of repressed bitterness and hatred apperceiving the war as a chance to give legitimate expression to these passions. The sentiment might also be the outcome of (vi) the prominent presence of physical courage and fortitude as attributes of the subject's idealego, war appearing to him as a test of manhood; or it might be the outcome of (vii) a high estimation of military service and achievements, an interest in the strategies and tactics of war.

c. Affirmations by the subject of his desire to participate, or of the necessity of his and others' participating, in the war.

Determinants. In addition to the determinants already mentioned, one or more of the following factors might operate to produce this sentiment: (i) a corporocentric orientation, based on a strong feeling of belongingness to, and oneness with, the nation (the United States being the subject's Larger Me), or based on the inclusion in his superego of the principle that every citizen has certain duties and obligations (as well as rights), one of which is to volunteer for service in time of war,

if he is one of the proper age and able-bodied ("My country right or wrong"). A man, in other words, might want to participate because he values his country's security and honor as his own, and/or because he has a sense of social responsibility: the call to arms comes as a moral imperative and he knows that he will feel at peace with himself if he enlists and at odds if he does not. Such a sentiment might also be subsidiary to (ii) a strong need for affiliation and for conformance, the man's friends are enlisting or already fighting; and/or to (iii) a need for blamavoidance or inviolacy, dread of the contemptuous epithet "slacker" or "coward." Or again, such a sentiment might be the expression of (iv) an underlying urge to dedicate and sacrifice himself to some object or ideal, the latter being indefinite until now.

d. Expression of positive sentiments ad leaders and sub-leaders who have recognized the gravity of the situation and who preached and practised whole-hearted participation, and the expression of negative sentiments ad those who have opposed intervention and have been reluctant to participate; also, the advocacy of vigorous unifying measures by the government and criticism of half-hearted, morale-lowering measures.

B. Criteria of Strength of Negative Sentiment Ad Own Participation in the War

1. *First Level (Behavioral) Criteria*

a. No efforts on the part of the subject to find his proper rôle in the war, but preoccupation with other matters (life as usual); or efforts to avoid combat duty by selecting a course that would postpone active service as long as possible, or one that would lead to some relatively safe non-combatant military service, or one that would take him out of harm's way entirely. Here, of course, it was necessary to take account of the individual's able-bodiedness, his special aptitudes and his pre-war vocational intentions, say to be a doctor or minister.

b. Manifestations of anxiety and panic at the prospect of having to face the ordeals and perils of war.

2. *Second Level (Verbal) Criteria*

a. Indifference to, or the expression of sentiments opposed to, the nation's war objectives.

Determinants. These might be: (i) a secret or avowed admiration of Fascism; (ii) a contempt for the inefficiencies and blunderings of Democracy; (iii) a disgust with things American—materialism, political corruption, the arrogance of big business, sentimentality, vulgarity, ugli-

ness; (iv) a conviction that nothing desirable will come out of this war: either it is nothing but another imperialist war, or a war to rescue the British Empire, or it is Mr. Roosevelt's war to spread socialism ("What will *we* get out of it?").

b. Expression of sentiments against war as means in the present crisis.

Determinants. Among the determinants of this attitude we might list (i) an intense need for harmavoidance, physical timidity, fear of suffering and death; and/or (ii) a need for infavoidance, dread of humiliation, scorn and ridicule, based on the subject's conviction that he will not make a good soldier; or (iii) the belief that nothing can be gained by modern war which will justify the loss of human lives, the suffering and the destruction ("War does not pay; war never settles anything"); or (iv) the conviction that war is morally wrong (pacifism); or (v) an aversion to army life and a disrespect for military men ("brass hats"); or (vi) a hatred or contempt for our leaders ("who got us into this mess").

c. Avowals by the subject of his reluctance to participate.

Determinants. Besides the determinants already listed we should mention (i) a strongly egocentric orientation, the sense of social responsibility being absent (ii) alienation from the ethos of American culture (a feeling of non-belongingness); and (iii) a passionate interest and strong ambition to succeed in some chosen profession, the war appearing to the subject as a grievous interruption of his plans.

d. Indifference to the progress of the war; the exhibition of skeptical, cynical or defeatist attitudes; escapist thinking; refusal to recognize the basic issues, or to face the fact that winning the war involves killing thousands of Germans, Italians and Japs.

These were the positive and negative criteria that we used in judging the strength of the sentiment ad own participation in the war. Thus estimated, the strength of this sentiment in a college man during the winter of 1942 was, in our opinion, about as good an index as could be had of his potential national morale, of his social value in this crisis.

We favor a restricted concept of morale, defining it in terms of a few *components*—intensity and endurance of drive and will-power manifested by zest, resistance to fatigue and pain, and relentless energy in striving against opposition towards a given goal—with all the other factors assigned to the category of *determinants*. Thus health, as we see it, is not a component but a very powerful determinant, illness being one of the most imposing obstacles that can confront the will. We would claim that it is impossible to judge morale except in reference to a particular goal. A man may manifest zest, confidence, and resolution on the football field but only apathy, indifference, and defeatism when confronted by an intellectual task. Further-

more, besides defining the common purpose, one must define the particular rôle, or rôles, which the given individual must play. One can not estimate morale except in reference to a specific rôle. If, for example, we are talking about a private in the army and if it is true that "the individual soldier," as Ralph Ingersoll says, "has one sole responsibility: to be obedient to the authority of the army," then degree of obedience becomes one index of the individual's determination to perform his function. If, on the other hand, we are considering a graduate student in a department of psychology, then independence of mind (in some circumstances, defiance) becomes an index.

Now in measuring the morale of able-bodied college men in the winter of 1942, the goal being fixed by the decision of the government, the chief question for us to decide in each case was this: how strongly is this man resolved to assist in the destruction of Nazi tyranny? As yet, the college man had no rôle and his only duty was to find one, and then prepare himself to execute its special tasks. Although behavior in this direction was accepted as the best evidence of the strength of the sentiment ad own participation in the war (and so of individual morale), not much behavior of this sort was actually required by the situation and what occurred was difficult to appraise. Thus we had to lean quite heavily on other evidences of this sentiment: expressions of opiñion as to the importance of the national objective, the necessity of war, and of own participation. Zest and realization of the difficulty of the task were also taken into account. Thus the rank order of our subjects, as we see it, exhibits variations in the degree of individual national morale or potentional morale) as well as in the strength of the sentiment ad own participation. At this stage, preliminary to getting into action, the two are practically synonymous.

Morale is apt to vary with the situation. It may be high at the moment of enlistment and then fall as the individual is subjected to greater hardships and perils, or it may rise to meet each crisis. The dominant trend in the American army through 1942 and 1943 seems to have been an upward one: many who were apathetic at the time of their induction achieved the necessary fighting spirit when they came within range of the enemy.

Our measurements of morale apply to the pre-enlistment period only. Although an intimate knowledge of the history and present structure of each personality provides some ground for predicting the probable rise or fall of morale in this and that individual as he approaches the zone of danger, these predictions were not taken into account in rank ordering our subjects.

In stressing participation in combat we seem to be out of line with the majority of our colleagues as judged by current publications on the topic

of morale (4, 6). In recent scientific literature one finds few references to such historic factors as the acceptance of warfare as necessary means, physical courage, endurance, a fighting spirit, respect for the army and the navy, an interest in strategy and tactics, capacity for obedience and disciplined behavior, initiative, *et cetera.* One can discover little that is germane to the morale, say, of a defender of Stalingrad, a member of the British Eighth Army, or an American commando in Polynesia. In psychological journals there may be a few articles on the learning of nonsense syllables but nothing on learning how to kill. For this one has to turn to the popular periodicals which run articles such as the following account of a lecture by one of the most successful of the British commando instructors:

> "This is a school for murder," the Major tells his class. "Murder is my business. Not the vague shooting of unknown people in combat, but the personal, individual killing of a man in cold blood. It's an art which you have to study, practice and perfect.
>
> "The average Englishman and American, unfortunately, suffers from remorse. You must overcome that, or it will slow you down at a crucial moment and cause your own death. . . ." (*New York Herald Tribune,* October 17, 1943, condensed in *Reader's Digest,* November, 1943, pp. 68-69).

In short, what American psychologists have written about morale is much more pertinent to the needs of a society at peace than to the needs of a society at war. Why is this? Have psychologists been evading the realities of bloodshed just as for generations they evaded the realities of lust? If so, we suspect that again it is their morality which obscures their view and unfits them for their task, which is to describe and explain impartially all manifestations of human nature, the least, as well as the most, agreeable. A scientist should have a stomach equal to the most unpalatable facts. Furthermore, it does not seem moral that a man should desire and enjoy the benefits of a victory achieved by methods the responsibility for which he will not share. As the devout Péguy, a socialist and a poet, has said: "To ask for victory and not to feel like fighting, I consider that ill-bred."

It would seem that in the present situation certain circumstances have operated to obstruct the vision of most psychologists working in this field To understand these circumstances one must go back to 1940 when the measurement of morale was elected as a problem falling within their domain of competence. The term "morale" was originally used to characterize a group, a regiment taken as a unit; but, since there were no satisfactory techniques for measuring group morale, most psychologists, taking off from the attitude scales with which they were familiar, turned to the measure-

ment of individual morale; and then, since the examination of men in the various training camps was not generally permitted, they picked as subjects men, women, and children from the civilian population. This brought them face to face with a dilemma, because morale is meaningless except in relation to a specified goal, and before the attack on Pearl Harbor the American civilian had no goal set by a congressional majority. A sincere isolationist might have met the most rigorous standard of high morale in working for *his* goal, that of keeping America out of war, and an enthusiastic interventionist might have deserved an equally high score when viewed in relation to *his* aim; but the two would have been in violent opposition, aggravating a conflict that was dividing the energies of the country. Thus the greater the morale of the isolationist and of the interventionist the worse was the morale of the nation as a whole, unity of purpose being one of the chief components of collective morale.

Although at this juncture it was not possible to speak of national morale in relation to war, there was no doubt that Germany was the unofficial common enemy and that the ideological issue was between Fascism and Democracy. Consequently, the conclusion we all accepted was that those whose sentiments ad Democracy were most positive and whose sentiments ad Fascism were most negative, possessed the background of values which would most strongly impel and sustain them in any possible forthcoming struggle with Germany. But, since the vast majority of psychologists are liberals who stand on the left of the midline, their version of Democracy is not exactly representative of that held or practised by the majority of Americans, now or in the past; and furthermore, since they were more human than scientific at this point and allowed their own sentiments full play in selecting the components of morale, the instruments which they devised turned out to be better measures of an individual's attitude towards liberal New Deal policies than of his readiness to fight Fascism. Being non-belligerent themselves, psychologists were not inclined to count belligerency as an asset.

With the advent of war psychologists were confronted with a paradoxical situation: it was necessary to raise an army to fight for Democracy; but, since every army is fascistic in structure (fascism being the application of the military pattern of government to the civilian population, during peace as well as during war), those who won the war for us by fighting would have to be capable of working under a fascistic regime for the duration. Fascism, without, to be sure, its unnecessary grosser brutalities and lies, was required to defeat Fascism. According to many reports, indeed, the American army and navy, in their regulations of relationships between officers and men,

are more fascistic than the partially democratized German army and navy. Even for the civilian population war brings about a partial suspension of Democracy, which is a design for peace. But, be that as it may, one obvious task for the psychologist after the declaration of war was to measure the fighting potentialities of college men or of pre-draftees at large. The fact that this was not done, as far as we know now, is indicative of the sentiments that prevailed among psychologists during the first years of World War II. The task was not congenial to them; the testing of intelligence, yes; but the testing of soldierly virtues, no. Perhaps they suspected that the facts would show that the average tough-minded "fascistic" personality fits better in the army, manifests higher morale in combat, and fights harder for Democracy than the average tender-minded idealist. Perhaps the correlation, if anything, is negative between socialistic inclinations and fortitude in a fox hole. On this point we have no facts. Anyhow, all the conclusions which psychologists have reached so far, many of them interesting and important, pertain to the morale (especially during peace) of civilians with rôles incomparably different from those of the soldier at the front.

Although in making our estimates of morals we kept each subject's attitude towards active combat steadily in mind, we can scarcely except ourselves from the criticism just leveled at the majority of psychologists, since we also have dealt only with civilians, and it looks on paper as if we also had been influenced by our socialist inclinations, despite constant efforts to remain neutral, for on examining the rank order we find the more politically radical men nearer the top (Nos. 1, 2, 5, 6) and the more conservative ones nearer the bottom (Nos. 4, 7, 8, 10, 11). One explanation of this is the fact that during the pre-enlistment period expressions of opinion bulk large in comparison to other kinds of facts, and among college men radicals, as tests have demonstrated (1, 15, 28), are generally more sophisticated politically and more intelligent verbally than conservatives. Hence, most of them will show up better when it comes to expounding the social issues at stake and the aims of the war. Their indignation at Fascism being greater, they are apt also to show more spirit during this first phase. However, as we have said before, a high rating at this time does not certify that a man will serve his country valiantly under fire.

Our 11 cases have been numbered according to their position in the rank order of sentiments ad own participation in the war (individual national morale). It has seemed best to start with the lowest in rank (No. 11) and to end with the highest.

C. The Eleven Subjects

Subject No. 11: Couch

Couch suffers from a physical ailment. Knowing all along that this would disqualify him for active military service, he has not defined the draft as a personal threat, as a call to duty or as an opportunity for adventure. His disability may in part account for his detachment, the tone of aloofness in all his references to the war, his apparent lack of concern. (In none of his *TAT* stories, for example, does a hero go off to fight the Axis or even consider the possibility of enlisting, although in two of his narratives a noncombatant is tortured or murdered by Nazis. Couch, we might say, apperceives this war as a round of cruelties inflicted upon civilians.) We do not believe, however, that the physical incapacity is the only, or even the chief, cause of Couch's solipsistic isolation from the most portentous spiritual and political conflict in Western history; for well-established in his personality, prior to the passage of the draft law, was a formidable cluster of basic sentiments which renders him veritably untouchable by social issues.

Couch became alienated from his parents, their cultural and religious background, several years before he left for college, when he decided to become a man of letters, to cultivate his aesthetic sensibilities to the limit, to make of his mind an instrument of refined discrimination. He feels that no creative work is possible without a transcendent ideal, but this ideal need have no connection with a struggle such as that in which his country is involved.

> The artist or writer does what he must do. He isn't very important anyway. He doesn't effect anything. There are lots of other people to take care of the world [15].

Although he confessed that his own experience has "led to the development of autism or extreme egoism, extreme ambition, and self-interest" [18], it appears that he is subject to occasional mild promptings of social conscience. To one of the items in the Argument Completion Test [15], that in which the dedication of oneself to the betterment of society is opposed to purely selfish individual ambition, he said:

> These are both phases of the same individual and the discussion is internal. At certain times and in certain moods one predominates over the other in XY's mind. He can defend either with equal cogency and logic. Sometimes he is inclined toward social responsibility by way of knowledge. But when he feels his natural personality most strongly then he feels the attitude of culture for its own sake and for *his* own sake very strongly.

The sentence "He can defend either with equal cogency and logic" is very typical of Couch. It sets forth an accomplishment of his idealego—as yet unrealized, except in a delusory way, since his arguments are but rarely cogent and logical—, and it exhibits his neurotic habit of confronting himself, when caught between two opposites, with each choice of action equally weighted with reasons, thus bringing his will to a state of complete paralysis.

If in seeking the truth one leaned too heavily on Couch's assertions of sentiment, it would be impossible, in many instances, to escape serious confusion, since this young man's determination not to commit himself to any definite standpoint is unrelenting. Only indirectly can one arrive at what would appear to be his more basic sentiments on each question. Asked for his opinion face to face, his answers are usually balanced and rebalanced by a series of limiting and qualifying phrases, a practice reflected in his free associations by the plethora of opposites, suggesting schizoid intellection, such as

Radicalism—Beneficial, harmful.
War—Evil, horrible, glorious.

The core of Couch's value system is reflected in his outstandingly high marks in the Aphorisms Test [13] on the following items: *Subjective Values; Intellect; Reason, Theory;* and *Creator of Values.* His favorite topics of conversation are "myself, culture, affairs in general, circumstances." Knowing even so little about Couch, who could go far wrong in predicting his attitude toward this war?

In the Aphorisms Test [13] Couch marks himself as being extremely negative ad *War, Compulsory Military Training* and *Americanism*—no flag-waving patriotism for him. *War* again appears among his most negatively cathected objects in the Interview on Sentiments [18]. Compared to our other subjects, Couch was unique in the rarity of his allusions to war; what references he did make were coolly analytical, extraordinarily remote from the tense realities. In criticizing a war cartoon he said:

> A considerable measure of truth lies in this cartoon, and since the artist puts the idea in *qualified* terms, the "hope of freedom" and the "threat of slavery," the idea is entirely valid from my point of view. History will, of course, determine what this war means, but at the moment it seems to mean just this [17].

Couch's preferred world is one of perpetually unresolved hopes and fears—anything to avoid the clash of forces here and now. In the Argument Completion Test [15], which allows the subject a pretty nearly open field for expressing his opinions, Couch was caught offguard. Evidently unmindful

of the possibility that he was committing himself, he gave a perfect exhibition of his own highly subjective way of viewing public questions. Here, in contrast to his other performances and to those of all other subjects, he omitted any opposition argument.

> *X* begins in a very rational manner to question the wisdom of *Y*'s enthusiasm for the war. He points out the dangers of battle, the chance that *Y* may get injured or killed in the struggle, and he remarks that he can not understand how anyone, even though patriotic and anxious to have the enemy defeated, could fail to have the opposite desire to be one of those who does not go under. He sees that *Y* has coached himself into the attitude of buoyancy, and though it has an element of truth in it, and enthusiasm, and feeling of relief from the everyday and prosaic affairs of university life, and that he is the type to take pleasure out of physical exertion and dramatic action, it has also been coached in himself in order to get himself into the right frame of mind, and to avoid a profound emotional upset. He explains to *Y* his feeling that war never settles anything.

Not so much by the motives that are mentioned—personal survival, relief from the prosaic affairs of university life, physical exertion and dramatic action, avoidance of emotional conflict—, but from what is disregarded—the hurricane of evil let loose by our enemies, our national survival, defense of ideals, simple obligation to country—this response, which fits in with everything else he said and did, stands as the one most revealing statement that Couch made on the question of participation in the war effort. Patriotism, as he sees it, is an artificially induced emotion.

In the above response, when Couch was representing the hypothetical *X*, he explained "his feeling that war never settles anything"; but in the Public Questions Test [37], faced, he was asked to believe, by a formal opera house audience, he gave an authoritative "Yes" to the question, "Does war ever settle anything?" though he was unable to offer adequate ground for his judgment.

> Yes, 5, War settles many things. I can't give reasons. I might give one, I think. I suppose it is because war is a matter of practical action, of facts and realities [37].

Couch approached despair in his response to the final question, "Do you believe in an enduring peace after the war?"

> I would say No, 4. I had hoped in a peace, in a peace of some length and some endurance, in the excellence of an enduring peace, but in view of past experience in events, and in view of past history, there is no reason to suppose this will be the last war. In fact, the war simply has not worked. [37].

Determinants. Not often do we come upon a lower state of morale than that indicated by Couch's sentiments as here recorded; and the fact that his behavior conforms in all respects to his opinions settles the question of his proper place in the rank order of these subjects.

Among the factors contributing to his present frame of mind three have already been mentioned: physical disability, neuroticism, insulated individulism. The latter has, for generations, been characteristic of the artist (as represented by the Romantic Genius figure), who at his best has been dedicated to the creation of Beauty, and by implication to the enlightenment of all humanity, rather than to relatively narrow nationalistic aims. But since the aggression of Nazi-Fascism is directed at the governmental forms which alone make possible the artist's free creative life, the present war is different from previous ones, as MacLeish has so eloquently made clear; and this is what the Couches of America do not fully realize.

Another important factor is physical timidity, the natural concomitant of a body made frail by chronic illness. From early boyhood Couch has assiduously dodged participation in competitive sports, avoided rough games of all sorts.

> I was not an athlete, and athletics were highly praised, and I was not in good health, and of course in school I was accused of being teacher's pet. I might have gotten into fights if I had been more pugnacious [5].

In the Harmavoidance Test [29] he was rated second only to Finch, our next subject, in degree of pain aversion; and in the Emotional Conditioning Test [30] he was extreme among all subjects in variability of inner arousal and in magnitude and variability of the deviations. He rated himself high on Physical Timidity [34] and said in answer to the word *fear,* "Fear is a subject which I fear"[20].

Parental overprotection has served to accentuate anxieties required through experience. "My mother," he said, "has always been afraid that things would happen to me."

For this generation the influence of the churches generally has been toward pacifism, forgiveness of our former enemy (Germany) and a disregard of the existence of evil; all of which tendencies are congenial to Couch's sentiments, although in his case we have no evidence to show that religion played any part in deciding fundamental attitudes. His parents were devout Protestants, interested in church work; but in his resolute and thorough-going efforts to free himself from their influence, Couch contemptously rejected, as far as he felt able, their bourgeois standards and with them Christian ethics.

> The problem of morality without religion is one of the least of my concerns. My morality is the strategy of self-culture, a veritable "culte de moi."

With such a philosophy Couch is in no position to react with indignation to the evil that Nazi-Fascists preach and practise without cease. Thus he can remain comfortably unperturbed, blind to the forces that menace all his values. That he is partially aware of the rootlessness of his present egocentric ideology is indicated by his saying, "My whole system of values is somehow detached; a perhaps vital connection with society has been impaired" [1]. This flash of insight has wrought no wonders for him yet.

Couch has not been helped to a higher level of morale by any profound trust in the common man, nor by any expectations of a possible better American society or an international federation of nations to be achieved after the war. His family would be classified as middle class, their political sentiments being, we should judge, conservative. If not, then here is another instance of their son's divergence from their frames of reference. On the Aphorisms Test [13] Couch stood on the negative side of the rank order on sentiments ad *the Masses, Classless Society,* and *Racial Equality.* In the Interview on Sentiments [18] his most negatively cathected objects, besides *War,* were *Proletariat, Negro,* as well as *Authority* and *State.* Couch, we might add, is a Southerner with a touch of nascent literary genius, who is satisfied to leave government as it is, so long as it does not interfere with his ambition to perfect himself as artist and gentlemanly *connoisseur* of culture. He has shown within his own region of pre-occupation flashes of wit and brilliance, as well as some fortitude in enduring much private suffering and depletion for the sake of rare moments of precious aesthetic excitement. The significant fact is that his region of concern does not overlap at any point the immense region of the world's struggle.

Subject No. 10: Finch

In the case of Finch the Aphorisms Test revealed a nuclear cluster of the following positive sentiments: *Faith, Subjective Values, Churchman, Moral Philosophy, Reason, Discipline and Habit,* and *Marriage.* These take sides against *Sex, Competitive Business, Technical Science,* and *War,* on all of which this subject is strongly negative [13]. Emerging at once from these few items is the conclusion that religion is at the core of Finch's emotive life, which happens to be correct. When asked what first came to his mind as being important in his life, he answered, "Religion" [18], the significant fact being that his father, to whom he is admiringly compliant, is a Protestant minister.

> I heard about religion all the time when I was growing up. I thought about the ideas heard at home and in the choir and church school. I really tried to live it. I was isolated from other children of my own age in the neighborhood. These ideas have been a substitute for friendship. I was very serious about prayers, etc. [18].

Clearly we are dealing with a young man, brought up in the Church, in whom the teachings of Christianity have been and still are an active force. These, together with his father's example, have served to imbue him with humanitarian ideals and the desire to do good; and now no life work that would frustrate the expression of these tendencies could ever satisfy his standard of values. In fact Finch was a mere boy when he decided to be either a minister or a medical missionary. Among his responses to the Sentence Completion Test [20] the following are pertinent:

> *Religion is*—one of my chief interests.
> *My main passion is*—love for humanity.
> *My greatest ambition is*—to do a lot of good.

One might guess that Finch would find it difficult to reconcile the foregoing sentiments with the brutalities of war and this has proved to be the case. When asked about the war, he replied:

> I hate it. I don't see anything idealistic about it. Ten years later we will see that it was just a strife for power. But you have to fit in, in spite of it all. If I should be a pacifist I would be in another world. I must stay with people and fight this war through and look forward to the battle for reconstruction [18].

This statement would seem to indicate a bare sufficiency of working morale, but, as we shall see, this initial impression is borne out neither by his statements to other experimenters nor by his conduct. He feels that wars are brought about by group selfishness and that America is as much to blame as any other country.

> Selfishness of nations is at the very root. In groups there is no faith. Man is moral but society is immoral. The basic change that is needed is to convince people to be unselfish in groups [18].
>
> There is a lot of talk about democracy. But no one seems to think about the way we led Japan into this. Open Door for the U. S. and Britain in China. Japan had to do this or starve [18].

Finch's moral justification of Japan's aggression indicates that he is in a frame of mind to use any argument within reach to express his dissatisfaction at his government's failure to keep out of war.

> It's all going to be the way it was before. There is nothing idealistic

about this war. It's just economics and domination. There seems to be a past destiny that makes people go to war every twenty years, again and again. They say that you have to fight to keep the best things alive. But this seems too awful. Why not give the Germans what they want? [15].

Finch is a Christian whose aversion to war and power politics is so profound that he can discriminate no difference in degree between the policies of Germany and the policies of his own country. At heart, of course, he is a pacifist; but he believes that he must stay with people (from whom he has always felt remote), and, according to his own words, "fight this war through" [3].

I can't stand being a Conscientious Objector. I feel the weight of the whole social world pressing down on me. I don't believe I could hold out against it [15].

That the conflict is severe is indicated in his statement that he "secretly desires to escape from it all" [20].

When I went before the draft board I was scared to death. I can't seem to face the problem. It is all so full of emotion. Last summer it just got me. I lay around the house all summer and didn't do a thing. I tried to face it but I couldn't [15].

Not having sufficient moral courage to declare himself a conscientious objector, he came to this solution:

If they want to put me in uniform, I will go, but I will never, never fire a gun. I just won't. I'll keep my thoughts to myself. I don't see what difference it makes to them what I am thinking. They can push me in if they must [15].

In the Dramatics Production Test [26] Finch arranged a scene in which a dead sheep lay on an altar surrounded by a circle of sitting animals. Outside the circle were rows of human figures. As he explained,

The sheep is the conquered country, dead, and being cut up. The other animals are the devouring countries. The people all lie here in rows, dead. This is serious. This is an awful world.

The tableau not only reflects this subject's horror of war and his assumption of its predatory basis, but, on a deeper level, suggests that he conceives of himself as a sacrificial lamb being led to slaughter.

Another reason for his hatred of war, he tells us, is his fear of regimentation and his dread of becoming callous.

War is the most horrible thing that there is. It changes people so.

> They become different. I would become different, all closed up inside. I would lose sensitivity and would become indifferent to cruelty and suffering. I saw the men drilling at Soldier's Field and it was horrible. I just couldn't bear it. [15].

Although Finch avoided war as a setting for his stories in the Thematic Apperception Test [21], on being presented with Picture No. 16, that of several sleeping cowboys, he took them for soldiers, a most unusual interpretation which evoked comments similar to those just given.

> These are soldiers. The individuals don't show up. Just masses. The training is the kind under which individuals break down. These people have no reaction against mass feelings. An individual would go out for himself. These have to get up and keep on marching. Next day the same. They keep them in the army forever due to "emergency" which can be extended as long as the rulers want. When they get out they have a hard time. They were sheltered in the army in a bad way. Either walk or sleep. If they try to go back to their friends they can't find themselves.

Determinants. In considering the chief determinants of Finch's state of low morale we turn first of all to what he himself mentions as final authority for his repudiation of war, namely, the principles of his religion. Here we can hardly avoid the conclusion that scripture is being used to support another motive. It is not a basic factor. In the first place several confidential talks with Finch convinced us that religious faith was not with him a central and compelling force. He has never had a profound religious experience, has no interest whatsoever in the great problems of theology, was for a long time uncertain of his calling. He is simply an eager, pleasant, gentle boy who adores his father and believes that the occupations of a minister, shepherd of a flock of two or three hundred upper middleclass parishioners, would be most satisfying for a life-time. In the second place, although Christianity, springing out of Hebraism, is *par excellence* the religion of universal love, the only faith that preaches the return of good for evil, and so might well be taken as an encouragement to attitudes of pacifism, there is no commandment in the Decalogue or in the New Testament against fighting an aggressor nation, nor one against combating crime with force. On the other hand there are several commandments to be found in the Bible which Finch and others of his stamp have rarely if ever thought of practising. Furthermore, for centuries Christian states—made up of people much more ardently religious than Finch has ever been—have waged the longest and bloodiest wars on earth without remorse, many of them Crusades and Holy Wars declared for religion's sake. Finch, indeed, might have

been born a Mohammedan if in 732 young Christians had said, as he does now, why not give the Arabs what they want?

In place of the principles of religion as such we would substitute the immense wave of anti-war and pacifist sentiment, instrumented by all the devices of modern propaganda, that swept the country—through churches, schools and colleges—in the wake of World War I. This sentiment was the outcome, chiefly, of the horror and pity evoked in men of humane feelings by the countless sufferings, seemingly so futile, of that devastating struggle; and was also, in some measure, the expression of a growing goodwill—or rather desire for goodwill—among men, reaching across the accidental boundaries of nationality, race and creed, combined with a profound longing for worldwide peace. The determination to outlaw war led to the adoption of a variety of means; of which one was the preaching of universal tolerance, and another the preaching of pacifism. The result was an unusual opportunity for gangsters and gangster nations.

The moral insensibility that may result from drifting into a state of undiscriminating tolerance is strikingly illustrated by Finch's incapacity to distinguish slight but crucial differences in existing ratios of good and evil. Having found some evil in every nation, this young man declares that one cannot choose among them. Consequently, why fight? It is very much as if one were to claim that there is no real difference between policemen and criminals because repressed tendencies to crime have been found among the former.

We acknowledge, in Finch's case, the strong influence of pacifist indoctrination and to some extent the influence of religion; but we are inclined to put more weight on a closer and more personal determinant, namely, his extreme, if not pathological, physical timidity. Finch is distinguished among all our subjects by an intense and all-pervasive bodily fear which, there are reasons to believe, is the prime source of his sentiments towards war.

> Nightmares and ghosts, all sorts of horrible imaginings terrorized me for years [1].
>
> Refractory and timid characterizes my early behavior [1].
>
> At school in the early days I was persecuted. I feared a lot of people. I had fights and hated school [1].

In the Pressey *XO* Test [35] he listed as the worst wrongs, *hate, bully, brutal, nagging* and as the worst worries, *insult, teasing;* all of which are reflections of the torments and abuses he suffered at the hands of his more pugnacious schoolmates.

He had the most extreme reaction of any subject to the shocks in the Harmavoidance Test [29], being unable to overcome an initial fear of which he was intensely conscious. He showed no isolation of affect and no repression. No other *S* confessed his fear, no other *S* manifested so little of the reticence of pride. At the conclusion of the experiment Finch, with some wit to spare, said, "I don't want to be a shock trooper anyway."

He rates himself *5* (the highest possible mark) on *Physical Timidity; 5*, on *Abasement* (in order to avoid pain); and *0*, on *Verbal and Physical Aggression* [34]. His great aversion to physical combat was apparent even on the Picture Selection Test [35]; and in conversation he was free in expressing his dislike of all forms of competitive athletics

> That sort of thing has never appealed to me or made sense to me [15].
>
> I tried cross country racing at school, but I'd run thinking, Why should I go through all this? Why should I torture myself? In touch football I'd always be worried for fear that the ball would hit me [5].

At an early age, trusting in the wisdom of his mother's counsel, Finch adopted pacifism on principle. "When I was in the third grade," he tells us, "I promised my mother not to fight any more" [18]. The result of this attitude, however, was just the opposite of that desired, since his school chums, learning of his resolution, took it as virtual permission to tease and pummel him unmercifully. His was the rôle of scapegoat until one day he screwed up enough courage to hit back and the promiscuous persecutions ceased. His mother, however, never stopped her anxious over-solicitous persuasions, and even now, when he is grown up and far from home, she pesters him with letters full of her maternal worries.

> If I am drafted my mother will be *awful*. She will wring her hands and think it is too awful. She says that young men should get together and refuse to fight. But what's going to get them together? [15].

Finch has no definite political convictions. What views he holds are humanitarian in tone and vaguely liberal. He sides in general with the upper middle class. But he will not accept any view that might commit him to a moral judgment in respect to the present struggle, any view that might impose participation as a duty. He does not favor the opinion that America is fighting to destroy a spiritual scourge. War is an evil justified by no end that he can see. He has no feeling of identification with his fellow countrymen, no realization that the free institutions from which he has derived both profit and enjoyment are endangered. Military officials and

draft boards are seen as alien forces intent on getting him into uniform, than which nothing could be more repellent.

> I don't want to waste my life in military service [33].
> Fighting is no way to spend one's life. My greatest longing is for a peaceful world. I fear a revolution instead of peaceful change [20].

Fortunately the problem has at last been solved. Finch has been admitted to the Theological School.

Subject No. 9: Grove

On the Aphorisms Test [13] Grove's sentiments are strikingly negative ad *Studies, Scholarship, Mental Activity, Plan and Method,* giving one the impression that he is "fed up" with the routine of college work. He is also among the very lowest on *Philosopher, Creator of Values, Idealism.* From the two syndromes one might predict an affective system opposed to intellectual activity, resulting in a disinclination to concede the value of the accomplishments of thought, and this supposition fits in with the finding that Grove has no rationalized ideology, no formulated guiding principles, no religion. Unusually high, on the other hand, are his sentiments in favor of *Spontaneity, Intuition, Imagination, Submission to the Irrational, Artist,* which together point to the conclusion that Grove relies on emotion and feeling rather than on the will to initiate and propel mental activity, and, since he devotes no energy to the execution or creation of art, that he is a devotee of fantasy, or undirected thinking. This is borne out by his high marks on *Thought vs Action* and *Thought vs Fact.* Viewing these two sentiments in isolation, we might suppose that we are dealing with a theorist, but taken in conjunction with the first mentioned syndromes, these sentiments indicate something else, namely a reluctance to deal with solid, straight-edge facts, to become involved in anything that calls for decisive action. Indeed, the whole set of sentiments so far discussed can be largely explained on the basis of Passivity, on which variable Grove received the highest mark of any of our subjects. He is conspicuously indolent and undisciplined, spending a good deal of his time listening to phonograph music, reading novels, and day-dreaming, his academic tasks being put aside until the very last moment and then, faced by the press of short time, accomplished with feverish speed. His written work is rarely completed on time. Only images of the consequences of failing an examination which is *just* ahead of him can stir his thalamus sufficiently to drive him to his task. Excited in this way, he works quickly and effectively, his verbal facility being very high,

It is Passivity that sets him against the function which he is compelled to use if he is to stay in college. Thus in the region of scholarship his first and second level sentiments are concordant.

In the region of physical activity, however, we find avowed sentiments that are unobjectified in conduct. Grove does not participate in any branch of athletics, an occasional walk being his sole form of exercise. At school he avoided football and other sports, and today his muscles are flabby and covered with a layer of fat. Knowing only these facts, one would hardly expect to find that on the Aphorisms Test Grove is among the very highest in his positive sentiments ad *Physical Activity, Risk and Adventure, Intensity, Free Will vs Determinism.* Such a discrepancy, we must reiterate, is not at all uncommon and in this case is readily explained by the fact that Grove is now in a situation that compels him to *work* with his brains but not with his muscles, and so it is easy for him to imagine lazily how pleasant it would be to exercise the latter. Of course the opportunity to use his muscles is at hand, but he is held back by sheer inertia. He claimed that if he were forced to exert himself physically he would like it and it would do him good; and this proved to be correct. A few weeks after the War Department instituted its physical training program at the college, Grove reported that he was enjoying the exercises very much. Thus Grove does have a first, as well as a second, level sentiment ad *Physical Activity,* but the two together are not strong enough to budge his bulk of lethargy. What he detests is not the movement of his muscles but the movement of his will. This, and this only, will explain his high positive mark on *Compulsory Military Training,* because, as we shall see, Grove is strongly opposed to war.

If this reasoning is correct, we should predict that as soon as Grove has had several months of rigorous military training his avowed sentiments in favor of physical activity will decline sharply and his sentiments ad mental activity will swing from negative to positive; for in his imagination he will picture himself doing the opposite of what is required at the moment, namely deriving pleasure and benefit from intellectual occupations similar to those which are today repellent. The essential point is that Grove is low on the variable Endurance and high on the need for Change (he can not tolerate the monotony of routine work), both of which stem from his passivity. Passivity is the key to most of him.

On the Aphorisms Test [13] Grove is strikingly negative on *Aggression* and *War.* He is the only subject to mark himself as positive on the aphorism, *Peace is the natural state of man: war is corruption and disgrace,* and also the only one who is negative to, *Anger is one of the sinews of the soul.* In

general, his sentiments have low intensity. He does not like to get excited about things. He said:

> When Hitler got started everyone was against him, but I couldn't see much difference. As long as I didn't think Hitler was bad there wouldn't be any reason for going to war. When I came to Harvard the majority of my friends were anti-Nazi and wanted to get into the war. One of my close friends volunteered for service in naval public relations. I thought it was foolish of him to enlist. I could not help sneering. I couldn't see that there was anything in it. Although I hate Nazi ideology, I can't get up enough spirit to resist them myself [3].

And he wrote:

> The present world situation worries me a great deal. My own opinions differ greatly from those of the people around me and this has created a conflict. I stand almost alone in my present opinions. I miss majority support [1].

Here he showed uncommon frankness and considerable insight in admitting that his desire to keep out of war compelled the judgment that Hitler was no worse than many another leader. Grove is one of our most negative subjects on *Americanism*. He said he disliked "super-patriots and rabble-rousers" [18]. He was willing to agree, however, that war *does* settle some things.

> It influences international policies. It influences international governments. It helps to take away difficulties in internal governments [37].

But he has little hope for an enduring peace after the war. He says:

> No. 3. No matter who wins this war the people who are in bondage can't be at peace. There is bound to be bondage no matter what [37].

Grove's political views are liberal. He is highly in favor of *Labor, Classless Society,* and *Communism vs Fascism,* attitudes which accord with a pattern of humanitarian feelings which might constitute the basis for an idealism still in embryo. In one *TAT* story [22] the hero commits suicide because his efforts to aid humanity are not appreciated. In the Argument Completion Test [15] the highest number of reasons Grove gave to support any viewpoint were based on the values, *Social Improvement* and *Helping Individuals.* In this test his humanitarianism is reflected particularly well in his completion of the argument about war.

> *X*: "How is it possible that you can forget yourself and the ambitions that you had before Pearl Harbor and go into this thing in such an unselfish way? Or maybe it is selfish. Your sole interest is only for the present. Your main purpose in life is to think of the future."

> Y: "Well, whatever happens to this country will happen to me. I should go in and clear up this mess, which is my fault as much as anyone else's. I live with others, am dependent on others, and so I should fight for others. I am giving society a boost. *You* know all the old stereotypes. My values are the satisfaction of helping people who have helped me. When we have won the war my mind will be settled. If you haven't cooperated you will be unsettled. You will not have contributed to the organism to which you belong" [15].

Here Y's argument rests, grounded on the desire to help those who have helped him. His indifference to the great principles involved is reflected in his statement that he could conceive of nothing except his family for which he would be willing to risk his life [15]. When Grove says "family" he means his mother, whom he loves dearly. His abiding affection for her is the root of his humanitarian sentiments, the source of the idea expressed by Y that "if you haven't cooperated . . . you will not have contributed to the organism to which you belong." There is probably some connection between the fact that Grove holds to no abstract ethical principles and the fact that he dislikes his father.

Two of Grove's *TAT* stories touch on the war.

> . . . (A young man) decides to go into Medical School as soon as possible because the draft is about to get him. Then he finds that he is unfit to be a doctor and so signs up for the army. His mother is completely disillusioned. Her son's future has been shattered and hers has been shattered with it because all her hopes were in him. He is apathetic toward the world in general. He has gone into the army as an alternative rather than as anything he wanted to do.
>
> . . . (Two young men) hoped to get into a vital industry but the draft got them. One was completely dissatisfied. His ambition was gone because he had nothing to work for that would fit him for what he wanted to be, so he just gave up the ghost. He didn't want to be a good soldier so he became reckless and got killed. The other adopted the philosophy that you might as well make the best of it so he became an officer and got specialized training which put him in the Adjutant General's office. The training he got in the army would fit him for something in later life [22].

These stories show Grove's characteristic apathy and indifference toward the war and its issues. Here, however, there is no hint of wanting to fight in order to help those who have helped him; rather, the idea that to be drafted would prevent the fulfilment of his ambitions. Since all our examinations have confirmed the finding that Grove's energy and ambition are unusually low, his emphasis on frustrated aims (a thema which keeps recur-

ring in his TAT stories) must be understood as a rationalization springing from a fantasy of achievement, which, in his case, has been stimulated by his mother. Her hopes are fixed on him. When he is at college faced with work that waits to be done he confesses that he has no ambition; but when the draft "gets him" he laments the dislocation of his life's course. As a matter of fact, he is intent on no particular profession.

The responses to the Argument Completion Test and those to the Thematic Apperception Test, selections from which are given above, do not agree precisely. According to the former, Grove has argued himself round to a tenable ideational position; according to the latter, he sees himself the victim of a hideous political situation. That the latter is closer to underlyng emotional configurations is proved by Grove's reaction to the news of Pearl Harbor. Walking back to his room on that fateful evening, he became aware of severe palpitation of the heart. He felt the earth falling away from under him and he thought of his mother miles away on the California coast. He went to bed but the anxiety persisted. He could not sleep. In desperation he woke his roommate and begged him to sit up with him for the rest of the night. He could not bear to be alone. The following day similar sensations recurred and it was a week or more before he became tolerably composed. Questioning revealed that he had had falling and floating dreams in infancy, and just recently, since Pearl Harbor, had dreamt of floating into a cafeteria and through a round air vent into the kitchen, and then back again, passing through the same hole into the outside air. There was much evidence of this sort to support the diagnosis of Claustral Complex and the high Clinic ratings on Fantasies of Insupport, Fears of Insupport, Imaginal Press Insupport in childhood, and, springing from this underlying form of insecurity, Basic Anxiety. These variables are sufficient to account for Grove's situational neurosis following upon the news of Pearl Harbor. In his autobiography he wrote, "I seem to be afraid of life. At the present time I show signs of confusion and helplessness" [1].

Grove was preoccupied at first with schemes for escaping combat duty; but, as usual, indolence and procrastination defeated his designs and before he knew it he was drafted. To one experimenter he admitted that he had not bothered to find out his number but was not worrying [33]. Another experimenter reported, "He appears surprisingly undisturbed by the thought of military experience." To a third he spoke of his "inertia and fatigue" and of being "tired and fatalistic about the war" [32]. All this demonstrates that Grove has been unable to will the obligatory and can meet the situation only by lazily acquiescing to circumstance. His passivity is a ten-

sion-reducing expedient which has become established as a habit, an instrument of harmavoidance. The most positive statement he made was, "If I entered the army I would have complete freedom from responsibility and that might be good" [33]. This remark suggests that the necessity of realizing his mother's hopes has been felt as a heavy burden, and, although to dismiss this obligation would be to abandon all that has meaning for him, his passivity is so great that to do so would give him some relief. Some of his *TAT* stories indicate a longing for extinction and he confessed, in his autobiography, "I have a not unpleasant preoccupation with death" [1].

Determinants. The most outstanding determinant of Grove's low national morale is Passivity, especially if this be taken in conjunction with the anxiety of insupport, the most pervasive form of Basic Anxiety. The latter was clearly exhibited in the situational neurosis developing after Pearl Harbor and the former in everything that he said and did. Full of significance is this statement in his autobiography: "I hesitate to make decisions and prefer to let things take their course . . . to let others take the initiative" [1].

Next in importance come physical fears. Grove rates himself high on Physical Timidity and low (0) on General Aggressiveness. When he came to college he selected swimming as his required sport because "it did not involve man pitting himself against man" [33]. As a child he had occasional physical fights, "but now I wouldn't. I can't account for the change" [5]. He abhorred athletics because he never could acquire the skill of other boys and it was "torture for me to participate" [5]. In the Clinic formulation he was rated high on Harmavoidance and low on Counteraction.

With so much insecurity and dependence one would suppose that his mother's attitude toward the war would have had a profound effect upon him. And this is actually the case. For years both parents have been strongly anti-war and have advised their son to steer as clear of this conflict as possible [3]. The mother is, in fact, a pacifist by conviction. Grove himself always thought of war as "primitive and barbaric," and feels that this attitude came from his mother, "who always talked of the evil of killing anything."

Grove hates Nazi ideology, but it is apparent that he has no idealogy of his own to set up against it. He is entirely lacking in moral indignation, being unable to see much difference between Germany and the other great nations. His basic orientation is toward individual personalities rather than toward ideas, and his philosophy, such as it is, has come from his reactions to events. He says, "Only in rare instances am I so strongly convinced of any belief that I would be willing to argue it with others" [1]. He also

lacks the support of a strong belief in God. "Neither parent went to church. They hardly ever referred to religious matters" [1]. He has little capacity to view the world from an impersonal standpoint, sociological or political, and no disposition to identify himself with any social cause. As a result, he has nothing with which to meet the present crisis other than the pacifist sentiments derived from his mother, a vague feeling of goodwill and the desire to do something for those who have helped him. At first one might suppose that his leftist sentiments would provide some ground to fight on, but closer inspection reveals that these sentiments do not stand on their own feet but are founded on a negative reaction to his Republican father, a successful businessman, who has been antipathetic to his son from the beginning. On the Aphorisms Test [13] Grove is strongly negative on *Businessman* and *Capitalism*.

In view of these findings we should add the following determinants: mother fixation and identification, pacifist indoctrination, lack of sustaining democratic ideology. Grove has a high *IQ*, but he has no convictions to live or die for Unless he finds his way into one of the non-combatant services of the army, he may be headed for a war neurosis.

Subject No. 8: Shea

Shea's entire life is dominated by an unrelenting ambition to make his mark as a scientist. "I have a drive, a terrible one," he asserts [32]. But the anticipation of imminent frustration often embitters him. "I have always had goals and ambitions that have been beyond anything that was practical or that seemed capable of being realized." In the past his designs have been repeatedly thwarted by circumstance, "Never has there been a moment in my life when I could make plans for the immediate future" [12]. From this one might predict that for Shea the war would intrude as another and even more formidable obstacle standing between him and his goal. "I feel that I can never waste a minute. I have to make my own way, and have my own thinking to do the whole way. That is why the draft is such a pity. All my work is wasted. It would have been better if I had gone into the army in the beginning. I now hope to go to Medical School, and am hoping for a draft deferment, but I am doubtful if I get it" [32].

Apperceiving the draft as acute personal frustration, Shea, we are not surprised to find, is extremely negative ad *Compulsory Military Training and War*. He believes more definitely than any other *S* that, *The establishment of compulsory military training would lower the mentality of Americans*

to an appreciable degree [13]. Shea lists as first among the most worthy ambitions, "To support oneself" [14]. Because of his own poverty, earning his living is of paramount importance to him. He feels no aversion to money makers. He is one of the two subjects who do *not* believe that, *War and courage have done more important things than business and mercenary aims* [13].

Shea seems to have no moral scruples about war as such. He admits that it isn't his uncertainty about the "ethics of war and all that" which upsets him but just the uncertainty about his own personal future. He thinks of war as being "destructive and ruinatious" [14] but inevitable. "War is inevitable. In the present world it is impossible to be isolationist. Because of that, victory is to be desired. We must fight, so we might as well win. Someone must do the work" [18]. It would be hard to imagine more indifference to the great issues of the war than is implied in the statement, "We must fight, so we might as well win." His interest in the social questions of the day is no greater. In the Aphorisms Test he is low on all the liberal sentiments: *Labor, Classless Society, Racial Equality, Economic Equalitarianism, Communism vs. Fascism,* and his sentiment ad *Politician* is also negative. He even goes so far as to say that, "The world, even in a social sense, is to me, inanimate" [1].

Shea believes that war can settle issues, mostly those involving territorial possessions. "War has settled one thing and that is that the victor will make the peace terms, and I suppose that that is what is meant by what the war settles. Another thing that the war has settled is national boundaries, and international boundaries, and governmental difficulties which existed before the war" [37]. Shea is also willing to concede a positive result of another sort. "I have observed," he says, "some beneficial aspects of the war from a spiritual point of view which I have not been able to evaluate completely" [1]. He envisages a permanent peace after the war, attained by the imposition on other countries of our democratic creed. "Yes 4. I believe that the United States . . . will dictate the peace. And if we still have the fundamental idea of democracy that we have now, we should offer it to the world, and it should be up to us to enforce it" [37].

Satisfied with the way in which American democracy has worked in the last few years, he exhibits none of the critical attitudes so common in his contemporaries. But when he is confronted with the idea of Americanism, which he associates with war fervor, he comes out strongly negative. He is more intense than any of the subjects in his approval of the statement, *Patriotism is merely a name for self-seeking and ruthless men to hide behind.*

Wars, he believes, are not fought by individuals but by herds of men. "It is the mass feelings of nations or groups of people rather than individuals who are fighting in the struggle. In the Spanish war the boys on either side would ask each other over for a cigarette, and then go out and fight. No one hated each other in the Spanish War, but it was the masses of people; the group man" [17]. No doubt this is a notion which Shea has found satisfying because it gives support to his own lack of personal involvement. In the Argument Completion Test [15] Shea completes the discussion about the war as follows:

> *Y:* "How is it possible that anyone who expects to be drafted does not feel at least a little patriotic?" *Y* has had it pretty easy all his life, and never had to work for a living. He has a vacation every summer and so on, and likes to get out and have adventure. Being drafted thus fits in pretty nicely. He hasn't done too well in his studies. Nothing to be proud of in the way of anything accomplished. He sees the new life as an adventure, and as an escape from that which he might have been expected to do as a civilian. *X*, on the other hand, has worked hard, has ambitions and goals, and has shaped his ambitions towards these goals. It is difficult for him to see what he as a private in the army could do. He has two conflicting ideas. First, that war is no good. Second, he feels that if he goes into the army some recompense should be made to him for giving up his career. He feels he should be given a commission, etc., or some position in the army where he could be of definite service.
>
> Neither will be convinced, but having had a long bull session they will become more tolerant of each other's views.

Shea says of himself that "My attitude varies with my mood. I am patriotic when I am feeling good, but not so patriotic when I am in an ambitious, selfish mood" [18]. In the above argument he is apparently seeking to justify his "ambitious selfish mood" by thinking of patriotism partly as an adventure indulged in by the playboys, and partly as an escape from the more serious business of life. There is a good deal of similarity between Shea's and Couch's ideas of patriotism.

Shea seems to be unmindful of the fact that if the war is not won his ambitions will be, in all probability, unrealizable, and that by fighting he will actually be helping to make possible the achievement of those very goals. But his sense of personal deprivation so blinds him to these considerations that he feels that should he enter the army he will be conferring a favor on the government for which he should be suitably rewarded.

One examiner reports that Shea's pessimism does not seem to be entirely occasioned by the prospect of military service, since he admits that he might

even enjoy "being with people," but it bears reference to a more distant future from which all positive attraction seems to have momentarily vanished. "Somehow," says Shea, "I've had the idea that war terminates everything. A post-war world will have no room for individual enterprise" [12]. Having said previously that he believes that the United States will impose a democratic peace, his belief that the war means the end of enterprise everywhere must spring from the feeling that his own career, as he has so ambitiously planned and worked for it, may be at an end. His view of the future is a projection of his own anticipated frustration.

In a last frantic effort to keep his fate in his own hands, Shea applied for admission to a medical school, although he had never intended to be a doctor. One of his friends reports:

> The draft worries Shea more than he knows. It goes below the surface, and you don't quite know what's wrong with him until you think of that. He says that he wants to go to Medical School, but although he keeps thinking he has found himself, actually he has always been interested in chemistry. He doesn't seem to care which Medical School he goes to and has written to all of them, the poorest as well as the best. He affixed a long letter to his draft board telling of his nearsightedness which would keep him from shooting a gun so he would be put in non-combatant service, and he might as well be trained for it. This was put in consciously clever language, trying to be very amusing.

Shea has a caustic sense of humor which occasionally crops out to mask the anxiety. For instance, to the word *Fight* he says, "The U. S. will either have to give our soldiers ample ammunition or supply them with glasses so that the whites of the eyes of the enemy can be seen." "Fighting to the finish is like eating a cake and not having it" [20].

The confusion and hopelessness into which Shea has been thrown by the war is well illustrated by the concluding paragraph of his autobiography [1].

> I am essentially a realist, and therefor never give myself away to the task of remodelling the world. In the present mood in which I now find myself, I am unable to attain the remodelling. I could wish for peace on earth, but then I would have to go into the far more complex problem of designing an international set-up for maintenance of the peace, an even more unrealistic consideration with the present conditions to work with. I do not find myself capable of formulating my attitude toward the social world, with the rapid change of events, and with my disorganized mental state I find it difficult even to contrive a point of view on any subject. As to my relation with the world or with society, the world has no regard for one individual since its total number of individuals is so large already.

Shea has been placed near the bottom of our rank order on national morale principally because he did everything he could to avoid the draft (and succeeded); but also because the prospect of being drafted as a soldier precipitated a protracted state of apprehension and perplexity; because his orientation was excessively egocentric, concern for the social and political health of the nation being absent; because he has never been stirred to moral indignation by the acts of Fascism; and because his general attitude toward the prosecution of the war is a mixture of indifference and cynicism, with some melancholy prophesies thrown in for good measure.

Determinants. The most potent determinant of Shea's low morale is, without doubt, his compelling personal ambition, goaded by the sting of poverty and by his mother's aims for him. Since his father's death a few years ago Shea has had to work his way through school and contribute to the support of his mother and sister as he went along. Not for a minute is he unmindful of this obligation. Although he has never felt very close to his family, his mother's aspirations are ever at his heels, like the hound of heaven. "My mother is terribly ambitious for us. That's why I'm here" [32].

Closely associated with this factor is Shea's egocentrism, his indifference to the welfare of others. This goes hand in hand with a kind of personal isolationism, a lack of social solidarity, the absence in him of a feeling of belongingness, of oneness with his fellowmen. He thinks that he is different from other people, superior in important ways, inferior in unimportant ways, and that he can rely on no one but himself. Everything that he wants must be attained by his own efforts. He is an atom in an inanimate social organism, his relationship with the whole being one of mutual indifference. If others do not help him, why should he help them? Needless to say, the anxiety of insecurity, aggravated by long years of social alienation, is a prominent feature of his personality. The hypothesis that childhood feelings of helplessness were reactivated by the present crisis helps to explain his disorganized mental state, his pessimism, his expectation that the war will terminate everything, that there will be no future. With this background, Shea has found it impossible to identify with his country, sacrifice his personal aims, dedicate himself to the common cause.

Shea's training in a Jesuit school has not helped him to play his part manfully in the present crisis. There he learnt to esteem the ideology of Catholicism ahead of the ideology of democracy; and there he developed an aversion to historical and social studies. He has always thought books on international affairs were "heavy and dull" [12]. For Shea, religion has been a haven of retreat and peace not a guiding force in a troubled world.

The equivocal attitude of the Catholic Church in the present war has not made decision easier for him.

Finally, we should list among the determinants Shea's physical awkwardness and timidity, his lack of athletic training. At school he suffered a bit from inferiority feelings because of his ineptitude at games. He lacked self-confidence. Characteristically he says, "There were people who were worse than I, but I would forget that, and would think I was no good. I am not energetic, but not physically lazy either, but I don't care a lot about competitive sports. I am not good at them" [5]. On the Aphorisms Test Shea's sentiments ad *Physical Activity* and *Athletics* were conspicuously low. He put *Physical Ability* in eleventh place in the rank order of his own abilities [9], and in the Behavioral Questionnaire [34] gave himself a *3* on *Physical Timidity* (on a 0 to 5 scale). In the Shock Experiment [29] he showed a high degree of erratic and non-adaptive behavior.

The main fact, however, is simply this: Shea had decided on his professional goal and had sacrificed everything to prepare himself to reach it. The war came as a heart-breaking interference. Shea had put all his eggs of hope in one basket and suddenly it looked to him as if the iron hand of destiny would smash the lot of them.

Subject No. 7: Nack

The Aphorisms Test [13] shows that Nack's political sentiments are highly conservative and this in a college man usually indicates lack of interest in social questions, a generalization which is not contradicted by Nack's statement that the three things he likes best to talk about are "school work, sports, the navy" [14]. His sentiments ad *Americanism* are unequivocally positive; he is one of only two subjects to say "Yes" to Decatur's affirmation, *My country right or wrong.* Although he is in favor of *Compulsory Military Training,* as a democratic individualist of the old school he is unutterably opposed to the doctrines of Fascism. One of the worst things that could happen to anyone, he thinks, would be to "live in Germany where you couldn't work your way up" [14].

His attitude toward the present war seems to be rather neutral. "I don't get particularly excited about politics and the war," he says [18]. But the words he associates with *War* are, "hateful, murderous, undesirable, useless, impatient, awkward, killing," and his sentiments ad *Aggression* are extremely negative.

To the question, Does war ever settle anything? Nack answers: "No. 4, because it is proven by example of the old French and Indian Wars, the

Napoleonic wars, the World War, the Revolution, the Civil War, the Mexican War, and the war in China, and a Roman war." How Nack could be ignorant or unmindful of the issues that were partially or wholly settled by these wars is beyond us. He has no hopes of an enduring peace after this war, because, says he, "there wasn't any after the last war, or after the Revolution, or after the Civil War, and I see no good reason for one after this war, because no man in power has public leadership, or power to give peace, and there is so much confusion in the world right now" [37]. There is a muddle of facts and reasons here which no amount of analysis could clear up, but two points stand out: Nack is opposed to war as a means, and he has not given enough conscientious thought to the problem to bring order into his own house.

He thinks that this war could have been avoided. "There are two ways of looking at it. Roosevelt and those up there know more about it than I do, and if they couldn't stop it, then I suppose I couldn't. Still, I like to think that it could have been prevented. The whole business might have been prevented way back at the end of the last war. We might have prevented Japan from attacking with a little diplomacy. But it is a tough thing to give an opinion on, I know so little about it" [18]. Nack obviously has strong pacifist leanings and therefore feels that wars should be outlawed, but he has no acquaintance with politics and does not himself see how this most desirable objective could be achieved. He is wise enough to know that he does not know the answer. The truth is that Nack has a profound single-minded interest in theoretical science. He believes that the three most important aims of an ideal social system would be to "prevent wars, to keep most people happy, and to provide a chance for the advance of science" [14].

When asked pointblank how he felt about the war, he said: "At the beginning of this year my roommate and I used to talk about it. He was a pacifist. I was the opposite. Now he has gone over to the other side. There are lots of questions that I can't answer, such as the right to kill. I used to say before we started that we should fight to prevent war, but once war comes, you should do your best to win. I became less definite the early part of this year. I left Naval Science because I had to prepare for Medical School. Without that influence I sort of became indifferent. I don't feel strongly enough about the war to raise a fuss about it, and if I was drafted I would go, but I would feel ashamed of myself" [18].

In the Argument Completion Test he finished the argument about the war as follows:

> *X* would say, "What advantage do you get going into war? You will undoubtedly kill people, and what right have you to do that?" *X* is an easy-going fellow. He is not looking for trouble. Therefore if he is drafted he will go into the army and not make trouble. He will be ashamed, but will go into the army and will be a good soldier. *Y* is likely to be belligerent. He would jump right into *X*, and tell him that he should get in there and fight the Japs. Japs have no right to live, since they started it. *X* is liable to stop the argument right there: "If that's the way you feel about it," and go off [15].

Nack said, "I don't know which side I'd be on. Once I was definitely on the side of war. Now I am not so sure. I would probably get in, but I'm not sure that I would agree with myself" [15]. From this and from what was reported above, it is obvious that Nack's attitude and *X*'s attitude are identical. Nack questions the right to kill, but he would obey if drafted (being an easy-going fellow who is not looking for trouble) despite the fact that he would feel some shame or guilt about it. He believes he would make a good soldier in the end. It seems that here we are dealing not with a man who is afraid of being hurt, but with one who is morally afraid of hurting. He expects, however, that he would get used to the business of killing and eventually he would engage in it as efficiently as the next man. Until recently Nack has been in the naval R. O. T. C., having enjoyed two summer cruises. He said that one of the best experiences he ever had "was when the gun crew for which I was pointer got the highest score on that summer's cruise" [1].

Nack joined the R. O. T. C. not to prepare himself for war but because he was interested in the science of navigation. Ever since he was a boy his unshakeable determination has been to become a surgeon or physician, and when he was accepted by a Medical School, he resigned from the R. O. T. C., thereby giving place to someone who wanted active duty. Thus Nack had an honest and legitimate reason for taking a course that would keep him out of military service for a number of years. Since leaving the R.O.T.C. he has found that his interest in the war has diminished markedly and now he does not spend much time about world affairs.

Nack has been given a low mark on the sentiment ad own participation in the war (national morale) because of his lack of recognition of or indifference to the values that are at stake. The brutalities of the fascist nations, the sufferings of the oppressed peoples, the possibility of defeat and the consequent loss of our democratic privileges have all failed to stir him. He has remained aloof preoccupied with his private interests. His aversion to war as a means set him in emotional opposition to the national

endeavor, although he would not have resisted being drafted and, we are convinced, would have made a good showing as a soldier. His conviction that no war could settle anything, that no benefits for mankind could be gained by fighting, has deprived him of an objective that might sustain him under fire. In other words, the effect of Nack on anybody with whom he talked could be nothing but demoralizing. On the positive side there is merely his somewhat shamefaced willingness to be drafted, whereas on the negative side there are his weighty scruples against aggression, his skepticism as to the possibility of a socially beneficial peace, and from first to last his invulnerable detachment.

Determinants. It should be stated at the outset that physical timidity is not a factor in this case. Nack has a strong body and he has always enjoyed exercising it in a variety of ways. As a boy he was often unruly and hard to manage. "I was a great one to take dares," he writes in his autobiography, "I could lick all the kids in the neighborhood and became a sort of leader. I got a thrill out of risking my life on steep ski trails, and shooting rapids in a canoe. I loved storms and would go out in the worst of them" [1]. His sentiments ad *Physical Ability* and *Athletics* are highly positive [13]. He puts Physical Ability fourth in the rank order of his abilities [9].

First among the determinants of Nack's low morale we would place two confluent factors: the first largely individual, the second largely social.

Nack is a potential misanthrope; the more he sees of man, the more he likes animals. On the Aphorisms Test [13] he is higher than any of our subjects in his sentiments ad *Animals* and *Nature*. "Until very recently," he writes, "I believed that war was natural. People couldn't get along with each other because they won't play fair. They will do things that I have never seen an animal do. I have always thought that animals were superior to man in all except intellect. I have been bitten by dogs and horses, and hooked by a bull, but never without fair warning and good reason. From my own observations these opinions were founded. They make me dislike history and made me very bitter toward people in general. History, I thought, was a story of man's betrayals. In High School I learned that nations, even the United States whom I thought could do no wrong, have done things that no dog would do. As yet I have seen nothing to change my opinion" [1]. Here, we must admit, is an astonishing conclusion to come out of a boy's experience. Nack has been viciously attacked by animals, but "never without fair warning and good reasons," and so, he decides, animals are morally superior to men, the inference being that ani-

mals have attacked him only after he has attacked them, whereas men have attacked him "without fair warning and good reason." As partial ground for this supposition, it was found that in early childhood Nack had been cruel to cats and toads; that later he had felt profoundly ashamed of his behavior, and in due time had become exceedingly devoted to animals of all sorts. If they attacked him, as they did occasionally, this was no more than a justifiable retaliation for what he had once done to them "without fair warning and good reason." He says that the years which he spent on his grandfather's farm in Vermont were his happiest. "I learned to love all the animals on the farm and would knock the block off any boy who even stepped on a toad. Once I saw one of the men kill a calf. He made an awful mess of it. After that I insisted that I kill and butcher all the calves. I, at least, would be sure that the calf felt no pain. I never had any aversion to killing an animal so long as it felt no pain" [1]. We do not require any more evidence than this to make the diagnosis of a nurturant reaction formation to sadism. Originally there was primitive enjoyment in hurting animals, and this provoked guilt and pity, which led, in turn, to nurturant behavior, or to nurturance fused with aggression (killing and butchering animals painlessly).

But this is not all. Nack's love for animals developed along the lines of empathic identification. When an animal was treated roughly *he* was treated roughly; and the man who was most apt to deal roughly with the farm animals was his own heavily built and masterful father. His father would get angry, not with his son (he was always kind to his son), but with an animal (with whom the boy felt himself identified) "without fair warning and good reasons." Thus Nack's aggression is turned against the sadism in his father as well as against the sadism in himself.

We might have left it at this, without venturing to explain more fully Nack's statement that people (his father) "will do things that I have never seen an animal do," and his characterization of history as "a story of man's betrayal," if it had not been that Nack told a story for the *TAT* that pointed to another traumatic incident which undoubtedly played a part in establishing his conviction that man was a sadist by nature and therefore evil, and in persuading him to a vocation of compassion (medicine) coupled with a philosophy of pacifism. Briefly, Nack's story runs as follows: "Oh, the fellow is about fifteen, I guess. He's either seen or read about an operation in which the patient had gone through all kinds of tortures, and he decided he's going to become a doctor. He's going to fix things, they're not going to happen like that any more. These are old doctors, very old,

long time ago. . . . The kid was probably just a young baby at the time, maybe. Looks like he had a nightmare or two. . . . Anyway, he's going to be a doctor, he's not going to have anything like this happen again." Here the hero is insisting that the old doctors are torturing the patient and that in the future he will do the operations—painlessly, just as the boy Nack insisted that "I kill and butcher all the calves." When reminded of this story, Nack recalled that when he was nine his mother had been operated on in the hospital, had suffered terribly and almost died, and that once he had been allowed to visit her, had seen the surgeon, and on the way home had vowed that some day he would be a doctor. Here then is another basis for his conviction that people (surgeons) hurt others (his mother) "without fair warning and good reason." The interpreter of the *TAT* suggested a further possibility. On the basis of the above given story, and a few other fragments, he made the diagnosis of primal scene complex: as a child Nack witnessed intercourse between his parents, and apperceived the situation as a sadistic assault by his two-hundred-pound father on his sickly mother. This supposition proved to be correct. Nack vaguely remembers entering his parents' room, finding them in bed and being told to leave immediately, his father explained that he was "doctoring" his mother. Nack, in his boy's heart, wanted to do the "doctoring" himself, but without hurting the beloved victim.

Thus, we have a series of painful memories: his father's sexual aggression (story of man's betrayal), the doctor's surgical aggression, his father's rough handling of animals, the farmhand's calf-killing and calf-butchering aggression, and finally, and not least, the boy's own sadism when playing with toads. Out of these came Nack's bad opinion of man, his pacifism, and his resolution to devote himself to humanitarian activity. With this background it is easy to see how he might feel ashamed or guilty in becoming a soldier, and yet how he might learn after a time to kill men as efficiently as he now kills calves.

As a second determinant, reinforcing the character structure developed out of these events, we would list pacifist indoctrination combined with the religious teachings of his mother. Indeed "both parents," Nack assures us, "have been a tremendous factor in religion." These influences, as we shall see in the next two chapters, have been strong and enduring. Nack is not only devoted to his mother and on good terms with his father but is, as he always has been, unswervingly religious. In his opinion war is morally wrong.

As a third determinant we might include the kind of American indi-

vidualism, manifested by Nack, which disapproves of meddling in other people's business, especially if it be a European war. It takes its traditional stand on self-sufficiency, and will have no truck with either Fascism or Communism. It leans toward isolationism and is suspicious of socialistic theories. Implicitly, if not explicitly, Nack's political sentiments are in line with this position, held for generations by the majority of American farmers and pioneers. On the Aphorisms Test [13] his sentiments ad *Centralization of Government, Economic Equalitarianism, Classless Society,* and *Communism* were outstandingly negative.

Subject No. 6: Hawk

"In the progressive High School which I attended," Hawk says, "ideals of peace and international coöperation were greatly stressed" [17]. Evidently he was an apt pupil for, as the Aphorisms Test shows, his sentiments ad War are strongly negative. He thinks of it as "detestable and inevitable" [14]. He is the most extreme of any *S* in his belief that, *There is such a thing as being too proud to fight,* and he definitely does *not* believe that, *War and courage have done more important things than business and mercenary aims.* None of our subjects are more certain than he that compulsory military service will lead us on the road to Fascism [13]. He is also slightly negative ad *Americanism,* being one of the only two subjects who believes that, *Patriotism is merely the name for self-seeking and ruthless men to hide behind* [13]. He thinks of *Americanism* as being "respectable, commendable, but insincere" [14].

Though more objective than any subject so far considered, Hawk, being opposed to war, does not like to admit that war can settle anything.

> It is difficult to say. In some cases it may. In some cases it may not. War has settled some immediate issues. Sometimes it settles longer ones. It may settle policies or territories [37].

On the whole, he tends to believe that war doesn't settle very much, as he sums his position up by putting himself down slightly on the negative rather than on the positive side. He does, however, have a definite belief in an enduring peace after the war.

> An enduring peace may come because all forms may be observed. It may come because of a good deal that we have learned since the last war, because leaders are better equipped to know what to expect from a lasting peace. It is quite possible. I should say Yes + [37].

At heart Hawk is in entire accord with the idealistic war aims announced by the spokesman of liberalism in America. His sentiments are conspicuously

positive and *Economic Equalitarianism, Labor, Racial Equality,* and *Communism vs. Fascism.* At school he was influenced by communist propaganda but was never converted. Today he would be called a democrat with socialistic leanings, a New Dealer plus. The aims of socialism still represent ideals for him although the wholesale debunking of all values which he has encountered since coming to Harvard has deprived these of their lustre.

> I feel that Harvard has done me a tremendous amount of harm by shattering the ideals that I had at the beginning. This has been due to the terrific cynicism of everything which I find, not only in history, government, and economics, but everywhere. This attitude tears down every ideal which one has [17].

Recently he has been wobbling with an uneasy conscience between a tarnished idealism and a half-hearted cynicism. He is now able to talk of war as "man's accustomed way of life," pointing out that "war has made everybody a little hard and opportunistic" [33].

The "shattering" of his ideals has temporarily deprived Hawk of a force sufficient to balance his basically egocentric orientation. He believes that "the most important thing in life is to fulfill one's own nature regardless of whether it benefits anyone else or society, provided that one has been conditioned in one's youth not to be a criminal" [15]. He thinks that "the only way to benefit society is to benefit oneself as a member of society" [15], and as if to prove the futility of self-sacrifice, he tells a story for the *TAT* [22] in which a man who performs a selfless deed for the benefit of another is killed by a malicious fate. These sentiments, which are the expression of a well-grounded belief in his own latent powers and possibilities, have brought Hawk into direct conflict with the claims of the nation. Now he must perforce give up for a while his cherished plans for personal development and advancement and direct his energies in other channels. But blocking the way to a wholehearted acceptance of this necessity is the vast frame of his personal ambition, the vision of the phenomenal career that lies ahead of him. So far he has failed to find a satisfactory resolution of this conflict.

Hawk is too clear-sighted not to realize the gravity of the situation, "threatened as we are with an enemy who will make this life you talk about a dream" [15], and he is quick to acknowledge that the most worthy ambition anyone can have today is "to take an active and intelligent part in the war effort" [14]. But, these realizations notwithstanding, he confesses that his own "chief aim in life now is to live through this war, to avoid dying, and to begin the life I have prepared for so long. This is my

chief preoccupation of mind right now" [1]. Concern with personal achievement—this is the theme that runs through the bulk of his responses. For instance, to the word *Happiness* he gives "aim, realized, work, recommendations"; to *Hope,* "ambition, aims, war, navy, commission" [24]; and to *Fear,* "I fear that extensive plans for the future are foolish at this time" [20]. In the Argument Completion Test [15] the emphasis in all his reasoning is on a future goal to be attained. In his conclusion of the discussion about the war in the Argument Completion Test [15] we can see laid bare before our very eyes the dilemma in Hawk's soul. It is a remarkably revealing picture of his inner conflict, his effort to reconcile himself to his inevitable involvement in the war, to the surrender of his own personal ambitions.

> *X:* "How is it possible that anyone wants to completely abandon his plans for the future, his roots at home, and tear himself out of all that he has been used to and go over and fight for an ideal? To me the most important thing is the life that I am living here, the continuance of the life that I have been expecting ever since my youth, to realize my ambitions and to conclude my education in the way directed."
>
> *Y:* "There are other things. Life around here has become impossible. You are threatened with an enemy who will make this life you talk about a dream. Your kind of life is ultimately gone. It will be changed by the many moves that this war will bring about. You can't bury your head in the sand and say that you will close your eyes through this whole business and come back to the same world that you knew before you put your head in the sand."
>
> *X:* "What if I get killed? What chance have I then? I will have wasted my life. I have a reasonable hope of success. Mine is a young life which has never been tried. Is it just going to be used to stop a bullet?"
>
> *Y:* "Some of us have to die in order that others will have a better world. Perhaps it will be you, perhaps not. That is out of your control. It is reasonable that every intelligent person should do his best. There is a chance to fight for our ideals. Then, too, it is a life of adventure. If you live it will be of great value. It will broaden you more than college ever could. It will be a great democratic experience for you who have always circulated in the economic and intellectual class. You will know the common man after you have been in service, and you will have some idea of the society you are working for and trying to fit yourself into. If you live this will be a valuable experience for you. If you die you will be of value to society as a whole, which means nothing personal, but should mean something in the larger sense."
>
> *X* is very much sobered by this talk. He begins to see that it is best

> to accept the inevitable which has come to him and which every intelligent man must accept [15].

Here we see Hawk making every attempt to will the obligatory, bringing together all the positive reasons he can think of for participating in the war. The threat of an enemy who would destroy our society cannot be denied; and we see how Hawk is trying to effect a compromise between his recognition that he must play his part in helping to defeat such an enemy and his desire to pursue his own ends. Although he says that "it is a chance to fight for your own ideals," this by itself does not carry enough vital conviction to make him act. It is necessary for him to add reasons showing how the experience will benefit him later, how it will serve his scheme of life.

At the time this test was given Hawk had already applied for training in the Naval Supply Corps, expecting that this experience would be of benefit to him after the war.

> I am going to get a Quartermaster job. I am physically fit, but I think I would make out much better there than I would in the army. . . . I wouldn't mind getting into action if I could get into some phase of it that would take me overseas, but I sort of feel that I would like to get into a responsible position. It seems to me that the Supply Corps now is so very important, and besides, from the selfish side, I like the idea of getting some training out of this war that will be of some use to me after it is over [33].

Hawk, however, has some misgivings about this solution of the problem. At one moment he feels that he should be dedicating himself to an ideal such as he imagined himself doing before he came to Harvard, that he should be throwing himself wholeheartedly into the present struggle; but then in another mood he is ready to subscribe to the comforting thought that the war is being fought for economic gains and this is not worth dying for. In responding to one of the cartoons he said:

> Victory is here represented by a chest of gold, which is about what it amounts to. The present way of living seems to be fundamentally a conflict between one society struggling against another, and though I am anxious to see our society win, I think that it is unfair to place it on too high a plane, when ideals these days are supposed to be unfashionable. It's upsetting because I am beginning to lose ideals. People have bounced them out of me. It seems to me to be wrong to accept the materialistic point of view, and yet it seems to have a lot of weight on its side [17].

Hawk, having seen the mote in the eye of other societies, thinks it only fair to consider the beam in the eye of his own, however upsetting it may be

to him. Having learned that nations and individuals are primarily motivated by self-interest, he has lost his idealism and is now out to look for the main chance himself. He is willing to "take an active and intelligent part in the war effort," but it must be a part which will insure his personal ambitions for the future.

> I wouldn't mind going overseas. I would just like some chance of coming out alive. The thing I would like to do most would be to fly because I think that I would like that. But I think the chances of living through it are too small [33].

Hawk was accepted for a two-year course of instruction in the management of supplies that would keep him out of active service for that length of time or more. Interviewed after a half of this period had elapsed, he gave the impression of being in a sorry state of individual morale. He had no zest for his work, did not feel that what he was doing had much connection with the war effort, was disheartened and confused, still a victim of the contending opposites: personal ambition and dedication to the nation. It seemed that neither need was being gratified to an appreciable extent.

Hawk was given a rather low score on national morale principally because of his carefully premeditated avoidance of active combat duty. His hatred of war as means to an end seems to have been engendered mostly by pacifist propaganda basing its message on the horrors of World War I. To Hawk, who does not think in terms of good and evil, war is not morally wrong, but immeasurably wasteful. We do not believe that his primary motivation in avoiding battle is crude physical fear as such, fear of injury and pain, but rather dread lest a bullet put an end to a magnificent career, the certainty of which rests upon an undeniable presentiment of his own potentialities. He is overcome by the pity of a vision cut short by violence. But the vision is not the offspring of world loyalty; it is the outgrowth of a primitive desire for power and glory. Hawk's motivations are essentially egocentric although the attainment of his goal entails constant dealings with social values. Hawk plans to enter politics after he has acquired training in business and law. Thus he is like Shea in being driven by a compelling ambition, but unlike Shea in so far as his ambition does not take him to a scientific laboratory where he can remain indifferent to the world's turmoil; but it takes him into the very center of this turmoil. Hawk, in consequence, is fully informed on current issues, and has arrived at an unequivocal ideological position, the standpoint of Democracy (in the broadest sense of the term) against Fascism, although, to prove his sophistication, he feels that he

must come out from time to time with a fashionably cynical and smart-aleckish remark, the only effect of which is to corrupt his rectitude.

Determinants. The principal determinant of Hawk's strong opposition to war as means was the pacifist indoctrination he received at school. The aversion he acquired there was not based on any religious considerations but on a repugnance to the horrors of the last war, coupled with an acceptance of a socialistic philosophy, which, being largely inspired by Communism, stood opposed to war between nations because a conflict of this sort creates a vertical cleavage that cuts across and diverts energy from the accepted horizontal cleavage between classes. As soon as Russia came over to the side of the Allies and Hawk's reflections reached the point where he could identify his socialistic faith with the principles of American democracy, the ideological path to his participation lay open. Consequently, his training in social thought must be set down on the positive as well as on the negative side of the dynamic equation: on the positive side because it brought him finally to a clear recognition of the issues of the war; and on the negative side because it failed to teach him that, the world being what it is, one must be prepared to fight for the life of one's highest values. Hawk's arrival at this simple truth was prevented in some measure by the corrosive skepticism that he learnt at college. Thus we must list among our negative determinants the analytical and ideal-deflating attitude of certain lecturers in history, government, and economics. Perhaps war is nothing but one nation's shabby greed against another's. Hawk is not yet the man to keep the sword of conviction sharp and shining in the wet weather of fashionable cynicism.

More important than these determinants, however, was the vivid thought of death terminating his career. Unable to feel that his sacrifice would be a triumph of the spirit, an inspiration to others, the utmost contribution to the continued life and renewal of cherished human values, he saw the war merely as the greatest possible threat to his ambition. In this he was strongly supported by his parents.

Although Hawk's mother and father are both German, having emigrated to this country before his birth, it is not likely that national origin has influenced the son's sentiments towards the present war in any way except to make him more ardently American than most. For, as it happens, Hawk's parents are passionately anti-German; his mother "never misses an opportunity to say how much better this country is." The father's importing and exporting business having been three times ruined by Nazi edicts, the family have this very personal provocation, in addition to several others, for

hating Hitler and his legions. But the parents have, nonetheless, been strenuously opposed to their son's participation in the war.

> Both my parents are against my being in the war. My father is more resigned to it than my mother. She is the worrier of the family, and she was horribly upset when my brother went into the service, even though there was no war at that time. They don't really know enough about what is going on and their main aim in life is to keep their sons out of the army and navy. When I first told them about this Business School course they blew up with pleasure and said that I should bend every effort to get in in order to keep out of the draft [33].

As far as physical constitution and athletic prowess go Hawk is about average. He has positive sentiments ad *Aggression, Physical Activity,* and *Athletics.* He puts *Physical Ability* in seventh place (near the middle) in the rank order of his abilities [9].

> I used to like fighting until I was eight or nine and began to read books. Then I used to avoid fights quite carefully and became the great pacifier. At High School I used to box, but I am not much of a boxer [1].

At school Hawk was outstanding as a leader: he was elected president of his class two years in succession and was chosen three times as one of a small group, selected from various schools, to attend a summer camp, the purpose of which was to train leaders. And yet, in the present crisis, there was not a trace of leadership ability in Hawk's behavior. Disillusioned, confused, and unable to bring his own mind into line, he could be of no help to others. There was no confidence in him. Trained to manage civilian activities, he found himself unable to use his native and acquired talents in the service of a cause he could not wholeheartedly accept; and because the principle of duty to one's country was a constituent of his super-ego he could not free himself of a lingering self-contempt based on his half-heartedness.

Subject No. 5: Dunn

Dunn is a disillusioned idealist of several years standing. On the Aphorisms Test most of his avowed sentiments are on the negative side. Man does not please him. On *Skepticism* he is first in the rank order and an *Optimism* next to last. This combination explains why, on the one hand, he is most negative on *Emotion, Idealism, Subjective Values,* and *Creator of Values,* and, on the other, he is most negative on *Intellect and Reason, Plan and Method,* and *Experience and Realism.* He trusts neither his feel-

ings nor his reason, although he is forever reasoning from feelings, thought being initiated and guided by his discontent. A great deal of time is spent marshalling arguments which prove the fallacies of arguments, the worthlessness of theories. The result is half-heartedness and a paralysis of will. This explains his high positive sentiments on *Intuition* and *Action vs. Thought*. Somehow he realizes that his compulsive intellections interfere with confident action and so imprison him. These latter sentiments, we would say, are unobjectified, favoring, as they do, that which he is not, that which he longs to become.

Dunn is only slightly negative on *Aggression* and *War*, but very much so on *Compulsory Military Training* and *Americanism*. He is one of the two subjects who believe that, *The establishment of compulsory military training would lower the mentality of Americans to an appreciable degree*. He is with one exception, however, the only S who does not believe that, *The establishment of compulsory military training would lead us on the road towards fascism*. Fascism is entirely antipathetic to his ideals, but, since his sentiments ad *Individualism* are less positive than those of the majority, the prospect of sacrificing some degree of personal freedom may have seemed less repugnant to him than it seemed to others.

He thinks of the adjectives, "cruel, mean, brutal, unnecessary, decadent, false" in connection with *War* [14], but in spite of this he is willing to concede that war has settled things.

> Certainly it has. Yes *3*. It settled the Civil War, our War of Independence. Certainly in the way things were changed in the last war. Certainly in the War of Sparta, in the Western War, and a great many others [37].

He also believes in the possibilities of a lasting peace after the war.

> Yes, I think we all have this belief or we certainly couldn't fight this war with a great deal of enthusiasm. I feel that a peace in which we disarm our enemies or heavily arm ourselves will produce a lasting peace. Or a peace in which we assure to those who are our enemies now what we stand for. These will produce a lasting peace. But certainly a petty peace like the last one will not produce a lasting peace [37].

It is apparent from these two responses given on the spur of the moment and under some stress that Dunn has given thought to these matters. He says that the things he likes best to talk about are "myself, creative things with creative people, and conjecturing about the future" [14]. By the latter he refers to the social and political future of the world.

That Dunn has been exposed to currents of liberal opinion is suggested by his strongly positive sentiments ad *Labor, Classless Society, Economic Equalitarianism, Communism, The Masses.* The suspicion that these socialist attitudes are products of disillusionment, a dissatisfaction with the workings of democracy in Great Britain and America, is confirmed by one response to the Argument Completion Test [15].

> *X* will then point out (I can almost put myself in *X*'s place)—my arguments would be—first, take *Y* back and lead him by the hand through British history of the 20's and 30's. Then British social and political history. I would show him the policy among upper class British towards Russia, Communism, and any further gains by the Social Service State. In the 20's and 30's the upper class British saw that the liberalism of Gladstone had led to a democratic state, and the logical outcome of that was socialism. In the 1920's the upper classes were afraid. Therefore they courted Germany and scuttled the League of Nations. I would show him the slums, the dole, etc., people only nearly alive. How close England was to revolution, if the English people didn't have the character to suffer rather than revolt.
>
> I'd do the same job on American History. I would point out that working people in England were anxious to help Spain but the government sold them out.
>
> Therefore when these same men persist in power today, how can you rationalize that with an open armed policy towards Russia? How, when state leaders still show pro-Fascist manifestations—how can you enthuse over a war led by them?
>
> I would also point out the attitude so prevalent, "It's better to win the war than think about the peace." I'm laughed down when I bring that up. But propaganda after the last war destroyed the possibility for the peace. I think it dangerous for people not to think about the peace. The Conference table is just as important as the war.
>
> *X* will stand with *Y* in the fighting. I am against what we are fighting against, but what we are fighting *for* is just as important.

It is clear from this that Dunn's antagonism and distrust are focussed on American and British leaders with pro-fascist tendencies rather than on the out-and-out fascists of Germany and Italy. The latter declare their evil, the former conceal their's behind a bushel of righteousness. Thus he is distrustful of patriotism until he can be certain of the goal toward which it is directed. The adjectives which he gives to the word *Americanism* are, "jingoism, traditional, stereotyped, hopeful, valid, earnest, pathetic" [14]. He says,

> I am skeptical about the war—patriotism with skepticism. I would not be in favor of a negotiated peace, because although I am skeptical about democracy, I am more skeptical about the persons we're fighting

> with. Look at the fact that people are still in power who sold out Spain, etc. I think more and more that those people will have to change or go. Churchill is already changing, sending Cripps to India. Yet I still think he wants the old England to go on. In 1939-40 I was much more sympathetic with the Allies at that time. More sympathetic with the leadership. Now I tend to exclude the leadership and merely have sympathy with the people. This is due to the fact of seeing men who should have known better give poor leadership [18].
>
> I can't feel sympathetic with the British government. I feel more enthusiastic about the war when I think of it as a people's war, and a possibility for a people's peace [18].

This change in his attitude he ascribes to Professor F whose course he has been taking.

> Professor F has been able to transfer my desire from getting personal gain towards using my abilities to the creation of a Social Service State. I could get a bigger kick in a government post than getting a big salary as a Babbitt in business [18].

Dunn says that one of his three greatest ambitions is "to do social good" [14], but he is careful to add that, "I don't believe in martyrs." There is little danger of his becoming one. After interviewing him on his sentiments the experimenter's impression was that Dunn, in attempting to be judicious, becomes so self-critical that he ends by having no assured sentiments of his own. This is also reflected by the low intensity of his marks all through the Aphorisms Test. His skepticism prevents him from seeing anything which he can wholeheartedly admire. He himself is aware of this and troubled by it.

> I have always wanted to be extreme, and the fact that I have shows that I'm always somewhere in the middle. I believe that if you really want to get something done you have to passionately believe in it and get out and do it. I think that if I ever really believed in anything, then I would not look at both sides of the question, but would overlook little inconsistencies, and drive ahead to the main goal. As it is I vacillate through skepticism [18].

He contrasts his own troubled, searching, distrustful attitude to that of his brother, who is an aviator.

> He has so little sense of reality and the actual implications of war that he delights to shoot at men as if they were the paper targets at which he shot as a child, with no more awareness than if they were immaterial objects [3].

"The trouble with this war for me," says Dunn, "is that I don't feel deeply about it. I don't feel deeply about anything ever. I can't get through

to all that this war means, and neither can my brother. My parents don't realize either. All that they feel passionately is that they want their sons safe. They were burnt in the last war, you see" [3].

Dunn, who suffers from a generalized paralysis of emotion, finds this especially intolerable at the present time when he is being forced into an active rôle, and he envies the boyish zest of his brother. He is in the unhappy position of wanting to want to participate but being unable to. "Bucking inevitables depresses and discomforts me," he says, "I am depressed at times" [1]. An experimenter with whom this subject talked at length reported that Dunn displayed great reluctance to take an active part in the war, that he had joined the naval R.O.T.C. more as an expedient that would enable him to finish college.

On the *TAT* Dunn told two stories with a war setting [22]. One is:

> The picture of a man in Spain during the Revolution, looking out of a window at bombers. He is strong in himself, yet more or less helpless against that particular kind of force. There's no end to that story. It might be Russia, or Libya, or any of a thousand places.

Another story is that of two young men who are:

> Thinking of the war and what lies ahead of them. They will go into the service as officers, and come back and follow the lines they had planned on.

This story suggests that unlike Shea, Dunn has no feeling that participation in the war would be the end of everything for him. What he fears is that he will go through the war feeling nothing, and find nothing at the end but the same repellent greed, hypocrisy, and opportunism which has characterized the behavior of our leading politicians and business men since World War I.

Determinants. Among the factors which have determined Dunn's reluctance to throw himself into the world struggle we would list his state of depression first. From this stems his bitterness, his obsessional thinking, his partial paralysis of emotion and will. To account for it we have discovered a profound trauma of press Disillusionment, the exposed untrustworthiness of a loved object, dating from infancy—a matter which cannot be discussed here. Closely related to this personal trauma is another determinant: this subject's identification with his family, more particularly with his father, a liberal Democrat, who was a struggling upward-mobile optimist until the Depression came to strip him of all his earnings and break his spirit. Within a few months he became more or less of a recluse whose only pleasure was to curse the order of society, the evils of capitalism,

the perfidy of leaders. His political views became increasingly radical until now he can see no hope in anything less than a sweeping revolution of the proletariat. Thus at home the son's intellectual education consisted chiefly of repeated exposures of the injustices and errors of American democracy. His father, he says, "is almost as intolerantly liberal as others are intolerantly conservative." Although the boy never became an out-and-out communist, the ground for faith in American institutions was taken from him, and so when the war came the prospect of fighting for the preservation of the status quo was more repellent than appealing. He had to see it as a people's war if his passion was to be totally engaged.

Another factor, in Dunn's case, was his mother's prohibitions against fighting, combined with much pacifist indoctrination at school. He feels that his mother conditioned his thinking "by idealizing certain patterns of conduct. We were under strict orders not to fight, for instance" [18]. His mother always exaggerated any risks and was fearful of what might happen to him [4]. He and his younger brother enjoyed nothing so much as playing soldiers. But their parents disapproved and took them to see "The Big Parade," hoping that this would impress them with the horrors of war. Dunn says that the only result of this was to give them new ideas. They "exchanged the technique of Balaclava for that of the Marne" [2]. An interest in mimic warfare continued side by side with a growing enthusiasm for pacifism encouraged by a woman teacher at school. He says that he was "a bit of an idealist, and a victim of such anomalous concepts as pacifism and a hero worship of Baron von Richtofen at the same time" [1].

His mother's law against aggression was abruptly abandoned as the result of a peculiar incident that occurred when the *S* was twelve. Up to that critical day the Dunn boys were never allowed to fight back when any of the neighborhood toughs attacked them and made away with their playthings. Following instructions, they always immediately reported the incident to their mother whose rôle it was to settle matters by scolding the aggressors and reclaiming the stolen belongings. The day came, however, when a young rascal swiped Dunn's bicycle and rode it to his home which happened to be two miles on the other side of town. This was too much for Mrs. Dunn, a busy housewife. "Why don't you defend your property?" she exclaimed. It was the beginning of a new era. After that there were no more quarrels and plunderings because it soon became noised abroad that the Dunn boys would strike back hard if attacked. As in Finch's case a policy of instantaneous defense proved conducive to peace.

Although at school Dunn became an ardent opponent of war (a negative determinant), he took an active part in athletics and was insociated in several groups, both of which experiences, as a rule, operate to produce high national morale. "I was an indiscriminate joiner," he writes, "and the champion of causes good and bad. I debated, was in the 'Y,' played soccer, basketball, and was captain of the track team." And here we come across another apparent paradox of sentiment. Dunn's upward mobility at school and college has been largely due to his athletic prowess and his popularity. He has never lacked friends; and yet he is among the most negative in his attitude toward *Athletics,* and he is at the bottom of the rank order on *Friendship.* These judgments spring from his bitterness (repressed aggression) which makes him as discontented with himself and his accomplishments as he is with the actions of other admirable objects.

Two other determinants of low national morale that have affected Dunn's present outlook are (*a*) the dishearteningly low ethical standards manifested in the sayings and actions of American politicians, and (*b*) the cynicism pervading the lectures given by most college professors. Dunn's instructors have taught him to believe the worst, namely, that the motives which determine the behavior of politicians are typical of human nature generally. The theory of economic materialism has put the finishing touches on his disillusionment.

His apathy and his inability to feel deeply are expressions of the dilemma experienced by innumerable other young men who have been exposed to the liberal pacifist currents of the last 20 years, by well-meaning parents and teachers who "were burnt in the last war." They were brought up with concepts of justice to which nothing in history conformed, and then became, as Niebuhr has said, so "overwhelmed by the fact that every nation is selfish that they knew of no standard by which they could judge the Nazis to be unjust." Dunn, like most of our other subjects, fails to mention the terrible tyranny which we are fighting to destroy. His skepticism has prevented him from perceiving this obvious fact, and consequently he cannot feel the profound indignation of the free man.

And so it has come about that Dunn, a graduate of naval R.O.T.C., and about to become an ensign, is setting out on this phase of his career with half a heart. He is distrustful of the motives of our leaders, and pessimistic as to the possibility of building the Social Service State that he envisages as an ideal; but he is a conscientious young man of energy and intelligence, and it is probable that if he approaches the zone of perilous action sustaining sentiments will emerge and he will nobly play his part in defending the

values that he has complacently enjoyed all these years as legitimate expectations rather than as long-fought-for precious privileges. [Note (1945): Dunn was transferred to a government agency for non-combatant service in 1943.]

Subject No. 4: Lake

Lake's sentiments appear to be in entire conformity with parental teaching and tradition. Any vestige of individualism is so deeply repressed as to be of debatable existence. In the Aphorisms Test [13] his most positive sentiments are those ad *Family, Marriage, Friendship,* and *Businessman,* and the most negative ad *Non-Conformity* and *Subjective Values.* This lack of individualism is further brought out in the Argument Completion Test [15] in which his arguments invariably rest on the basic sentiments of community and friendship and on parental and traditional standards. In his reactions to the war cartoons [17] Lake is unique among all the subjects in that he never draws a distinction between his own reactions and those of the public. He stands by the great middle class from first to last.

In talking about his plans for the future Lake shows no anxiety about being drafted. His bad eyesight eliminates the possibility of combat duty. To one experimenter he says that if he is drafted he hopes to be accepted at the Business School, either in the school for Quartermasters or in the school for Defense Industry, as he feels that these will help him in his future work [26]. To another experimenter he remarks that he expects to become a soldier and thinks that he will like it [3]. A third reports that Lake does not seem to feel strongly about anything; he tells her that he is perfectly happy, the world is wonderful, he is anxious to get into the war since it is inevitable [32].

Most of the experimenters commented on Lake's lack of emotional intensity and depth. He seems to have an almost compulsive determination to look at the bright side of life. In the Dramatic Production Test [26] he was unusual in providing all his productions with happy endings. This is his consciously affirmed attitude toward life and he is resolved to maintain it.

> Optimism is the right and happy attitude, and one should concentrate on this. No matter what happens there is always a good side and one should keep thinking of this aspect. I am not afraid of death, and if I were wounded in the war I could find some advantage even in this [15].

Behind this determinedly bright persona we must search for the hidden Lake.

In the Aphorisms Test Lake's sentiments are neutral ad *Americanism*

but positive ad *War*. He is slightly against *Compulsory Military Training*. He thinks of war as being "hateful and stupid" [14], but he is willing to concede that it can settle some things.

> Yes 3. It tells you what to work for. We did save something out of the last war [37].
>
> Yes 5. I think that the world will be so weak that an enduring peace can be imposed. There are people, there are men, there will be minds that can formulate an enduring peace. Human nature can be changed [37].

Now some of these sentiments are at variance with what he tells us of his cheerful willingness to participate in the war "since it is inevitable." If we knew no more of Lake than this we would be willing to assume that here is a young man who has simply accepted the inevitable, and without much thought, assumed his share of the destiny that has been thrust upon him. In only one reaction—his conclusion to the discussion about war in the Argument Completion Test [15]—does he give the slightest intimation of an underlying conflict. It may be said that in all his responses to this test Lake shows an inability to think of specific problems in relation to general ideas, the arguments being based on very simple and commonplace assumptions, which, with this one exception, reveal almost nothing of his inner life. He begins as follows:

> *X* says, "We know that wars have been won, but no permanent gains seem to be made out of war." *X* is still skeptical and begrudging the whole thing, this way of life being such an interference. "Why should I have to go and give my life in the draft?" he says. I don't think he realizes that it is the attitude of selfishness. Deep down it is because all things are being taken away from him.

Lake's greatest ambition he says "is to attain complete unselfishness and benevolence" [1]. But the demands of the war, one might infer, have given rise to such a feeling of deprivation that he is unable to meet it unselfishly. Such an attitude is impossible for him because he has no positive ideal to put up against his sense of individual loss and privation. "Nothing I can think of," says Lake, "would be worth the price of my life. I would like to think, though, that the world will go on improving" [15]. When it is suggested to him that the improvement of the world depends on the efforts and sacrifices of individual men he answers, "Well, I guess nothing that I can do will effect much, or bring much about. I am only one person, and I couldn't change anything. This may be selfish of me, but I guess we are all selfish" [15].

Lake continues the argument about the war by giving the point of view of *Y*, the other protagonist.

> *Y* is optimistic about the war and everything after. He loves to speculate on the war, what slight chances there are of losing it, and what the peace will be. He thinks there will be less of the world left after the war than the experts think. Many men will be killed, and the world will be a havoc, and much hatred everywhere. There will be a few people who can rise above themselves and outline a peace which will give the greatest good for the greatest number.
>
> All this time while Y has been discussing his ideas, *X* has been getting more and more depressed. They talk on and on, and *X* decides that they had better finish off. So they get up and go to the toilet, and that is the end.

Lake has told us that the subject he likes best to discuss is the war, and Y's argument undoubtedly reflects aspects of his own thought. We see his insistence on optimism in spite of the fact that "*Y* thinks there will be less of the world left after the war than the experts think." *Y* well exemplifies the spectator's attitude toward the war, that of objective comment with little personal involvement. *X*, on the other hand, shows a very different picture. The familiar doubt about the significance of the war is again repeated. There is no moral commitment and no basic decision, and, as a consequence, the fundamental feeling is that of individual frustration and loss in the face of inescapable demands. From the way Lake brings his argument to a close we may infer that this discrepancy between his idealego and his actual feelings is very disturbing. As soon as the latter come into consciousness his reaction is to eliminate them, to "get up and go to the toilet."

About the future Lake says,

> My one desire in life is that I will be able to accomplish something for the welfare of humanity, with the only reward being the satisfaction that I know deep inside me that I have done so [1].
>
> For my ideas regarding a more perfect world after the war, I can only say that my mind is in a constant conflict with numerous unharmonic possibilities. I think I most often resort to a socialistic world embodying as many liberal democratic qualities as possible. But each day the possibilities seem slimmer. But deep inside I am really very much of an optimist [1].

Lake tells us that his one desire in life is to be able to accomplish something for humanity, and he desires a world which embodies as many liberal democratic qualities as possible, but he seems to be unable to relate these aims to any action possible to him. He is overwhelmed by the impotence

of the single individual in a global world, just as he was overwhelmed by the vast impersonality of the university into which he came after leaving the organismic community of his youth.

Determinants. Lake's national morale is not of the kind and strength that wins victories against a valiant enemy; but considering his disability of vision and the improbability of his ever engaging in active combat, it seems to us that his unhesitating acceptance of duty, his cheerfulness, his inveterate conscientiousness are sufficient to guarantee a creditable record in the Army. He has been assisted in the attainment of this healthy attitude by his respected father, who, despite his failure to reach the battlefront in World War I, is commander of the Legion Post in his home town.

Physically, Lake is strong and stocky, but not athletic. Stimulated by his brother, he went out for football at High School, but gave it up after two or three seasons. "I think I was afraid of the game but never did I let anyone know of it," he confessed in his autobiography [1]. Since then he has followed various sports with keen interest without participating actively. "I like the spirit of athletics," he says, "but do not have the ability." He rates *Physical Ability* as seventh in the rank order of his abilities. In the Harmavoidance Test [29] he was, in general, more infavoidant (fearful of contempt) than harmavoidant (fearful of physical pain). His most conspicuous block was to the word *Coward*. Under the threat of shock his performance did not deteriorate.

Lake's somewhat tepid attitude is part and parcel of a phlegmatic temperament. He is slow-moving, physically and mentally, and not easily aroused by anything. His activity level is below average, and partly because of this his emotional stability seems relatively high. Thus he is not prompted by impetuosity to throw himself into things with zest and earnestness. Nor is he driven forward by ideological enthusiasms. His analysis of the present crisis is simple and reasonable, uncomplicated by the corrosive subtleties that embarrass some of his more sophisticated classmates. We expect Lake to give a good account of himself in the Quartermaster Corps.

Subject No. 3: Yawl

Yawl is a cynical, rebellious individualist who has adopted psychological realism as his philosophy. On the Aphorisms Test [13] he displays intense positive sentiments ad *Skepticism, Non-Conformity, Subjective Values,* and *Self-Interest.* He says that he likes best to talk about "myself, my interests, problem discussions" [14], and that he esteems as the three most worthy ambitions, "helping mankind, self-expression, living a good uninhibited life"

[14]. Yawl makes many conflicting statements, and here is one of them: "helping mankind" is an ambition that is out of line with his other aims. His major sentiments, he affirms, are "the non-acceptance of conventional values (merely because they are conventional), the judgment of people as individuals (not just as masses)" [18].

Yawl is not interested in the activity of groups, in social institutions, in economics or in government; the focus of his preoccupation is human nature, the person as an unique individual. Thus social issues, as such, rarely engage his interest. His general temper is radical, and for a while socialism attracted him, but his political sentiments are not radical. On the one hand, he is negative ad *Centralization of Government, Economic Equalitarianism, Labor,* and *The Masses;* and, on the other, he is negative ad *Businessman, Politician,* and *Churchman.* The former cluster can be partly explained by reference to his high negative mark on *Idealism.* In the Argument Completion Test [15] he ends the debate on the question of devoting oneself to society as opposed by following one's selfish aims by saying: "*X* is a dope. The question as to whether the work you do is valuable to society or not is too theoretical and won't get you anywhere. That's not suited to *my* nature. If it was, I would be doing it. . . . You can only change as he gets better individually." Yawl brings his autobiography [1] to a close with the statement: "I don't want to change the world much. I think the reality of the way it is is all right, and to wish to change it is the silliest of all possible daydreams. The social world in the fullest sense of the word is the way it has to be and is not at all bad. I would not become a crusader, but would leave the world as it is, and move to some part of it that is to my liking." To the word *American* he gave the response: "good, usually poor taste, self-preservation, right, beneficial, propaganda." What will be the attitude of such a man when faced by the crisis of war?

Yawl's sentiments ad *War* are strongly positive, second only to Ingle's. To the word War he gives: "fighting, killing, dying, human, necessary, pointless, universal" [14]. To the question, Does war ever settle anything? Yawl answers:

> Yes *2.* You can consider quite a few things. You know it seems inevitable that it settles something, and in that way it's inevitable. You can say in the first place that it settles the history of a race. It settles problems of the expansion of governments. It settles certain problems of the population, and in that way may be necessary. And you can consider that it will settle certain problems of human instincts which doesn't amount to much among ourselves [37].

But Yawl, like a true skeptic, does not believe in the possibility of an enduring peace after the war. To this question he answers:

> No 4. War is man's instinct. To a large extent man will keep on fighting for small things and big things, and wars are a way of getting them. But it's not going to settle anything. The races, Germany, Japan, are going to keep on going. I think in a few years we should go on fighting again. But I think it is too much to ask the human race to do that. I think a new generation will spring up that has some new ideas. That is a very beautiful concept [37].

Yawl says that war can settle "quite a few things," but later he asserts that this war is "not going to settle anything." The truth is that many of the things he says are intended to be sensational, clever, or provocative. He does not always know what he means or mean what he says. Continuing the theme of "man's instinct," he says that:

> Certain instincts have gotten rubbed out since man because civilized and that war represents the welling up of these instincts. I don't know whether this is a correct interpretation, but anyhow war happens to all of society, and therefore you just can't say that it isn't for me. I have no feeling that I am being dragged into war. I have a positive conviction that it is part of life. On the other hand, it doesn't settle anything. You just kill people who don't want to fight either. No, no, no, the present war will settle nothing. It may keep the world from being overrun, but what is coming will come anyhow. There is a loss of liberties coming anyhow. It would be worse under Hitler, but even so there will be a great restriction of freedom. We have had too much *laissez faire*, and have now come to the stage where you have to say "You do this and you do that." We're going to lose what we are fighting for anyhow. There is no point in fighting. But a negotiated peace wouldn't last long. So I think we have to keep on going until we win it. It will come out a little better in the long run than it would if we lost. And anyhow war is active and not passive [18].

Here is a new slant. There is nothing much to be gained by any war; but war comes every so often as a predetermined welling up of the fighting instinct in the race. At such times the individual had better realize that it is an inevitable phase of life which must engulf him as it does others. This is passive fatalism, the shadow self of the rebellious individualist. He acquiesces even to the restriction of personal liberties after the war. It must come, he argues; "We have had too much *laissez faire*." It is clear that Yawl thinks of humanity as a great, unmanageable mass governed by unalterable natural laws. He believes that only single individuals can be modified.

Yawl is the only one of our subjects who accepts war as such. "War is inevitable," he says, "since fighting is one of the many admirable and necessary human instincts" [12]. But he wants to take the instinct raw, not have it dressed up with moral or patriotic symbols. No debunker was ever more suspicious than he is of idealistic or sentimental propaganda. This antipathy of his comes out most strikingly in his responses to cartoons, for example:

> I don't like it. It's using sacred symbols, the nativity scene, as being American . . . a gross exaggeration . . . giving some monstrous half-ape, half-devil, as the opposing side. I don't see what more claim we have to be Jesus Christ with a cross over our head than the three leering Japs have. This propaganda is over-played.
>
> This is a better cartoon. It shows something threatening your life while you're in the water. It's not overdone. It is not just arousing sympathy for Christ-like Americans, but telling you to keep your eyes open because the war has spread. It's a good analogy with the idea of life lines being cut off while you're under water.
>
> This is overdone . . . pouring out the life blood of Germans from a soda syphon. And furthermore, it is quite obvious that the same thing is going to happen to us. I don't see the point of it except that it is slapping the Germans and not us [17].

Yawl's conclusion of the debate on war in the Argument Completion Test [15] is as follows:

> *X*: "How can an individual like you kill someone when the whole affair is the result of imperialist higher-ups?"
>
> *Y*: "It is something you can't dodge. It is part of men's fighting instinct. You can't get away from it. It is best to accept it and not question it too much."
>
> *X* grumbles a lot when he is drafted but finally he goes off to Army Camp. He does not object because of his fear of social disapproval and his desire for praise.
>
> I've got both tendencies. I always argue the case of the one who takes it as a matter of course, but I have a streak of the other in me.

Here we have a statement of partial ambivalence which comes about as near to representing Yawl's standpoint as anything that he said. One experimenter reported that Yawl seemed to be concerned about his own lack of purpose or direction, "but he tosses off the problem at the moment by saying that the government will take care of that" [2]. To another experimenter he said, "They can get me next January if they want me, but I don't think I will be drafted for a while. I might like to join the Air Force if I get through college. But I don't know. I couldn't be an officer in anything else because I haven't taken any R.O.T.C. courses" [33].

Yawl is an emotional and impulsive young man who is attracted powerfully to the prospect of change, sensation, and excitement. "Anyhow," he said, "war is active not passive." Perhaps it was this that prompted him, perhaps it was something else, but in any event he suddenly walked out and enlisted in the Air Corps as a pilot candidate. He, the youngest of our subjects, was the first to go, electing the most dangerous of the services; and because of this act we have placed him third in our rank order. He was the only one who was not averse to war as means, war being, in his opinion, a cyclic occurrence that must be accepted along with everything else in the universe. In getting into the war he was willing the obligatory ("You can't get away from it. It is best to accept it.") As motivation he also mentioned the need for activity ("And anyhow war is active and not passive"), and the needs for blamavoidance and recognition ("because of his fear of social disapproval and his desire for praise"). Knowing Yawl, we suspect, in addition, the operation of pride, the desire to maintain self-respect by action (when not doing the thing would signify lack of courage and so provoke contempt of self). Yawl's fitness for aviation is questionable and it is possible that we are dealing here with a desperately dramatic act instigated by a desire to prove to himself that he is capable of dangerous undertakings.

Yawl has not been put at the top of the rank order, because of his lack of sociocentrism: he does not feel identified with the nation, he has no ideal of social responsibility, he is not enlisting out of a sense of moral obligation, and he has no interest in war aims; he believes that war is as futile as it is inevitable. He will be sustained by pride, by the spirit of adventure, and by the carefree comradeship of which he is capable; but under dire stress the fatalistic cynicism that pervades his mind may undo his resolution.

Determinants. The factors that are chiefly responsible for Yawl's excessive egocentrism, for his indifference to social values and for his rampant cynicism must be set down as negative determinants. These are: (*a*) his profoundly intraceptive and subjective temperament; (*b*) his choice of literature as a profession; (*c*) the influence of certain highly subjective and egotistical romantic writers; (*d*) the influence of the debunkers; and (*e*) his negativistic opposition to the character and sentiments of his father.

Yawl is, in fact, the product of a long-lasting son-father conflict. For years the boy, feeling no great affection or respect for his parent, repeatedly defied him, and today he is the open enemy of every article in his creed. He says he is ashamed of his father's "Babbitt-like capitalistic outlook" and

he ridicules him because he "believes in blind school spirit, and in blind patriotism. He refuses to be objective, and talks of the 'blunders of the bone-headed Boche' in the last war. He is full of this Rotarian Babbitt stuff, and is one of the most complete examples of 'one of the boys' that you ever saw" [4]. His father's friends, he says, "never question anything. They are dull and have a poor sense of values. They have a vegetable complacency, and are without either intelligence or understanding" [18].

From scorn of his father's values it was but one step to the repudiation of all middle class standards and the dramatization of himself as a classless non-conforming genius. Thus it was the representation of social forms by a somewhat ridiculous father that turned the son against social forms in general and persuaded him to a policy of exaggerated individualism. Rebellion against his father established a pattern which was objectified in his later encounters with authorities.

On the positive side are Yawl's high level of activity, his impulsiveness and his manifest aggression. As a child he had a furious temper which was expressed by screaming, kicking, fighting, and throwing knives and mallets at his brothers and sisters. His parents were afraid that he would end in the penitentiary. He had difficulty submitting to discipline and was sent to seven different schools before coming to college. "I was notoriously uncooperative," he admits, "and had a fairly aggressive nature" [1]. "I liked mass brawls, and fights, and athletics" [1]. The sports in which he excelled were pole vaulting and football. He has always been fond of wrestling and says that he can beat up much heavier fellows [12]. But even his athletic associates "have condemned me for lack of training, or lack of the noble self-sacrifice that is admired in most competitive sports" [1].

In spite of all this aggressiveness, Yawl received a high mark on Harmavoidance. As a child he suffered from affrighting nightmares in which he was pursued by savage animals [2], and even today he is not entirely free of apprehension at night. Evidences were found of unconscious fears of being attacked or mutilated [12]. One of his English themes consisted of a vivid detailed description of the fear experienced by a soldier who had to go out on a night patrol. In both shock experiments he reacted violently to pain [29, 30]. Besides anxiety, the examiners found a good deal of unconscious passivity, and it was decided that Yawl's manifest assertiveness was a prideful counteraction to less masculine tendencies that were repressed. If this is true, there is a possibility that Yawl may someday be unable to resist a temptation to collapse.

Subject No. 2: Ingle

Ingle has acquired a cluster of assumptions and sentiments which are rationalized and verbalized sufficiently to constitute an ideology, an ideology of revolutionary socialism which he misses no opportunity to expound with the fervor of a prophet. Of all our subjects Ingle is the most politically conscious, the most ideocentric, the most fully identified with a doctrine. On the Aphorisms Test [13] he is highly positive ad *Labor, The Masses, Classless Society, Racial Equality,* and *Communism,* all of which call for a greater degree of cooperation among diverse elements than is the rule in the United States at the present time. Ingle, consequently, finds himself strongly opposed to *The Individual of Primary Value, Self-Interest,* and *Competition* [13]. Having been at odds with our traditional political philosophy, however, his sentiment ad *Non-Conformity* is highly positive.

Ingle was for several years an ardent Marxist, but he has recently swung back to a less radical position. Today he is a leftist liberal who purposes to work for the reform of democracy along socialistic lines. In his predictions for the post-war world we find a concise summary of his own faith:

> I expect after the war there will be government ownership, a changing state, with the same ideals of social and even revolutionary progress that were born with this nation, with a more complete democracy than it has ever enjoyed, both in the sphere of education and politics [1].

Ingle has a vigorous social consciousness; he puts "service to society" first in listing the three most worthy ambitions [14]. In the Argument Completion Test [15] he stands out from the others in respect to the number of arguments based on the desirability of the goals, *benefit to society, social improvement,* and *elimination of oppression.* He is also high on the necessity of a *future goal;* and, being temperamentally an optimist, his faith in the ultimate actualization of his ideals is staunch and unabating. His sentiment ad *Optimism,* by the way, is more positive than that of any other subject. Integral to his philosophy is the high value placed on altruistic aims and on the practice of Christian brotherhood. In Ingle's case the *Argument Completion Test* was particularly efficient in clearly demonstrating the unusual scope and precision of his ideological knowledge, the large number of arguments he had on the tip of his tongue, and his talent in setting forth both sides of every issue with cogency and even-handed justice. His unerring ability to apperceive individual behavior in relation to significant social trends was also brought out in his responses to cartoons. Typical of him is the comment,"This is good because it makes the fight of a struggling soldier only part of a larger struggle." [17].

In college Ingle has concentrated in anthropology and biology, with the intention of combining the knowledge acquired in each of these disciplines as the foundation for a career in biology socially applied. In his opinions ad *Scholarship, Scientist, Facts,* and *Empiricism* he stands at the extreme positive end of our rank order; and these sentiments are objectified in his behavior. He is a hard worker and has already succeeded in completing a bit of research in the field of human physiology. Less objectified are his positive sentiments ad *Facts vs. Theory* and *Plan, Method;* and still less so are his negative sentiments ad *Spontaneity, Intensity, Imagination,* and *Free Will.* For Ingle has a mind that is a veritable maelstrom of concepts, and he is, above all, a theorist. Having chosen science as a profession, however, he is inclined to stress the virtues of self-control, moderation, critical appraisal, and adherence to the testimony of substantial facts. Thus he attempts to check and balance the force of his outflying imagination.

With the help of dialectic materialism Ingle has succeeded in combining, to his entire satisfaction, the scientific and political ideals that mean so much to him. "I am an anthropologist," he says, "and the creation of a new society is close to my heart. It is also close to my nature" [15]. The same position is taken and supported by one of his characters in the Argument Completion Test [15].

> I, as an anthropologist, will have ideas and know where we are going. I will know where things are really going, and I will be able to push. I will be part of the wave of the future [15].

Two of his greatest ambitions are "to know enough to be right," and "intellectual success" [14]. He thinks it is very important to be awake to everything, and admits that he himself has a "terrific drive to intellectual curiosity" [18]. "Life," he asserts, "ought to accomplish a contribution to human knowledge." [18]; and in his own life thus far he has taken some big steps in equipping himself with the necessary intellectual tools.

> My political reading was started by the Spanish war. In my freshman year I read Lenin, Marx, Engels, Pareto, Veblen [18].
>
> My chief interests are in genetics, the human body, population, birth rates, the effect of diet on metabolic rate, climate on human constitution, and various racial and genetic strains that contribute to the difference in races [33].

In the Aphorisms Test [13] Ingle is more strongly positive than any of our subjects in his sentiments ad *Aggression* and ad *War,* and third in the rank order on *Compulsory Military Training.* He is one of the two subjects who does not believe that, *The establishment of compulsory military training*

will lead us on the road to fascism. But in the Sentiments Test [18] *War* is among the objects that have the greatest negative cathexis. The reason for this contradiction seems to be that although he doesn't favor war, he realizes that it may be necessary in the creation of a new society and that it is inevitable today. The adjectives, "necessary, righteous, avoidable (sometimes)" which he associates with the word *War* are more forthright in approval than those given by any other subject. He is perfectly clear in his belief that war does settle issues.

> *Yes 5.* On numerous occasions wars have settled national questions and national issues, settled a vast number of moral issues, settled questions of freedom, the power of the different parts of the country versus the power of the central government. It has settled questions of the predominant classes and predominant races [37].

But he is less certain about the possibility of attaining an enduring peace after the war, his positive opinion being tempered by certain realistic considerations.

> Yes *3.* It depends on the state of balance between the nations at the end of this war [37].

He is alone among our subjects in believing that, *The finest thing a man can do is to lay down his life for his country;* although he is neutral ad *Americanism,* and the adjectives he associates with this word—"abused, useful, functional"—indicate an attitude of intellectual detachment. Here as elsewhere Ingle gives expression to the fact that terms which were once meant to stand for something precious to Americans have been so cheapened and corrupted that today they do not excite exalted sentiments or move many people to selfless dedication, although they may still be "useful, functional" in arousing some sections of the population.

In the Argument Completion Test Ingle concluded the discussion about the war as follows:

> "*X* reels off historical examples. All the wars of the past have been wars of classes. The imperialist class has always been involved. Every war has been imperialist. Wars have been settled at the expense of millions and millions of lives. Only the profiteers benefit.
>
> "*Y*: The trouble with you is that history is a great fountain of ideologies. There is an historical example for everything. A just war is a war of national liberation. Millions will be liberated from imperial aggression. We have the prospect of freeing a whole continent from the claws of the most violent form of national aggrandizement that the world has ever seen.
>
> "*X*: This war will settle nothing. The British will take all of Europe,

and it will be just as bad. In 20 years we will have another war.

"*Y*: You misunderstand the power of national liberation, when people get up on their hind legs and free themselves from aggression. I have been waiting all these years for people to throw off their shackles. Consider all the people subjugated by the fascist regime. Now we can set them all up and treat them as equals. We have the possibility of progressive governments in England and China.

"*X*: Look at Chiang Kai-shek. He is the typical war lord. Can you expect any possible improvement there, or in Churchill?

"*Y*: The essence of our difference is in the extent of trust that we have in the people to free themselves. I am going out to resolve the conflict and fight."

Y does a fine job and he doesn't die. *X* goes eventually but with a cynical heart and with no confidence or faith.

From this argument it is clear that the liberation of oppressed peoples forms the positive ideal at which Ingle has arrived after the resolution of his doubts and cynicism. He says:

> The thing which has come out of Soviet Communism and the thing I consider most worthy of emulation by the rest of the World is their just and equitable treatment of minority races (1).

Seven of Ingle's stories in the *TAT* [22] are set within the frame of the present conflict. Seven, being easily the largest number of war stories given by one man, may be taken as proof of this subject's extreme involvement in the international situation. Two of his stories are worth summarizing:

> 1. A young man has just graduated from college and comes back home. The war breaks out. During his college career he has become a pacifist. He is very convinced and he tells his mother that he has decided to become a conscientious objector. His mother is very patriotic and is in terrific torment over the idea that he might have to go to prison and spend the rest of the war in jail. But he refuses to register and does spend the rest of the war in jail, just as his mother feared. She dies of heartbreak.
>
> While he has been in jail, he has written a book. He has experienced a conversion in that he sees that there are certain issues in the conflict that are worth fighting for. But he is a very convinced internationalist and a very convinced altruist, and he is convinced that the particular war he was put in jail for was wrong, but he sees that there might be subsequent wars that might be worth fighting for, and he becomes, instead of a pacifist, an idealistic socialist. Since he is very close to his mother, there is a terrific scar which lasts the rest of his life long.
>
> 2. This is a scene the day after war is declared in a college. These two young men have been preaching war ever since Munich. They devoted practically all their time and energy to this essential problem of

> getting the American people into the war. This is the day they are going to enlist. The fact that they think they are fighting for their ideals is the principal issue of their lives. They are looking at their college nostalgically, realizing that this is the end of their education. They enlist in the army. They will be thoroughly good soldiers, and will both survive the war with their convictions unshaken and their objectives still clear. In this picture they are looking at their past for the last time before tearing themselves away for the great decision.

These two narratives reflect the history of Ingle's own development. He writes:

> I became interested in the Spanish War. If I hadn't been so young I might have enlisted and gone over to fight. As it was, I used to write passionate verses every time a lurid account of bombings of Loyalist towns appeared in the press [1].

With his sympathy for the Loyalists, he suffered the disillusionment felt by so many when the democratic governments failed to intervene, and he passed through a period of doubt, of questioning the motives behind the position adopted by the United Nations. For awhile his sympathies were wholly with the Communists, but later he came to feel that the Communists were one-sided. He says that he tried to get his college friends to enlist for war work.

> I was interested in fighting Hitler for the last year, because of my feeling against social injustice. I have been reading fascist theory. I think fascism is a threat to racial self-realization. The opportunity for self expression of a country is cut down to nothing, and the people have no opportunity to raise their standard of living [1].

Like his hero in the first *TAT* story, Ingle has grown to feel that there are issues worth fighting for. Instead of being a pacifist he has become an "idealistic socialist." The threat of a ruthless and powerful enemy endangering the very existence of his country does not alone arouse Ingle's energies. He goes into action when he becomes convinced that that enemy is not on the side of social justice.

During his last three years at college Ingle has been the leading spirit in several political movements among the students, all of them devoted to the promotion of radically liberal policies. He is a talented social thinker and agitator who is extraordinarily well informed on world issues, who realizes the evil meaning of our enemies, and who resolutely affirms that this war must be fought out to a decisive conclusion. Therefore, if avowed sentiments were all, we should place Ingle ahead of all our subjects on national morale;

but avowed sentiments do not tell the whole story. In practice Ingle has not yet reached the standard set by his ideals. To one examiner he expressed a desire to get into the war, but to another, he said, "If I get a war research job and go to Washington, we will all be one happy family,—and there are lots of women down there too" [33]. In his autobiography he writes, "If I can get into some of the work done on the problems of feeding the army and civilian population for the duration, my dearest wish will be fulfilled." [1]. On another occasion he suggested, "I might get into work on acclimatization, and if I got into the army that would stand me in good stead because there undoubtedly is secret work going on in this country and in Washington, testing clothing and that sort of thing" [33]. When he was asked whether he would prefer such activity to combat service, he answered, "Well, not particularly, but I am useful because of a certain kind of training. I will do that, and if not I will fight. I am not particularly averse to fighting. It's another way of contributing" [33].

This last statement does not successfully conceal the fact that a reluctance to run the hazard of dying on the battlefield has got the best of Ingle for the present. His reluctance is clearly manifest in the energy of his efforts to find a suitable position in some non-combatant service. He has followed every lead and left no stone unturned. No doubt he is particularly fitted for a research job, but he is also a good physical specimen. His place in the war effort is undetermined at the moment; but if he does get drafted as a soldier we feel reasonably sure that he will adjust himself emotionally to the new situation and after several months of training will be able to function on the same level of activity and enthusiasm as he has in the past when applying himself to other aims. We base our prediction on the fact that Ingle has a relatively strong constitution, an ego of more than average strength, an unshakable ideal and the capacity to throw himself into things with zealous earnestness. Besides this, he is realistic, unusually intelligent, and gets on with all kinds of people.

Determinants. Ingle stands out among all college men of our acquaintance in his understanding of social and political issues, in the certainty and correctness of his analysis of present world conditions and in the clarity of his perception of what is at stake in this war against Fascism. Ideologically he is completely equipped to participate in the conflict. He knows and cares about what we are fighting for. He has made the most of his educational opportunities.

The chief determinants of this component of high national morale, in Ingle's case, are these: (*a*) superior parents both politically sophisticated,

who prepared him to welcome social responsibility as the duty and privilege of every American citizen; (*b*) intellectual curiosity, combined with a high order of intelligence, leading him to devour and digest with profit a wide range of books on social philosophy; (*c*) the influence of a master at his preparatory school who introduced him to Marx and stimulated him to think on a global scale with sociological concepts.

As a rule communistic indoctrination in the Twenties and Thirties served to set American adolescents against all wars between nations, the adoption and maintenance of this attitude being encouraged and reinforced by the arguments of pacifism. Consequently, the finding that Ingle's social education has acted as a positive rather than a negative determinant of high morale is an agreeable surprise. Dunn was inhibited, paralyzed and soured by pacifist and communist influences, but not so Ingle. How can we account for the marked difference between these two results of similar ideological pressures? Well, in the first place, Ingle's identification with Communism was more complete than Dunn's, whereas his acceptance of Pacifism was qualified at best. Ingle was not reared in boyhood to inhibit all aggressiveness, Dunn was. Furthermore, Ingle could not disapprove of war on principle since he sympathized so fully with class wars, wars of liberation, revolutionary wars. Dunn's father had been broken by the economic depression of the early Thirties and had become a disillusioned pessimist. Ingle's father, on the other hand, keeping his balance through this period, had worked hopefully for social reconstruction. He remained a rock of strength for his son, a magnet pulling him back steadily to the central American tradition. As soon as Russia swung over to the side of the United Nations it was easy for Ingle to come out solidly in favor of American participation since there was ground now for seeing the world conflict as a peoples' struggle rather than as an imperialist war. And finally, more fundamental than all these ideological differences is the opposition in temperament and character between Dunn and Ingle. The former is emotionally embarrassed by an unconscious conflict that binds aggressiveness and affection in one repressed integrate, the result being that his hostile thinking is directed against the leaders of his own side rather than against the common enemy, and it is hard for him to admire anyone. Ingle, on the other hand, gives free vent to his impulses, his loves and his hates, and he knows the real foe when he sees him.

Thus, next in importance on the positive side we would list Ingle's high level of mental activity, his enthusiasm, responsiveness, and optimism.

Physical vitality we might mention third. For, although Ingle was a precociously intelligent boy, he was never a passive or retiring bookworm. He

describes himself as "an active and boisterous child" [2] who enjoyed all forms of outdoor life.

> At twelve I joined the Scouts and quickly attained the first class rank, and became patrol leader. We used to box, and I was an active participant. We would go swimming in the early spring to toughen ourselves. At school I boxed, played football and sprinted on the track team [1].

Ingle rates himself *0* on Physical Timidity [9], and the adjectives which he associates with *Boxing* are, "satisfying, invigorating, lusty" (14). He says that he has good physical enducance and "can stand almost anything." His sentiment ad *Athletics* is highly positive.

It is our impression, however, that the level of Ingle's athletic participation in adolescence was hardly average, that there was less than the usual amount of competition at the schools which he attended, and that now, in his desire to be taken for an all-round man, he is apt to exaggerate his physical ability and hardiness. He is not an athlete according to college standards, in any event; and judged by several of our tests he is not outstanding when it comes to taking punishment.

Somewhat upsetting to the impression that Ingle gives of a self-reliant young man, full of enterprise and fortitude, is the finding of an appreciable amount of *Basic Anxiety* which seems to be connected with a residual castration complex, the outcome of a submerged revolt against his father. Since the latter was a good Republican until very recently, it is not unlikely that the son's fervent radicalism is the sublimated expression of an early opposition to parental authority. Being hyperactive, Ingle was hard to manage as a boy and during one period his parents, on the advice of a physician, had to resort to spankings. It was about this time that he suffered from a phobia which we have reason to believe was associated with an unconscious fear of mutilation. Anyhow, some irrational anxiety still remains and it might well be this that has interfered with his resolution to join the Army and practice what he preaches. The hypothesis is substantiated by several of Ingle's war stories given in response to the *TAT*. Not a few of his heroes were predestined, so it seems, to die a violent death. This bias of his dramatic imagination is in line with the impression received by an examiner who reported that Ingle "showed apprehension that he might be wounded in the war." Thus Basic Anxiety should probably be listed here as a negative determinant.

Subject No. 1: York

York says of himself, "I don't like conservative people. I rebel against the stupid bonds of convention. Maybe I am more liberal than I am radical. In my approach to actions I am apt to try a new thing" [18]. This impatience with traditionalism is reflected in the positive sentiments which he holds ad *Individualism, Risk and Adventure, Non-Conformity, Idealism, Communism vs. Fascism* [13]. He wants "the kind of democracy that will try new things" [18], and it is clear that his idea of Americanism reflects his own wishes. He thinks of it as "good, wise, free, venturesome, unresponsible" [14].

Even from such a small sample of his sentiments we may deduce that York is by nature inherently opposed to Fascism. He says that his strongest aversion is "for anything regimented like fascism and the Nazi version" [14]. But this generalization he finds hard to reconcile with his sentiments in favor of Communism, so he has perforce to qualify it. "Communism is regimented too, but there is a point to it" [14]. Behind all his thinking about the war lies this fundamental dilemma. He is unable to reconcile his idealism with the practical methods necessary to bring it about. "This is a major question," he says, "not only about the war but in general, i.e., what you *think* vs. what you *think* you should do" [15].

In the Aphorisms Test [13] York comes out against *War*. He thinks of it as being "needless, necessary now, destructive, killing, wild" [14], and he says that his greatest ambition is "to make the world a better place to live in, to eliminate war" [14]. He does not even believe that war ever settles anything. Arguing under great pressure he says:

> *No 1.* A physical fight cannot finish anything. It is easily seen from many wars that things are not settled by physical means. War is unpleasant, it is harmful. It is harmful to people. It destroys their habits, upsets their emotions, their thinking, their business. It destroys business relations. It is unnatural [37].

But he is willing to concede that this war is beneficial in that "it is making people think" [18], and because of this he has hopes of an enduring peace after the war.

> Yes 4. In this war more people understand. Civilians are affected. More people are killed. More people are waiting for the final outcome. More people are hearing about it through the radio and other communications. More people are disillusioned by the last war and want it completed this time. The countries are thinking about it. The people in the U. S. are thinking about it. This is such a terrible war that more people are disgusted with war [37].

This perhaps represents more of a wish than a belief because he admits on another occasion that,

> War is hard to understand. I haven't made up my mind whether it is inevitable or not. There aren't enough people strong enough to control themselves on a voluntary basis. But we could have peace by a strong hand on the part of some nations [18].

Again he is forced to the conclusion that only by coercion, by "a strong hand," can people be persuaded to the ideal of giving up war.

York has very negative sentiments in regard to *Compulsory Military Training* [13] which derive from his hatred of regimentation, but in spite of this he has been a member of the R.O.T.C. ever since coming to college. This can be accounted for by other forces as strong as his dislike of military training. First, he is a man of action with sentiments that are strongly positive ad *Intensity, Risk and Adventure, Optimism, Fact vs. Theory,* and sentiments that are somewhat favorable to *Aggression* and negative ad *Repose.* Second, he is a thorough-going American: he is highest in our rank order on *Americanism,* and one of only two subjects who concur with the statement, *My country, right or wrong* [13]. Here he stands out as being the most positive, and *this* is the key to his good national morale. He knows his duty when he sees it and can will the obligatory unimpeded by abstract sentiments, sentiments that apply to most situations but not to the one that now confronts his country. He is against war except when it is absolutely unavoidable. Today it is unavoidable, therefore he is in favor of *this* war.

His completion of the discussion on war in the Argument Completion Test [15] seems to be the expression of an internal dialogue between the man of action and the man of thought, both of whom are represented in York himself. He begins by saying, "This war is some question!"

> *X*: How is it possible that a person with your intelligence can let your natural instinct of aggression overcome your higher sensibilities when you realize that there can't be any outcome to the war? You should be sorry that you are drafted because of the weak draft system.
>
> *Y* is the wholesome type. No matter what his religion or his scruples, he is drafted by his country and realizes that he must get in and clean this thing up. He may or may not feel happy about the draft, but all the more credit to him.
>
> *X* will get drafted, and he might as well make the best of it just like Y. I suppose in the army everyone gets the same feeling.
>
> Therefore even though Y feels that war doesn't settle everything, nevertheless we are in it, and therefore he should follow the government and make the best of it.

The tone of this is that of a man who has made his decision, in spite of the apparent discrepancy between his ideal and the kind of action that is called for at the moment.

York, who avers that he would rather discuss politics and world affairs than anything else, shows in his reactions to cartoons about the war, that he is thoughtful and serious and understands the implications and the dangers of Nazism.

> These are treating serious subjects in too light a way.
>
> This represents the humorous approach by showing the stupidity of what is happening, but the subject is too tragic for that.
>
> *We have too many cartoons that are discouraging. We need some that* are morale lifting.
>
> This isn't right. The point is that it isn't just the German youth that Hitler is trying to take the blood out of, it's all the countries that he has overrun.
>
> The idea of this is all right, but "Hope of Freedom" is pretty wishy-washy, and "Threat of Slavery" both are very simple. The freedom stands for everything—freedom of thought, freedom of time. Slavery shouldn't bring to mind colored people on a plantation in the South; it's slavery of ambition, and initiative, and everything.

In one of the stories which he gave for the *TAT* [21] he describes a battlefield:

> A mixture of wrecked man-made things, and wrecked God-made things. Horribleness. The uselessness of it all. It makes you ask why? These things just don't dissolve together, tanks and trees. Man-made things and God-made things don't mix.

That the world situation has deeply concerned York may be inferred from his response to the blank card in the *TAT*. For this he told the story of a follower of Gandhi in India who is trying to stir the people to revolt against the British. "He doesn't seem to realize that he won't be very free after the Japs win anyway," he comments. He then goes on to describe a map of the world on which he sees the Germans and Japs trying to cut England's life line.

> You can also see lots of little people in our country. They are hustling about, but this time they have decided that there is no point in their obstructionist work for higher wages and shorter hours. They have all pretty well got together now and they have found out the straits that they're in, but it's too late. No doubt they will be kowtowing to some little guy that would be a German or a Jap.

It is hard to account for this cynical ending, why he allows himself to play with the idea that it is too late to win. He believes that "the smartest thing would have been to have gotten in early and cleaned this thing up fast," and nowhere else is there an indication that he is pessimistic as to the final outcome of the war. Perhaps he is saying, "If you complacent Americans don't bestir yourselves, this is what will happen."

Determinants. Highest among the positive determinants we would list York's temperament, his high level of activity. He is a quick, energetic, responsive and at times impulsive man of action, an extravert who can throw off the burden of weighty intellections that worry and embarrass men of a different stamp. He has seen clearly the main facts: the United States has been attacked, war has been declared, there has been a call to arms, and he as a healthy six-footer must play his part. There is only one thing to do: to get in and help win the victory as soon as possible. York's instincts are healthy.

On the side of conscience there is another positive determinant: York is sensitive to moral values, and, therefore, sees very clearly and is not ashamed to declare that the Nazis are outlaws whose military might and ideology must be laid low. He knows evil when he sees it, probably because of a religious training.

Next, we would draw attention to York's indomitable Americanism, his stolid democratic convictions, his enlightened vision of future possibilities. He is as much interested in winning the peace as in winning the war; indeed in his mind, the two constitute a single aim. In achieving this orientation, York tells us, his father, a parcel deliveryman, has been a helpful and inspiring influence. "He is very liberal in his views on politics and very flexible. He is in favor of democracy, and of changes when they seem beneficial. He thinks the present war is too bad, but that it had to come because of our lack of insight" [18]. He is "an idealist who reads everything." An *E* who met the father reported that he discussed world affairs and the war with acuity and intelligence.

York tells us nothing of his mother's views, but speaks of her as being "very aggressive and very much of a realist" [4]. His mother is by all odds the dominant parent, the driving force of the family, but York prefers his father.

It must have been his father who instilled into him a critical and realistic attitude toward history and contemporary social events, for, unlike most of the others, York does not seem to have experienced great disillusionment when the war broke out. Stimulated by his father he has thought a good deal

about the issues of the war and to good purpose. He understands what is at stake, and is the only one of our subjects, with the exception of Ingle, who shows any real concern for matters over and above his immediate personal dilemma. Like his father, he wants a democracy "which will try new things" and he is alert to the need for social change, and still he says, "My country right or wrong." This awareness has probably served to quicken his feelings of revolt against the Nazi threat of "the slavery of ambition, and initiative, and everything." In this he is very much like Ingle. But he is unlike Ingle in that for him thought follows action. He believes that "You can't make up your mind on the basis of ideology. You choose what you want to do, and rationalize it afterwards—at least that's what I do" [15].

On the physical side, York's stature and robust health operate as positive determinants, but there is a vein of elementary physical timidity in his nature which must be counted as a negative factor. He finds it hard to release aggression and go all out. His sentiments on fighting are positive, but he confesses that "the children in our family are chicken-hearted. I don't understand it. We don't like to fight. I have always had a fear of combat as has my younger brother" [5]. But though he did not like to fight as a boy, York was no coward. "I can fight well, but usually I am reluctant to start" [20].

> I was never afraid of much. I enjoyed forcing myself to do something dangerous. It was an adventure to see if you were brave enough [2].

This suggests a strong counteractive tendency which is borne out by the fact that the thing which he was most afraid of as a child was the water. He overcame his dread, however, and is now an excellent swimmer. Swimming, indeed, is the one sport in which he has achieved some reputation. He never cared much for competitive games, preferring sports "in which I was thrown on my own resources" [2]. He has confidence in his physical prowess, putting this in second place in ranking his own abilities [9].

In his last year in High School he had a German teacher whom he admired and he decided to become a teacher of German himself. He is now majoring in this subject, and hopes to be able to put his learning to use after the war.

> If there is not sufficient prospect for a German teacher after the war I shall attempt to use my training in the great task of reconstruction which Europe especially will need, and which I think will be led by Americans. I would like to do something great, to contribute some help to the world, to do something big, whether political or something else I don't know [18].

York joined the naval R.O.T.C., and at the time he was seen at the Clinic he was in the throes of trying to reconcile this affirmative action with his previous sentiments against war. Ingle, on the other hand, had settled his ideology but was still reluctant to enlist as a combatant. In a special test for leadership ability given at the Clinic, York showed an unusual ability to keep his head and effectively direct others by quick, vigorous, and decisive commands.

D. Summary and Conclusions

We imagine that most readers of these case records will agree that victorious armies and navies are not welded out of such stuff as these men are made of. Each is an individual of worth, but an individual who is reluctant, if not unfit, to partake of the collective valor of his age. If, as Gerald W. Johnson (*Saturday Review of Literature,* 1943, Nov. 20) predicts, the present era will be known as the century of mass heroism, it is not likely that this body of college men will be remembered among those who have contributed to its unique glory.

> If it is a man's wish to live at a time when the human spirit has soared to dizzy heights, should he not be content to live in the days of Madrid, London, Stalingrad, and Chungking? I believe that posterity will think so. . . .
>
> We (Americans) should be the people who best understand the peculiar greatness of the twentieth century, the century that has democratized heroism; and thus we should be the people who grasp most firmly the value of our times. . . .
>
> Not without some strain of heroism in themselves will the American people ever be capable of appreciating to the full the heroism of the British, the Russians, the Chinese; and without that appreciation we shall never even guess what is the glory of our own times. . . .
>
> If Americans should go through this war blind to the glory of the common people who withstood the *blitzkrieg,* and who held Stalingrad, and who contested every mile of Chinese soil, they would never have the faintest conception of the value of what this generation is winning, and therefore they would have no effective will to protect it whenever and wherever it is attacked. . . .
>
> "Some men have deserved a better century"—perhaps; but certain it is that some men have not been worthy of the century in which they were born. Only strong men are worthy of a terrible century; only great men are worthy of a great one. The twentieth century is both terrible and great—terrible in its blood and agony, but great in the magnificence with which plain men, humble men, anonymous men have risen to grapple and master terrors before which heroes might stand appalled. Is he who would ask a better century worthy of this one?

None of our subjects accepted the war with either stoical equanimity or enthusiasm: all were disquieted, if not perplexed and confused; four were panicky. Not one of them was prepared, physically, emotionally, or intellectually, for the ordeal they were called upon to face. All had been reared to a profound horror of war. None regarded military service as an unquestionable obligation. It was a matter for debate. All had an aversion to the occupations of a soldier; none had a high estimation of military men; none were interested in strategies and tactics; none had been brought up to view with patriotic pride the valor of those who fought at Bennington, New Orleans, Gettysburg, or Belleau Wood. What Major John H. Burns said in *The American Professional Soldier* apropos of the average intellectual's attitude towards the soldier is true for our group of subjects taken as a whole.

> The intelligentsia—the jugglers of modern ideologies—looked down their noses at the Army . . . in most of their minds there was clear animosity—an animosity based not on reason but on emotions aroused by the symbol of the one thing that human thought appears unable to solve. That one thing is war. . . . Strange, wasn't it, how . . . practically all the vocal parts of our population—had one powerful emotion in common? They disliked the professional soldier.

Many of our subjects were accustomed to judge political and social events against a meticulous moral standard, but they were so preoccupied with the near-at-hand defects in our own culture that they had no free energy to direct against distant European ills; or they had become so immunized by continuous small doses of American evil, had been so often outraged and disillusioned by the greed, corruption, hypocrisy, and cheap optimism of their fellow Americans that they were incapable of responding with healthy indignation to Evil, with a capital *E*. Some of them had worked themselves into a position where they could scarcely tell the difference between the half-truth that is democracy and the lie that is fascism.

Four of the subjects (36 per cent) were not inducted for service at all: one had a serious physical disability, one entered theological school, and two took up the study of medicine. Of the latter, one picked medical school as a refuge from the draft, whereas the other, Nack, went there in pursuance of a long premeditated plan. If he had enlisted, he, we feel sure, would have made an able soldier. Five of the subjects (45 per cent) applied and were accepted for non-combatant duties in the army or the navy. Only two (18 per cent) as things stand today, expect to be engaged in active combat (Yawl, York).

With the purpose of revealing some of the psychological determinants

of military morale—the *positive determinants* which raise the level and the *negative determinants* which depress it—let us start by reviewing some of the clinical findings, listing the forces, as far as we could determine them, which operated to produce the individual differences found among our subjects.

1. *Immediate negative determinants of morale.* In addition to the above-mentioned negative factors—complacency (the feeling that there was no real danger of a national defeat); absence of righteous indignation at the doctrines and practices of fascism (the idea that German imperialism was no worse than British imperialism); aversion to war; lack of respect for military profession; absence of ambition; no urge to self-sacrifice—in addition to these, which were common to all but a few, the following are worth noting: physical timidity or apprehension was admitted by six (55 per cent) of the subjects (York 1, Lake 4, Shea 8, Grove 9, Finch 10, Couch 11):[7] Applicable to the last four men is Major Burns's explanation of some of the intellectual's animosity towards the professional soldier.

> All of these people shuddered over the horrors of war, and rightly so. For who does not? But often the basis for their shuddering was the self-conscious feeling that they themselves were not capable of standing up in battle—unless it be waged with words. Consequently many of them acquired a sense of inferiority which grew distortedly and caused them to vent their spleen on the only symbol of war that confronted them—the professional soldier.

The belief that this was not our war or that nothing could be gained which would justify the losses and the sufferings was expressed by seven (64 per cent) of the subjects (Yawl 3, Dunn 5, Hawk 6, Nack 7, Shea 8, Grove 9, Finch 10). Two (Nack 7, Finch 10) asserted that the war was morally wrong.

No covert admiration for Fascism was revealed, but, on the other hand, there was little, if any, freely expressed admiration for Democracy. If these men loved their native land, enjoyed the American way of living, or were proud of the memorable achievements of their forebears, they took pains to cover up their feelings. Sincere allegiance to the United States and its customs was implicit in much that York, Ingle, Lake, and Nack had to say, but, like the others, they adhered to the present fashion of confessing no loyalty to the nation or to any of its institutions. Most of the subjects were preparing for a career and by these the war was apperceived as a

[7]The number after each name signifies the position of the subject in the rank order on sentiments ad own participation in the war.

grievous and unwarranted interruption of their expectations. This was particularly true in two (18 per cent) of our cases (Hawk 6, Shea 8). Lack of social responsibility was conspicuous in six (55 per cent) of the subjects (Yawl 3, Nack 7, Shea 8, Grove 9, Finch 10, Couch 11).

Disillusionment, pessimism or cynicism, in one form or another, was noted in all but two (Ingle 2, Lake 4). Nack thought that the war was just another example of man's betrayal of man; Dunn blamed the ruling classes for the whole affair; Hawk laid it to greed and profit-seeking; Yawl asserted that it was merely another cyclic emergence of the aggressive instinct. Only the baser motives of humanity were mentioned. The majority agreed that there was very little possibility of the war's resulting in any betterment of man's lot on earth.

2. *Immediate positive determinants of morale.* Most of the subjects eventually arrived at a realistic appraisal of the situation: it is a great misfortune, but now there is no way of avoiding it; the best decision is to pitch in and get it over with as soon as possible. The operation of the needs for Affiliation, Conformance, and Blamavoidance could be inferred in the majority; the need for physical adventure in one. Three (27 per cent) of the subjects (York 1, Ingle 2, Hawk 5) were fairly clear as to the ideological issues of the conflict and were vocal in their opposition to fascism. Five (45 per cent) had a highly developed sense of social responsibility in general (York 1, Ingle 2, Lake 4, Dunn 5, Hawk 6).

3. *Correlations, Personological. (a) Subjects with low morale.* The three lowest subjects in the rank order (Grove, Finch, Couch) were among the four *highest* subjects on the following variables of personality as rated independently by the Clinic staff: Basic Anxiety, need for Harmavoidance (physical fears); and Intraception (subjectivity, personalistic orientation). They were among the four *lowest* subjects in Energy, Endurance, Conative Conjunctivity (organization of purposive behavior), Ego Structure (stability of character, strength of will), Extraception (objectivity, impersonalistic orientation), need for Excitance (physical adventurousness).

Subjects wth low morale were also *high* in: Dejection and Pessimism, Guilt Feelings, need for Infavoidance (fear of humiliation and failure), and need for Seclusion (enjoyment of solitariness). Feminine component, Homosexual tendency, the defense mechanism of Avoidance, Conflict between Passivity and Counteraction, and the infantile complexes of Oral Reception and Urethral Ejection were likewise conspicuous.

These same subjects were at the *bottom* of the rank order in: need for Affiliation (diffuse sociability) and Superego Integration (the will in steady

accord with conscience); also in their sentiments ad Objectivity and Facts and ad Applied Science; and finally in Athletic Ability and Organizing Ability.

(*b*) *Subjects with high morale.* The three top men in our rank order (York, Ingle, Yawl) were among the *first four* on the following personological variables: Energy, Impulsivity, need for Change (novelty), need for Excitance (adventure), need for Recognition (prestige), need for Affiliation (sociability), need for Sex (diffuse interest in women), and need for Play-mirth pleasure-seeking). They were also *high* in Conductance (the translation of ideas into action) and Exocathection (high valuation of concrete environmental objects). Among the infantile complexes they were *highest* in Oral Aggression. They were also *high* in Substitute (Compensatory) Striving and in Social Ability.

On the other hand, these high morale subjects were marked *low* on: Striction (inhibition, cautious governance of functions), Protectivity (defensive reticence), Guilt Feelings, need for Infavoidance (fear of belittlement and failure), need for Seclusion (desire for solitude). They were *lowest* in the defense mechanism of Avoidance, and in the infantile complex of Anal Retention.

Here the results are very clear: the compound of positive variables stands out in sharp contrast to the compound of negative variables. On one side one finds the energetic, impulsive and variable extravert, seeking novelty, sociability, pleasure, sex experience, and easy prestige. He has few internal restraints, few fears and inhibitions; his ideas are quickly translated into action; he is unencumbered by guilt feelings and inferiority feelings; he is adventurous and does not avoid new situations. He is not conspicuously aggressive, but there is some residual oral aggression in the inner layers of his personality, no anal retention. On the other side is the type that is characterized by lack of enduring energy, weak ego structure, little capacity for impersonal orientation, a variety of avoidances: guilt feelings, inferiority feelings, physical fears, diffuse anxiety, and spells of dejection. In such a person femininity, homosexuality, and the complex of oral reception are not uncommon, and in consequence one finds evidences of conflict between these and the tendency to counteract them by voluntary efforts. Signs of the infantile complex of urethral ejection are still discernible. This type of man enjoys solitude, is not conspicuously social. He is low in organizing ability and in athletic ability, and is apt to be uninterested in mechanical appliances and the cold facts of physical science. He is sensitive and subjective, but

not necessarily an introvert. Introverts are mostly in the middle of the rank order (Dunn 5, Nack 7, Shea 8).

Each of these types is self-consistent and contrasts radically with the other. Since the opposition involves such *primal characteristics* as *energy*, impulsivity, striction, extraception-intraception, and athletic ability, we can be reasonably certain that we are dealing here with a fundamental constitutional and temperamental factor which deserves to be included among the chief determinants of good military morale. In simplest terms, the extraceptive social extrovert with a high degree of mesomorphy (Sheldon and Stevens, 22), is likely to be found in large numbers in any high morale group.

4. *Correlations, Past History.* (*a*) *Subjects with low morale.* Our three lowest subjects were marked among the *top four* on the following past history variables: Dependency (upon the parents), Inferiority Feelings (during adolescence), Neurotic Symptoms. Less conspicuous but also *high* were: Childhood Illnesses, Capricious Discipline, Overprotection, Negative Cathexis of Mother.

These subjects were among the *four lowest* on: Leadership (during adolescence), Athletic Achievement (during adolescence), Social Adjustment (during adolescence), and press of Deference (parental praise).

(*b*) *Subjects with high morale.* Our high morale subjects stood among the *lowest* on the following past history variables: Neurotic Symptoms, Parental Strict Standards, Capricious Discipline, Overprotection, Inferiority Feelings (during adolescence) and Sex Disgust (on first encountering the "facts of life").

These findings are consistent with the personological data. They suggest that the lowest morale results from a combination of constitutional factors and certain disabling conditions of childhood (illness, overprotection, capricious discipline). But they do not answer the question of whether the constitutional factors constitute a predisposition to illness and neurotic symptoms, to becoming the kind of child who will provoke overprotection and capricious discipline.

Organized in a convenient form for those whose rôle it is to exclude potential misfits from the army or to select the best material for officers' candidate school, our findings are as follows:

PERSONOLOGICAL DETERMINANTS OF MORALE

a. High in good morale, low in bad morale

1. Energy, Endurance.
2. *n* Excitance (adventurousness).

3. *n* Affiliation (overt manifestations of friendliness and good will).
4. Social Ability and good Social Adjustment at school and college.

b. High in bad morale, low in good morale

1. Inferiority Feelings, fear of failure; avoidance of difficulties as a defense mechanism.
2. Guilt Feelings, overstrict conscience.
3. *n* Seclusion (seeker of solitude).
4. Parental Overprotection.
5. Parental Capricious Discipline.
6. Neurotic Symptoms in childhood or adolescence.

c. High in good morale

1. Impulsivity, *n* Change: the individual acts promptly, without heavy reflection; he enjoys variety, new situations.
2. *n* Playmirth (love of fun).
3. *n* Sex (likes women).
4. *n* Recognition (tries to impress people).
5. Exocathection (likes people and things as much as if not more than ideas, words, symbols).
6. Substitute Striving: if the individual fails at one thing he will turn to something else.
7. Infantile complex of Oral Aggression.

d. High in bad morale

1. Basic Anxiety, *n* Harmavoidance (physical timidity, worry, feelings of insecurity).
2. Intraception (subjectivity, personalistic outlook).
3. Periods of Dejection and Pessimism.
4. Feminine Component, signs of Homosexuality.
5. Conflict between Passivity and Counteraction.
6. Infantile complexes of Oral Succorance (oral receptivity, weaning trauma, etc.) and Urethral Ejection (bed-wetting, urinary exhibitionism, etc.)
7. Dependency upon parents in childhood.
8. Negative cathexis of mother (overt or covert hostility).

e. Low in good morale

1. Striction (predominance of inhibitory tendencies, cautious governance of speech and action).
2. Protectivity (diffidence, reticence; reluctance to speak of private affairs).
3. Infantile complex of Anal Retention (constipation, excessive cleanliness, parsimony, extreme negativism, overscrupulousness).
4. Parental Strict Standards.
5. Sex Disgust (when first hearing about sexual intercourse between parents, etc.)

f. Low in bad morale

1. Ego Structure (stability and strength of character).
2. Extraception (objectivity, impersonalistic attitude).
3. Conative Conjunctivity (planning and organization of everyday behavior, harmony of aims).
4. Superego Integration (absence of conflict between the will and a conscience of sufficient rigor).
5. Aversion to objective facts as such, and to the technics of science.
6. Leadership (in adolescence).
7. Athletic Achievement (in adolescence), Athletic Ability.
8. Parental Praise and Encouragement (in youth).

5. *Recent cultural patterns and social attitudes detrimental to military morale.* The generally accepted opinion is that at the time of Pearl Harbor the morale of our nation was below what morale should be to wage war successfully against powerful enemies. It was below that of the British, the Russians, the Chinese, the Germans, and the Japanese. Furthermore, the Student Opinion Surveys of America revealed that college men instead of being ahead of the rest of the country "were several steps behind in their response" (Belden and Belden, 6) to the greatest crisis in history. In an attempt to explain this fact enough has already been written to fill several volumes and the little that we have to say had better be reserved for the final section. Suffice it to list here a few of the social influences which seem to have been most potent in lowering the level of morale.

1. *Pacifism.* The doctrine of pacifism affected all classes and ages of society, directly or indirectly, during the Twenties and Thirties. Being one of the few *isms* that won wide assent, it should probably be set down as the chief specific factor conducive to low military morale. Six (55 per cent) of our subjects York 1, Dunn 5, Hawk 6, Nack 7, Grove 9, Finch 10) were thoroughly indoctrinated, and although the others did not mention it specifically we suspect that they too were influenced to an appreciable extent. We have seen how conscientiously three overanxious mothers trained their sons (Dunn 5, Grove 9, Finch 10) to avoid dangers and never fight back; an explicit substantiation of the statement attributed to Brigadier Chisholm, head of the Canadian Army's medical service. According to *Time Magazine* (November 1, 1943), he called soldiers' mental breakdowns "a disability of the English-speaking peoples. . . . A whole generation has been taught not to fight. From earliest childhood a boy is trained not to run risks so as not to break his mother's heart. . . . The result is that in the Army there is an emotional attitude toward getting hurt." Pacifism was supported by religious teachings in two of our subjects (Nack 7, Finch 10), but for others it was

a secular doctrine preached by parents, teachers, and the cinema. A slight negative correlation was found between sentiments ad war and sentiments ad religion rho-.14).

2. *Debunking.* As Michael Roberts (20) has said, "often this pacifism was founded, not on the doctrine that other peoples' lives were sacred, but on the belief that nothing was worth fighting for." When asked whether anything is worth a million lives, our top man, York, responded with a decided "No." This was the view of his generation. The wave of debunking, in rolling across the country, had levelled all values, leaving nothing to worship or admire, no ideals to cleave to, no loyalties to bind the spirit. Parents and teachers with the best intentions had practised their belief that youth should be given every side of every question and allowed to come to their own conclusions. The prevailing notion was that the adult should withhold his own opinion, if perchance he had one, lest the weight of his authority deflect the natural spontaneous judgment of the growing mind. As a result of this policy many young people gained the impression that to be analytically neutral on all issues is the mark of intellectual superiority. Thus no structure was created that could stand up against the fashionable activity of depreciating historic personages and institutions. The forces that prompted the debunking will be reviewed later.

3. *Individualistic Self-Expression, Overprotection.* There has been an extension in the last two decades of the notion that the child is a hive of creative potentialities which the parent and teacher must be careful not to abuse, discourage, or in any way distort or check. Their chief function is to open up avenues for self-expression and self-enhancement. In the American family, as Bateson (5) has pointed out, the child is the exhibitionist, the parents the spectators. There is nothing greater than the young individual, his free spirit and his ambitions; he has many rights, but few obligations, no real responsibilities. The adult should first arouse the child's interest in whatever it seems best for him to do, so that his activity will always be carried forward on a wave of enthusiasm. He should never be made to do anything that is too hard or tedious; he should be shielded from the impact of sorrowful events; his life should be full of gaiety and joy. In recent years sensitive children have been better protected from humiliations, rough sports have been less encouraged, many schools have abolished compulsory athletics.

4. *Entertainment.* During the last few years there has been a marked increase of easy and alluring opportunities for entertainment, especially passive entertainment (movies, radios), a great deal of which is emotionally enervating, reeking with cheap and drippy sentiments.

Such were some of the influences operating to produce softness, self-indulgence, egocentricity, cynicism, and perpetual entertainment-seeking.

This was all very ominous, of course, to the army man who saw the war coming and knew that to him would fall the responsibility of making fighters out of these undermined young characters. To quote Major Burns once more:

> He (the professional soldier) yearned for the type of man that went into the Wilderness and into the Argonne. But he had long since begun to fear that he would not get them. For to the modern educator especially—a sluggish thinker for the most part—the acquisition of ideas was paramount, the acquisition of ideals secondary, and the physical defense of either abhorrent. Thus the products of our educational timberline might perhaps be only inferior soldier material, and by the same token, inferior human beings.

We shall not stop to quarrel with the Major over his last statement, but, instead, bring this discussion of the determinants of morale to a close by raising one more question: Was the morale of our subjects representative of the morale of American youth in 1942? We can not answer definitely as there are no statistics bearing on this point, but it is our impression, derived from a broad acquaintance with the student body at Harvard, that these men were clearly below their college level. Furthermore, with much less assurance, we would hazard the guess that Harvard undergraduates were below the level of their contemporaries throughout the country, including among the latter those who did not go to college. If we had to score our men on a six-point scale (0 to 5), defined so as to correspond to the normal distribution of military morale in American youth, we would say: 0 for Couch, Finch, and Grove; 1 for Shea and Nack; 2 for Hawk, Dunn, and Lake; 3 for Yawl, Ingle, and York. There would be no 4's and no 5's. Or, according to a rougher scheme of scoring: 45 per cent of our subjects would be marked Low below the 27th percentile); 55 per cent would be marked Middle; and none would be marked High (above the 73rd percentile).

As an explanation of the apparent fact that our group was below the Harvard standard it should be pointed out that two of the three lowest subjects initially presented themselves at the Clinic because of neurotic symptoms and later agreed to serve as subjects. Thus we began with the scales tipped on the side of low morale. But how account for the absence of men in the High category? Here we can only refer to chance and to the considerations which guided the selection of our subjects: a doctor whose function it is to make routine examinations of a large number of students

gave us the names of some "interesting normal personalities" whom he thought would be motivated to coöperate in our experiments either by the pay or by intellectual interest. The operation of these criteria would tend to eliminate athletes and upper (social) class "clubmen," because these, as a rule, have bland, uncomplicated personalities without lights and shades and are peculiarly unconcerned with psychological processes. Furthermore, 60 cents an hour is no inducement to a clubman. Anyhow, as it turned out, there were no clubmen among our subjects, although it can be said that Yawl (3) was on the fringe of membership; and there were no major sport athletes. Only two of our subjects had engaged successfully in minor sports (York 1, Dunn 5). Since our observations indicate that the military morale of athletes and clubmen, taken as a whole, has been above the college average, the exclusion of these classes probably deprived us of one or two men who would have fallen in the High category. Finally, there is the fact that before our examinations started the average level of morale at college had fallen, due to the enlistment and departure of a good many men with the strongest positive sentiments ad own participation. All of our subjects, with the exception of Yawl, stayed to graduate.

If it is true that the level of morale among Harvard undergraduates has been lower than that of their contemporaries throughout the country, we would be inclined to attribute this, not to the large proportion of students coming from the "effete" Northeast, as some say,—in this study, for example, our three top men are from the Northeast, and of the three lowest, one is from the South, one from the Pacific Coast, and one from the Middle-east—but to the large proportion of students drawn from the upper one-seventh of the high schools of the country. Since these are distinguished for their scholarship, rather than for their mechanical or athletic abilities, Harvard (and other colleges with equivalent standards, which do not cater to athletes) is likely to get a relatively large proportion of young intellectuals and a relatively small proportion of men with soldierly physiques and characters. Most of the latter, we should judge, go to the great State universities or to no universities. In conformity with this conclusion is the high incidence of physical inferiority during adolescence, fear of rough sports, experiences of being bullied, and so forth, in the life histories of Harvard students examined over the last 15 years. To generalize, it might be said that colleges with high intellectual standards select and train men who are capable of fighting with words rather than men who are capable of fighting with bayonets. Sometimes the two capacities are found in one individual, but such a man, surely, is exceptional. Therefore, we would say, that the most

that can reasonably be expected of many young intellectuals at college, is that they be spiritually "worthy," as Gerald W. Johnson has said, "to march in company with the winners of the Battle of Britain and the winners of the Battle of Stalingrad and the unconquerable men of the East," that they "feel like fighting" even though their innate and acquired talents fit them for other rôles than that of firing a machine gun or piloting a plane.

These considerations apply to our group of subjects taken as a unit. Since their love of scholarship was decidedly above the average, about 70 per cent of them being honor men, they may be roughly classified as "intellectuals," better fitted for peace than for war. As we have judged them at least two, Ingle and York, are worthy of a century of mass heroism.

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By Henry A. Murray and Christiana D. Morgan

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V. SENTIMENTS TOWARDS RELIGION

A. Introduction

In this chapter are assembled all of the data, a meagre harvest, bearing on the sentiments of our 11 subjects ad religion and religious activity.

In the minds of most people religion is founded on a belief in supernatural beings or powers. According to Westermarck (*Christianity and Morals*) it is "a regardful attitude towards a supernatural being, on whom man feels himself dependent and to whom he makes an appeal in his worship." This may be accepted as the prime characteristic of the Christian religion, and, since all of our subjects are nominal Christians, no other religion has to be considered. The specific criteria used in rating sentiments ad *supernatural religion* were as follows: (*a*) Sentiments in favor of the belief in God: an assured belief, the will to believe, desire to experience God, preoccupation with the problem of His existence, or dissatisfaction with one's inability to believe. Also, sentiments in favor of prayer. (*b*) Sentiments in favor of the moral authority of the Bible—the Ten Commandments or the New Testament, the Beatitudes, the Parables. Also sentiments pro religious instruction at home or at school. (*c*) Sentiments in favor of the Church as a beneficent social institution for self and for others. Membership and regular attendance at church services. (*d*) Sentiments in favor of churchmen (ministers, priests); interest in theology as a profession.

Our researches showed that more than half of our subjects were avowed agnostics, or so completely indifferent to orthodox religion that they could scarcely be assigned a score on any of the criteria. This finding prompted us to attempt a broader conception of religion, to characterize the field of facts which are pertinent to religion, the means and ends of religious activity, the essential attributes of religious individuals.

Religion is the only great field of human activity which is defined in terms of a particular belief—the belief in a supernatural being. If a man does not believe in God he is not religious, according to the accepted view. It is as if politics were defined as a regardful attitude towards Monarchy, or art as obedience to the rules of Classicism, or science as belief in the Ptolemaic system. Perhaps the concept of God should be taken, not as the only answer, but as one of several possible answers to the momentous questions which concern the religionist, and that instead of distinguishing the latter as one who subscribes to a particular hypothesis—the existence of a supernatural world wholly different from the one in which we live—

we should distinguish him according to his preoccupations, activities, and aims.

Guided by the reflections of MacMurray (*The Structure of Religious Experience*), though differing from him in certain minor respects, we submit the proposition that the aim of religion is human perfection (goodness, righteousness, saintliness) in relations with others. This includes striving for self-perfection, striving for perfect interpersonal relations, striving for a perfect group (community, society, nation), striving for perfect inter-group relations (including international), striving for a perfect world ("the Kingdom of God on earth"). MacMurray, who insists on the necessity of referring religion to the realities of actual life, affirms that "the field of religion is the field of personal relations, and the datum from which religious reflection starts is the reciprocity or mutuality of these. Its problem is the problem of communion or community (p. 23). . . . The task of religion is the realization of fellowship. The religious activity of the self is its effort to enter into communion with the Other" (p. 26).

Clearly this is not the place to attempt to defend so radical a proposal. The most that we can do is to set down the interrelated criteria selected for estimating the strength of sentiments ad *natural religion*. (No one is under any obligation to accept this term.) These criteria were used only occasionally, when it was necessary to differentiate individuals who were lacking in positive sentiments ad supernatural religion.

(*a*) Sentiments pro self-regeneration and growth of character: efforts to evolve inwardly; constant re-creations of an idealego and repeated efforts to exemplify it in behavior ("What should emerge from religion is individual worth of character"—Whitehead).

(*b*) Sentiments pro ideal interpersonal relations: efforts devoted to the perfection of friendships and erotic relations ("Love is a true natural religion"—Santayana).

(*c*) Sentiments pro creation and evolution of an ideal group, ideal order of society, ideal international relations based on the principle of mutuality. ("Another world to live in—whether we expect ever to pass wholly into it or no—is what we mean by having a religion."—Santayana. "All the great movements of our time have commanded the power to invoke in their service a quality of effort in which the essence is the religious spirit"—Laski).

(*d*) Sentiments pro means (modes of behavior) which are consonant with the attainment of these ideal ends: efforts to discover a way of life which is in harmony with the spirit of a better future, *not* to act on the principle that the end justifies the means. ("The life of religion . . . consists of the belief that there is an unseen order, and that our supreme good lies in harmoniously adjusting ourselves thereto"—James. "Religion is world loyalty"—Whitehead).

(*e*) Capacity for dedication, loyalty, steadfastness. To what extent does the *S* live in view of the ideal? Has he set up the ideal as a supreme value to which all else has been subordinated? In his conduct is he selflessly devoted to this end? Or, is he perhaps searching for an ideal? "Religion at its best is the deepest response of the self to the highest we know"—Knox. "There is that in human nature that demands unquestioned allegiance to some final end"—Randall).

(*f*) Sentiments in favor of a long-time perspective: capacity to dedicate the self to a distal goal not realizable in a life-time, to work in the faith that later generations will benefit by one's efforts. The individual's contribution to the ideal cause is his immortality: he lives in his children, in the work he has accomplished, in the spirituality he has transmitted to others, and in the enduring institution he has served.

(*g*) Sentiments pro the potential worth of human beings: to act on the belief that people are capable of more virtue than they have yet shown; to reverence germs of growth in self and in others; to be guided by premonitions of promise rather than waiting for patent demonstrations of worth.

(*h*) Sentiments pro moral standards and pro an evaluating attitude: moral sensibility; ability to recognize means and ends that are utterly hostile to the ideals to which the self is dedicated; conception of evil as motives and acts which destroy the possibility of mutual trust and harmonious relations; efforts to oppose, eliminate, or embrace and transform evil. The facilitating, beneficial and creative forces may be called God (Good)—God is love—; the hindering, hurtful and destructive forces may be called Devil (Evil)—Devil is Hate.

(*i*) Sentiments pro extrapersonal orientation: viewing every problem of relationship first from the point of view of the other and then from the point of view of an imaginary Ideal Judge. The Ideal Judge may be one's most respected exemplar, one's conscience, an imaginary perfect being (God), or the company of one's ancestors or descendants, or future generations. The aim is always the good of the whole (the vitality of a relationship, the welfare of society). This is the opposite of egocentrism.

(*j*) Sentiments pro self-judgment: adoption of an evaluating attitude towards oneself; measuring oneself against the ideal standard; sense of own fallibility and imperfection; tendency to be more severe with oneself than with others, to take the blame if necessary. Honesty and sincerity in appraising self.

(*k*) Sentiments pro valued subjective states: higher estimation of spiritual health than of worldly success; emphasis upon satisfying or fruitful inner states—zest, enthusiasm, heightened sensitivity, creativeness, ecstasy, serenity, self-respect, contented conscience, indifference to pain, all-embracing love; judgments of human worth (self and others) according to quality of feelings, elevation of sentiments, generosity and selflessness of motives, according to being and becoming, rather than

according to ability or power, wealth, social status, notoriety, tangible achievements. Self-transformation is largely a matter of changing nuclear sentiments and attitudes. ("Religion is the art and theory of the internal life of man"—Whitehead).

Here also one should take account of sentiments con materialistic values. How much does the *S* value worldly success? Does he thrive without it? To what extent can he maintain his spiritual balance in the face of financial deprivations, physical afflictions and social frustrations? And more important, is he spoiled by success and popularity? ("One foe of the spirit is worldliness"—Santayana).

(*l*) Sentiments pro introversion, endopsychic activity, reflection and pro solitude. A great deal of religious activity requires solitude: waiting on the spirit, attention to inner states of feeling, creative activity, contemplation and re-examination of ideals, endeavor to apprehend some general principles, rational ordering of one's ideas, self-judgments, planning and resolving actions. Also, there is preoccupation with dreams and reveries, with irrational processes at the margin of consciousness, mysterious forces on which a man's destiny so often depends. ("Religion . . . is a careful and scrupulous observation of the *numinosum*, a dynamic existence or effect, not caused by an arbitrary act of will" —Jung. "Religion is what the individual does with his own solitariness. . . . If you are never solitary, you are never religious"—Whitehead).

(*m*) Sentiments pro submission to a beneficent possession: allowing an irrational but seemingly creative and transforming force to have its way with us; yielding one's will to an overwhelming idea or feeling, or voluntarily acting as an instrument of a mystical compulsion; loss of personal will through identification with an ideal passion; experiencing spiritual conversion. ("Religion is a relationship to the highest and strongest value, be it positive or negative. The relationship is voluntary as well as involuntary, that is, you can accept, consciously, the value by which you are possessed unconsciously. That psychological fact which is the greatest power in your system is the God, since it is always the overwhelming psychic factor which is called God"—Jung. "There are resources in us that naturalism with its literal and legal virtues never recks of, possibilities that take our breath away, of another kind of happiness and power, based on giving up our own will and letting something higher work for us"—James.)

(*n*) Sentiments pro symbolic representations: the *S* is capable of apperceiving a character or a human situation as a dramatic interaction of forces, to interpret events in a figurative sense, to understand and enjoy, or to invent, parables and myths, to view his own life and that of others as an allegory.

Here one might also include sentiments pro rituals and symbolic rites. In each case it is a matter of the abstract portrayal of emotional events in vivid concrete forms. This is the most profoundly affecting type of communication. ("Religion is the symbolic, poetical representation of the conditions and aims of life"—Santayana).

(o) Sentiments pro insociation. (Insociation is incorporation in a group with a sense of identification and belongingness and the acceptance of a common aim.) This involves the capacity and willingness to partake in the creation and evolution of a harmonious association of seriously intent persons and to work for the good of the whole. ("Nobody is anything except as he joins himself to something. You cannot be a whole unless you join a whole. This, I believe, is religion"—Bosanquet.)

The subjects are numbered according to their position in the rank order of sentiments and religion, but they are presented in reverse sequence, the least positive subject coming first.

B. The Subjects

1. *Subject No. 11: Yawl*

In his responses to the Aphorisms Test [13] Yawl is definitely set against *Churchman,* and even more strongly against *Faith, Religious Belief.* He is one of three subjects who believes that, *A religious creed represents a delusion and keeps us infantile and therefore ethically inferior.*

Yawl believes that, *He who has fully accepted atheism is free* [13]. For him Atheism and the scientific attitude go together. In the Sentiments Questionnaire [14] he rejects all the given adjectives for the word *Atheism* with the exception of "scientific"; and the adjectives which he himself associates with *Atheism* are, "scientific, logical, easy, clear, not ugly." Yawl has evidently been puzzled by the irrationality of religion, the nature of God, and feels that Atheism is logical and clear and not confusing. He says, "We have a rather hazy God, jealous yet Christian, gentle yet merciless, giving man a certain amount of free will yet ruling with an iron hand. I've enough of it. Just say man is a mass of conditioned reflexes" [20].

There is a certain petulance in his summary dismissal of the whole problem. In the present stage of his development he is exasperated by the irrationality of religion and feels that it can be well annihilated by science. Any statement about the nature of man, however partial its truth, is satisfactory to Yawl provided it sounds "scientific." Now Yawl is not a scientist and indeed cares nothing about it, being by temperament antipathetic to impersonal methodology. What he is striving for is psychological realism, and this he cannot find in religion.

Yawl's ideology centers about what he calls a "'skeptical rationalism." He says that he cannot believe in religion "because it has not rationally

come about" [37]. He is highly positive on all the aphorisms in favor of skepticism, being one of three subjects who do not believe that, *Skepticism is the great inhibitor of creative ability,* and believing more strongly than any other *S* that, *Faith may have its victories, but skepticism remains the only permanent basis of tolerance.*

Yawl thinks that his skepticism developed "partly from reading and some from experience."

> You find people positive on both sides of arguments, you can find great books and thinkers on both sides of religion, for instance. You know they are both brilliant, and therefore I am skeptical [18].

He goes on to say, "I came to the final realization that I couldn't convert other people to my point of view. I developed the feeling that opinions depended upon people" [18]. This led him to set a high value on tolerance, and he lists "intolerance and lack of human understanding" as among his strongest aversions [14].

Yawl says of himself that he is a materialist. "I have observed that you can substantiate the materialist point of view with facts. Idealism craves some power beyond itself. Faith and reason can't conflict. Reason says, 'Here is how I can prove it factually.' Faith either believes or doesn't" [15]. Though Yawl himself has an imaginative mind, is interested in psychology and hopes to become a writer, he shows himself here to be a true child of his time in trying to prove any hypothesis by the collection of facts. He believes with more certainty than any other *S* that, *Religious faith is merely the entrusting of one's life to an unknown and ever unknowable product of the imagination.*

If Yawl really feels that Faith and Reason can't conflict, and if he sets tolerance and human understanding among his highest values, what is the basis for his irritable repudiation of religion other than the fact that it is irrational? A partial answer lies in his hatred of insincerity. He describes his greatest aversion as being "insincerity of human beings and human relationships, and hypocrisy" [14]. His hatred of hypocrisy appears to be connected with his rejection of his family and their social milieu. He says that he is "fed up with the insincerity of the friends of the family" [18]. He associates the word hypocrisy with religion [14]. When asked to make up a sentence containing the word *Visit* he says, "Oh Lord, visit our habitation we beseech thee, and you can damn well bet that we'd crucify you again" [20]. In the same test the sentence which he gives for the word *Doubt* is, "My name is not Thomas, but I doubt a damn sight more than he did."

Yawl says that he "began to dabble in objective studies of various religions. I realized that they were trying to keep man in line. A lot of them had a lot of good. I realized that they were all very similar" [18]. When Yawl tells us that he realized that religions were "trying to keep man in line" we come to the real crux of his opposition. He has a strong need for Autonomy and all his sentiments are in favor of non-conformity. He is at present in full rebellion against what he considers the stuffiness of the New England tradition in which he has been brought up. Sex prudery is his particular antipathy, but anything that Yawl feels might be used to keep him "in line" makes him buck like a high-spirited colt at the touch of a saddle.

Yawl has no use for religion as a means of aiding man to combat the evils of his own nature. He gives the strongest negative mark to the aphorism, *Only through religious faith can a man rise above his primitive inclinations.* This is a doubly negative statement for Yawl, who not only does not believe in religion, but who also does not believe that a man should try to rise above his primitive inclinations. He says that the three most worthy ambitions are to "help mankind, self-expression, and to live a good free uninhibited life," and he no doubt associates "rising above primitive inclinations" with the sex taboos of the New England tradition which he holds in such abhorrence. He will admit no such thing as categorical sin, believing that "there is no sin except that which is contrary to your own nature. . . . There is only sin for those who make sin" [20]. His criterion of morality is "whether the action makes you feel good afterwards or not." Here Yawl, as is characteristic of him, takes the position of the supreme individualist. Man is a law unto himself.

Although Yawl does not believe in religion, it makes some appeal to his aesthetic sense. The adjectives that he gives in response to the word *Religion* are, "believing, non-reasoning, faithful, worshipping, unquestioning, beautiful, sensuous" [14]. And as though comparing Atheism with this, he is careful to say that Atheism is "not ugly." The aesthetic element in religion is its chief virtue, as Yawl sees it. He says, "Religion has been proved to be advantageous to man with his fear of insecurity, his fear of outside elements, and also his fear of authority. It is a beautiful concept. It's a good idea, but personally I can't believe in it" [37].

Human nature is Yawl's first and last point of reference; and hence, he sees religion as the expression, sometimes pitiful, sometimes beautiful, of man's weaknesses and needs. In general he thinks of it more as an inhibiting force than as a creative force, and he has adopted the prevalent attitude

of scientific analysis to annihilate what he now feels to be the irrational bases of religion. His avowed philosophy of life is to be free from inhibitions and restrictions which prevent him from achieving his highest values, "self-expression, and the living of the good, free, uninhibited life." By not admitting the existence of sin in his own nature, there need be no guilt, and rational man can become one with natural man.

It can safely be predicted that no church of the traditional sort will ever count Yawl among its members. He is immune to supernaturalism. Furthermore, it is not likely that he will ever dedicate himself to a collective ideology or become insociated in a group devoted to social betterment. He is an irreclaimable individualist, and if he ever arrives at an ideology it will be one that defines for him a perfect dyadic relationship, natural and personal. Up to now the nearest he has come to a religion is the eager though tentative acceptance of D. H. Lawrence's poetical Cult of Eros. It was the conception of an utterly fulfilling worshipful relationship with a woman that encouraged and guided Yawl's first experiment in love. But the affair ended abruptly after a short stressful season and was followed by a period of promiscuous and irresponsible adventures. It bred more cynicism than it did renewed idealism.

Yawl is highly positive ad *Subjective Values* and *Submission to the Irrational*, sentiments which are only too well objectified in his behavior. Thus, as a potentially religious personality he might be likened to Luther, the romantic protestant who yields to his instincts and recognizes no spiritual authority on earth. Yawl must also be counted among the children of Rousseau. He is a hive of spontaneities, impulses, emotions and insights, all of which are directed away from religion rather than towards it. He possesses very few of the qualities required of the true religionist. He has little capacity for dedication, steadfastness, loyalty, insociation, or self-control. He has no reverence whatever, and would rather be clever than sincere. His moral sensibilities are undeveloped, and in his apperceptions of the world, the valuating process is conspicuously absent. He is, notwithstanding, intelligently eager to improve himself, if the process does not cost too much, and he looks forward to a rewarding relationship with a woman enlightened by all the wisdom that psychological realism has to offer. This he may eventually realize to a happy degree.

Determinants. Yawl believes that his sentiments in regard to religion are derived from the following experiences of his childhood.

> I was made to go to Sunday School, yet the fact that my parents never went to church must have weakened the case considerably.

> Because my family never went to church I suppose I began to wonder. I had seen my grandmother become an ardent Christian Scientist when I was nine. The next winter I spent the winter with her in Florida and was made to go to the Christian Science Church. She had tried two or three other religions, and I was convinced that she had no real faith. That must be another source of my belief that a person builds up religion for personal reasons [18].
>
> My father allows religion as sacred ground, but does not talk about it and belongs to no church. He holds with the Protestant ethic with the theology gone. "You must follow the rules," is his idea [14].
>
> My interest in religion began at school between the age of eleven and thirteen. There was an Anglican headmaster who was a great man. I became a confirmed Anglican. After I left school the influence of this dwindled, and I began to question religion. I first became articulate at twelve years. I argued with a master about religion. We used to go fishing and talked about it for hours. He was part of the lost generation who had lost his direction in the last war [18].

It is no accident that for a time Yawl took Byron as his hero for Yawl himself has many of the psychological characteristics of the Romantic, who, preoccupied with his individual sensibility and individual will, is conscious of aspects of his experience which find no expression in the conventional life of his time. He feels that the fixed order of society excludes too much, that its restraints prevent him from attaining experiences which might lead to a greater passion and intensity, and in defiance pits against convention his own turbulent and rebellious soul. His imperative is to affirm the superior truth of his own vision, the vision for Yawl being some sort of uninhibited life with sexual freedom as a prominent feature. Yawl has been able to find nothing in religion which illumines for him the nature of man, and he feels that in science, rather than religion, will he find the basis for the psychological realism of which he is in search. And further, it is among the very people who profess religion that he finds the greatest offenders against psychological honesty. Though neither of his parents are religious, he manages to include them in this general indictment, his hated father having served as the original focus for all his rebelliousness. It was his father who embodied for him sterile convention, conformity, and above all hypocrisy. His detestation of this latter quality is so deep and so pervasive that we suspect its origin was some episode in childhood in which an adult grievously deceived him. It is unlikely that Yawl will ever find any good in the Church as an institution, though as his knowledge of man grows deeper he may come to understand that man has created religion out of his aspirations as well as out of his fears.

2. *Subject No. 10: Hawk*

Of all our subjects Hawk is the most negative in his sentiments ad *Churchman* and *Religious Faith* [13]. Not one of his responses are favorable. Seven out of his eight marks are the most extreme of any of the subjects, which indicates that here, as elsewhere, he has no doubts or uncertainties of feeling. But in his autobiography [1] he writes, "Nominally I am a Lutheran, but actually my religious ideas have not crystallized and I am an Agnostic." But in spite of his ideas being still unformed, he is emphatic in his belief that, *Such influence as Christianity retains today is due to its financial power as much as to its spiritual appeal.* He is equally emphatic in his denial that, *In the present moral chaos, the only hope of recovering spiritual discipline is in a return to religion* [13].

Hawk feels that religion "tends to narrow the mind. It doesn't make a broad-minded person" [37]. He is more certain than either of the two other subjects who gave an affirmative answer that, *He who has fully accepted Atheism is free* [13]. Hawk fears restraint and circumscription of any sort. He has positive sentiments ad *Individuality,* and his philosophy stresses self-development. He is apt to think of religion as something which will bind and narrow him. When asked to make up a sentence containing the word *Sin* he says, "The idea of retribution for sin is a powerful weapon in an established church" [20]. Here the implication is that the idea of sin is merely an instrument of control.

On the other hand he believes that to accept Atheism is to be intellectually and morally free. But the adjectives which Hawk associates with *Atheism* are not all favorable. He thinks of it as being "not respectable, intellectual, skeptic, cynical" [14]. He is aware of a certain social stigma connected with it and so prefers to identify himself with the less criticizable position of agnosticism. He concedes, furthermore, that skepticism has its disadvantages, being the only *S* to give the most extreme positive mark to the aphorism, *Skepticism is the great inhibitor of creative activity* [13].

Hawk is also dissatisfied with religion because, he says, "To me it has no meaning, for the reason that it is based on faith. It doesn't have any rational or tangible fact basis. It seems to develop all from mythology and dogma" [37]. The adjectives which he associates with *Religion* are, "superstitious, valuable social restraint, ethical, mythological, mystical, prejudicial" [14].

Hawk's intellective processes are balanced, logical, and 'realistic; so he finds himself indifferent to religion because of its lack of rationality and tangible evidence. But at the same time one of his most cherished senti-

ments is that the instinctive and irrational aspects of life should play their part along with reason. On the Aphorisms Test [13] he is markedly positive on *Creator of Values, Philosopher, Imagination*. His own fantasies are unusual in character, being often archetypal in their symbolism, full of magical and mythic elements. He has a strong half-conscious inclination to yield to his own irrational unconscious, but at the same time is fearful of doing so. For these reasons one might guess that the great symbolic drama of man's soul, the Christian religion, would appeal to him. But as a child, when he was exposed to religion, he had visions of being observed by God, and fears of God's punishment when he did anything wrong [2]; concurrently he was overwhelmed with fearsome nightmares. When this phase had passed he came to associate religion with superstition, mystery, and dread, and, through counteraction, developed an unusually strong reality sense with an aversion to irreality of all sorts. In several instances in the Argument Completion Test [15] he contrasts "prejudice based on fact" with "foolish fear and superstition."

But Hawk has come to realize that some sides of his nature are not developed and that, in consequence, he has missed something along the way [18]. His new idealego is a multi-sided man who has experienced everything and sees the world as a totality. Of all our subjects Hawk was the most resolutely negative ad *Singleness of Aim* [13]. It is perhaps for this reason that he is unwilling to dismiss religion irrevocably, feeling that his "religious ideas have not yet completely crystallized" [1].

It is not likely that Hawk will ever be won over to a supernatural ideology, but he already possesses a collective ideology, a form of socialism to which he has been loyal for some time. His capacity for insociation is high and his ability to organize the activities of a group is outstanding. We can see him in the future directing a political movement with shrewd tactical sense. The predominating direction of his interests is exocathective: financial, political, and social. But his sentiments ad *Subjective Values* [13] are more intensely positive than those of any other subject, and his preoccupation with self-becomingness is continuous and sincere. As a potential religionist, however, he is today too much the servant of an irreligious need for Dominance, an egocentric ambitiousness that is propelled by a half-conscious fantasy of magical omnipotence. As a result his capacity for dedication and selflessness is deficient. He has no thought of finding his life by losing it. Personal power is what he wants, conscious governance of himself and others —this above all.

Determinants. Hawk's father's people are a mixture of German Protestants and German Jews. In his autobiography [1] he writes:

> The one aspect of my life that I have ignored completely in writing this, and perhaps with good reason, is the religious one. Though my mother was of the Lutheran faith, and my father first of the Lutheran then of the Jewish, and then of no faith, my own faith has never been developed. I went to Sunday School for a short period, and gave up without much objection from my parents. As for moral ideas, most of them came from my family and school, and the boyish reading which I did. Right now a liberal form of Christianity such as Unitarianism would have the greatest appeal to me. Ideas of right and wrong were always evident in our family teachings, but theology and religion were not taken seriously by either parent. Consequently the church background has had no effect upon me.

Brought up by parents who had no religious faith and who had severed all relations with any Church, Hawk regards himself as an outsider who can view the Church and religion with critical detachment. What he sees he doesn't like, feeling that the Church holds its sway over people by financial power and by the appeal to fear. Hawk has very positive sentiments ad *Will, Voluntary Control* [13], and he fears the Church as a coercive force which is likely to interfere with his moral autonomy. He also has liberal sentiments, being highly positive toward *Labor* and *Communism,* and it is possibly the influence of the communist ideology which has made him suspicious of the financial control which he believes the Church exerts.

Hawk has always led an active life, and most of his interests are predominantly extraceptive. He is full of practical common sense. On the other hand, he has rich powers of invention with archetypal and mythological trends of imagination which he cannot relate to his ambitions and which he has not found reflected in any great allegory of life. The symbols, the drama, the poetry of the Christian religion, having once been associated with the affrighting dreams of infancy, were shunned thereafter with all other forms of irreality. But even to this day, potent fantasies course beneath the surface of his apparently strong realistic hold on life. On one occasion, indeed, such a fantasy broke through his socially integrated self in undisguised form. For several weeks Hawk half-humorously insisted that the members of his college circle call him God. His early dread of the avenging Deity had evidently been conquered by the fantasy of himself as equivalent in power.

Hawk is full of creativeness ready to be bent to a great enterprise—the development of self, of personal relationships, of social reforms. The process

should not be inhibited but furthered by conscious intention, because if it is denied and severely held in check, the time will surely come when life will get flat and stale, and then the paranoid tendencies which are now dormant may break with vengeance into life.

3. *Subject No. 9: Grove*

Grove has no intense sentiments for or against anything. Behind his personable exterior and friendly manner is an aversion to life born of an inveterate inertia coupled with timidity and ineffectiveness. He is mildly interested in psychology and psychiatry; but his approach to human nature is wholly analytic and deflating, devoid of creative sublimations or ideals, moral or religious. He is, however, opposed to skepticism, being one out of two subjects to affirm that, *Skepticism is slow suicide.* In the Aphorisms Test [13] he is slightly negative ad both *Churchman* and *Faith, Belief.* When forced to give an answer before an imaginary audience to the question, *Do you believe sincerely in religion?* he answers,

> Yes 3. It's a unifying force. It's something people can fall back on in time of need, in time of emergency. It explains a great many points that government can't explain. It's something to fall back on. It is all embracing. It is an international thing, an organization above governments [37].

Although Grove has no personal interest in religion, he can when pressed produce plenty of reasons for its being a good thing, and thus, apparently, talk himself into it; but he has no core of conviction one way or the other. His psychological studies have persuaded him that religion has its roots in man's nature, and therefore it may be a good thing as a support for human frailty.

The adjectives which he associates with *Religion* are, "orthodox, self-made or formal, universal, hypocritical" [14]. The association "self-made or formal" is significant, as will be seen later. For *Atheism* he thinks of the adjectives, "intelligent, confused, unorganized" [14]. It is difficult to say why he thinks atheism is both intelligent and confused, unless it be that he himself, as we know, is both intelligent and confused.

It is hard to predict Grove's future. As he stands now, in his tweed coat and flannel trousers, he does not seem to possess any of the capacities and traits required of a religionist. He is interested in no ideology whatsoever, being skeptical of the power of thought to settle or even illumine anything. He is most negative in his sentiments ad *Idealism, Philosophers,* and *Creators of Value.* He is mildly in favor of socialistic reform, but

does not seek, or even seem to need, a rationalized frame of reference. That part of his mind which in others is tenanted by some sort of philosophy of life is now a vacuum. But we cannot be certain that it will always remain so. One day a ready-made ideology may suddenly rush in and occupy the vacant flat. However, it is not likely that he will pay much attention to the new boarder, since his character, if we can judge it by its present structure, does not fit him for dedication, insociation, or reverence. At present his valuations are wholly in terms of pertinence to his private pains and pleasures. He is an intraceptive psychological realist who has not yet learnt to release his damned-up reservoir of feelings by associating them with anything greater than himself. It is possible that service in the Army will do wonders for him. Undoubtedly there are potentialities in him that have been dozing quietly for years and may yet be quickened into life.

Determinants. Grove's father's family were Congregationalists, but his father "switched to Christian Science. He reads in this but he doesn't go to church" [4]. His mother is a Methodist. He himself was brought up in the Episcopal Church. "But despite this affiliation," he says, "religion has played a small part in my life. Neither of my parents attended church, and there was no religious discussion at home. Although I attended Sunday School for three years and went to a church summer camp for four years, I seem to have absorbed nothing and have not gone to church for six years" [1].

It seems that religious teaching made little or no impression on him because it was not reflected in the interests of his parents. "I can never remember religion being talked about at home," he says [1].

Grove, who dreaded and detested his father, never incorporated this fearful aspect of his parent into his idea of God. For him God was wholly just and merciful, not one to be feared.

> I never felt that God was watching me to see whether I was good or not. I felt that God was benevolent, and I trusted him more than I trusted most people [2].

In spite of the fact that Grove has a strong *n* Abasement, as well as a strong *n* Succorance, this beneficent God of his was lacking in appeal. Not fearing Him, Grove could not worship Him.

> I still feel that the Episcopal Church is rather barren from a child's point of view. There is nothing to fear or worship in the mystical and emotional way that a child seems to relish. Religion was unimportant in my home, and I considered formal religion to be something which you could take or leave [2].

To this indifference to formal religion Grove contrasts the primitive feelings of awe and deference which he experienced as a child when he, and a group of other children created a religion of their own.

> Our crowd were always building things. We even made up a religion. A group of about seven children, age 7-10, all quite imaginative were involved. It was a very well integrated group in that the children had played together and lived in the same neighborhood for quite a few years. The sexes were about evenly divided.
>
> I can recall that this was something that we tried to conceal from our parents, not because we were ashamed, but because we thought it was something of our own that they had no part in.
>
> We set up a "temple" in an old garage next to a vacant lot. It's main ornament was a large idol, a rather amateurish imitation of a Buddha drawn on the side of the garage. This was surrounded by ferns, worn out curtains, painted candles and other bric-a-brac which we thought would add to the mysticism. We also threw shaving talc over everything to make it smell nice.
>
> There was a great deal of pomp and ceremony involved. We had a hierarchy of priests which changed from time to time, and as I remember it, there was a lot of chanting and bowing before the idol. Actually the old garage took on an air of sanctity as far as we were concerned.
>
> I can remember that at the time all this seemed much more real to me than my church, perhaps because church was a duty and there never seemed anything concrete for me to grasp.
>
> All this lasted over a period of about seven months. It broke up when we went away for the summer, and was not resumed the next winter [2].

The Christian God to whom Grove was first introduced was unexcitingly benign, but the more tangible and fearsome Being created by himself and friends aroused his worship in "the mystical and emotional way." The legitimate God of the Episcopal Church satisfied the boy's need to fall back upon a comforting support, whereas this other God was born out of the fascinated fear of the dark and dangerous power which he sensed in his father. Grove reacted to the coercions of his parent by passive resistance and inertia, a response which became an inveterate habit. And so the mystical emotion which he felt in bowing down before the affrighting idol proved to be the last flare of genuine passion before the gates of the prison-house of passivity closed on him, the lock was turned and the key lost.

In his autobiography Ingle states his faith.

> I stand with the great majority of biologists in accepting the evidence of my senses, and of believing in the objective reality of the universe. I stand with the physical scientists who maintain that change and

> transformation are basic attributes of the universe. The Marxists call this Dialectical Materialism, and other thinkers haven't as good a word for it; the fact that this philosophy stems on the one hand from the idealists and proponents of change is bound up in the word "dialectic," which means a law of change in the Marxian sense. The fact that Marx owed so much to the stream of materialistic philosophy is bound up in the "materialism"—a belief in the objective reality of the universe. I do not believe in a personal God, and am skeptical of most people's God concepts.
>
> Dialectical Materialism is a powerful tool for thought. Again and again in the history of biology—particularly in morphology and physiology—the minute the organism is considered from a dynamic point of view, the seeming vagaries and inconsistencies of anatomical fact clarify themselves. On the other hand, the minute a scientific hypothesis is subjected to rigorous proof and verified, you have a materialistic affirmation of a dialectic [1].

Ingle is perfectly confident that the objective reality of the universe is final. Unlike York, who seeks to be convinced of the existence of God so that he may find a fixed absolute in a world of flux, Ingle, a twentieth century Heraclitus, makes growth and change themselves the center of his philosophy. Fact, he feels, can only be clarified and made meaningful by this dynamic point of view. Ingle believes this philosophy of dialectic materialism to be a powerful tool for thought. But we cannot escape the conclusion that this is not the only reason why it appeals to him. We know that his view of the world changed rapidly and easily as he grew. He tells us with what gargantuan appetite he devoured one philosophy after another in his youth. The assimilation of new ideologies is the very breath of life for him, but now having found one in which change and transformation are of the very essence, perhaps there is enough movement within the system to appease his extravagant need for novelty and to hold him within its boundaries for a season. Such a philosophy conforms beautifully to Ingle's own intellective processes. He eagerly seizes upon observed events and builds up a theory which will accommodate them, quickly passing on to a new theory whenever a new fact intrudes itself. This process, so painful to many others, is the very ground of this man's health and zest. Thus, in dialectic materialism Ingle sees endless vistas stretching out ahead of him with no frontiers in sight. It is not surprising that although he once delighted in theology he soon found it not only too unreal but too static and too circumscribed for his tastes.

In the Aphorisms Test [13] only one other subject is as extreme as Ingle in his belief that, *A religious creed represents a delusion and keeps*

us infantile and therefore ethically inferior. Except for this—although he is negative, to be sure, on *Faith and Belief*—he gives no extreme marks, which suggests that despite his own lack of conviction he is not intolerant of others' beliefs. Tolerance is also reflected in the adjectives which he associates with the word Religion: "abused, hypocritical, beautiful, indubitable," as well as in those which he gives for *Atheism*: "bigoted, skeptical, mechanistic" [14].

Not only is he tolerant of religious views generally, but he is able to identify himself with the attitudes of other men. This was especially brought out in the Argument Completion Test [15] where in the discussion on *Hedonism vs. Aceticism* he puts these words into the mouth of the religious ascetic:

> When you dissociate yourself from idle pleasures you can look God right in the eye. I want no diversion from the divine mission and inspiration. The farther you are sunk in the carnal life the farther you are from the Godhead. The reason that I deny myself is for the sake of the special pleasure in being close to God whom I feel around me. By denial I express ambition for myself. The Christian religion is the religion of the individual. Salvation is the aim. I desire my own salvation and the salvation of other men through my example.

Ingle tells us that although he does not believe in God, he admires certain other people's attitude in religious matters [31], and in the quotation given above he shows that he is not without respect for the religious ascetic by being able to argue for him with a touch of eloquence. Armed and supported by his own belief in materialistic philosophy, Ingle has no interest in debunking the religion of others. While he has little sensitivity for ordering personal relations, he enjoys and is invigorated by the manifold intellectual attitudes of everyone he meets, especially those attitudes which he accepts as a possible challenge to his own. He is eager to test all men's beliefs against his, and this testing cannot be fully enjoyed if he does not give opposing points of view their full measure of value.

Having taken his stand with the biologists and physical scientists in believing in the "objective reality of the universe," Ingle is quite willing to accept religion as a psychological necessity for most people.

> Religion is very necessary. Religion is designed primarily to take care of crises in people's lives. Without religion, it is necessary for religious substitutes to exist. If no other compensating mechanisms exist in our society, it would seem necessary for religion to exist [37].

As his sociological interests developed Ingle came to see that although a

religious creed represents a delusion it is nevertheless one of the most useful compensating mechanisms invented by the human race. He feels no superiority in holding this attitude, believing that he himself also needs to derive benefit from this valuable social institution. It is a good thing, he thinks, to take stock of himself every now and then by going to church and setting himself to a brief period of introspection. Furthermore, he derives aesthetic pleasure from the ritual and organ music.

> Soul searching in a church service has always done me good, and provocative and moral ideas have frequently drifted into these ears from members of the preaching profession. To me a good sermon is as worth while as the best kind of lecture on a secular subject [1].
>
> I consider some religious services, particularly the Roman Mass, Quaker Meetings, and any services with good music as a profoundly moving and beneficial experience [1].

Ingle's Agnosticism is a settled matter. He has no doubts or conflicts, and feels no need whatever, either intellectual or emotional, for God. His faith in change and transformation on the biological level is a sufficiently satisfying way of looking at the universe. He believes that the cure for suffering humanity lies, not in man's spiritual striving, in his urge to come nearer to the Godhead by transforming and perfecting his own nature, but by attaining a better body, better food, better teeth, better housing, and all this and more "by revolutionary progress toward better social conditions" [1].

Ingle has some of the attributes of a religious personality. Already he is dedicated to a collective ideology built on broad humanitarian lines; his capacity for insociation is above the average; his egocentric ambitions are subordinate to his desire for the realization of the Good Society. He is highest among our subjects in his positive sentiments ad *Classless Society* and *Racial Equality*, both of which are products of Christian teaching. Thus he falls in with those who hold that the proper aim of religion is the establishment of God's kingdom on earth.

On the other hand, Ingle's way of life does not make room for any of the inwardness characteristic of religious experience. He is a rampant extraceptor whose sentiments ad *Subjective Values* are more negative than all but one of our subjects. His interests are closely focussed on the material aspects of the universe, and he plans to bring about social betterment by working in the domain of applied biology, the implication being that man's welfare can be best served by improving his environment—his body, the physical surroundings, and the social structure—rather than by furthering his inward development. His feeling function being undeveloped and his

respect for religious imperatives being nil, he has little basis for moral certitude. Consequently, his apperceptions of good and evil, his valuations of himself and others are insensitive and unreliable. His judgments of men are marked by a tolerance that borders on indifference.

At best, Ingle could be called an applied social religionist whose strength lies largely in his ability to theorize. In contrast to this, he is almost wholly lacking in the inclinations and aptitudes which serve to nourish a personal religion. The God that must be felt, not proved; the religion of solitariness and contemplation; the experiences that engender mysticism—these do not lie in the life-path of the inquisitive, rapidly moving, rationalizing, extraverted Ingle.

Determinants. Ingle has always had a high level of both physical and intellectual activity. He is at the top of the rank order on Extraception and on Energy (Intensity and Endurance), and surely he would be outstanding in these qualities among any group of young men of his age. Ingle admires both of his parents, and they have been able to give him so much judicious support that he feels confident of himself and of his own views. His parents were not religious and never tried even half-heartedly to indoctrinate him, although his grandmother made some futile efforts in this direction.

> My maternal grandmother is a practising Episcopalian, but both parents are backslid members of the same faith. This doesn't mean that I have been discouraged from religious reading or experiences because of the irreligious habits of my parents [1].

His parents were open-minded and encouraged the same attitude in their son, which probably was not difficult as at an early age his avid and voracious appetite seized upon theology as well as science for its food. His parents, both of whom are intelligent and cultivated people, were so impressed by the precocious intellectual interests of their son, that they never tried to discourage him, but on the contrary provided him with all the content which he needed to occupy his very active mind.

> Before I was twelve I had read the Bible, the Koran, the Book of Mormon, and Science and Health, as well as an ancient and enormous tome on the history of the Reformation [1].

It is doubtful whether his powers of digestion were equal to his appetite at this age, but it proved to be a good mental exercise which left him with a taste for theology, though his predominant interest has always been in science. "I liked theology and still do, although I am still an agnostic and always

have been" [1]. Because of the fact that Ingle was thus encouraged and his mind kept occupied in such a diversity of mental fare, and also because of the understanding received from his parents, Ingle never felt the need to search for God. From an early age he has been able to look at religion objectively. For him Christianity was never holy ground, never more than one of the nutnberless curious phenomena of the universe, as much to be questioned and pried into as any other biological fact.

Two main factors are involved in Ingle's objective attitude toward religion. (*a*) He has traveled extensively with his parents who were always at pains to have him understand the lives and attitudes of other peoples and thereby he acquired early the habit of comparing diverse ideologies and beliefs. (*b*) Like Hawk, Ingle reacted to his early childhood fears by a flight into objectivity, which resulted in the negative cathection of irreality and superstition. In this he was encouraged by his parents. We know, for example, that his father helped him to overcome his sexual anxieties by giving him books on the physiology and anatomy of the reproductive system. This flight into science encouraged his mind to run way ahead of his feelings which resulted in a premature detachment of viewpoint. His feeling has become so subordinate to his intellect that he would not hesitate to push open the doors of the Sanctuary and dissect the Holy Ghost.

Ingle is outstandingly articulate, positive, and optimistic, his trust being placed in the new science of man and society. With this instrument he purposes to participate in the construction of a new world that will permit men to live a happier, a freer and a more rational life. He has the will and capacity to make a memorable contribution.

5. *Subject No. 7: Couch*

Couch subscribes to no religious creed. "But," he says, "I want to stress exactly what I mean—that I do believe sincerely in religion as a necessary social institution. I myself have no religious faith, although at the same time I am open to the possibility of religious faith in the future—more experience and deeper knowledge. I think it is a good thing socially and therefore in that sense I do believe in it" [37].

Couch's sentiments are all in favor of religion as a beneficial social force. He believes that, *In the present moral chaos, the only hope of recovering spiritual discipline is in a return to religion;* and that, *If the influence of the American churches were to be eliminated our democracy would become too corrupt to endure.* He does not believe that, *A religious creed represents a delusion and keeps us infantile and therefore ethically inferior* [13]. In

the given adjectives to the word *Religion* he crosses out "destructive," and the words which he himself associates with religion are, "'good, useful, worthy, misled, misguided, necessary" [14].

"I recognize, of course," he writes, "the necessity of form and a consistent moral code for the well-being of society at large, and the great pragmatic worth of the same for the individual life" [1].

Adopting an attitude worthy of a sophisticated Catholic, Couch values religion for its utility in the governance of society. Having majored in Sociology because, as he says, "I thought it would be good mental discipline," he has assimilated among others the standpoint of Pareto, who possessed a type of mind that would naturally attract an intellectual like Couch. But what especially appeals to him about religion are the forms, passionate yet dignified, which it has created to shape men's lives.

Although Couch tells us that he has no religious faith, he does not proclaim his denial of God. The adjectives he associates with the word *Atheism* are, "mistaken, typical, extreme, significant, adolescent" [14], and he gives the strongest negative mark to the aphorism, *He who has fully accepted atheism is free.*

> Morally I am more remote from my parents than they realize, yet essentially only in the one respect, the recognition of religious authority. I am no longer a Christian, but I am or am about to be a man of good will. If I forsook their faith irrevocably it was without undue cynicism, bitterness, or a lapse into the equal and opposite error of atheism, or that of abandon. I regret in fact, that certain Christian truths are not true, and still consider the Christian system of ethics to be probably the finest in the history of the world, humanistically speaking [1].

Couch insists on a nicety of discrimination when he asserts that he has not fallen into the "equal and opposite error of atheism." Having read that atheism is a symptom of adolescence, this position becomes repellent, and he had to sharpen his logic to prove that, though he had ceased to believe in the God of his fathers, he was still no atheist.

At the age of 16, with the appetite of a medieval churchman, Couch began to savor the pleasures of dialectic in discussing theology with his distressed parents.

> When I first argued, it was still from within the faith. And trouble arose, much as it did for Peter Abelard who in the 12th century argued also from within the faith, but with an excessively rational bias, as if the deepest mysteries of the Trinity, and the insoluble paradoxes of dogma, could be resolved by clear thinking. I must confess that one of my motives was a delight in argument itself—as a kind of stimu-

> lating game—a pleasure not shared by my parents. Fortunately, neither of them excelling in logic, I am sure they did not quite see the tendency and the enormous implications of my incipiently subversive thoughts [1].

"As to ultimate theological truth my standpoint is of course agnostic," Couch says, and he goes on to describe his present attitude toward ethics.

> Now, deprived of religious conviction in absolute right, sin and salvation, my own ethic in those areas of action covered by the Christian precepts is contingent and equivocal, and in a sense artificial; beyond the residuum of socially conditioned reactions, it must remain, while developing the product of self-conscious taste and prudence, oriented to values and norms which are strictly secular, and are moreover without foundation in the integrated value system of a solidary society. It will be the morality of wisdom, not faith. In any case the problem of morality without religion is one of the least of my concerns at this stage of my life. Morality for me is the strategy of self culture [1].

What Couch cannot bring himself to admit—although there are signs that he is troubled—is the possibility that his "strategy of self culture" may well lead him into perilous and sterile by-paths from which he will find it difficult to extricate himself. He tells us that,

> My major experiences have lately centered about the discovery of *higher* culture and art, and intimate almost mystical emotional experiences of an integrative and dynamic variety, particularly as the result of prolonged introspection, music, drugs or drunkenness [1].

For religion Couch has substituted the cult of sensibility, a shift of cathexis which, as he goes on to explain, has resulted in a complete disruption of sympathy between his parents and himself.

> To relate my total perspective to theirs as simply as possible; the elements of their conception of virtuous character which I have retained in mine *I* have bereft of religious meaning, and given a new context in a total conception of the superior secular man. I have added two entire systems of value, that of intellectuality and that of culture, which open realms unimagined and inaccessible to them [1].

Couch's conception of the "superior secular man" is that of a man who has achieved cultural superiority.

> Whose thought attests a mind of great clarity, vigor, depth, subtlety, precision, originality, whose feeling moves between exquisite sensibility and the depths of joy, pride, and melancholy. His conversation is astute, felicitous, urbane, witty. In matters of culture his flair is impeccable, yet catholic. *Voila un homme!* [1].

This, then, is Couch's idealego, to the attainment of which all his present energies are bent. For this he has sacrificed the satisfactions of faith, hope and charity. That he occasionally questions the wisdom of his course might be predicted.

> My perspective holds the possibilities of a life of infinitely richer texture, deeper and more creative, but a life far less salutary, comforting or happy. I may have condemned myself to some miserable compromise between the possible—almost yet never realized, and the real—almost yet never accepted [1].
>
> Conceivably I have made a bad exchange, and my emancipation was a Pyrrhic victory. If so I shall lay the blame not upon myself nor the world of men, but upon Nature, the Universe, and ultimately its famous Creator [1].

Continuing his spiritual autobiography Couch comes finally to the confession of a circumstance that has hurt his pride most grievously.

> Another strain resulting from my metamorphosis, and indeed it is a strain, is my neurosis. I feel the enormous pressure of an unconscious burden of sin and guilt feelings [1].

Having rudely shown his superego the door, Couch is distressed and mortified to find that the old fellow has climbed in the back window and is avenging himself by interfering with the vital machinery of his house. Firstly, near the surface there is this ego-superego conflict, initiated by the attempt of pride to deny and repress conscience; and secondly, on a lower level, an id-superego conflict which has resulted in an obsessional neurosis and an hysterical aphonia to boot. Surely the "superior secular man" is being tried in the furnace of affliction.

Couch, as we have seen, is favorably impressed by the socializing power of the Church and is sincerely responsive to the aesthetic elements in ecclesiastical forms and rituals. Furthermore, he has certain qualities and aptitudes that fit him for the introverted phase of religious experience. He is an extreme intraceptor, concerned with personal becomingness, who is stubbornly true to his own individual ideology. His sentiments are strongly positive ad *Subjective Values, Solitude,* and *Creator of Values.* He values personal relationships.

In other critical respects, however, Couch seems weak, when viewed as a potential religionist. He has evinced no interest in any human enterprise. He has no world loyalty, no capacity for insociation or for dedication to any aim beyond that of his own perfection. Steeped in the sin by which the angels fell, he withholds respect due to his superiors, and is addicted to vain-glorious

masquerades. His sincerity is doubtful. In conformity with his exemplar, the decadent Romantic Genius, he has no valuating moral attitude that is consciously acceptable. His social sentiments are aristocratic generally, being highly negative, for example ad *Racial Equality*.

These deficiencies notwithstnding, it is quite possible that some day Couch will be caught by the great and perpetual appeal of Thomistic philosophy to reason and to taste, and his solipsistic sufferings will be healed by his conversion to Catholicism.

Determinants. The religious indoctrination of Couch during childhood was as steady and thorough as that imposed on any of our subjects, with the possible exception of Finch. This early training by example and precept is enough to account for Couch's preoccupation with the subject.

> My father, who is a Baptist had a very sincere conversion before marriage, and my mother who was always religious belonged to the Methodist Church with which denomination I always had more to do [+].
>
> First and foremost with my parents is the Christian life, which for them amounts to sincere conformity to the recognized practices of church going, church work, bible reading, prayers, tithing, charity, and the sincere cultivation of the Christian virtues of faith, self-sacrifice, good will, purity, probity. Closely allied to this Protestant ethic is the bourgeois one of industry, thrift, hard-headed wisdom, the traditional family life, and the rest. And if these be considered *ideals*, it may be added that my parents attain them admirably [1].

Couch's apostasy in adolescence was the result of several factors. A delicate constitution, ill-health, neuroses, and consequent over-protection, all contributed in producing a frail hypersensitive boy unable to participate on equal terms in the games and pastimes of his classmates. Solitary most of the time he had to depend on his own resources which, as it happened, were considerable. He had artistic talent combined with a high order of intellectual ability. These assets he proceeded to develop to the fullest degree and in a short time his precociousness marked him as an eccentric among his fellows. With him, the conventional rebellion against the older generation took the form of a relentless rational analysis and undermining of all the values implicit in his mother's and father's simple-hearted way of life.

> As a child I didn't feel very religious, although I tried to read the Bible, etc. I don't think it went very deeply but later it got deeper. I thought about religion a good deal and tried to be pious. But then at sixteen there came a complete break, though I didn't fully work out the implications of my position until I was seventeen [+].

The bitterness of the struggle was largely due to the extreme divergence in temperament and taste between parents and offspring. Thus among the factors that operated to bring about the boy's deflection from Methodism, we should include intellectuality, aestheticism, revolt against parental standards, and lack of insociation with boys of his own age.

There was one boy, however, and later three others, whose influence was crucial in initiating and supporting the intellectual civil war at home.

> At the age of fourteen a new friend came into my life. Our conversation soon touched on serious things, namely the enigmas of the universe. One of the very vital results of this year's long dialectic, as it were a kind of prolonged fencing match, was the emergence in both of us of the principle of free thought [1].

These conversations led to the reading of idol-breaking books, such as the works of Spengler and Freud, and in short order, Couch had all the weapons that he needed to annihilate the unsubtle and unverbalized philosophy of the folks at home. The final result was the complete loss of respect and love; and today Couch looks with revulsion on these two whom he has vanquished with his instruments of mind, neglectful of the fact that he is still emotionally dependent on their sustained affection.

> At the time when my first religious doubts began, I allowed myself to open discussions with my parents on the slightest pretext, naïvely trusting in the reasonableness of my approach to disarm them, but naturally the emotions attaching to religious ideas and filial relationships being strongly charged ones, our discussion usually lapsed at once into mutually antagonistic arguments. It seems to me that my parents should have brought forward convincing apologetics for their cognitive religious position, but this they could not do. The Sunday School literature that they put into my hands had quite the effect opposite to the intended. My parents attributed whatever bad influence they posited to books and friends, without understanding that I had taken a rational stand [1].

Couch combines two points of view, that of the pure artist and that of the pure intellectual. If he comes to religion it will be by way of these two channels, never by the direct way of feeling, for this latter function has been thoroughly undermined.

6. *Subject No. 6: Dunn*

All of Dunn's responses to the aphorisms on *Churchman* and *Faith, Belief* hover prudently about the neutral point, although the general trend is negative. On no topic does he admit intense feelings, with one exception—

Skepticism. Here he is definitely and unequivocally positive. He denies more strongly than any other of our subjects that, *Skepticism is the great inhibitor of creative activity,* and only one other subject is more emphatic in his belief that though, *Faith may have its victories, skepticism remains the only permanent basis of tolerance.* The words which he associates with *Religion* are, "conditioned, accidental" [14].

Dunn believes that he has religious faith but he cannot find words to define it. The direct question, Do you believe sincerely in religion? is enough to precipitate a virtual paralysis of thought.

> I'm an Agnostic. I believe that there is a God, but that you can't know about it particularly. I can think of nothing else [37].

Although he has attempted to clarify his ideas by reading Whitehead, Perry, and others, these efforts up to now have brought him no farther than the simple statement,

> I am aware that there must be some omnipotent force called "God," but that's as far as I have gotten [18].

The adjectives he associates with *Atheism,* on the other hand, are "tenable, unlikely, valuable, unconsoling" [14], which suggests that although his intellect might rest content in the denial of God, such a conclusion would leave his feelings hungering for consolation, later, if not now.

> The place that I assign to religion is that of finding of comfort on facing death [18].

Dunn scorns the simple faith of his mother who, he writes, "would rather fear God and worship Him than understand"; but yet he himself has been able neither to give up the idea of God nor to arrive at an acceptable conception of His rôle in the operations of the universe. The more Dunn reasons about it—and he reasons a good deal—the nearer he approaches unbelief, a position which disquiets him considerably. This man, in short, is a compulsive thinker with an ungovernable craving for absolute conviction. For him Agnosticism is merely a respectable name for an unsatisfying state of indecision, an unstable balance between the claims of science and religion. He says that:

> As I became aware of science it strengthened my Agnosticism. However you can oversimplify the rôle of science and make out that it can replace religion [18].

Of one thing Dunn is certain: he has no use for institutionalized worship, for elaborate creeds and rituals, believing that "religion is something to be

alone with. I find it in Nature better than in the Church" [9]. We believe that Dunn has no clear religious thoughts when he communes with Nature, but rather the experience of a voiceless empathy, which has in it some of the wonder and awe of true religious feeling.

Dunn deplores sectarian disputes, such as those to which he was exposed at home and later, to some extent, at school. Just now, in fact, this is a peculiarly sore subject for him, as he has fallen in love with a Catholic girl, and the only thing that seems to stand in the way of a happy marriage is mutual distrustfulness centering about the topic of religion. He, for one, is "always conscious of fighting off bigotry" [18], a bigotry which annuls his pretensions to intellectual detachment and aloofness. He puts the blame for this on his mother, because of "the way she preached intolerance toward other religions. This has left its scars" [18].

There is little likelihood that Dunn's perplexity about the supernatural will be resolved in the near future. It is the product of much deeper emotional conflict that manifests itself in several other interrelated forms, one of which is a conscious conflict between personal ambition—for wealth, social position, and prestige—and a morally enlightened desire to dedicate his efforts to the ideal of the Social Service State. His sentiments ad *Economic Equalitarianism* and *Classless Society* are definitely positive, and since he is striving to attain a total understanding of human history, his sentiment ad *Philosophers* is also positive. We would say that his present outlook was humanistic rather than religious, based as it is on the logical arrangement of objective facts. Distrustful of his own feelings he has accumulated no fund of wisdom based on introspection. He is on the negative end of our rank order in his sentiments ad *Subjective Values, Creator of Values,* and *Idealism.* His need for social approval runs hand in hand with an unconscious and denied over-valuation of conventional standards. Thus his behavior is outstanding in its conformity to accepted patterns, and yet much of his conversation consists of a barrage of disgruntled criticisms and complaints against American society and its acknowledged leaders. Dissatisfied with himself he finds little to admire in the actions of mankind.

Determinants. Dunn's preoccupation with the problem of religious faith is the direct result of his Methodist mother's influence and of Sunday School indoctrination during childhood. These are the chief positive determinants. The chief negative determinant, on the other hand, has been the skeptical unbelieving attitude of his father. Dunn is a chip off the old block. He prefers his father's articulated steps of logic to his mother's outpourings of emotion, associating the former with Agnosticism and the

latter with ignorant religiosity. "My mother is too emotional," he writes, "and has recently taken strongly to the Church, nagging my father to make him go too" [33]. The father has always "regarded church as a community institution, not as a personal panacea for the world's ills" [4]. It was on the mother's insistence, not on his, that the children went regularly to church.

> My brother and I from the time we were four attended church and Sunday School. Here we were dully stuffed with the beliefs and prejudices of our creed—Episcopalian—from which we emerged in our sixteenth year cynical, and not favorably impressed [1].

The readiest explanation of Dunn's present unstable position on religious questions is the conflict of spiritual attitudes that has always existed in his home, the father being the greater of the two forces. Next to this on the negative side, we would list compulsive extraception supplemented by the inhibition and devaluation of subjective judgments. The cause of this was the financial failure of his father and the boy's consequent desire to regain, if not to surpass, his family's former social status by "making good" at school and college. The better he conformed to the valued patterns of behavior the faster his mobility up the scale. Rewards have been plentiful as viewed objectively. He is listed among the hundred "clubmen" in a college class that numbered a thousand in its freshman year; but inwardly he is discontented. He feels that all the world's a stage, and men and women merely actors, since in striving so assiduously for conspicuous success he has lost the sense of his own being. There is still the possibility that he will recover his identity through religion, since all the prestige that he has won has failed to quiet an undefined half-ashamed uneasiness, certain vague intimations that there is something elusive beyond his reach, a truth that he must search for and possess.

7. *Subject No. 5: Lake*

Lake says that for him religion is "a kind of a vague, unimportant, uncertain thing. I didn't think much about it" [18]. In spite of this, his present attitude is distinctly favorable. On the Aphorisms Test [13] his sentiments ad *Faith and Belief* and *Churchman* are positive, and he sets himself down as strongly against *Skepticism*. No other subject is so negative in his response to the aphorism, *Faith may have its victories but skepticism remains the only permanent basis of tolerance,* and in his disagreement with the statement that, *Skepticism is a necessary attitude for an educated mind.* He does not think that, *A religious creed represents a delusion and keeps us infantile*

and therefore ethically inferior; and with one other subject he is the most extreme in his opinion that, *In the present moral chaos, the only hope of recovering spiritual discipline is in a return to religion.* He also believes more strongly than any other subject that, *The men who have done most for humanity have all been deeply imbued with religious faith.*

Lake's mother was a Catholic before her marriage, but as there was no Catholic church in the town in which she and her husband settled, she drifted away from her faith, and Lake says that only occasionally has she seemed interested in religious matters, although for a time Christian Science appealed to her. His father, who was brought up as a Methodist, has likewise "never been much concerned about religion" [4]. Largely because of the local situation, the parents decided on the Episcopal Church for their children. Lake says, "I am an Episcopalian, but since my Sunday School days I have never attended church very often. Religion is a thing that has been something personal to me" [1].

His feeling that for him religion is something personal and private, not social and public, may be attributed largely to the fact that he is very much attached to both his parents and neither one of them is actively connected with any church. It is also for this reason, we suppose, that Lake is more definite than any other subject in disagreeing with the aphorism, *If the influence of the American churches were to be eliminated our democracy would become too corrupt to endure.* Lake's family have shown no evidences of corruption, despite a long history of non-attendance at church services. Like his parents, Lake himself is scrupulously moral. "For my own life I want to try to live up to the Ten Commandments. It seems to me an ideal moral code despite the very broad interpretations that one has to give it" [1]. As long as "very broad interpretations" can make the Decalogue conform to old-fashioned middle class standards, Lake is heartily in favor of it. It has a "unifying effect" upon himself and other members of the community. Social solidarity founded on plain common sense is the prime desideratum. Far-flung imaginings, eccentric enthusiasms, irrationality, mysticism, may be exhilarating to others, but they are vain to him.

> By nature I am not religious, and have had to reject a great many principles of both Catholicism and Christian Science, the two extreme faiths to which I have been exposed. Catholicism doesn't fit in with the democratic conception of life; Christian Science is so often too far out of this world and way up in the clouds [1].

While no traces of any Catholic influence are discernible in Lake, he has made use of the Christian Science Technique of positively ignoring and

negating everything unpleasant or disagreeable. He cultivates optimism as the expression of a philosophy of life.

In the Public Questions Test [37] when asked whether he sincerely believes in religion, he answers:

> Yes, 4. Everybody must have a personal religion or a code. A religion has a unifying effect. Religion has a stabilizing effect on the mind. Religion gives strength.

What Lake refers to as "the stabilizing effect of religion" seems to be very important to him, and he contrasts this with *Atheism*, for which he gives the adjectives, "wandering, uncertain, unstable, radical" [14].

The active core of Lake's "personal religion" is revealed in his autobiography:

> I am convinced that complete happiness can only be acquired by not thinking of oneself. While such a state is impossible 100 per cent, it can be built up to a highly efficient stage by practice. It is upon this theory that I can believe that Christ ever lived. If he lived he was human, if he was human he must have had all the inherent human characteristics—sexual passions included. Yet we all think of Christ as a person unendowed with such earthly qualities. We also think of him as the most *benevolent* and *unselfish* creature that ever lived. Therefore the conquering of depressive and repressive moods seems possible only through these two qualities [1].

What Lake means here is not entirely clear. Happiness, he says, is the result of selflessness. It is possible for a human being to become very largely selfless by constant practice; therefore, one can believe that Christ, who was wholely selfless, was an actual human being. If he was a human being he must have experienced sexual passions as well as depressive and repressive moods. But since it is evident that he conquered these passions and these moods, he must have done so through selflessness, because selflessness was his most distinctive trait. Therefore, selflessness is the only way to overcome sex and the depressions associated with it, and thus to attain complete happiness. This is probably a correct rendering of the passage, for Lake has admitted feeling very guilty and dejected because of yielding occasionally to his sexual impulses. Compared to other individuals of his age, his self-control in this sphere is exemplary, but the memory of one burst of passion in adolescence is a mortification to him still.

And so it seems that Lake in his efforts to conquer the Blue Devils has taken Christ as his exemplar. In doing some unselfish deed he forgets himself. More often, however, he uses the technique of disregarding or reasoning away his gloomy thoughts. "It is a part of my nature," he says, "to

ignore and forget all those things that are disheartening. I use terrific logic sometimes to make things seem right." In this endeavor he is generally successful, as far as his friends can see, no rift in his armor of serenity being apparent to observers. For Lake, Christ is not the historical Man of Sorrows but the Man of Cheerfulness, and as such the image of him is an agent in the operation of compulsive optimism. Reliance on the Ten Commandments, combined with admiration of the selfless Jesus, constitutes Lake's personal religion.

Lake is a matter-of-fact extraceptor with neither the inwardness, nor the passion, nor the imagination of a religious man; but he is placed fifth on our rank order chiefly because he is in no way opposed to religion (in the narrow sense), but, on the contrary, is favorably inclined to it; and because the fragment of religion that he does possess is an active force in his life. It makes him dissatisfied with some of his present actions and inspires him to do better.

Determinants. Lake's Episcopalian education did not take hold. It floated away down the river of time.

> Before Confirmation it was seldom that I missed a Sunday School class, but despite my good attendance, I don't recall learning very much about the Bible. At present I know nothing about it" [1].

Perhaps the chief fact to remember here is that Lake's parents were not religious and they gave him such a comfortable feeling of security that his childhood was unusually happy and he did not have to look elsewhere for support and hope. Today, however, he does feel some desire for religion.

Among the possible determinants of his present need two are worth mentioning. No longer in close contact with his parents, Lake is living in a social environment which is more complex than the one in which he was brought up. Here at college he has not found the clear imperatives which formerly he could depend on receiving from his parents; and so he needs a substitute influence to strengthen him in the moral law by which he rules his conduct. Although he has a well-structured ego and a strong superego, he is nonetheless afraid of his own impulses; and if he had as a support such institutionalized guidance as a church provides, his now overburdened repressive mechanisms could relax a little and so permit a greater flowering of his personality.

In practice, Lake's theory that to be happy you must forget about yourself—escape into normalcy and look for a "good time"— has not been conspicuously successful in banishing inner tension, sudden emotional blocks, and automic agitations. Under ordinary circumstances these perturbations

are either absent or unnoticeable, and a short acquaintance with Lake's two-dimensional conscious outlook would lead one to suppose that here was "an easy trust assumed of easy trials." Certainly in his outer layer this subject is another Horatio—"There are more things in heaven and earth, than are dreamt of in your philosophy" would occur as an appropriate reflection, and stick to our impression of him, unless by chance we took a look at the inner layer revealed on the Thematic Apperception Test.

Lake's *TAT* stories are fairly seething with melodramatic robberies, violence, accidents, and sudden deaths. One tale, for example, is that of a man who has a passion for robbing graves and dissecting the eyeballs out of corpses. In another, the hero, a daredevil driver, runs his car into a hearse, the coffin is cracked open and the body thrown out; all are killed. Surely these, and there are other visions of the same sort, are as "wondrous strange" as the ghost of Hamlet's father. In conjunction with monstrous crimes, the Reformation thema is apt to occur; and the variables Superego and Blamavoidance are unusually high. Thus, this test furnishes evidence of enough second level, inner layer conflict to account for Lake's ungovernable moods and tensions. One of his bizarre stories tells of a man who gets lost in a blizzard.

> He sees a house in the distance and tries to reach it. He thinks he sees animals—no, angels. He thinks he is close to Heaven, but then the whole sky is filled with the figures of Hell. On the ground are symbols of Heaven. Above are the symbols of Hell. There is a great conflict. Is Heaven up or is Hell up? When he finally reaches the house he loses consciousness. This whole story is something that went on in his unconscious mind and will never be told by him.

This may well be an expression of Lake's own battle to keep heaven up and hell down, a battle which, as he says, often forces him "to use terrific logic to make things seem right." In making things seem right, church membership, we suggest, might help considerably.

The second determinant is Lake's great need for affiliation. He is primarily a sociocentric individual who functions most happily when he is incorporated in a group. This has been denied him in the religious sphere and he feels the need of it. Had his parents been church-goers, no doubt he would have faithfully maintained the allegiance formed in association with them, but this not having been the case he is emotionally adrift. He has tried to make religion a personal affair simply because there were no outside influences which encouraged church attendance. We predict that he will eventually join a church, and perhaps become a vestryman, and when he does he will have less trouble keeping his heaven up and his hell down.

8. *Subject No. 4: York*

York is not sure where he stands on religious issues. He says that he feels the need for some Supreme Being, and he is against the statement that, *Religious faith is merely the entrusting of one's own life to an unknown and ever unknowable product of the imagination* [13].

In the Public Questions Test [37] when asked if he sincerely believes in religion he answers, "No, 3"; but he modifies this by saying that he is "undecided about it." This notwithstanding, his sentiment ad *Faith and Belief* is highly positive on the Aphorisms Test [13]. Of the given adjectives for the word *Religion* he crosses out the negative ones, and the adjectives which he himself gives are, "necessary, hard to think clearly, changeable, diverse, omnipresent, powerful, holy" [14]. With one other subject he is the most extreme in his belief that, *In the present moral chaos the only hope of recovering spiritual discipline is in a return to religion* [13].

There is a conflict in York between his critical intelligence which does not accept religion and an emotional craving which he cannot banish. The opposition of the two prevents him from reaching any clear position. He says that he is undecided about religion "because things have to be proved to me unless I am sure. I have never experienced any call yet" [37]. In other words, he thinks that his doubts would be quieted either if he were given a rational proof of God's existence or if, out of a mystical experience, a belief was engendered that would transcend rationality entirely. He questions the latter solution, as he says that he has known very few ministers and preachers who have been veritably called. He feels that the Bible does not help him any "as it is too far away" [37].

York is more than willing to discard dogma and the forms of religion. He feels that ritual is silly and he says that he never prays. But what he cannot relinquish is the idea of God. During the last two years he has spent a good deal of time "wondering about omnipotent power." Does God exist or not? He hopes the answer is "Yes," for he dislikes Atheism. The adjectives which he associates with this word are, "thoughtful, untamed, cynical, unbelieving, unhappy" [14]. York wistfully longs to have the question of God's reality settled once and for all by being granted an authentic revelation such as he imagined his two grandfathers, both ministers, experienced when they received the call. A stranger to serenity in his present state of half-belief and doubt, he craves the certainty that can never be displaced. A poem he composed shortly before coming to the Clinic is truly expressive of his discontent.

Oh, let me live a simple life
Where two and two make four;
Where man may stand before his God,
With feet low planted on the sod,
And know—and guess no more.

Why must we always wonder
If what we think is true,
If whether or if whether not
Perhaps some conflict we've forgot
That quite distorts our view?

Life taken as it came from Him
Ought surely to suffice
But no, we *each* should plumb the law
Deciding how adepts must draw
The melting speed of ice.

But if York has doubts about the existence of God, he has no doubts at all about the value of the Church as a social institution. Here all his sentiments are definitely positive. He feels that "it is a thing to keep people living happy" [12]. He himself participates in church activities; singing in the choir, teaching in Sunday School, and attending meetings of his church club. "I am quite pious on Sundays," he says [31]. But he is bothered a little by these activities. "I justify going to church because it is a good example, it's a fine thing, even if you do feel a little hypocritical; it keeps the children occupied for two hours, it gives you a healthy feeling; sometimes a sermon is useful, and singing is fun" [12].

York has been given fourth place in our rank order chiefly because belief in God is a vital issue with him and he is too honest to profess belief where there is none or little. His poem is testimony of a valid hunger for religion. Besides this, some weight was given to his very regular attendance at church services and meetings, despite the fact that in doing this he helps to support himself.

Determinants. York's mother, the daughter of a Lutheran minister, has always been religious. "She goes to church and reads religious stuff. She was one of those Sunday School children who learns the Bible" [5]. His father is also the child of a minister (Methodist), but today *his* religious views are non-conformist. "My father is more thoughtful. He can't stomach some of the forms of religion and would rather think it out for himself. He dislikes churches, but once during a storm at sea he resorted to prayer which caused the storm to subside "[12].

Although his father dislikes churches, he has tried to make his children open-minded about religion. For example, York tells how he "read us a book, *I Am Persuaded,* by an atheist who became convinced that there was a spiritual life" [18]. The father is a collector of quaint notions, one of which is the venerable belief that there are "old souls" and "new souls." The old souls are people who have been reincarnated and are now living a second life. He has won his wife over to this view, and both agree that their son is an old soul because he has such understanding of other people.

The chief determinants of York's religious sentiments have been, without doubt, the influences, some concordant, some discordant, coming from his parents. Both parents agreed that he should go to Sunday School as a boy and both have favored his participation in church activities. Indeed the father, in spite of his non-conformity, has set his boy an example by serving as president of the men's club at the church. But on other more crucial points the mother and the father have disagreed and the total effect of their persuasions has been to disturb the equanimity of their son. The radical social sentiments and the unorthodox religious ideas of the father have prompted York to question the whole economic and political structure of society as well as the foundation of religion. The impulse to examine the basic tenets of society was also fostered by his own unhappy realization of the discrepancy between his family's life of poverty and the frivolous expenditures of the rich, with whom he came in contact in earning his way through school and college. This critical appraisal of his world soon began to undermine his early religious belief, and an interest in Communism with its vision of the ideal society and its repudiation of religion as opiate of the people served to increase his doubts. The fact that his mother, the dominant parent, has remained faithful to her original beliefs has not helped York to retain his, first, because like Dunn, he has little respect for his mother's critical intelligence, and second, again like Dunn, because his father is his favorite parent.

His mother's high level of aspiration for the boy has been like a whip daily driving him to do his utmost. He must earn his own living and get high marks at the same time. This combined with the disharmony at home, his mother's nagging, and the corrosive effect of his father's radical ideas, have served to keep him in a state of tension. This tension, coupled with the ever-present sense of financial insecurity, has no doubt contributed to the growth of his felt need for some fixed point of orientation—for God as unifying principle in a shifting and contentious world, as a final answer so that he might "know and guess no more."

9. *Subject No. 3: Shea*

Shea has science in his blood; it is in the air he breathes; he feeds on it, embraces it with his affections; his thoughts are full of it; some nights he dreams the correct solution of a problem that has vexed him in the laboratory. He is a biologist, an ingenious experimentalist, apt in the construction of mechanical appliances, a slave to his ambition and routine. He is constituted to succeed. On the Aphorisms Test [13] his sentiments are highly positive ad *Machinery* and *Scientist,* also ad *Food.* "I am a materialist," he says with proud finality.

Shea's incessant drive for achievement permits him little leisure. He has not had time to cultivate friendships or take part in extra-curricular activities. He is more negative than any of our subjects in his sentiments ad *Hedonism* [13], and he gives the highest positive mark to the aphorism, *Only through the rational will's mastery of passion can one progress step by step to maturity and wisdom.* He is also outstandingly positive in his sentiments ad *Self-Interest, Self-Reliance, Will and Voluntary Control, Free Will and Initiative,* and *Singleness of Aim.* From this syndrome one would naturally infer that Shea is a proud resolute individualist, possibly with some trace of the lone wolf in him. This is correct.

When he was a child his mother would accuse him of being "stubborn as a mule," and now 15 odd years later every experimenter at the Harvard Clinic would agree that, mules aside, Shea was by all odds the most uncooperative subject that ever agreed to coöperate in our experiments. His character is a wall of resistance and protectivity, most of his sentiments being on the negative side, opposed to a great many things that are valued by others. Although he was rewarded with high marks and honors for his industry in scholarship, his sentiment ad *Excellence of Harvard Education* is more negative than that of any of our subjects. He is also highly negative ad *Harvard as a Whole* [13]. As a scientist, one of his strong points is his will (and his ability), to shatter the false beliefs, proofs and premises of others. It is difficult to convince him of anything. Certainly it would be hard to find a man who, in most spheres of thought, exemplified with such vengeance in his conduct the dictum that *Skepticism is a necessary attitude for an educated mind.* To this aphorism Shea responds with a hearty "Yes, 2." Here, say, is Sancho Panza on a sturdy mule running down and puncturing with his lance the inflated and insubstantial conceptions of less earth-bound men.

Now what should be the religious sentiments of such a person? If Shea had been brought up a Protestant one would naturally infer that this in-

veterate debunker of immaterial and idealistic notions would be an atheist or agnostic, but, it happens that he was reared a Catholic, and this makes all the difference. Whenever Shea approaches a problem which has been settled by some ecclesiastical pronouncement, he drops his lance, dismounts, turns off the current of his thought, and becomes a willing happy yes-man. He is strongly against birth control. He gives as his greatest aversions, "false philosophies, anti-Catholic philosophies, Communism, Fascism, Freudianism" [14]. Atheism, he asserts, is "evil and communistic" [14]. He claims that the Russians, having repudiated the Church, have therefore renounced belief in the dignity of man, for which the Church alone has always stood. It is the Church also, he insists, which has upheld the family as a social unit, and "this," he says, "I am very much in favor of" [14]. On the Aphorisms Test [13] Shea is first in the rank order of positive sentiments ad *Churchman* and second ad *Faith and Belief.* He is the only subject to give an affirmative answer to the aphorism, *Only through religious faith can a man rise above his primitive inclinations.*

In Shea's mind there is no conflict between science and religion; each has a separate domain of sovereignty; the boundary is clearly defined; there is no debated territory. "Religion vs. science," he says "is a lot of hooey, to put it in plain terms. You always have to remember that our science is based on the observation of facts, and of course you don't need facts in religion" [33]. Shea has found that this simple formula serves to keep science and religion distinct, each in its proper sphere. It does not occur to him, apparently, that facts might help in arriving at a decision on such matters as birth control, Communism and Fascism. He is not disquieted by having two dissociated compartments in his mind; indeed he thinks that this arrangement has advantages. When asked what satisfaction he finds in religion, he answers:

> Well, it's . . . it's a life in a different world, if you want to put it that way. You can live in two surroundings, and it's very nice to get out of one and into the other. . . . The religious world is spiritually refreshing. *Of course the word "spiritual" calls up a lot of prejudices in* the minds of a lot of people, and in the minds of others it has a familiar meaning. It's a place where one can find the—well—it's a refuge, I should say. Or it's a—an ample space for sublimation, and it's a—it's a place where there are answers for every question, satisfying answers, whether they are rational or otherwise [33].

Shea has completely accepted the irrational premises of his religion and the dichotomy between religion and science troubles him not at all. He has decided that there is no point in stirring up a civil war on rational grounds

when he feels no conflict in his heart between the two. "I suppose it is my predisposition to be in favor of religion, and it is certainly not up to me to find a conflict" [33].

Shea is going to maintain his faith by refusing to think about matters that have been covered by the dogmas and edicts of Catholic authorities. To submit with childlike trust to the decisions of those versed in the venerable wisdom of the Church is a comforting and supremely satisfying necessity. We are reminded here of Cardinal Newman's simple affirmation of faith in his *Apologia Pro Vita Sua:*

> From the time I became a Catholic, of course, I have no further history of my opinion to narrate. . . . I profess my absolute submission to its (the Roman Catholic Church's) claim. I believe the whole revealed dogma as taught by the Apostles to the Church and as declared by the Church to me. I receive it as infallibly interpreted by the authority to whom it is thus committed, and (implicitly) as it shall be further interpreted by that authority to the end of time.

Shea's willingness to entrust his fundamental beliefs and many of his sentiments to the "higher-ups" in the organization of the Church must be kept in mind in making sense of his positive mark on the aphorism, *Religious faith is merely the entrusting of one's life to an unknown and ever unknowable product of the imagination.* The other five subjects who answered this in the affirmative were unequivocably anti-religious in their sentiments, and Shea's response can be understood only by underscoring the phrase "entrusting of one's life," and assuming that he interpreted the rest of the sentence as a reference to the sum of truths (unknowable by him alone) which the Church presents to him in a brief form in her creeds.

That Shea is vaguely aware of a possible weakness in his position is suggested by his statement that one of the three worst things that could happen to anyone would be "a spiritual upset" [14], and his almost morbid dread of being drawn into a discussion of his religious views. He repeatedly announced that he does not consider himself a missionary and that he dislikes arguments. Religion is a fragile possession which must be shielded from the chill winds of controversy. It is his refuge and retreat, his source of private nourishment which must not be exposed lest its healing powers lose their magic. So, contentedly, he leaves the controversies to the Church Fathers, certain that although he himself might be unequal to it, they are sure to have the satisfactory answers.

> I am not a missionary. I don't discuss religion with my friends. Occasionally issues arise such as the discussion of the birth rate. Naturally I have my own views, and when they ask me what I think I

> just shut my mouth tight, I don't try to convert them. They just weren't lucky enough to be given any faith [18].

Although Shea esteems the Church as an important social institution, he nevertheless prefers to think of religion as a private matter. The adjectives he associates with the word *Religion* are "spiritual, private, social" [14]; and in the Public Questions Test, when asked if he believes sincerely in religion, he answers:

> Yes, I do, but I believe that that is a private matter. However, I do believe that an individual should not look toward religion as something for himself. What I mean is—there should be religion, and it should be left up to the individual whether he wants to believe or not [37].

What Shea seems to mean here is that there should be an institutionalized religion and every individual should have the right to decide whether he wants to believe in it or not. This decision is a private matter. But an individual should not create his own personal religion, as something for himself. The underlying significance of these opinions might be this: "My belief in the Catholic religion is a private matter; it is not something that can be argued out in public, the main reason for this being that I have no rational ground for my belief, having entrusted all such matters to the Church. Religion is my private refuge. To attack it with my intellect would be to spoil it." Of all the ambiguous statements that Shea made at the Clinic the following is perhaps the hardest to interpret:

> I am a materialist; even religion is realistic. It depends on how you define realism. Don't ask me to define it. I think it is an attitude by which mind sticks to the vulgar or common. The realist sets his standards by real existence, or something that seems possible of existence, whereas idealism sets up a standard which is far beyond real possibilities [18].

As we read this passage, Shea is contrasting the objective realism, if not materialism, of the Catholic Church with the subjective idealism of many a Protestant who looks "toward religion as something for himself." This interpretation fits our finding, on the Aphorisms Test [13], that Shea's sentiments ad *Intuition, Submission to the Irrational, Creator of Values, Philosophers,* and *Individuals of Primary Value* are all highly negative. Inspired individuals in the distant past have had their intuitions and created values which Thomas Aquinas and others have rationalized into systematic philosophy: and out of a thousand years of experience have come the most realistically satisfying answers to all questions. Who are we to set up our intuitions

of value against this vast edifice of inherited revelations and pragmatic truths?

Shea is thankful that he has been given a faith. It is a precious gift, the loss of which would be more terrible than anything he can think of. He realizes that he has something which many of his friends lack. They, for instance, are afraid of death, whereas for him life is but a probational passage to a better world.

> There has always been a feeling that I have observed in those without religion that those without find it more difficult to take what the world gives them. I have four roommates and none of them attend church regularly. One of them is an Atheist one is a fallen-away Episcopalian and one of them is a fallen-away Methodist. To them death is the greatest tragedy, everything is then lost. To me existence on earth is merely a passage [18].

That Shea is immune to the threat of death was not proved or, in fact, disproved, by his reaction to the possibility of being drafted for combat duty. We are told by a friend that he first met the situation with "a deep and simple faith, saying that he had no fear of death." But his equanimity was of short duration. He soon became greatly disturbed and sought by every means in his power to avoid the draft so that his career would not be interrupted. Concern about his own future was paramount. Here, certainly, he, the individual, was of primary value.

Shea has been given third place in our rank order because in the narrow sense he is religious. He is among the few who affirm belief in supernaturalism, in God and immortality. But in other respects he is not religious. "I am a materialist," he says, and it is this philosophy that he practices. He is dedicated to his career in science; this is his real religion. Catholicism is an insulated complex, a region of passive retreat which demands none of his best talents. Religion is of little help to him in his personal development, in his dealings with others, in solving daily problems. But there is always the priest, and Shea's readiness to accept his answers whether they be rational or not.

Determinants. Shea's mother is a Roman Catholic, but his father, who recently died, did not belong to any church.

> Religion was not discussed in our home as father was brought up a Methodist, and Southern Methodists are very anti-Catholic. It took him a long time to get rid of that feeling [18].

This difference in the religion of his parents may be one of the reasons why Shea dislikes religious arguments, insisting that he is not a missionary

and that religion is a private matter. "Most of my religion," he says, "was absorbed from school, but mother was a very regular Church goer, and she and the whole family were quite religious."

Since Shea has never cared very deeply for his mother, we believe that the establishment of all the religious convictions he now holds can be credited to the influence of the Parochial School, run by the Xaverian Fathers, which he attended for nine years. As his interest in science developed he undoubtedly asked questions of his teachers in the desire to reconcile the scientific and the religious points of view. Having been given answers which made acceptance the basic assumption of two worlds, Shea has been content to let the matter rest there, and today he definitely cultivates as his philosophy of life a dissociation between intellect and feelings in the realm of religion.

Another factor is his unhappy childhood and the deep strain of pessimism and hopelessness which lies embedded in his character. Possibly some trauma of early infancy, perhaps that of rejection by the mother, engendered the conditions for his finding in the Church a substitute mother, a haven of security and comfort which he could not find in life. Thus what he learnt at school quieted a profound craving and in so doing implanted a belief that would last a lifetime. Those who think that the march of reason and the inculcation of the scientific attitude are destroying religious faith throughout the country have not reckoned with the Catholic parochial school system.

According to Shea's mother, her son has always been devoutly religious, regular in Church attendance and other observances. Since childhood there has been little change in his beliefs, he assures us. "I have perhaps a saner point of view. What I mean is that I lean to a re-arrangement of certain parts of it, but actually there isn't much change. Practically none" [33].

10. *Subject No. 2: Nack*

When asked whether he believes in religion Nack unhesitatingly answers:

> Yes 5. Because it gives men something to look for. It gives something to keep them together. People need somthing to keep them morally good, to make them live a better life, to make them see what is fair and right, and to keep them happy, teach them how to live together, and teach the children how to live together [37].

Here Nack expresses his belief in religion as an aspiring ideal, a cohesive force as well as a moral force. Feeling as he does that history is the story of man's betrayal of man, he looks to religion as the only power capable of making them see what is fair and right. So it is not surprising that he, of

all our subjects, is the most positive in his belief that, *If the influence of the American churches were to be eliminated our democracy would become too corrupt to endure* [13].

Nack, who has the will to believe, is not deterred by intricacies of logic. He says that he does not believe in determinism but that he can build up no logical argument against it. The pragmatic hurtfulness of believing in determinism is enough to outlaw the hypothesis. "The main reason I don't like determinism is that I don't like to like it. It is a hopeless outlook. No point in living. It holds everywhere but in the mind" [18].

Nack, who is a scientist, is willing to accept the fact of determinism in the physical world but not in the realm of the mind. Having made this distinction, his faith can remain secure, and he can deny more resolutely than any of our subjects the statement that, *Religious faith is merely the entrusting of one's life to an unknown and ever unknowable product of the imagination,* and with one other subject is equally emphatic in not believing that, *A religious creed represents a delusion and keeps us infantile and therefore ethically inferior* [13].

Nack says of his present religious view that it is "more or less free. I have definite ideas that I don't want to interfere with others. I think one ought to look at each religion and pick the good out of each one. One ought to stick to one religion on the whole, but not because one's mind is closed to others" [18]. The adjectives which he gives to the word *Religion* are "Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, Universal" [14]. The secret of Nack's tolerance lies in his belief that religion, every religion, makes people happy. For him this is no cool Machiavellian observation but an opinion, supported by empathy and projection, that springs from a deep personal faith which, from earliest childhood, has determined his life and his vocation. The true purpose of life, he believes, is the generation of happiness, the removal of unhappiness.

> If nobody benefits from your life what use is it? It all goes back to the questions of why we are here. I don't know why, but it bothers me and I would like to know. I had an idea, and still have, that we're here to have so much happiness for ourselves and others. We should try to remove all the pain and unhappiness. . . . There's always the argument that the cynical chap gets joy out of cynicism, but I don't believe it. I believe that a fellow should enjoy his work. If you can say when you die, "I enjoyed living," then you have had a happy life [18].

Religion for Nack is not a matter of soul searching, not a quest for the absolute, not an heirloom which he delights in destroying with newly acquired weapons of wit and logic, not a sentimental symbol of order in a disordered

world; it is implicit in his moral fiber, in his uncomplicated convictions, in his unshakeable belief that men are here in order to attain and to bestow happiness. Nack is a passionate man. All of his sentiments are stable and have not changed. He holds to them undeviatingly, and in this his religious sentiments are no exception. The fact that his greatest interest lies in mathematical physics indicates that his intellect is not operating in the sphere of religion. He is content to let faith rest in the deeper layers of his being, as little to be questioned as his mother's love. Nack would agree with Samuel Butler when he said that to atempt to get at the foundations of religion is to try to recover consciousness about things that have passed into the unconscious; "it is pretty sure to disturb and derange those who try it on too much." Like Shea, Nack is a scientist who has no urge to create a unified philosophy inclusive of both religion and science. But he is different from Shea inasmuch as his religion operates in his daily life, governs his sentiments, attitudes and conduct. He tries to exemplify the ideals of Christianity in his dealings with others. Shea, on the other hand, though he accepts every last tenet of Catholic ideology, social and political, has made of his religion a retreat from life, an escape into a collective fantasy of another world.

Determinants. Nack says that his parents have been "a tremendous factor in religion" [18]. His father has never been sincerely religious, but his father's father, on whose farm Nack lived for several years, "knows the Bible backwards" [4].

His mother, he tells us, has religious leanings but goes to several different churches, principally the Dutch Reform and the Christian Science.

> When I was a child Mother used to teach me about religion. She taught me what was fair, read the Bible to me, and told me stories. Sometimes I used to act out the stories that she read me from the Bible [18].

Nack's early religious training was unique in that his teachers took pains to apply the principles of Christianity to actual situations in his life.

> In Sunday School we had a basketball team. I practically lived for that team. The teacher would always apply the religious lessons to our games; that sort of brought it home [18].

The group of children with whom Nack played were apparently exposed to the same or similar influences, for he tells us that, "My gang had a very strict code of ethics. The ideas of right and wrong were very strictly delineated" [18]. Of greater weight than all these influences, however, were, in Nack's case, the gentle persuasions of his beloved mother.

> My religious training at home was similar to that I got in Sunday School. My mother would tell me stories about Joseph, etc. We would discuss events in basketball games that I had actually played in from the point of view of the Bible. "What was the fair thing to do here?" etc. [1].

It was by this means that the boy's character was formed. Such teaching helped him to acquire in his earliest years all those virtues which he now believes should come through religion. It gave "him something to look for," helped him to be "morally good," and made him see "what is right and fair." Nack's muscles, one might say, have become indoctrinated with religion. As he grew up he came to see how seldom these principles were exemplified by men in their dealings with each other and with animals. But Nack, whose forebears are up-state Yankees, has come, through nature and nurture, to a fundamental and austere frame of right and wrong which will never be questioned by him, no matter how deep his disillusionment. One might say, using Edwin Arlington Robinson's splendid words, that Nack has ascended easily,

> By comfortable altitudes, and found,
> As always, underneath him solid ground
> Whereon to be sufficient and to stand
> Possessed already of the promised land,
> Far stretched and fair to see:
> A good sight, verily,
> And one to make the eyes of her who bore him
> Shine glad with hidden tears.

11. *Subject No. 1: Finch*

Finch was put first in the rank order because when he came to the Clinic he had just about made up his mind to follow in his father's footsteps and enter the ministry. In conformity with this decision, all his sentiments towards objects of religious value were positive: *Churchman, Faith and Belief, Subjective Values,* and so forth. But—and here a ravine seemed to stretch across his path—he was not sure that he believed in God.

After several years of doubting, Finch was still not absolutely certain that he believed in God. However, he had finally manoeuvred himself into a position which in his mind provided enough rational ground for entering the ministry, although such other-worldly faith as he possessed had not been forced on him by an indubitable experience, but had been acquired largely by an act of will. He had not yet been called.

"I still believe," he writes in his autobiography, "that Christianity has all

the answers by supplying the right method of going at things. My belief in God is founded on a 'will to believe,' making a jump to believing, and by daily experience finding it true. William James is my present hero. He says that varieties in methods of worshipping the Universal are needed to fit the temper of the people. Since I am a member of this civilization, Christianity is the best 'over-belief' for me and I *do* hold to it" [1].

Finch says that if he were asked to formulate his beliefs he would take one sentence from James, which, according to his memory, ran as follows: "Live as if it were true from day to day and you will find that it is true." "I think that is what father did. He's told me about different things in the ministry and it certainly is true that there is a God and that He is taking an interest in people" [33]. Finch further emphasizes the importance to him of James' *Will to Believe* in one of his responses in the Argument Completion Test [15]. *X* and *Y* are having a discussion on belief vs. skepticism, and Finch continues the argument:

> *X* has a strong belief and has grown tired of skepticism. When he hears Y saying that we should maintain a skeptical attitude he disagrees violently. He says you can't sit on the fence. It is absolutely necessary that you stand on one side or the other. He himself believes that there is a God, but Y can't make up his mind. *X* shows him James' *Will to Believe*. *Y* reads it and is impressed and decides that he must make a stand one way or another. So he decides that there is no God. They both remain good friends.

The conclusion suggested by this passage, that Finch has suffered so much from perplexity that suspended judgment is no longer bearable, is supported by one of his *TAT* stories in which the hero, having committed an unpardonable crime, is punished by having to live the rest of his life in a state of constant indecision. William James, who found his own way out of the state of obsessional paralysis, succeeded with the magic of his words and reasons in opening the saving path to a fellow sufferer. Finch does not believe all that he should believe if he is to preach to others but he believes that he will believe.

When asked what it is about the ministry that appeals to him, Finch answers, "The freedom in it; you're your own boss" [33]. This attracts him because all his life he has been unusually submissive to his parents and now he has reached a point where their coercions and restrictions have become irksome and he is taking his first cautious steps toward independence. Another reason that he gives is that "the contact that a minister has with people as adviser and helper would be good. I would like helping people" [33]. For many long years Finch suffered the agonies of a frail and timid

child who has become the butt and scapegoat of schoolboy bullies, and it is natural that today the thought of friendly associations, with himself in the superior rôle of guide and benefactor, should have a very special appeal. Furthermore, imbued from his earliest years with the ideal of Christian charity and service, he has been very much drawn by the image of his father ministering to his devoted flock.

It is noteworthy that Finch, in giving his reasons for choosing the ministry, never mentioned Jesus, a belief in immortality, or a desire to dedicate himself to God. He spoke only of the social side of religious practice: the prospect of a pleasant independent existence with agreeable personal contacts and the opportunity of being serviceable to others. Questioning revealed that he was totally uninterested in theology.

Finch affirms that it is the minister's function to "oil the machinery of human society to make it run smoothly; also to keep society from being a machine, by taking it into something with heart and individualism" [1]. Emphasis on heart and individuality is typical of the person-centered intraceptive man. Finch is one of these; he apperceives the world almost wholely from the point of view of his own feelings, or from the point of view of the feelings of someone to whom he is closely related. He is subjective in his approach, preferring intimate relations with one individual at a time. He has no appreciation of impersonal, merely practical, dealings between men or of the workings of institutions. Individuality is so important to him that he has a dread of joining any organization lest he become regimented and mechanized. This dread is dependent upon his docility to social pressures, the habit of outward compliance being bred in his bones. Only covertly, and, even then, most timidly and futilely, is he anything of a rebel.

Finch's type of mind is admirably suited to his profession. It is that of a myth-loving primitive religionist, *melange* of artist, moralist, and philosopher. The following characteristics are relevant: susceptibility to illusions and hallucinations (not yet entirely controlled); prevalence of potent fantasies throughout his life; the animistic nature of his early dreams and daydreams. His *TAT* stories show variety and fluency with traces of a mythological imagination. Important also is his ability to distinguish and organize material on the basis of feeling values: to make moral judgments, to approve or disapprove quickly, to assign human meanings to things, to deal intelligently with abstract sentiments as well as with affective symbols, myths and allegories, to read lessons in stones. We believe that Finch has the capacity to compose a great sermon provided he is profoundly moved by some personal experience.

Determinants. First in determining Finch's sentiments is the personality of his father. Long has the son reverenced him, sometimes as if he were a perfect being. Indeed the closest to a religious experience that Finch has ever come occurred in connection with his father. The boy, then about 12 years of age, was attending a Sunday evening service. The church was dark, the organ had just stopped playing, and there before the altar stood his father, figure illumined by the candles. Gazing intently at him, the boy suddenly felt a wave of rapturous agitation sweep over his body, as for one instant God appeared to him in the guise of his father—the two were one. Never, before or since, has he been so mystically transported. Recalling the event later, he recognized and admitted to himself that the physical sensations he experienced were largely sexual in nature. His father was his exemplar through these years, and now to become a minister himself is scarcely more than deciding on a predetermined course of action.

Finch's mother is also religious, after a fashion, and her son has been very much attached to her. But she has nagged him too much and too long; even today hounds him with her counsels and admonitions as if he were still a child. As a result, he is becoming openly refractory. "My mother would *love* to have me a minister," he said, "which is one of the reasons it took me so long to make up my mind" [15].

Finch has lived all his life within the bosom of his father's church, one that served a prosperous, middle class, suburban community. Since his parents were not liberal in their outlook, few currents of contemporary thought permeated the confined environment of his youth, and until he came to college he was never exposed to any influences which would tend to undermine his belief in the only religion that he knew. Not only his parents themselves, but their special and respected position in the community, brought him a security which he needed to offset the anxiety provoked by the many unhappy experiences he had at school.

Finch, a lonely child, lived in a world of religious ideas which were, as he says, "a substitute for friendship" [18]. These were very real to him. "I tried to live religion" [18]. Thus his conscience was firmly rooted in the precepts of the church. "Any time I do something wrong, the next day in church I think about it. In the general confession I think about those things especially, and then usually I resolve that I am not going to do them any more. And so I think good and bad are closely connected with religion" [33].

His superego being wrought out of the substance of Christian faith, it would have been difficult for Finch to have pursued his skepticism to the point

of leaving the Church. His guilt would have been overpowering. Moreover, such an action would have caused a breach in his relationship with his father which would have left him without the guidance or support which his dependent nature has always craved. So he wisely made the distinction between the emotional and the rational aspects of religion. The gnawing doubt remained, however, until he came upon James' *The Will to Believe,* which offered him the solution to his problem: live as if you believed. "If you can say Yes to religion," Finch declared, "it helps you to be expansive and not all closed up" [15]. By a conscious affirmation of the existence of God, by disregarding his own secret doubts, he can now enter the ministry with a clear conscience.

As a final determinant we should include the war and the possibility of being drafted, which aroused in Finch such overwhelming fear that any doubts about religion which might have taken root in the indulgent days of peace had to be quickly repressed because of his urgent need to find safety within the cloistered walls of a theological seminary.

We feel that Finch has made a wise decision. His religious doubts are not the result of any intellectual activity on his part, but rather the effect of a climate of skeptical opinion on a passive and receptive personality. The Devil will never play at chess with Finch as he did with Thomas Browne, who lamented that while he strove to raise the structure of his reason the Devil undermined the edifice of his faith. Without doubt, the study of theology will by degrees direct his mind toward conceptions which he will have no disposition to question. The process will be greatly facilitated by the thought that he is doing as his father did before him.

C. Summary and Conclusions

We venture the opinion that our subjects are fairly typical of the low and middle range of religious sentiments in the college populations of America, though not so low relative to the country at large as they are in their sentiments ad military morale. The addition of two or three truly religious young men, one a fundamentalist, would probably have been enough to give us a representative sample, however small.

The style of furniture in the minds of these men is the direct antithesis of what was intended by the dominant and more vocal elements among the Puritans who organized a virtual theocracy, a miniature Commonwealth of God, three centuries ago, on the shores of Massachusetts Bay and founded there a college in order that the ministry to the Churches would never be illiterate. The deep, but narrow, stream of religious conviction that ran so

strongly through the character of the first emigrants has been dispersed into a thousand diverse and shallow currents, becoming in some places a mere trickle, in others utterly dried up. Our top man is forcing himself to believe in God in order to follow the footsteps of his father in the ministry; the third man on the list has a secluded pool of religious orthodoxy in the midst of a highly cultivated area of scientific materialism. The fourth subject and the sixth are doubtfully agnostic, the fifth thinks of religion as "a vague, unimportant, uncertain thing." Five (45 per cent) of the subjects are not at all disturbed by their lack of religious faith. Only Nack, second in the rank order, rests secure in the tradition of his fathers.

Of course it is impossible to generalize from these results, but at least it can be said that our findings are in accord with the widely held opinion that religious belief has declined in the last two generations. Only Shea's faith, as a result of his Catholic schooling, is still at the level of his grandparents'. Finch is much less religious than his father and mother, and Nack has certainly fallen from the standard of that grandfather who "knew the Bible backwards." But classing these cases as doubtful, it is fair to say that in the history of at least eight (73 per cent) of our subjects there has been a marked fall of religious belief and observance over the last two generations. In the majority of these (Lake 5, Ingle 7, Grove 9, Hawk 10, Yawl 11) the drop occurred in their parents' lives. Only one of our atheists (Couch) has two religious parents. In two cases (York 4, Dunn 6) the father lost his belief, but the mother not. In each instance the son has been left wobbling between the two, inclining towards the father more than towards the mother.

That the strength of the parents' sentiments ad religion is the chief determinant of their sons'. outlook is indicated by the fact that the sentiments of 10 (91 per cent) of our subjects agree very closely with their fathers' sentiments, and eight men are in accord with both father and mother. Couch is the only one who has made a clean-cut break with both parents.

A positive correlation (rho .42) was found between sentiments ad religion and sentiments ad family. The stronger the family ties the stronger the son's religious sentiments, despite the fact that more than half of the 22 parents involved do not go to church. The relationship is best illustrated by Nack and Yawl, the former being very firmly attached to both family and religion, the latter attached to neither. The chief factor accounting for the correlation seems to be the constant decline of religious faith in America, a social influence which is more apt to affect a young man who is loosely united to his family. In Recent Social Trends (10), 1934, Hart concludes,

on the basis of his comprehensive study of leading periodicals, that "religious sanctions have been largely displaced by scientific sanctions," and that "antagonistic criticism of the church, of ministers, and of traditional creeds reached a maximum in 1926-1928 in general magazines, and still exceeds the volume of favorable comment." In the same publication Fry (9) reports evidences of a decided decline in religious dogma: young ministers believe less doctrine than do their elders. Another determinant might be the fact that a rebellious adolescent, like Yawl, who breaks away from the authority of his family is very apt to be the type to denounce the authority of religion also.

Although it is striking that not a single subject showed the slightest tendency to become more religious than his parents, there is still the possibility that two or three of them (York 4, Lake 5, Dunn 6) will swing towards religion as they grow older. Not seldom do we meet persons who illustrate the truth of Bacon's famous maxim: "a little knowledge inclineth a man's mind to atheism, but depth in philosophy bringeth men's mind about to religion."

Another outstanding feature of these case histories is the paucity of religious instruction that was received. Here our findings bear out Michael Roberts' conclusion that:

> "Today the average university graduate understands far more of physical science than of Christian philosophy, and does not know that an intelligent Christian philosophy exists. He rejects the doctrines of religion because he is comparing his childish knowledge of religion with his adult understanding of science, anthropology, and politics; he contrasts the simple doctrines that he learned from his mother with the sophisticated polish of statistical mechanics or psycho-analysis, and firmly believes that he is 'thinking for himself'" (20).

As to the typical personality of the more religious student, our findings are not very illuminating. Our three *top* men are among the four *lowest* in Breadth of Interest, the need for Sentience (aesthetic enjoyment), and in their sentiments ad Art and ad Amusement. In America the opposition between the Churches and the Arts is traditional: First it was Protestantism that adopted an attitude of extreme hostility to aesthetic interests; more recently it is the artist who has been most persistent in his criticism of the Church. Most novels have not been friendly to religion. Our religious subjects are also among the *lowest* in Verbal Aptitude. Oral Achievement (at school), the need for Exposition (talking, explaining, instructing), the need for Dominance (arguing for one's convictions), and sentiments ad Politics. In other words, our religious subjects are not much interested in politics and social issues, not bubbling over with ideas which they feel

compelled to communicate to others; and, as cause or effect, their facility with words (according to standard tests) is below the average. Also their Social Ability and Social Adjustment (at school) are low. Projectivity (misinterpretation of the environment as a result of the intrusion of one's own sentiments) is the only variable in which they are all high.

It is surprising that our three least religious men are not particularly high on a single one of the variables on which our most religious subjects are low. The former subjects, indeed, have very little in common. What they do have in common, however, is not without interest. They are high in repressed Abasement (Masochism) and in the infantile complex of Claustral Ingression; both of which might be interpreted as residual tensions which have not abated because these men have no God before whom they can abase themselves and no embracing Church to replace their mothers. They are also high on Id-Ego Conflict, which is the condition that might be expected in individuals who have no established religion to reinforce their superego in its governance of instinctive impulses. Less intelligible is the finding that our least religious subjects are outstanding in strongly preferring their mothers to their fathers. They are also highest in their interest in psychology (analyzing people) and lowest in Mechanical Ability.

It seems that in the last 20 years many of the human dispositions and functions which in former times were attracted to and occupied by the solitary inner phases of religious activity have found some temporary gratification in the field of medical psychology, exploring or merely reading about the strange new world discovered by Janet, Freud, Jung, and others. There is some similarity, no doubt, between a psychoanalysis and a religious conversion, a fact which is attested by the number of young ministers who have recently become interested in this branch of mental science. Jung's attempt to bridge the gap between psychology and religion is another indication of their relationship. The fact that modern psychology is capable of serving as a partial substitute for religion, the former as it were, draining away the energy that might otherwise have been given to the latter, is suggested by one of our findings: a negative correlation (rho —.70) between sentiments ad religion and sentiments ad psychology.

On the other hand, it seems that since World War I those elements of the personality that once found their fruition in the outward phases of religious activity have become engaged, to a large extent, with social and political issues, in extending liberal democracy, communism and internationalism. Without doubt the conception of an utopia on earth can serve as a substitute for God's heaven, both being ideal worlds different from the

one in which we live. That social betterment is a cause that appeals to many religionists is attested by recent developments, beginning, say, with the famous encyclical of Pope Leo XIII (*Rerum Novarum*, 1891) and later (1908) with the so-called Social Creed of the Protestant Churches. The fact that an intense interest in radical social ideologies is apt to wean a man from religious doctrine is suggested by the negative correlation *(rho —.52) that we obtained between radical political sentiments and* sentiments ad religion. The slight negative correlation (rho —.16) between the former and sentiments ad psychology shows that these two interests are distinct trends diverging from religion. If a composite rank order of sentiments ad psychology and ad radical social reform is correlated with sentiments ad religion, the result is highly negative (rho —.84). Here then is a mite of experimental evidence to support the supposition on which the Catholic Church's opposition to psychoanalysis and communism is partially founded.

VI. SENTIMENTS TOWARDS PARENTS

A. Introduction

In this chapter has been assembled data pertaining to dynamic systems related to the family region. When the facts were being collected the aim was merely to discover the strength of each subject's sentiments ad father and ad mother, but afterwards we decided to attempt to judge the worth of the relationship attained in each case according to the following criteria:

(*a*) *Mutual affection*—How much love does the subject feel for his father and for his mother? How much love does he think his father and mother feel for him?

(*b*) *Mutual respect*—How much respect does the subject feel for the wisdom, intelligence, character, values and abilities of the father and of the mother? How much respect do they show for their son's character and talents?

(*c*) *Mutual devotion in action*—To what extent does the subject spontaneously and willingly attempt to satisfy the needs of the father and of the mother? Does he try to please them, by going home when he can, writing to them, doing favors, and complying with their legitimate requests? To what extent do the parents actively promote the welfare of their son?

(*d*) *Operation of imperative sentiment*—To what extent does the subject act on the moral principle, Honor thy father and thy mother? Here the external manifestations are the same as under (*c*) *devotion in action*, but the behavior is promoted by the superego, out of piety or a feeling of obligation, rather than out of spontaneous affection.

(*e*) *Mutual enjoyment of companionship*—How much do father and son, and mother and son enjoy each other's company, talking or doing things together, reciprocating or coöperating?

(*f*) *Conformity of basic sentiments*—To what extent does the subject share the basic assumptions and values of his father and his mother? How much similarity of feeling is there on fundamental issues?

(*g*) *Intimacy, absence of barriers*—To what extent does the subject feel free to discuss anything he likes in the presence of his father and of his mother? Do parent and son exchange confidences? Does the son expose the middle layer of his personality to his parents?

(*h*) *Mutual sense of permanence*—To what extent can the subject rely on the enduring devotion of his father and his mother, no matter what happens? How much stability and security, mutual trust and loyalty, is there in the relationship? How stable is the son's affection and devotion to his parents?

(*i*) *Mutual appreciation of uniqueness*—To what extent does each partner in the relationship recognize and respect the individuality, independence and dignity of the other? To what degree does he accept and enjoy the other as he truly is, without wishing him differ-

ent or trying to change him? How well can each person sympathetically view the world from the other's standpoint? Here one looks for the absence of overpossessiveness, the absence of cramping coercions and restraints.

In many cases the data necessary for sound judgment was lacking, but we decided, nevertheless, to attempt a rough ordering of our subjects in terms of these criteria. Balancing the different factors was very largely a subjective operation in the present study, but it would be possible in future researches to increase the degree of objectivity and agreement among judges by defining the operational criteria more exactly and deciding on a definite method of weighting the separate measures.

B. The Subjects

1. *Subject No. 11: Couch*

On the Aphorisms Test [13] Couch is markedly negative on all statements pertaining to *Family*. With one other *S* he is the most positive in his belief that, *The child has faith in the sanctity of the family. When he grows up he knows better.* For the word *Family* he gives the adjectives, "ambivalent, useful, sentimental, a burden, burdensome" [14]. Asked if he ever felt homesick he answers, "No, except in the sense of being sick of home, which is a different thing" [5].

He tells us that neither parent is his favorite parent, and this is borne out by his responses to the aphorisms ad *Father* and *Mother;* his score on both items is —1. He is more convinced than any other *S* that, *The potentiality of youth is cramped by the small laws of his family,* and he is one of the three subjects to give a negative mark to the aphorism, *A man may put his trust in his father.* The adjectives which he associates with *Father* are, "strong, slow, ambivalent, admirable, incompatible, irritating" [14].

Couch's father was apperceived in the guise of a stern superego figure. He overburdened his son with commands, requests and injunctions, and was, at times, "harsh, intolerant, and inconsiderate." The boy Couch was sometimes in mortal terror that his father would find out what he had done [4]. On one occasion, at the age of nine, Couch, suddenly annoyed by his father's spilling shoe-blacking on a cherished picture, exclaimed, "Damn"; and his devout father struck him across the mouth. This event resulted in the automatism of turning his head slightly to one side when talking to an older man [3]. Couch was but half-conscious of the existence of this symptom and entirely ignorant of its origin before coming to the Clinic.

Couch's father expected more attention and affection than he ever received

from his son. The boy never idealized him, never wanted to be like him, was often ashamed of him [4]. Couch tells us that his fantasies about his father "are confined to dreams, where my father is alternately the object of hostility and of presumably homosexual feelings" [1]. Antipolarity of sentiment is all pervasive in Couch's personality, and it is probable that its roots lie in an early love followed by hate toward both parents. He is the least positive of all our subjects in his sentiments ad *Older Men* on the Aphorisms Test, one reason being that his neurotic symptoms are generally aggravated in their presence. This does not hold for *Older Women*. Couch is the most extreme in his acceptance of the statement, *Older women are more understanding and companionable than older men* [13].

Couch thinks of the adjectives, "sweet, loving, annoying, irritating, pathetic, handsome" in connection with the word *Mother* [14]. Although Couch never accepted his mother's sentiments as his own, never admired her or wanted to be like her, he nevertheless feels that sometimes he *is* like her. His mother is more affectionate and solicitous than his father, and he thinks that she has a tendency to spoil him, which worries him a little, because he feels that he has not outgrown his dependence on her ministrations.

Couch, who says that he has "peculiar sentiments against authority and control" because he himself has "a great urge to master and control" [4], feels some pride in the fact that his mother has praised him and complied to his wishes "often quite deferently" [4]. This deference on the part of his mother gives him a peculiar satisfaction, his erotic impulses being linked with narcistic exhibitionism and sadistic dominance. Antipolarity of feeling towards his mother is as definite as it is towards his father. He dreams of her as a sexual object and at the same time feels her as repulsive.

Couch's parents were strict in their standards, and, though loving and overprotective, were stern in their discipline. Both parents punished him physically by spankings. "These punishments rankled," he says, "and meant a great deal. I had a strong sense of pride and individuality, and I felt anger and rage against my parents when they encroached on these sentiments" [4]. This resentment, now largely controlled, manifests itself in spells of irritability and a prevalent contempt.

In the young man's autobiography we find an intricate exposition and analysis of the vicissitudes of his relationship with his parents. He writes:

> My parents are intelligent, religious, middle class people [18].
>
> They have little sympathy with the world of the 20th century, as one finds it, let us say, in the social life of academic circles. But if they are not very sophisticated, they are intelligent, refined, relatively to their associates, and have common sense almost in overplus [1].

He feels that his mother and father are "perfectly matched, and get along beautifully together. I never heard one angry or cross word, never any conflict at all" [4].

> I had a very salubrious childhood and couldn't ask for a better one [4]. We had a comfortable house, full of antiques, good food, sweetness and light, Sunday School literature,—a very wholesome and cheerful home indeed in which to begin life [1].

Although there is veiled contempt in this description, Couch did, as he says, begin life auspiciously with parents whose attitude towards their only child was "affectionate and over-solicitous, but not overly over-solicitous [1]. He speaks of his early years as "a halcyon childhood, unusually full and happy" [1].

But now, however, Couch, whose ambition is to be a man of "sensibility and culture in the widest sense," bitterly resents the fact that his parents were so "bourgeois" and so limited in outlook that they were unable to encourage or to develop what he now feels were his most valuable gifts.

> When I was five I began to draw. My parents did not discourage my enthusiasm, yet I was left to my own devices. . . . They never thought to provide me with decent paper and brushes, or with good pictures as models, much less to enlighten my efforts. In retrospect, however, I cannot rightly reproach them for negligence. They could have had no comprehension of what the artist-personality *means*, psychologically speaking, and no genuine knowledge of art itself. That value, a beautifully *trained* mind, was simply non-existent in their perspective. Finally they were beyond a doubt consciously unwilling to encourage *serious* interest and ambition lest I eventually become unshakeably set upon art as a career, with all that that prospect conjured up for them of Bohemianism, ethereal impracticability, nude models, garrets and starvation [1].

Couch seems to feel that he should have received what very few great artists in the world's history have received: intelligent and devoted guidance from sensitive artistic parents. "My parents," he says, "gave me too much affection and not enough understanding" [4]. Had they been less affectionate, Couch might have found a sterner vein in himself, but as it was he felt helpless, passive, and unable to resist their influence until his later adolescence [4]. Even now he is not free of it, and this passivity, this inability to throw off the yoke of dependence, increases his resentment against them.

In the history of his intellectual growth Couch feels that,

> . . . their part was parallel to that in the growth (or degeneration) of my art. I began with enthusiasm for stories and words at the same

> age that I began with enthusiasm for pictures. My parents neither obstructed nor sped my progress. From them throughout I had no meaningful supervision of my reading nor careful, stimulating instruction [1].

And Couch goes on to draw the comparison between himself and Montaigne, whose father taught him Latin as a mother tongue and who was awakened every morning to music.

> So up to the age of fourteen I stood without solid grounding in anything, without dignity, without indoctrination in the processes of clear and penetrating thought, nor indoctrination in the traditions of the world, in discrimination in the social graces. To put it frankly, a child of talent, intelligence and energy had been deprived of the characteral and technical training necessary to the full fruition of these potentialities [1].

Couch, deprived of appreciation from his parents, compensated more and more by nourishing himself with mounting dreams of grandeur. The rift between him and his parents grew ever wider.

> There was disgust on my part with a distinct tendency on theirs to deflate my estimate of myself and my capacities, to hold my spirit down to theirs, on that level where the average and undistinguished are themselves the ideal. Ironically enough they never even comprehended, much less nurtured my *only* merits [1].

Couch now feels that the great impediment which stands between him and his goal is the 20 years which he spent in surroundings which were "banal, mediocre, callow, and provincial." His parents' tendency to hold his spirit down to their own level of mediocrity is intolerable to one whose aim is to be a creator, to dominate by the wit and subtle brilliance of his language, to display his very soul to a select and discerning auditory.

His craving to be with people who will appreciate his possibilities springs from a strong need for recognition. He admits exhibitionism in his erotic fantasies and his *TAT* stories provide ample proof of the strength of this drive. It is unusually high, both in the outer and the inner layers of his personality. Art is its selected channel of expression.

The fault, Couch is at pains to insist, lies not in his parents themselves as "they had neither the impulse nor the information," but is due to their cultural limitations.

> In view of the range of my family's education and of their values, the kind of training I now curse my luck in having missed, cannot be laid to negligence, for it was an impossibility [1].

The impersonal realization that his parents are not to blame for the

culture they represent is powerless, however, against the affects of contempt evoked by their mere presence.

> In my last two years of high school I was already showing signs of subconscious aberration, in this case wholly involuntary feelings of hostility, guilt, and revulsions which often made their presence in the same room intolerable [1].
>
> I have developed a shuddering physical revulsion whenever I am in my mother's presence [4].

"The conflicts and strains within the family," says Couch, "are directly traceable to the eventual disparity of perspective" [1], and we believe that he is right. Numerous other determinants were unearthed in our explorations of his personality, but none so potent as this: an unbridgeable dissimilarity of temperament and sentiment between parents and son. Violent friction at this point has reactivated and sustained every earlier tendency to injure and humiliate his father and mother; and the conflict does not subside because Couch, having gained no equivalent solidarity in allegiances with like-minded contemporaries, must perforce return to his home and confront at every meal these objects of his bitter scorn, on whom he must still lean. He cannot live with them and he cannot live without them.

A picture of the present state of the relationship is given in one of Couch's *TAT* stories. It is that of a young man who returns home from college.

> He quickly loses the sentimental glow, and a tension begins to infuse the scene. He sits there staring at his family with hostility. He realizes that they are ugly, noisy, crude, loud, stupid. He realizes that he hates them, but also realizes that he is very like them in most respects —appearance, mannerisms, and speech. He feels a hatred, a very deep hatred of the family, which is essentially a hatred of himself.

To uproot in himself all the imbedded qualities inherited and acquired from his parents is one of Couch's major aims, and as an aid in this spiritual enterprise he has created an exactly contrasting idealego. Unhappily, this figure is a genius of such superlative capacities that it is impossible to approach him; and so, with no realistic ground for pride to stand on, Couch is left with only two abiding regions: the convincing hell of inferiority feelings and the unconvincing heaven of visionary power ad glory. And the greater his sense of frustration becomes, the greater becomes, as he puts it, "the elevation and distance of my expected trajectory" [1]; and the greater the elevation of his trajectory, the wider the cleft between his parents and himself and the more consuming his resentment.

As we read Couch's history, the chief determinants of his rejective and antagonistic sentiments ad parents are his excessive narcism and his extreme need for recognition and the failure of his parents to gratify this need with discriminating and judicious praise. He hates them for depriving him of his due. Discriminating praise in the domain of art was impossible because of their limitations. But even had they been capable of properly encouraging their son's efforts in this sphere, they would have been deterred by their strong negative sentiments ad artists, all of whom, as they imagined, were improvident, eccentric, and immoral. The sentiments of Couch's parents are products of the marriage of puritanism and commercialism, of a climate of sentiment and opinion which is profoundly inimical to art; hence the compulsive egotism and subjectivism of the majority of great uncompromising artists in this country.

2. *Subject No. 10: Yawl*

Yawl writes in his autobiography, "The tone of our family is not very affectionate or demonstrative, and the family ties are not strong" [1]. Certainly they are not strong in Yawl himself. He is more negative than any of our subjects on the aphorisms pertaining to *Family;* he is one of the two subjects who does not hold with the fulsome statement that, *The family is one of nature's masterpieces,* and with Couch he is the most positive in his belief that, *The child has faith in the sanctity of his family; when he grows up he knows better.* In spite of this, the adjectives he associates with the word *Family* are not derogatory: "communal, close, friendship, semi-compulsory" [14]. He says:

> My parents get along fairly well together, yet I have observed few if any signs of romantic love. They have no special emotion after long periods of separation. However, there is little or no fighting either [1].
>
> I am sure that they are not in love and never were [4].

On the Aphorisms Test [13] Yawl is low in the rank order of sentiments ad *Father* and middling in his sentiments ad *Older Men.* But the adjectives he associates with the word *Father* signify respect: "protective, idol, provider, mentor, guide" [14]. Here he must be giving a conventionally impersonal response to "father" in a generic sense, because we know he has little use for his own father. Perhaps the explanation of this impersonality, as well as of the absence of aggression against father-figures in all but one (Dramatic Productions [26]) of the projection tests, is that Yawl's antagonism to his own father as a concrete individual is very conscious and hence

clearly distinguishable from his reaction to other fathers, and, furthermore, it is avowed so constantly and extravagantly that no banking up and spread of affect is possible.

Yawl makes some references to his conflict with his father in almost every interview and shows no hesitation in giving the most unflattering, if not scornful, accounts of his father's character. His strong con sentiment is based on the manifestation by his father not of hurtful press so much as of certain contemptible traits. He cannot admire his father because he thinks of him as weak; he has never been energetic or masterful, never taken the initiative when he should have [4]. Also Yawl despises him for his narrow and sterile conventionality, his values and his friends.

> He has a completely Babbitt-like and capitalistic outlook. . . . He loves the Reunion Rah-Rah stuff. One of the most complete examples of the boys you ever saw [4].
>
> He is the duplicate of Bojo Brown in *H. M. Pulham, Esq.* [32].
>
> I have *never* liked my father's friends. They strike me as being insincere. They are too hearty, and just too damned delightful [18].

Then Yawl scorns his father for his intellectual short-comings.

> My father believes in blind school spirit, blind patriotism, and thinks that I am radical because I am objective. He refuses to be objective, and contradicts himself often [4].
>
> I realize that he and his friends are school-boyish in their ideas. They are narrow-minded and can't talk about anything intelligently [18].
>
> I don't care if I never see him again [32].

The focus of some of the conflict between the two is the father's insistence that his son go into business after graduating from college. Despite his own failure as a businessman, the father has a great respect for material achievement and he views with suspicion and dismay his son's impractical propensities.

> My father always tells me that I should do more for my material success, which consists in following in his footsteps. When I seem interested in something that is not immediately directed toward economic attainment, I am treated as a complete fool [1].
>
> He wants me to be a business executive. Every friend in college, every activity, is evaluated and approved or condemned, as to whether it will lead toward a business executive rôle [4].
>
> My father wants me to be a collegiate big shot but I won't. [32].

Yawl also looks down on his father for his Victorian prudishness about sex.

> He is very self-conscious whenever sex comes up. He shuts up like a clam. It just doesn't exist, which I think is unhealthy as hell [4].

Thus Yawl's repudiation of his father appears to be almost complete. He condemns him for his timidity, his boyishness, his insincerity, his lack of discrimination, the narrowness of his outlook, his prejudices, his lack of intelligence, his standard of success, and his sexual inhibitions.

The intensity of Yawl's pro sentiment ad *Older Women* in the Aphorisms Test [14] puts him nearly at the top of the rank order on this item, but his sentiment ad *Mother* is barely on the positive side. With one other *S* he is the most extreme in his belief that, *A mother's love is the excuse for a hundred petty tyrannies*. The adjectives which he associates with *Mother* are, "good, affectionate, loving, kind, sacrificing, thoughtful" [14]. It is not possible to say whether Yawl was thinking of his own mother when these words came to his mind for he never succeeded in giving us a very clear impression of her character. He has said that she is not exactly the domestic type; that she has a fiery temper and generally gets her way; that she is the moving force in the family, particularly in recent years since the business reverses of her husband. As time goes on, her dominance becomes less subtle and the father's jokes about it less amusing. This notwithstanding, Yawl is truly fond of his mother, even though as an exponent of sophisticated cynicism he is hesitant to admit it.

Yawl, in truth, very much enjoys conversing with his mother, especially since the day when he broke the ice of reticence that had heretofore covered the whole topic of sex. Since sex had been, for some time, his chief focus of concern, he was naturally delighted to find his mother not permissive merely but responsive when he launched on an exposition of his favorite theory that all relations between men and women are motivated and colored by the sex instinct. He would never "dare to tell this to the old man lest I be shot for heresy" [3].

> My mother, whom I resemble more in appearance and temperament, agrees with many of my ideas and sanctions others, although she personally doesn't hold the same belief. I can talk to her completely and frankly on all subjects [1].

If Yawl and his mother can talk amicably and confidentially as equals, they can also quarrel as equals, and nothing is more certain than this to infuriate the father. Once after an especially violent scene the latter, who had been out chopping wood, came in with axe in hand. For a moment the son felt certain that his father was going to hurl the axe at him and he stood stock-still expecting it to strike, but nothing happened; his father vented his anger in abuse.

From this and other things that have been said, one might guess that

the father had the rôle of disciplinarian in the family, but actually all the punishments, some of which were physical but none severe, were administered by the mother. To this fact can be traced some of Yawl's contempt for his male parent. The boy has always had difficulty controlling his own insurgent impulses and it is highly probable that he would have done better and been happier if, in his attempts to manage himself, he had had the steadying authoritative governance of an allied sympathetic father. In the inner layer of Yawl's personality there is a strong need for punishment.

There is much evidence in this case to support the diagnosis of traumatic weaning and traumatic birth of sibling with felt deprivation of love (i.e., partial rejection by both parents), leaving a residual tension of covert *n* Succorance and *n* Passivity. The reaction formation, based largely on Pride and Narcism, has consisted of the compound, so strikingly manifested today, of counteractive *n* Rejection, *n* Autonomy, *n* Aggression, and *n* Recognition, the boy having learnt that the only way to attract the attention that he wanted from his family was to do something startling or provoking. As it turned out, he became a "behavior problem," and when he was 11 his mother, at her wits' end, took him to a Child Guidance Center in Buffalo for "being a bad boy, not conforming, and for having a don't-give-a-damn attitude" [12].

Persisting through these stormy years have been his affection for his mother and his contempt of his father; and although there is criticism mixed with his affection and an unmistakable flavor of attraction behind his contempt, Yawl is as good an illustration of an overt Oedipus complex as this series of cases provides. His relationship with his father is a failure on all counts, but in appraising it one must hold in mind the fact that, in contrast to Shea, Dunn, and Lake, it is consonant with the reputation he wants to have to exaggerate rather than minimize the conflict. In this he is encouraged by the modern novels, dating from *The Way of All Flesh*, that he has read, by his identification with D. H. Lawrence, and by the image of himself as artist, the indictment of Philistinism being an essential component of the Romantic Genius type.

Yawl is too critical of the social milieu and class conventions of his parents, too critical also of the quality of their relationship to each other, to have much regard for the fruits of their experience. He does not admire them, and is not in any way devoted to them; he never lifts his little finger to please them. The moral injunction, "Honor thy father and thy mother, as the Lord thy God hath commanded thee," has been replaced by one which enjoins him to show contempt for them as representatives of an ideology compounded of Puritanism and the profit motive. Yawl is doing

his best to sever himself from all that his parents stand for and is looking in the opposite direction for a way of life. Whether he will be able to maintain his rebellious individualism and find a path suitable to his nature remains to be seen. It is to his credit, anyhow, that he was the first among our subjects to enlist in the Army, even though this involved the implicit acceptance of some of his father's values.

3. *Subject No. 9: Shea*

In his autobiography [1] Shea sums up the whole matter of family relations in one sentence: "Our home atmosphere was harmonious, my mother affectionate, and my father the same." But this assertion, unhappily, cannot be accepted at its face value, first because it does not conform to some of Shea's other reports, second, because several similar clean-sweeping assertions in his strangely ironic and perverse autobiography have been definitely proved to be untrue, and third, because his personality is not one that is likely to come out of a harmonious family setting. The suspected distortion can be explained by setting the statement alongside his opinion that one of the three worst things that can be said about a person is that "he is disrespectful towards his parents" [14]. One examiner reports that she received the impression from several indirect references to his family which Shea made during the course of a conversation that there had been a good deal of friction, but when she tried to draw out more information, he immediately stopped speaking [32].

Shea gives highly positive marks to all of the aphorisms pertaining to *Family* [13]. With two other subjects he is most emphatic in his belief that *The security and elevation of the family are the prime objects of civilization, and the ultimate ends of industry and trade.* But in spite of these opinions, in describing his own childhood he says, "I don't remember ever feeling happy" [5]. And he tells us that when he was away from his family he was never homesick—"I don't know what it means" [5]. When asked whether he felt closer to his mother than to his father he answers, "I don't know. I think that I have never been close to anyone in my life" [5]. "I have no favorite parent" [1].

In the Aphorisms Test [13] Shea is among our most negative subjects in his sentiments ad *Father,* and about average in his sentiments ad *Older Men.* Only one other *S* besides Shea gave a negative answer to the statement, *No one will ever be prouder of a man's success than his own father.* The only adjective which he associates with *Father* is "kind" [14].

The father, who died three years ago, appears to have been dominant in

the family, as Shea tells us that his mother seldom had her own way against him. He thinks his father "did a fairly good job of raising a family" [+]. The father's ambitions to raise his financial status and develop his intellectual potentialities were never realized, and this failure engendered moroseness which led, Shea thinks, to a state of mutual indifference between father and son.

> He only realized that I was one of his children about once a month. The rest of the time he was wrapped up in his own thoughts. His affection and interest were cyclical [+].

Shea was his favorite child, and sometimes the father "would break down and be really chummy with me," but most of the time he was taciturn and remote. Shea was dimly aware of some profound sense of failure in his father, and he often wished that he could make things better for him [4]. As time went on, the father's moodiness became more overpowering and signs of a mild paranoiá appeared, which worried Shea considerably as he felt that he and his father were fundamentally alike.

> Dad always had a complex pretty strongly, and I've always tried to keep away from it. He thought other people conspired against him. Such thoughts do try to arise in me, but I get rid of them straight away. I'm like Dad in build and personality—the spitting image—so I know what to watch out for. That's been quite a problem [2].

A friend of Shea's reports that "he admired his father a great deal. Whenever the subject comes up he shows such a profound respect that his death must have been a great crisis in his life." Shea himself says that at the time he thought he was not much affected by his loss, and it was only later that he realized how much he had hidden. "But it is the only answer. It's much better to hide all your feelings" [32]. In one of his *TAT* stories [21] the hero is impelled by remorse to visit periodically the grave of a deceased friend whom he once treated badly—which suggests that his father's death provoked in Shea a classical guilt reaction because of bad will towards his father, some of which was expressed openly. Considering his imperative sentiment pro respect for parents in conjunction with his perpetual irascibility, his strong needs for Autonomy and Aggression, this diagnosis is almost inescapable.

Shea's marks on the Aphorisms Test [13] are exactly the same for *Mother* and *Older Women* as they are for *Father* and *Older Men*, which bears out his statement that he has no preference. He is neutral on *Mother*, and slightly positive on *Older Women*. He is one of the three subjects who do not believe that, *There is nothing which a woman will not sacrifice for*

her child. The adjectives which he associates with *Mother* are, "affectionate, kind, loving, personal, instructive, helpful" [14].

Shea permits himself more criticism of his living mother than of his dead father. Although he evidently admires her, he says that up to the age of 14 he was ashamed of her social inadequacy [4]. He does not think of her as an ideal mother but has tried to emulate her stoicism. "She can endure all sorts of pain and anguish with no external sign" [4]. He feels that she has been over-possessive, and has stressed too much the sacrifices she was making for him. A feeling of bitterness flavors many of his statements. He thinks that she denied him things and often deceived him, and there were times when he felt that she did not want him, that she even resented him [4].

As a child Shea was hard to control, inclined to fits of rage when thwarted, for which the treatment adopted by his mother was a cold bucket of water in the face. As he grew older his mother relied on spanking or the switch to bring him to his senses [32]. He sometimes felt that she was severe, intolerant, and inconsiderate, and often felt resentful. Later the punishments came mostly from the father, but these were never physical. They consisted of reproachful glances and meaningful silences.

Shea's mother, who came from a lower class than his father, grew up amid the privations, disappointments, and brawls of a bad-tempered, poverty-stricken family. Seared by those years, she resolved after marriage that her children would never have to endure what she had endured. Since she was convinced that money provided the only means of escape from hardship and affliction, she placed all her hopes on the value in the market of her husband's energy and talents. The latter earned a decent living as a journalist, but unhappily he could not rise to the level of her aspirations, and this realization brought on a chronic state of moody melancholy which hung over the family circle like a cloud. As time went on, the mother transferred her furious hopes for upward motility to her sons' potentialities. They must not endure what she endured. "That's why she is so ambitious for us," says Shea. "That's why, I suppose, I am here. She wants us to go a long way" [32]. A friend of his reports that "his terrific conscience over work is his mother's influence; she demands all *A*'s, and a *B* isn't good enough. She has driven all her children." His mother, Shea says, has been entirely wrapped up in the outcome of his efforts, and at times he has felt overburdened by her dominance, even helpless and passive, unable to get out from under the lashing power of her will to his success [4].

Shea has strong imperative sentiments pro family, father and mother;

he feels that he should feel love and respect; and, consequently, is reluctant to admit officially that he does not. In confiding moods, however, he lets it be known that his mother and he are not held together by mutual affection, but by some bitter and relentless compact which holds him to the iron rails of her ambition. He told a friend that even if he became a great success he could not stop, such was the fixed and ever-forward habit of his energies. Thus he has permitted himself to become the slave of an autonomous complex which has driven him upward to conspicuous, though never enjoyed, heights of scholarship, and downward to grievous dejections whenever he has failed to hit the exact mark at which he aimed.

Shea's case illustrates the necessity of distinguishing imperative sentiments, sentiments for sentiments, from sentiments proper. More than any of our other subjects Shea has been brought up to respect the commandment, *Honor thy father and thy mother.* He has a strong moral sentiment in favor of this guiding rule, which operates on both the first and second level, that is, he objectifies the principle in action and avows it in words. In this respect he is our top man. On the other hand, the feelings that have actually been evoked by his mother have been predominantly negative and when positive never very strongly positive. Judged by these affects, he stands tenth, just above Couch. In ranking him as we have, it is obvious that we did not give as much weight to the moral sentiment as we did to the nature of his basic feelings, and for this reason: Shea's moral sentiment does not prompt him to attempt to improve his relationship with his mother for their mutual enjoyment; his sentiment compels him to persevere in his studies, and in so doing he satisfies himself as much as he satisfies her. Also, in choosing scientific research ahead of more lucrative employments, he is intelligently following his own bent rather than yielding to the importunity of his mother's need for material security and comfort. Not love, or even the desire for love, but the dutiful acceptance of an obligation is the force that binds Shea loyally to his mother.

4. *Subject No. 8: Grove*

Grove's composite score on the items pertaining to *Family* in the Aphorisms Test [13] is zero, the average of several antithetical dispositions. He dislikes his father and his brother but is devoted to his mother. He assures us that he has never felt homesick. "I don't think I ever wanted to go home" [2], he says, thinking of the summers when his father makes him work in his warehouse, "which bores me stiff." But at a time of stress and helplessness, such as that fateful evening when he heard the news of

Pearl Harbor, his thoughts turn quickly to home and mother. As a boy he ran away from home several times, but always returned within a day or two. He describes the press of family discord; but in spite of this he asserts that "as a whole our family had a great deal of pleasure together" [33]. He can think of only one adjective to apply to the word *Family*, which is "close" [14].

In his autobiography, written in the form of a psychological case history, Grove says: "As long as I can remember my father has been negatively cathected in my mind, although there may be some light ambivalent tendencies" [1]. In the Aphorisms Test he is more negative than any of our subjects in his sentiments ad Father; to the statement, *No one will ever be more proud of a man's success than his own father*, he is one of the two subjects who answer "No."

The chief determinants of Grove's negative sentiments ad his father are the latter's manifestations of [1] four hurtful press: capricious discipline, severe punishment, insult, and relative rejection (preference for younger brother) [2]; a hurtful press towards a cathected object (maltreatment of his mother) [3]; and several disturbing traits (irascibility when drunk, brutal frankness, and vulgarity). These were mentioned in his autobiography and in interviews.

> My father is the dominant parent and the punishing agent of the family. He meted out this punishment with an iron hand, and very frequently, unnecessarily. There was unevenness in the punishment also. Often acts which really deserved punishment were disregarded. When punishment was meted out I usually took it, but on two occasions when I felt that it had been too severe I ran away from home [1].
>
> I gradually developed a strong fear of my father and I would go to my room every night after dinner rather than stay downstairs when I might clash with him. This led to a feeling that I was out of things and not a real member of the family [1].
>
> Discipline was very capricious. I can remember being punished for letting the screen door slam; and then one time when I smashed the car he didn't say a word. You were never sure just what would be punished and what wouldn't [33].
>
> I have always been afraid of him, afraid of his words. He once said that I was an unwanted child and that hurt. I can remember that on a few occasions he told me to get out and never come back, and what kind of a person was I to stay in his house when I didn't love him [33].
>
> As I grew older I especially dreaded insult in front of other people as a form of punishment [+].
>
> I never brought any of my friends home to the house. My father has always been terribly frank, and I was always afraid he would embarrass me or say something. He's terribly frank as far as dirty jokes and

> that sort of thing is concerned. That's all right around the house, but not before friends [33].

On one recent occasion when his father criticized him, Grove sneered and walked out of the room. Infuriated by this gesture of contempt, his father came after him and caught him by the collar, and then the son's banked-up bitterness exploded and for the first time found physical expression.

> I always said that as long as I stayed in my father's house I would never raise a hand against him. But my mother told me to hit him if he hit me. I got him down on the floor and just sat on him. I didn't hurt him. I don't think he ever harbored a grudge; I did [33].

That Grove's hostility toward his father has its source in inner and middle layer dispositions is indicated by the findings on the *TAT*. The marks on press Dominance (coercion and restraint) and on need Aggression are exceptionally high; one story describes a bitter conflict between father and son in true-to-life terms, and another tells of a young man's attempt to revenge the insults and harsh treatments he has suffered from his boss. In this last story the hero conceives and carries out a plan whereby the breakdown of a heavy piece of machinery will cause the death of his enemy; but at the crucial moment, out of fear or perhaps pity, he lets out a shout of warning. The shout saves the father-figure's life, but discloses to those present the author of the murderous plot. The story ends with the execution of the guilty hero. The inference to be drawn is that a large part of Grove's personality would be satisfied if his father died but that his aggression is so mixed with anxiety that even in his dreams he cannot imagine injuring his father, or anyone else for that matter, with his own hands. His enemy must be killed by a machine, or by someone else, or in an accident. Judging by his treatment of his baby brother, we have reason to suppose that somewhere, locked in the inner layers of his personality, there is some potentially active aggression; but this has long since been inhibited by anxiety and passivity, and having avoided boxing, wrestling and rough sports generally, Grove has no adequate mechanisms for translating aggressive tendencies into action. Only when his father initiates action by laying hands on him, his mother having advised him to "hit him if he hits you," can he use physical force, and then he is careful to say, "I didn't hurt him."

When asked about childhood fears Grove responded by describing the constant dread he had of his father [2], a dread which may have had a traumatic genesis because he says that "somebody told me once that when I was a small child I used to cringe away from him" [33]. In any event,

to wrestle with his father and put him down, as he did recently, was a decided step forward in the conquest of a long-standing fear and so in the elevation of his self-respect.

Grove, who has always loved his mother dearly, has often been indignant at the way his father treated her, particularly when he was under the influence of liquor.

> My father always wore the pants and I resented it. This gave me the dislike that I have for dominating others. I would never like to dominate [18].
>
> His drinking leads to trouble and very nasty scenes. He used to take it out on mother, and once in a while when he couldn't hurt her directly, he'd take it out on us and hurt her indirectly [33].

Another important reason for Grove's strong negative sentiment ad his father is the press of rejection presented by the latter. "He likes my brother better than me," Grove says. "He always feels that I don't love him and I feel that he doesn't love me" [33]. The father's preference for the younger brother strikes a sensitive spot in Grove's affective structure. To start with, he was greatly disturbed by his sibling's intrusion into the family circle and within a few months of birth he had made two attempts to do away with him: once by stuffing bread into his mouth until he choked, and another time by lifting him out of his crib and dropping him on the floor. On each occasion the baby's life was saved by the opportune arrival of the mother. The brother was the under-dog in many subsequent quarrels but eventually outgrew the subject in strength and fortitude, and the latter had to face the humiliating truth that his brother could lick him in a fight and at every sport. In fact, this once-despised competitor became a football hero and the apple of his father's eye. For the last few years the two brothers, their interests diverging more and more, have had little to say to each other. Thus, in Grove's mind father and brother stand together, both negatively cathected.

But the father also has some power to evoke positive affects in his son. He has certain abilities, for instance, which Grove admires.

> All during my life I've had an affection for him but it has just been rather hidden. Especially in the last three years I've realized what a fine man he is essentially [33].

The two adjectives which Grove associates with the word *Father* are, "punishing, supporting" [14], and in speaking of his own father he admits, "When it comes to big things you can rely on his being a big help" [33]. From this we inferred the existence of a basic dependence, the nature of

which was indicated by the findings on the Argument Completion Test [15]. Of all the completions offered by our subjects, Grove's show the greatest opposition between the two personages participating in the argument, the relationship in most cases being one of dominance-submission. The persuasions exerted by the dominant character take the form of superego exhortations to positive action, to which the passive character usually responds with a flat denial followed by an expression of negative sentiments. The latter individual however, is never able to maintain his position in the face of the moral pressure of the former, and ultimately he gives in. The dominant character decides the issue. This seems to correspond closely to the father-son relationship as it operates today. The father is very forward on all occasions in dictating or suggesting what his boy should do, and the latter invariably opposes his authority with passive negations. Grove, indeed, freely admits that when his father proposes a course of action something in him refuses to do it. Passive resistance is the best means he has found of frustrating his father's wishes. But in thus defeating his father he defeats himself, since the end result of passivity is lack of achievement, and lack of achievement leads to discontent, self-blame and feelings of inferiority. Realizing all this, Grove once admitted that he wished his family lived in Cambridge or that he had gone to college near his home in California, because then he would have felt the closer pressure of his father's influence and would have accomplished more and consequently felt more satisfied with himself than he does now. Evidently he pictures himself, like the passive character in his completions, resisting for a while the exhortations of his father and then finally deciding to follow his advice, reserving the right, if he should fail, to blame his father for urging him to pursue the adopted course. Grove's *TAT* stories show that the ideal conditions for overcoming passivity prevail when the hero himself initiates the action and then some older man supports him in his decision and encourages him as he goes along. But, whichever way we take it, one can hardly avoid the conclusion that below the layer of negativistic passive resistance there is an elementary dependence coupled with some affection for the father—"When it comes to big things you can rely on his being a big help."

On the Aphorisms Test [13] Grove's sentiment ad *Mother* is positive, third in the rank order of intensity. The adjectives which he associates with the word *Mother* are, "dear, protective, nurturant, loving" [14]. His own mother, he writes in his autobiography, "is one of the most perfect women in the world, and I have always been devoted to her" [1]. There is nothing in our material which suggests that this is an overstatement; in

his *TAT* stories there are no signs of unconscious hostility. "My mother and I have always understood just how the other felt" [+], he says, and he is not too proud to admit that "even up to the present time I retain a childish desire to be with her whenever I am in trouble or have to make a decision" [1]. He thinks that his mother has developed in him "an interest in people and a kindness of heart that my father hasn't" [33], and that in selecting medicine as a career he is expressing the spirit of her teachings; his ambitions are largely based on his desire to please her, do something for her, and fulfill her hopes. It is characteristic of him that he applied for a scholarship at Harvard only because she urged him to do so. He had never considered there was the slightest chance of his qualifying, but rather than disappoint her he tried [1].

Grove thinks that as a child his mother spoiled him, though "she never played favorites, always treating both children in the same way" [1].

> Mother would never spank us. First she'd start to, and then she'd get to thinking how funny she looked and start laughing and we would laugh too. It's lucky that my mother didn't have charge of bringing us up entirely [33].

The mother had one method of reprimanding her son which was invariably successful.

> When I had done something wrong, she would act hurt, and tell me to go to my room until I was ready to come down and apologize. I never failed to come down within half an hour [1].

Considering Grove's hatred of his father, we are not surprised to find that as a child he entertained fantasies of rescuing his mother, as well as fantasies in which she appeared as a highly idealized figure. He remembers his worship of the miraculous beauty of the Queen of the Emerald City and other heroines of visionary loveliness [2].

Grove feels that his relationship with his mother has been ideal. He never felt that she was unstable, unjust, domineering or interfering. Although she has praised him "a lot," she has never been physically demonstrative and never demanded much outward affection from him. Consequently he has had the sense as he grew up that his love was freely given [+].

Grove is the best illustration that we have of an Oedipus complex in which the strong attachment of son to mother is founded primarily on the dependency of babyhood and on fears of the strange and threatening world outside the region of the mother's protective presence. The imaginal press of Insupport, coupled with Basic Anxiety, is recurrent in Grove's personality,

as we have noted (see *Sentiments Towards War*), and it is in the history of his relationship to his parents that the chief determinants of these two tendencies can be found: the neurotic illness of his mother and the fear engendered in her son that she might die of heart disease; his mother's long absence from home because of this illness when he was very young; the birth of his little brother; the discord between his parents and the threats of divorce; the capricious discipline; the unjust punishments; and the father's drunkenness. In his autobiography Grove, speaking of his father, says:

> When he was intoxicated he would quarrel violently with my mother. There was often talk of divorce and this upset me greatly [1].

He tells us that his grandmother, with whom he lived when his mother was away, told him that "my father had been the cause of mother's nervous breakdown, and that he was gradually killing her. This led to great anxiety which extended over a long period" [1]. The fear of losing his mother resulted in a deepening of the boy's nurturant devotion to her and a very close association developed which seems to have aroused some jealousy in the father. Even today the latter is apt to complain that his wife gives the boy too much attention and to suspect that he, in turn, has been trying to talk her into getting a divorce. Actually Grove has never urged his mother to leave his father, although he was frequently wished she would; but he has not hesitated to confess his sentiments: "I'd go to her and tell her what I thought of him. I have said on occasion that I hated him but that is not true" [33].

Grove has the feeling of being rejected and was convinced at times that he was not the child of his parents. He imagined himself the son of a nobleman who would arrive one day and claim him as his own. He had many fantasies of leaving home and traveling. "I even ran away two or three times, but of course I went back," he says. "It was to get pity" [2].

Grove has been placed rather low in the rank order, chiefly because of the negative and hostile character of his attitude towards his father, not to speak of his brother. This antagonism has given rise to negative sentiments ad many objects which the father values, such as business, the Republican party, alcohol. To be sure, the boy's relationship with his mother is unusually deep and stable; he loves and admires her, shares her basic sentiments, finds her company congenial and feels free to discuss anything under the sun with her. But their relationship is founded on a succorance-nurturance pattern with alternating rôles, each sympathizing with the other whenever circumstances seem to justify it; and this, satisfactory as it may be at times, is apt to interfere with the development of an independent courageous atti-

tude in confronting life's difficulties and dangers. Grove, for example, is forever bemoaning the fact that he was deprived of a solid, unified family background, and he believes that if things had been different he would not now be giving way so often to the self-pity "which has always been one of my weak points."

5. *Subject No. 7: York*

York loves his home because it has "a secure feeling" [12]. He says:

> I have never had great affection for either parent. I must be cold-blooded or something. We will have pets and they will die and everybody will be so sad, but I don't care. I will bury them, and I think, "Well, if I am sorry it is because I have played with them and if I am sad it is sort of selfish; I don't have them to play with any more. And I think, well, if my parents die I wouldn't have any home" [5].

Only one *S* is more extreme than York in his belief that, *The potentiality of youth is cramped by the small laws of his own family,* and he is one of three subjects to give the most affirmative answer to the aphorism, *The family circle provides fine examples of tyranny, injustice, selfishness, and hate* [13]. He resents his present 10:30 bed hour, and the parental rule of going out only one night a week. "Both mother and father make me do this. It's rational enough, but if everything were rational the world would be a dull place. Or they say, 'You must go to college if you want to get ahead.' I'm likely to resent such statements and not do it for a while" [18].

In what he has to say about his family, the father comes out as the preferred, less criticizable parent [32]. York is positive on three of the four aphorisms pertaining to *Father* and *Older Men* [13]; and the adjectives he associates with the word *Father* are "helpful, necessary, friendly, coöperative, loving, kind, idealistic, leading, showing." He feels that he is closer to his father than to his mother.

> My mother is very social and rather aggressive. My father is the more understanding of the two because he had an unhappy childhood. He prefers his own company and that of a good book to other people's [1].
>
> Outwardly I am closer to my mother because like her I like to get around and be doing things, but I feel closer inside to my father, because he is sensitive and I am sensitive too, and I suppose that it is the inner thing that counts [33].

Besides feeling that he and his father are very similar below the skin, York has a fund of pity for him because he lacks the social as well as the aggressive propensities which both he and his mother possess in full measure.

Mingled with this feeling of likeness with his father, York feels a nurturant pity for him because he lacks the aggressive and social qualities which he and his mother possess.

> The strongest feeling for my father is sorrow that he doesn't have much of the social stuff. He keeps things on an idealistic basis and you can't handle people that way [33].

York enjoys nothing better than talking with his father "about conditions in general." He is in sympathy and for the most part in agreement with his liberal views, but believes that his parent is doomed to ineffectiveness because of his tender-minded impracticality. He himself is more worldly-wise and realistic.

York's mother is ambivalent to him. On the Aphorisms Test [13] his sentiment ad *Mother* is more negative than that of any of our subjects. He says, "Yes, 1" to the aphorism, *One good remedy for a better world: teach mothers to recognize when their sons are old enough to govern themselves,* and "Yes, 1" to the aphorism, *A mother's love is the excuse for a hundred petty tyrannies.* But his associations to the word *Mother* are all positive: "female, friendly, helpful, working, loving, kind" [14]. His *TAT* stories [21] exhibit the press of rejection and coercion by older women, but his scenes in the Dramatic Production Test [26] reveal no hostility to parent figures, and in several of the interviews he spoke with pride of both parents.

York feels that he resembles his mother because he wants "to get around and do things." "Like her I am more pushing, and I don't have my father's qualms of indecisiveness" [12]. "Talking is an outward thing and I can talk with her, usually about religion and church gossip" [33]. He thinks that his mother

> . . . is more apt to be a good counterbalance to my own radical views. From her I have gained the ability to get around and take a practical point of view. She isn't taken much to thinking or philosophizing [18].

York's mother, who went to college and taught school before her marriage, has always stressed the value of an education. She tutored her son while he was a school boy so that he could skip grades and enter college at an earlier age than other boys. At first there was no resistance or criticism on his part; he fell in with her design for his life, accepting her conviction that the path to success led through college. More recently, however, he has become conscious of a growing resentment, first, because his mother herself does not practice what she preaches, and second, because the pressure of her

unrelenting ambition for him, with all its attendant rules and regulations, has become almost unbearable.

York feels that his mother does not live up to the ideals that she set for him, that she does not exhibit in her life the fruits of a true education, that she uses her knowledge mostly to further her will to power inside and outside the family circle. "My strongest feeling about my mother is one of disappointment," he says [33].

> I get displeased with my mother. I suppose it should be "Honor thy father and thy mother," but sometimes I feel that she is not using what she has got, and I feel a sort of disgust. She should think things out more. For instance, she has taken all kinds of courses and she tells these mothers what to do, and then she will come home and yell on the slightest pretext [33].

The idea that she should be telling other mothers what to do appears so ironic to him that he is driven to write a poem about it.

> Our mother's not around these days,
> We children shift alone,
> Our father misses her at night,
> She's either out or on the phone.
>
> And what's the reason we're forlorn?
> And why are we half orphanized?
> A Parent Education course
> On child care she must organize.

Since we know that York's mother is a hard worker, ever-devoted to the welfare of her family, this poem is a gross exaggeration of the state of affairs in his household. What it truly does reflect, however, is a middle or inner layer feeling of having been partially deprived and rejected by a mother who was intent on pursuing her own ambitions. He tells us that his mother was never demonstrative and that as a child he used to wish that he lived with different people who were more affectionate [5]. At times he is inclined to think that all his mother got out of her college was faith in the virtue of discipline.

> My mother went to college and I don't think that is so good because it gave her ideas about discipline and how much to punish children. My mother wants things to happen when she wants them to happen. She wants people to obey; whereas my father wants to talk things over [33].

In York's family punishments were inflicted by the mother. "She knew very well that I hated to do nothing, so she would sit me down to do

nothing" [5]. He thinks that his mother quite often denied him things that he might well have had, that she was often severe and intolerant, and generally interfered too much with his desires and preferred activities. "My father," he says, "doesn't punish. He is apt to blow up, but even then it isn't bad. More often he will talk with you, and when he gets through you feel like a nickel" [5]. It seems that what York objected to particularly was not so much his mother's actual punishment as the fact that he felt it to be punishment without love, arising from "ideas about discipline."

In brief then, York has unambiguous affection for his father and respects him for his wide reading and idealistic conceptions. Father and son hold many sentiments in common and they enjoy each other's company. He recognizes nonetheless that his father is weak and ineffectual. The affection that York feels for his mother, on the other hand, is overbalanced by a good deal of resentment. He does not admire her mind any longer, although he does respect her energetic will, oppressive as it may be. He is less congenial and less intimate with his mother than he is with his father; he does not feel certain of the quality of her love. His underlying criticism of her is that her discipline is too strict and that she is exploiting him for her own satisfaction. She does not appreciate him for what he is, but for what he might do to lift the status of the family. Although York says, "I have never had great affection for either parent" [5], he is, nevertheless, devoted in his actions; he still obeys the rules set down by his mother and feels responsible for their welfare. "I like to keep them happy," he says. "In fact, it gets stronger than that. I *have* to keep them happy" [33].

6. *Subject No. 6: Dunn*

Dunn is a man whose outer layer is, in certain significant respects, the contrary of his middle layer: he seems to go out of his way to say things which are the exact opposite of a crucial truth. For example, in his autobiography he writes:

> Christmases are my earliest memories of Mother and Dad. They are visions of bountiful giving, and hearty reception on my part. I was at peace with them and with the world,—and why not? [1].

Here, when he is free to select what he will out of his past, he speaks of his "earliest memories," of Christmas, of "bountiful giving" and "hearty reception." A psychologist with his ear to the ground might perhaps have predicted that intimate talks would reveal that Dunn was protesting too much when he wrote this, and so it was proved: Dunn's earliest memory is that of having to give up the little tricycle he received on Christmas day to his

younger brother, playmate and life-long rival. This memory is crucial because it is symbolic of a disillusioning realization that is at the bottom of his nature, namely, that his mother has loved his brother more than she has loved him. This he appears to be taking pains to deny when, in writing of his parents, he affirms, "Their attitude toward their sons has always been fair." But then he gives himself away on the Thematic Apperception Test: in no set of stories in our entire collection is there to be found so much implicit blame of parent figures.

In another part of his autobiography Dunn writes:

> Mother's and Dad's opinions tend to conform and to be synonymous although there is no great compunction that this be so. Their interests lie in books, the theater, and a small circle of friends and their two boys. The temperament of both is congenial in all company [1].

But later in a confidential interview he confesses that whenever he thinks of his family it is with a sour and resentful feeling, the whole basis of which is not clear to him. Among the difficulties he enumerates, however, are these: the opposition between his father and mother on religious and other fundamental issues, the constant bickering that occurs, his father's melancholy withdrawal from social activity, a course which distresses the whole family. Thus Dunn is a man whose formal assertions are unreliable. Most of his important sentiments have a low degree of publicity.

On the Aphorisms Test [13], which is less direct than the autobiography, Dunn is among our three most negative subjects in his sentiments ad *Family*. He and Yawl are the only two who deny that, *The family is one of Nature's masterpieces*. He is about average, however, in his sentiments ad *Father* and ad *Older Men*, but because of his tendency to give low marks on all items no one response stands out. The adjectives which he associates with *Father* are, "eternal, interesting, prejudice, pleasant" [14]. He tells us that he admires his father's tolerance and his interest in books. "He makes a point of reading and is well read" [4]. Father and son are similar in many respects, physically and mentally.

> I have always been likened to my father. Save for a difference in inches we look alike and are built on common lines. We think alike and he undoubtedly has had much influence on me [1].

Ten years ago the father's business went to pieces, with the result that there was a very marked drop in the family's financial and social status.

> One of the effects that this had on father was to make him almost *too* cynical of values, friends and people. This bothers me and I feel guilty that it should [4].

In an interview he explained that he criticizes his father because after the blow of failure he retreated to a position of passivity, making no attempt to counteract. For years, whining and complaining against the order of society has been his principal occupation. Even today when he is once more earning a good salary in connection with an important war industry he keeps reiterating that the only solution of the economic problem in America is a revolution of the proletariat. And yet he and his wife have never abandoned their middle class prejudices and pretensions; they are still anxious to keep up with the Joneses. This is very disconcerting to Dunn, who feels that the acceptance of his father's views imposes the moral obligation to devote his life to revolutionary activity, but, on the other hand, having made his mark at school and at college, he recognizes that he has the energy and talent to succeed under the present system of rugged individualism. The former course is idealistic but probably doomed to failure; the latter offers proximal rewards but is selfish and out of keeping with his highest principles. Dunn is not only attracted to his father's ideas but is incapable of maintaining an independent and contrasting standpoint; and yet recognizing, as he does, that his father's communistic persuasions are the result of his personal failure in business, he is not entirely convinced that he, the son, who has the capacity to succeed, should dedicate his life to their fulfillment.

Dunn tells us that there has always been a special bond of sympathy and unanimity between his mother and his brother on the one side and his father and himself on the other. His father was less affectionate than his mother but a better companion; he often played games with his boys and greatly appreciated their successes; "When we played on teams he always came to watch us" [4]. In recent years father and son have had many stimulating and congenial talks together about politics, economics, history and religion. As a child Dunn preferred his father's discipline to his mother's. His father sometimes punished him physically and sometimes, he thought, unjustly, but then, he hastens to add, "I was a little smug at that time, so I probably deserved what I got" [4]. Though he says that "to be spanked by Dad was capital punishment" [2] it was better than verbal reproach. He never felt rebellious or resentful.

It is evident that Dunn idealized his father up to the time of his financial crash; after which, due largely to the manner in which his father reacted to the reversal of his fortune, a feeling of disappointment arose which led to a profound sense of disillusionment, if not resentment. His father was a man of clay after all.

On the Aphorisms Test [13] Dunn is just below the middle of the rank order in his sentiments ad *Mother* and ad *Older Women*. As is the case with his aphorisms ad *Father*, no one of his responses stands out. The adjectives he associates with the word *Mother* are, "eternal, gracious, nostalgic, friendly" [14]. He says that he admires his own mother "for her graciousness and her quality of niceness." But he criticizes her for being emotionally unstable, over-possessive, and interfering too much in his activities, overburdening him with guidance [4]. She emphasizes the sacrifices that she has made and insists that he do things her way [4]. His mother often looks up to him as her superior and defers to him in "questions of reading and books" [4], but it is a source of irritation to him that she, who reads all the modern books, "points out in detail to us the unreality and the evil of them, and yet she can't keep away from them" [32]. She is full of prejudices which she cannot justify and this to such a confirmed rationalizer as Dunn is evidence of a feeble intellect. For example, there is nothing he hates more than to hear her express judgments based on class distinctions which do not correspond to their present position in the social scale.

The mother was chief disciplinarian in the family. Sometimes she administered physical punishments and sometimes threatened measures which were not carried out, but feared more than these was her moral disapprobation. Dunn feels that his sensitivity to this side of his mother's nature

> . . . had a great deal to do with the way I felt about asserting myself. She conditioned my thinking, by utilizing certain persons as ideals. She told me that smoking stunts your growth, so that even now I don't smoke. We were always under strict orders not to fight. She had a passion for not wanting us to talk to other people. She taught us manners, etc., etc. [18].

Dunn has begun to realize that he is more obedient to his mother's demands than are most men of his age, and her coercions and prohibitions are less tolerable than they were. He blames her strict training for some of his present inhibitions and his lack of self-assertion. Not yet, for example, has he dared to disobey her injunction against smoking. "Mother had great anxiety for our safety; she exaggerated risks, and was pessimistic" [4]. And today she is as demanding as ever, exerting her influence in a hundred subtle ways, convincing evidence of the pervasiveness of the mother-son conflict being furnished by Dunn's *TAT* stories [21].

This subject provided us with an illustration of a case where the responses cannot be properly interpreted without knowledge of the individual's general

state of being. During the period that he was taking the tests at the Clinic he was in the throes of a grievous depression that had claimed him for some months and was showing no signs of letting up. As a result, all of his responses were slanted towards the negative side, and, except for his excessively formal autobiography, where he painted a picture of perfect family harmony, he was disposed to stress the least satisfactory aspects of his relations with his parents. In later interviews it became clear that although in his early years Dunn suffered a profound disillusionment, first engendered, say, by the birth of his younger brother and his belief that his mother had turned her love away from him, and although later he suffered another disillusionment when the ideal image of his father was shattered by the latter's uncourageous reaction to misfortune, the son's basic attachment to both father and mother has always been strong and vital. He is actively devoted to his parents as a result of both pragmatic and imperative sentiments; he feels very close to his father, shares many of his viewpoints and always finds his company congenial. He can rely utterly on the permanence of both parents' devotion to him and their appreciation of his talents and successes. In recent years he has begun to question his father's political views and to lose respect for many of his mother's opinions. His opposition to her is accentuated at the moment because he is engaged in winning his independence, a process which is difficult for him because of the long years of unhesitating compliance to her governance. But this is a necessary stage in growing up and in no way jeopardizes the integrity of the underlying relationship.

7. *Subject No. 5: Hawk*

Hawk feels that "all in all family existence has been a pleasant one" [1], and he gives the highest possible marks to all the aphorisms on *Family* [13]. The words which he associates with *Family* are, "English bad, unifying, of support to me, guiding, strengthening, worthy of love" [14]. Here "English bad" refers to the fact that his parents, who emigrated from Germany shortly after their marriage, still speak with an accent. They both come from upper middle class Prussian families, the father being the younger son of an affluent business man. Unable to get on with his older brothers, he came to America to set up business for himself.

Hawk has always had the assurance of his parents' constant affection.

> Both were fairly indulgent, and left their ideas of Prussian discipline back in Prussia. Their influence over me never took any offensive form such as nagging or domineering. At an early age they allowed

> me liberties which most parents of city boys did not,—such as traveling alone, swimming alone, keeping late hours. I just grew up without anything that seemed to me to be conscious influence on the part of my parents [1].

The family quarrel that precipitated the parents' departure for America left an unpleasantness which spread to flavor their sentiments towards everything German and disposed them to look with favor on everything American. And it was perhaps for this reason that they leaned over backwards in outdoing the proverbial leniency of American parents. Perhaps also, feeling uncertain as to the customs in this world of their adoption, they were fearful of doing anything that might interfere with their children's adjustment. Certain it is, anyhow, that Hawk took every advantage of the freedom that was granted him.

> My mother's chief complaint was that I was never at home. I never hang around the house. Our family doesn't do much together [5].

The absence of oppression at home explains why Hawk is the most intense of all our subjects in his denial of the statement that, *The family circle provides fine examples of tyranny, injustice, selfishness, and hate* [13]. Hawk says, "My parents' marriage seems to have been a happy one; certainly until both parents had passed their fiftieth birthday it was extremely harmonious despite the severest financial ups and downs" [1]. Since that time, however, his father has had diabetes and this illness, coming on top of business reverses, has changed him into a depressed and moody man. An interviewer who recently visited the parents in their home reports that it was her impression that they were cast down by their misfortunes.

On the Aphorisms Test [13] Hawk is more positive than any of our subjects in his sentiments ad *Father* and ad *Older Men*. He and one other subject (Lake) are the only two who do not believe that, *The potentiality of youth is cramped by the small laws of his family*, and he is the most definite in his belief that, *Better than an inheritance is the friendship of an older man*. This suggests a strong need for Deference, and such is the case. The words which he associates with *Father* are, "intelligent, efficient, understanding, my youthful ideal, not well" [14]. Some of these associations seem to be related to "my youthful ideal" rather than to his father as he exists today, because Hawk does not think of his father, who has failed in one business after another, as an efficient man. "He is too easy going in his business and doesn't go at it with enough vim" [4]. Neither does he think of his father as intelligent. "He has few intellectual ambitions"

[+]; he "is usually absorbed in his business and the politics of the day and not much more" [1].

In summarizing his opinion of his father, Hawk says:

> He has been a fine father, always doing without himself if it would help us boys in any way [1]. He was also a very fond father, and though he couldn't afford it he used to give us lots of toys. We always had the best in the neighborhood [5].

Hawk's positive sentiment was engendered in his early youth when his father would come home laden with gifts for his boys. In those days the father was the boy's exemplar, pattern for his idealego. But as time went on he became less adequate. After failing once or twice, he became reticent, less confident of himself, less forceful. "He has never been open or unreserved, although actually he is a mild man" [4]. And he ceased to keep in touch with the activities of his boys. "My father is never interested in what we do, never concerns himself particularly" [5]. As a result, Hawk developed a powerful idealego within himself and his high *n* Deference sought satisfaction in other older men. This transition took place without leaving any residue of bitterness, because the early memories of his father's generosity and indulgence had left an indelible impression. It is interesting to note that Hawk is unique in introducing no father figures in the abbreviated *TAT* [23], and in leaving aside the father figures in the Dramatic Production Test [26].

Hawk writes, "I first worshipped my father as a man of the world, then my mother because she seemed closer to me" [1]. He says that his mother "had a position of responsibility before her marriage, and though she has been willing to give this up her ambitions have never been satisfied. She is nervous, active, and terrifically interested in everything. She is more aggressive than my father but does not always have her way with him" [4].

Although Hawk is only half as intense in his responses to the aphorisms pertaining to *Mother* as he is to those pertaining to *Father*, he is, nevertheless, once again at the top of our rank order. No other *S* is so strongly against the aphorism, *One good remedy for a better world: teach mothers to recognize when their sons are old enough to govern themselves.* On the other hand, he is with Yawl in responding "Yes 2" to the statement, *A mother's love is the excuse for a hundred petty tyrannies.* In Hawk's case the mother's tyrannies do not take the form of positive demands and prohibitions but spring from an anxious concern for his welfare.

> My mother has always more or less annoyed me by being over solicitous. It is annoying to come back from college and to have her worry-

> ing over when and where I am going, etc. I don't mind saying that I rebel against it [33].

The adjective which Hawk associates with the word *Mother* are, "helpful, cheerful, beneficial, guiding, thoughtful, wise, efficient" [14]. He tells us that he has thought of his own mother as perfect, often wanted to be like her, and wished he could devote his life to her [4]. To what extent sentimental idealism is responsible for these assertions it is not possible to say. He admits that his mother has occasionally seemed over-possessive, and has sometimes called for an unusual amount of attention and tenderness from him. Whenever she is demonstrative in her affections he feels embarrassed.

His mother, who did all the disciplining, used to spank him occasionally and this invariably provoked resentment. He would lock himself in his room and brood over the injustice of it. In another connection he speaks of his mother as being "very nervous and emotional" [32] from which we might surmise that her punishments were sometimes hasty and ill-considered. But in speaking of them now he says he does not think they were severe [4].

Because his mother was more alert than his father and more interested in his activities, he found he had more to share with her than with him.

> My mother has a keen insight in exactly how I grew up, and what I was doing. Whereas father was usually a generation behind in his ideas. By and large, I believe that my mother has always been closer to me and has been the greater influence over me. She has a greater interest in the things I am interested in—literature, art, music, and meeting people [1].
>
> I copy her likes and dislikes in taste almost unconsciously [18].

We must admit that we have failed to find the key to Hawk's extremely positive sentiments ad father and mother. Parents and son go their separate ways; there is not much mutual enjoyment of intimate companionship. The mother has shared some of her boy's interests but her over-solicitous attitude cramps his style. He finds something to criticize in both parents; and yet his affection and devotion are undeviating. Even after sufficient allowance has been made for the fact that Hawk shows a tendency to give high marks, either positive or negative, on all items, he still stands at the top, or very near the top, of the rank order. This might be explained by supposing that his parents gave him everything he required during the first years of his life and the impression they made on him at that time has remained unimpaired. Since then, being accorded a good deal of freedom, he has developed his self-reliance to the point that he is no longer dependent on them. He has all of them that he needs within himself as constituents

of his superego and idealego, and being more at home in this country than they are, the assurance that he will succeed where his father has failed puts him in a superior position. Having nothing to fear from his parents he can love them without qualification.

8. *Subject No. 4: Finch*

Finch's belief that "parents should act as guardian angels for their children" is a product of his own experience, his father having admirably filled this rôle for him. "My father," writes Finch in his autobiography, "is a wonderful person."

> He is absolutely sincere in all that he does. He has good creative ideas, he is fairly liberal, not quite liberal enough, but his liberality is founded on the right things—a deep-seated desire to help people [1].
>
> The economic, social, and physical sides of my father are also good. A clergyman is highly respected, and my father is especially. A great many people really love and admire him [1].

The image of his father as a spiritual shepherd arouses the most reverential feelings in his son.

> In the long run he will not count for too much. He has written no famous books, nor has he made any great discoveries, yet to the present time his value to the world is infinite. There are about 225 people under his influence, and about a hundred of those are very much under his influence and follow his teaching and example as disciples [1].

The father's person has been invested with the sacredness of the faith that he serves, so that the son sees him not simply as an individual, but as a representative and symbol of a great tradition, as incarnated Christian piety. Finch devoted an entire theme written for an English course at college to a description of his father's study, the most beautiful room he has ever seen, with the light filtering in through the stained glass windows, the whole atmosphere being one of peace and holiness. The religious exaltation evoked by the sight of his father before the altar during one memorable evening service has already been described (see *Sentiments Towards Religion*).

Finch has never differentiated himself from his father. His sentiments so far as we know are exactly the same as his father's; the father's vocation will be his vocation. Especially does he admire his father's reticence and restraint, the habitual silence which permits the son to imagine hidden depths of feeling and of wisdom. "My mother's uncontrolled love," he writes, "may be contrasted with Dad's, whose love is firm and deep, but reserved and unmanifest" [1].

> It is easy to hurt his feelings, but he never lets us know when we have done so. Sometimes it escapes, and our remorse is great [1].

In contrast to his mother's discipline, his father's has been steady, definite and just.

> My father would try to reason things out with me. He was more firm in his discipline. If he held up his finger he meant it. You could always go ask him something. He said "yes" or "no" and meant it, and you didn't mind [22].

Finch tells us that he cannot remember his father ever having spanked him but his moral lessons were all the more telling, for "mental punishment was worse than physical punishment." The son was invariably obedient because, as he says,

> I didn't want to hurt my father's feelings. I loved him a lot and didn't want to do anything to break up that relationship [4].

"Thy will be done" sums up Finch's attitude to his father, and this is reflected in his low scores on the aphorisms pertaining to *Self-Reliance*.

Turning his thoughts from his father to his mother, Finch makes an admission that is unusual in so conventional a young man:

> I don't like my mother. I can't get along with her at all. She is so fussy and worries about everything, our health and everything. It's just terrible. Now with my father I can sit down and talk things over, but never with her. Even if she comes into the room when I am talking with my father I have to close right up. Everything shuts up inside me [15].

His father would be astonished and shocked if he heard this, for in his opinion (according to an interviewer who visited him) the boy's outstanding characteristic is his devotion to his mother. Evidently there is a marked discrepancy at this point between the outer layer (first level) and the middle layer (second level) of his personality. Finch has acquired all the habits of deference and compliance; he is a dutiful boy. But inwardly he rebels against his mother and is disgusted with his own docility, his fear of her resentment.

He tells us that he has always been certain of his mother's love, and this is confirmed by the absence of any signs of the rejection complex: no imaginal press of insupport, of deprivation, of loss or lack; no orphan thema or self-pity in his fantasies; no deep-seated tendency to melancholy or pessimism. The basic relationship is secure in so far as it depends on the permanence of the mother's devotion. But her son does not admire her; he does not

want to be identified with her; he is quick to tell us that "my mother doesn't look a bit like me. She is dark" [15]. In truth, she has become his principle annoyer, an interference to his development.

Finch's mother is overwhelmingly loquacious; she is a gushing well of meaningless observations and anecdotes; and she is forever worrying about her children, hemming them in with warnings of disaster, nagging them with injunctions and advice. Her affection smothers them. Says Finch in his autobiography:

> She is very emotional. She worries like the devil. It's terrible—she will worry over every little thing. We are her main interest, but in uncontrolled love she tends to alienate us. She has few interests outside of us. She is interested in the house, and cleanliness, and spick and span order, even to too great extremes. She is not as bright as Dad, and has not had an equal education [1].

The press of affiliation and nurturance are generally classed as both agreeable and beneficial, but if expressed without regard for the temperament, needs and momentary mood of the subject to which they are addressed they can operate as harms. The exasperation provoked in Finch by his mother's overflowing, anxious and coercive love is plain in everything he says about her.

> My mother is too emotional. She worries all the time. She is a nuisance, wants to know everything that I am doing. She's not logical. You have to fit in with her. She has a strong sense of duty which is a burden to me. I have never been intimate with her [4].

The mother administered most of the punishments but her way of executing this function inspired no respect. According to the son's testimony, her discipline was vacillating and capricious, the expression of a passing impulse, a recurrent nuisance rather than a dreaded force reserved for critical occasions.

> I feel it would have been better if my father and mother had been more consistent, if my mother had been more like my father. She would spank me because I worried her. She would say, "You shouldn't worry me the way you did" [32].
>
> My mother would spank me if I did anything wrong, but this never made any difference to me. But I did dread having my father come home and find out about it. I didn't mind my mother's spanking because I was sure of her love and knew that she loved me whatever I did [4].
>
> My mother was too emotional and too soft. For punishment she could only say, "I'll tell your father." She should have been more strict. She was too soft [32].

To understand Finch's life-long obedience to his mother it is necessary to take account not only of a masochistic tendency in his personality, but of the fact that his early home was a little island in the midst of a negatively cathected region which provided no avenues of escape from his mother's supervision. The father's first parish being in a lower class section of Columbus, the boy was insulated from the children of the community by his parents' decision that none of them were fit playmates for him. The situation was not fundamentally altered later when the family moved to a pleasant middle class neighborhood, because Finch detested school; he was bullied by the young sadists in his class, and made no friends. And then the range of his activities were limited, as always, by his parents' innumerable Do's and Don't's. Thus, the boy's life space did not extend much further than the boundaries of his own backyard. His mother's shadow was his refuge. The price he paid for his dependence upon her company and protection was submission to her will.

Finch was reared in accordance with the most rigid standards of comportment. Slang, swearing, card-playing, dancing, going with girls, smoking and, of course, drinking were strictly prohibited. Even tea-drinking was classed among the minor sins. These restrictions were accepted without a murmur, until on coming to Harvard Finch woke up to the fact that other "nice" boys were free to do these things, and that he was conspicuously different from the rest due to the peculiar moral education he had received at home. For this he blamed his mother, because it was she who was perpetually laying down the law. Today he looks back on his whole boyhood as a Dark Age, a period of tribulation and imprisonment out of which he is only just now emerging by cautious experiments in free choice. He is apparently working himself up to a long-overdue revolt against maternal tyranny. And although the conflict comes down to such issues as whether or not he will tell his parents where he is going every time he goes out of the house, and although he has got no further than muttering complaints against his mother's dominance, he has already begun to think of himself as a stubbornly independent liberty-loving man. His sentiments ad *Individualism* and *Noncomformity* are extremely positive, and he gives himself the highest mark on the need for Autonomy, the overt manifestations of which are, in truth, negligible. On the Aphorisms Test [13] he responded with a "No" to 61 per cent of the statements, signifying a diffuse negativism in the middle layer of his personality, for in his face-to-face (outer layer) relations at the Clinic Finch was as obliging and coöperative as any subject we have ever had.

That the underlying rebellion against authority involves the sovereignty of the reverend father, consciously unquestioned, is shown by Finch's responses to the *TAT* and the Mind Reading Test. In the former a recurrent thema is that of conflict between an older and a younger man. The younger man, who prefers action to thought, disagrees with the counsels of the older man. Later he sees that the older man is right and he feels guilty for having doubted his wisdom. In another story the son is harshly punished by the father but he gets his revenge in the end.

The findings on the Mind Reading Test are startling, coming as they do from a smiling, gentle and polite young man. In 30 out of the 50 pictures the press of Dominance or of Aggression is projected into the mind of the figure (represented in the photograph) or into the mind of an imaginary person confronting the figure. In the latter type, which recurs much more frequently than the former, the figure's attitude is that of impotent passivity or of passivity combined with revengefulness. For example:

> (*a*) "I just have to go on suffering and suffering. I can't do anything about it" (impotent passivity).
>
> (*b*) "I don't like it but I have to do it—I'll get even with you sometime" (passivity plus revenge).
>
> (*c*) "You may have got me now but just wait a minute. I'll show you" (passivity plus revenge).

Other sentences exhibit trends of distrustfulness, resistance and defiance; and there is one expression of frank sadism:

> (*d*) (Bandit torturing someone and enjoying it). "Gee, this is fun."

This last, being in keeping with the other responses, suggested the hypothesis that Finch, much bullied in his schoolboy days, had consoled himself with fantasies of retaliative cruelty. Questioned later during a confidential interview, he admitted that this was true. He had imagined himself torturing his tormentors in a variety of ways, one of which was that of burning off their genitals with a red-hot iron. These and other memories confirmed the conclusion that Finch has a good deal of underlying malice, but that it belongs to the second level (level of thought), and there is no likelihood of its ever being objectified in action; ideo-motor conductance is low.

Finch stands first among our subjects in his reverence for his father. The strength of the sentiment, we judge, is due, first to the beneficial press the father has embodied, second to his exemplary character, and third to his connection with the Church. The son has vibrated to the feelings which the father has inspired in his congregation. Finally, there is the homosexual tendency: in Finch the Oedipus complex is inverted.

The rôle of the Man of God has set the father on a higher plane, separated from his son by a moral gap which acts as a bar to perfect intimacy. The son believes that if he confessed his whole mind to his father the latter would be grievously disappointed, would feel that his son had fallen short of the high standard that he holds for him.

> I am quite intimate with my father now but not so close as with friends. He has too much interest in me. I'd rather talk my problems over with friends. They are more impartial. I might be below what my father thinks of me [+].

In this, we may surmise, the father is not unlike the son. He also feels it necessary to set himself forth as better than he is, more moral and more conventional. Thus on each side a barrier of pride flattens the impression of the character and prevents a fructifying intimacy. To an interviewer the father described his son as "a very average sort of boy," which is a complete miss. Finch is far from the ordinary run.

The mother's negative cathexis has a long history; it is the product without doubt of certain childhood events, some of which may be outside the range of memory. Finch's repetition of the phrase "get all closed up" in describing his habitual response to a hostile environment and also, at another time, in explaining the effect his mother often has on him, suggested first that the mother was unusually aggressive in her early disciplining of the boy, which proved to be correct, and second, that one specific trauma might have been caused by her attempt to give the boy an enema, to which he responded by getting "all closed up." In an interview it was ascertained that Finch does remember his mother giving him an enema and that it was very disagreeable, but the recollection is not connected, as far as he is now aware, with any striking degree of affect. In his *TAT* stories all the female figures are dominant, coercive, restraining or undisguisedly malicious.

9. *Subject No. 3: Lake*

Lake is a bland sociocentric extraceptor whose region of self-knowledge is narrowly circumscribed. He has no private and unique feelings that he is aware of. Poke him and he responds with morally imperative sentiments which correspond closely to the ideal patterns of the middle-of-the-road American. Engage him in an intimate conversation with barriers down and one gets the same result. Thus, in contrast to Dunn, whose public assertions are a mere front of conventionality, Lake has become largely identified with his imperative sentiments. Most of the time he actually feels what his family and his community would like to have him feel, what he

himself would prefer to feel. Thus he is an example of the socialization process carried to the point where both uniqueness and individuality are all but obliterated. On the Aphorisms Test [13] he is extremely positive, far above the other subjects in the rank order, in his sentiments ad *Conformity, Coöperation* and *Reason*. He also expresses strong con sentiments ad *Skepticism* and *Subjective Values*. Knowing these facts, one can predict with some assurance what Lake will tell us about his family.

"Our family atmosphere," says Lake, "has been filled generally with respect, interest, and security" [1]. "Comfortabe, homey, compatible, loving," are the adjectives which he associates with the word *Family* [14]; and he is highly positive on the aphorisms for *Family* with one exception. He is among the three subjects who give the most positive response to the statement, *"The family circle provides fine examples of tyranny, injustice, selfishness and hate* [13]. But this response stands alone; it is not supported by anything that he says or by the results of any test. In the Dramatic Production Test [26] both father and mother have a positive cathexis, and the scene which he creates is that of a happy family with the parents presiding over it.

In the Argument Completion Test [15] Lake has the highest score of any *S* for arguments favorable to parental and traditional standards; he and his parents stand together as a unit.

> In all my attitudes, my parents and I are in agreement, both father and mother. I admire them both very much, and I want to go a little farther, to show them that I appreciate what they have done for me. I also want to have their friendliness, discretion, and honesty [18].

Lake especially emphasizes the discretion of his parents, whose philosophy he says "is to do everything in moderation" [31]. This is a cherished ideal of Lake's; an almost excessive valuation of sanity leads him to shun extremes of any sort. "The policy my parents adopted in bringing us up," he says, "was one of making us all partners in the family and teaching us to reason out our problem and then follow a course of our own discretion. Of course they were always on hand as council" [1]. The importance of the parental council in deciding matters is indicated in one of Lake's responses to the Argument Completion Test [15]. One young man is arguing with a reluctant friend in favor of a dangerous mountain climbing trip. Lake continues,

> They decide to talk it over with their parents. They each go home and talk it over. They are persuaded by their parents to take the less dangerous trip.

Lake is the only *S* who solved this controversy by referring it to the parents.

Lake tells us that his parents were careful not to show favoritism in deal-

ing with their five children and that he never felt that they did. "Our parents were always fair to us and we to them" [4]. No signs of family insupport are to be found in Lake's personality.

> Our parents were always extremely interested in things we did, and always encouraged us in constructive ideas. They taught us to be ambitious and to go farther than ourselves. We were always confident of their love, but they never embarrassed us with affectionate demonstrations [1].

Lake has a score of +11 on the aphorisms for *Father,* the highest score possible being +12. He thinks of the adjectives, "paternal, honest, good, lovable" in association with the word *Father,* and he asserts that he has always had the greatest admiration and respect for his own father and consequently has accepted most of his standards. He has always been pleased when people said that he resembled his father [4]. He thinks of him as being energetic and masterful, but there is no evidence that he was at all severe, as Lake says that he preferred his father's punishments to those of his mother because his father never resorted to physical means. "He is a happy fellow," Lake says. "He gets the most out of life and that is what I try to do" [4].

In Lake we find no trace of antipolarity of feeling toward his father either overt or covert. There is nothing in the *TAT* (21) to suggest hostility. Most of the parental figures are benevolent and there is little or no aggression against them. In his positive sentiments ad *Older Men* Lake is second in the rank order.

Unqualified admiration is also evident in everything Lake has to tells us about his mother. He claims that he has always regarded her as ideal, has wanted to live up to her standards and emulate her ways, especially her social skills. "Her attitude is probably the most lady-like that I know."

> She is non-critical, picks out the good points about people and does not talk about them. She has always been honest, straight-forward, tactful, never anything harsh [4].
>
> My mother is small, heavy, not demonstrative, just. She doesn't get angry, is very practical, and has a good business head. She is an excellent bridge player. She gets along well with people, is respected and admired by every one I know. She has been a good mother to five kids. She is very active [4].

One of the examiners who saw Lake outside the Clinic reports that he talked at length about the extraordinary virtues of his mother [32]. "Beautiful, kind, generous, devoted" are the adjectives he associates with *Mother*

[14]. "She was teacher," he says, "being at home all day. From her I learned altruism—doing unto others—and equality" [18].

There seems to be more admiration than warmth of feeling in Lake's attitude to his mother. "She is rather haughty in a way," he confesses [4]. It was the mother who did most of the disciplining with even-handed justice; physical punishment was rare.

> When we were unreasonable, my mother gave us good word whippings. My reaction was one of shame for doing something to deserve punishment [1].

Apparently, Lake experienced no resentment on these occasions; he never thought his mother was severe, unjust, or nagging, and never felt rebellious or hostile after punishment [4].

> We children never had to do anything. My mother taught us independence and judgment [4].

Thus in all his public and private statements Lake contributes to the picture of an almost idyllic family scene, expressive of harmony, justice, and mutual respect. And there are no reasons to suppose that his behavior at home does not conform closely to this pattern. That Lake is a dutiful and devoted son is certain. In none of our case histories do we find a better illustration of family solidarity. The results on the *TAT* show that Lake is lowest of any of our subjects on press Insupport, press Lack and Loss, press Rejection. There are no signs of oral deprivation, weaning trauma, or oral aggression—all of which goes to prove that his relationship to his mother was firmly established at an early age.

In view of this it is of some interest to observe some of the inner layer constituents revealed by indirect approaches. In the first place, we notice that Lake says that he prefers his father and that this is confirmed by the Aphorisms Test [13]. In the composite rank order of all items pertaining to family relationships Lake stands second; he is tied for third place on *Family,* is tied for first place on *Father,* is second on *Older Men,* is first on *Marriage,* and second on *Children.* But on *Mother* and *Older Women* he is next to the bottom, tied with Couch. Notable also is the amount of aggression in Lake's *TAT* stories, some of which is directed towards objects that are symbolic of the mother's body; there are also several collisions and eye injuries. On the basis of the collisions and eye injuries the diagnosis was made that Lake had once overseen parental intercourse; and this proved to be correct. Lake remembers it as the most traumatic experience of his life. Aggressive penetration of a human body was interpreted as resent-

ment aroused by the mother's pregnancy engendering a desire to destroy the incumbent rival. Birth of sibling occurred three times in Lake's childhood, but probably, as the *TAT* suggests, a strong reaction formation of nurturance took place almost immediately and aggression was successfully repressed. Thus there are no conscious memories of hostility toward the younger children. Lake does remember, however, that he was excessively curious as a child, and it is possible the impairment of eyesight which was first noticed when he was about eight or nine was the resultant of guilt engendered by his voyeuristic tendencies, his observation of the primal scene or of his mother's body. The repression and projection of the need for cognizance (voyeurism) is plainly seen in Lake's boyhood sense of being spied on by his parents. This, the only criticism he ever had of them, he fought down as he undoubtedly fought down others.

> One of my observations during my adolescence was that my parents seemed almost over-interested, almost to the point of being suspicious. That was a contemptible thought and one that I found myself fighting, and fighting successfully, for I came to realize that my parents' interest in me was one for my general well-being and advancement. What made my particular fight against thinking my parents suspicious easier was the fact that they had the utmost faith in our honesty. And I believe that all of us have always tried to live up to this trust in us [1].

In connection with the fantasy of ripping open the mother's body it is interesting that a few years ago Lake decided to become a surgeon, but was finally deterred by realizing that he was disqualified by his eyesight and a tremor of his hand. As a crowning *coup de grace* Lake concocts a fantastic story of two American brothers, who, being converted to Nazism while interned in Germany, become pilots in the air force of the enemy and, returning on a mission to their native land, end by dropping bombs on their own home, which destroy it utterly.

What has been disclosed by the *TAT* are a few residual tendencies of childhood of which Lake is entirely unconscious. They belong to the inner layer of his personality and to the second level, since they influence his fantasies but not his behavior. There are no signs of aggressiveness in Lake's social attitudes. Indeed, it would be hard to find a more good-natured individual. Reading some of his more bizarre stories, one gets the impression of an imagination gone awry, as in hebephrenic schizophrenia; but his outer layer personality entirely contradicts so ominous a diagnosis. Ideomotor conductance—the readiness with which thoughts are translated into action—is evidently low in Lake's personality; but what bearing this has on his further development we cannot say.

In any event, the revelation of a buried antipathy to his mother does not change our appraisal of Lake's relationship to his parents. He is high both in his spontaneous and in his imperative sentiments towards mother and father. He is affectionate and respectful, and shares in large measure their assumptions and sentiments. The permanence of these feelings can be relied on. Most unusual is the absence of possessiveness and exploitation; Lake's parents are not using their son as an agent for upward motility, no obligation has been imposed on him to fulfill the thwarted ambitions of either one of them. The only thing that has not been indicated by the data is mutual enjoyment of intimate companionship. Lake's mother is a little "haughty," which suggests barriers to the free expression of private feelings; and as for doing things together, all we can say is that there is nothing on the record. We suspect constant reticence at home somewhat alleviated by distance, because Lake, speaking of his parents in far-off Kansas, says: "Although I have lived at home all my life until now, I feel that I have never known my parents as well until I came away to college. Now I feel closer to them than I have ever felt before."

10. *Subjects No. 2: Nack*

Nack writes that his father and mother "got along in perfect harmony. Though home changed often it was always happy wherever it was" [1]. Harmony prevailed, he tells us, despite the fact that "my mother is as different from my father as black is from white."

> She is weak and rather sickly, where he is big, strong, and healthy. She is dainty and neat, where he is happy when his desk is in heaps. Their ideas are different too. She loves music and art; he doesn't know what they mean. There is a difference, too, in their families. Mother's family read, sing, and play instruments; Father's work hard on the farm [1].

On the Aphorisms Test [13] Nack stands third, tied with Lake, in the rank order on sentiments ad *Family*. Only one other *S* (Hawk) is more extreme in denying that *The family circle provides fine examples of tyranny, injustice, selfishness, and hate*. In his autobiography and in interviews he presents a valid and convincing picture of enduring family support and mutual appreciation. His parents have always been interested in what he was doing and proud of his achievements, although recently they have been unable to follow him in his passion for abstract mathematics, and, as a result, he has grown away from them intellectually. Nack is next to the top of the rank order in his positive sentiments ad *Harvard Education, Studies and Scholarship, Mental Activity* and *Intellect, Theory*.

Nack's father, who was raised on a farm, is now a competent mechanical engineer. "He is a great big fellow, 200 pounds, and is pretty forceful. He is *definitely* energetic and masterful. He has been successful in all of his aims and spends all his time in business" [4]. Nack admires his father's strength, although at times he thinks he is too rough.

> Father always did the dangerous work on the farm himself. Golly, he would do anything. On the farm he was the boss of thirty or forty men. I used to wish that he wouldn't treat the horses and men so roughly. But he has a way with men, I swear. They work hard for him [4].

The supposition that such a man must have been a dominating figure to his son is confirmed by some of the adjectives which Nack gives for *Father*: "old, sedate, kind, bossy, directing, demonstrating, helping, working" [14]. On the Aphorisms Test [13] Nack stands fourth in the rank order in his positive sentiments ad *Father*. He says that he always felt affection and respect for his father and was pleased when people said that he looked like him, but that as a child he was never close to him.

> He didn't seem to know how to play with me. It was only later when we began to have things in common, common interests, that we became great pals [1].

It was the mutual enjoyment of Nature and of farm work which first brought father and son together [32]. Later they found a common interest in applied science. But the father was often away from home on business and when at home was generally so occupied with his own affairs that the boy saw very little of him. "Mother tells me that father is all wrapped up in me," Nacks says, "but you'd never know it." Largely because of this distance between son and father and the contrasting closeness of son and mother, it is the latter, not the former, who has had the greater influence in shaping Nack's sentiments and aims [4]. So intimate, indeed, is the mother-son relationship that the father, feeling excluded, sometimes complains that his wife gives too much attention to the boy [4]. The father is psychologically an outsider. Nack only remembers being punished once by his father, when he ran in front of a street car, but he can recall occasional harsh words.

> Father never punished. He used to pick on me a good deal in order not to show favoritism in front of the other men on the farm. Once he blew up with me. I spoke sharply in return, and gave him quite a shock. I think I hurt him. It made me feel a little bad afterwards. Not since [4].

This statement, "He used to pick on me a good deal," and the recollection of his father blowing up, proves that not only the farm hands and the animals were treated roughly but the son as well. Common suffering would account, better than any other factor, for Nack's emphatic identification with animals and also for his emphatic identification with his mother, since, as has been shown (see *Sentiments Towards War*), Nack received the impression that his great hulk of a father was not as gentle as he should be in his treatment of his sickly mother. As a result, we get a *TAT* fantasy (21) expressing the Rescue thema, just as one would expect.

> There is a castle on top of a cliff, maybe a princess in it. This fellow has been traveling along this long and dangerous pass to get at the princess. He probably wanted *to save her from the Prime Minister*. This is one of the ordeals they have to go through. The old dragon comes out and they have to cross a bridge where there is an inferno below, and probably the bridge will collapse. But the fellow will marry the princess and live happily ever after.

As a supplement to the evidence of unconscious hostility towards the father that has already been adduced (see *Sentiments Towards War*), we have a scene which Nack constructed for the Dramatic Production Test [26]: An old man insists on climbing a mountain peak while the younger men hang back. The rope breaks and the old man is caught on a ledge on the side of a precipitous cliff. Nack concludes his description of the scene with the statement, "I am trying to decide whether this young man will go to his rescue or not." Then, among other items, there is Nack's response to a *TAT* picture [21]:

> . . . it's a scrap between Achilles and the old fellow who, if he is lifted off the ground by Achilles, will lose his strength.

There can be little doubt that the father is an ambivalent figure to Nack. He evokes both positive and negative feelings, the former being more conscious and overt than the latter. The son's hostility belongs to the inner layer of his personality. It never intrudes to fracture the working relationship which has developed over the years. Nack respects his father, shares many of his interests, and enjoys his company.

Nack affirms with confidence and pride that he "holds first place" with his mother, that she cares more for him than for his father [4], and he does not hesitate to speak of his own preference for his mother. On the Aphorisms Test [13] he is second in the rank order in his sentiments ad *Mother*. He is the most emphatic of any *S* in denying that, *A mother's love is the excuse for a hundred petty tyrannies,* and only one other *S* (Hawk)

is more extreme than he in agreeing with the statement, *There is nothing that a woman will not sacrifice for her child.* He is equally positive in his sentiments ad *Older Women,* and believes strongly that *Older women are more understanding and companionable than younger ones.* The adjectives which he associates with *Mother* are, "good, old, young, pretty, beautiful, white-haired, soft-hearted, kind, lonely, hopeful" [14].

For his mother Nack has the deepest admiration and affection; in his eyes she is the ideal mother. He has accepted all her standards and tries to live by them. These were instilled into him not only by her example but also by the talks they had together [+]. Nack tries to emulate his mother's qualities of sympathy and understanding as well as her appreciation of beauty.

> I have always wanted to be like my mother in the nice way that she gets along with people. People come to her when things go wrong. She is such a nice person to talk to. Everybody loves her. All the small kids used to come in to see her. I have wanted to be like her too, in her enjoyment of music and art [+].

Nack's family is the most striking illustration that we can offer of the situation so common in America of the mother who cherishes the cultural values while the father is occupied with his business. By nature Nack has little aesthetic sensitivity but, because of his mother, he values it immensely and looks down on his father for his neglect of this important constituent of the good life. "My mother," he says, "has one great drive, always to be accomplishing something. She hates housework because it doesn't accomplish anything" [1].

> She has always wanted a career. As a child she studied music and art, later costume designing, which is what she does now. She wanted to be a doctor but got sick and couldn't go on with it [+].
>
> My mother has always sort of looked up to me, and has tried to push me on and help me [+].

From other evidence that we have it is clear that the mother hoped that her ambitions would be fulfilled in her son's career. He was poignantly aware of her frustration, and partly out of this came his decision to be a doctor.

It was his mother rather than his father who administered punishment, but "the punishment consisted mostly of her showing disapproval" [4].

> It was always easier to confess to mother. . . . She always told me no matter what it was I could tell her. So that's the way we ran things [+].
>
> My mother taught me that I could tell her anything, and that we would

> work out a solution to my problems together. It worked swell. It taught me to do what I thought was right at the moment, then go home and talk it over and I wouldn't get spanked [1].

Nack is a manly self-reliant fellow, but even today he occasionally feels impelled to discuss his troubles with his mother. "I might go home and squawk to Momma about something" [12]. He has found, for example, that when his temper is aroused he can get it under control by blowing off steam to some sympathetic listener.

Nack's resolution to become a doctor was to some extent a product of his sympathy for his mother in her periods of illness. "Ever since I was a kid, I wanted to be a doctor and fix her up" [9].

> I'd like to see what I could do to make her happy. But I don't know exactly what she wants, home or business. She always has wanted a home and my father hasn't given her one [4].

This obligation that he feels to take care of his mother is so strong that the event which he gives as having made the greatest impression on him as a child is one in which he greedily deprived her of a glass of milk.

> When I was a small child I once made some malted milk for my mother. She had to leave and I drank her portion. That may sound trivial, but never in my life have I felt so ashamed. She didn't say anything, and never chided me for it, but even now I get a terrible feeling inside me when I think of that incident [1].

This is an interesting reversal of the classical memory of being deprived by the parent.

The principal determinants of Nack's tenderness towards his mother—her illnesses, her operation in the hospital, the boy's observation of parental intercourse—these have already been listed and discussed. It seems that his intense need for Nurturance may be explained, partly as a superego reaction formation against his own sadistic inclinations and partly as an extraversion of his own self-pity (intranurturance) as a result of empathic identification with a fellow-sufferer. These two forces combined with the years of benefits and satisfactions enjoyed as direct consequences of his mother's admirable qualities have engendered an attachment that is as reverential and enduring as that of any subject examined at the Clinic.

The only slight criticism of his mother which Nack permits himself to make is that occasionally she is too demonstrative in her affections. "When I am leaving for college she'll get all worked up about it, though she holds her tears down." Nack has strong sentiments in favor of controlling his own emotions and only very rarely, we suppose, gives vent to *his* affection.

In response to the *TAT* picture of a young woman with her head against a man's shoulder Nack says,

> This is a young fellow and his mother whom he loves; they are looking back over the years. In a burst of emotion he comes up and hugs and kisses his mother.

The possibly softening effects of so tender a relationship have been offset by native vigor and a barely governable temper, a rough and tumble boyhood, the example of his father's forcefulness, plenty of hard work on the farm and a few memorable trips in the woods, running rapids and climbing mountains. Nack is high in his positive sentiments ad *Physical Activity* and *Athletics*. There is nothing in his history, as far as we can see, which suggests that his devoion to his mother has in any way impeded his development.

11. *Subject No. 1: Ingle*

Ingle's father and mother are unique individuals, each highly developed in a different mental function and in a distinctive social rôle, each to some extent a specialist in a separate field of endeavor, indeed in several fields; but amidst this diversity, such is their basic mutuality of feeling, they have created a unity—a harmonious family structure, flexible yet durable, which sustains and encourages their children. The family is a micro-democracy with a prevailing atmosphere of liberality that exemplifies both differentiation and integration to an unusual degree. Ingle appreciates his rare fortune.

> My family has been nothing if not cohesive. My father and mother are supremely happy together. His intellectual force and executive abillty oomplement her artistic intuitions and individuality. . Both huve a very wide range of interests both intellectual and artistic [1].

Ingle, a young man of boundless energy, of manifold curiosities and occupations, is quick to give his family credit, if not for initiating many of his interests, at least for making possible and fostering their pursuit. He thinks of them as opening doors not shutting them.

> Whether I was born with it or not, the sort of parents I have had has given me a richer background in many things than my friends [1].

The breadth of Ingle's horizon is in some measure the result of the traveling he has done in company with his parents.

> Our parents, my sister and I huve treasured memories of doing things together. Mother and Dad are both very experienced travelers, and we all have intense impressions of strange and fascinating people we have met on our travels [1].

Many young men on coming to college feel that they have moved from the restricted environment of their home into a larger and freer world, but not Ingle. Many of the courses he has taken at college produced in him a feeling of constriction rather than expansion.

> I believe that the state of mind I have gained from my parents is a pity for the narrow-minded specialist. I have acquired from them a special curiosity about fields of knowledge that sit astride the old fashioned scientific and philosophical disciplines [1].

His parents being intelligent and up-to-date, Ingle has not had the experience of developing beyond them, of finding their views too narrow to contain his own. No matter how radical his notions have been, his father and mother have never confronted them with rigid and dogmatic negations but with open-minded interest and rational discussion. Consequently he can say with truth: "I never woke up at 16 or 17 to consider myself in open revolt against my parents" [1].

His admiration for his parents has never been disturbed by the suspicion that they were hypocritical in their ethical instructions.

> Teaching in morality has always been by example. I see very few qualities of my parents, and these of the most minor nature, that I don't admire [1].

Ingle tells us that he has learned from his family "appreciation of co-operative life, solidarity of group living, working together, sharing responsibility" [18]. The adjectives which he gives for the word *Family* are, "omnipresent, universal, institutional, solid, enduring" [14]. In these responses we see Ingle, the sociologist; but "solid" and "enduring" are more appropriate to his own family than they are to the common run.

Now Ingle is an extraceptor who invariably intellectualizes his emotions and in responding to statements such as those that constitute our Aphorisms Test he, more than the average subject, is guided by objective facts or logical considerations. When he sees the word "Family," for example, he is more apt to think of what he has read in textbooks and magazines about the family as an American institution than he is of his personal experiences. Consequently we would be surprised if Ingle's reactions to formal tests did justice to the exceptional merits of his own parents. We find, objectivity notwithstanding, that he is among the first three subjects in the rank order on all items—*Father, Mother,* etc., except *Family,* and here he is in the middle, due to a strong "No" on one aphorism, *The security and elevation of the family are the prime objects of civilization and the ultimate ends of industry and trade.* One could hardly expect a Marxist, though half-reformed, to agree with this statement.

Except for Finch, who nourishes a distant mystical reverence for his father, Ingle is more enthusiastic than any of our subjects in his admiration for his male parent. The adjectives which he associates with the word Father are, "familial, divine" [14].

> I have envied my father his gifts, but we have always been very congenial, and I have never admired any other man more. We share a great number of interests. Intellectually I resemble him more than I do my mother. He is an excellent business executive. His range of friendship is perfectly enormous. He has great personal magnetism, enthusiasm, and character. His literary style, with its humor, charm, and simplicity, has always been my model. He is thoroughly at home in English literature and economics, and has taught me a little of his wide knowledge of nature study and plants [1].

Now, what Ingle enjoys as much as anything is arguing political and social issues with his father. We have been given no detailed account of these discussions; but we do know that the father is a staunch Republican and that the son has been a fervent Communist and more recently a convinced Socialist, being always further to the left than the New Deal. Ingle assures us that the debates with his father are never rancorous, that discussion is invariably maintained on an objective and rational level. One gets the picture of a serene and magnanimous parent listening to his son's flood-tide of radical conviction without losing for a moment his emotional aplomb, almost as if he were a psychoanalyst passively receptive to the most outrageous attacks upon his personal beliefs. Since Ingle himself has no talent for listening, being a veritable steam-roller in the way he flattens others with the heavy volume of his thought, this version must be in the main correct, if Ingle is truthful in saying that the debates are carried on without a tinge of anger or resentment. Is there any evidence that the son's vehement opposition to his father's ideology represents a displacement to the intellectual level of infantile hostility? If this were the case it would be easier to understand his passionate advocacy of antagonistic political views and his relish for these arguments with his father, each of which could serve as a partial catharsis, thoroughly enjoyed because unpunished. The father has permitted his son complete freedom of speech and, over the years, some sense of triumph, since his own political position has moved towards the democratic side, in the direction of his son's.

As a matter of fact, Ingle's *TAT* responses [21] are full of rebellious aggression. In 40 per cent of the stories the hero is either an out-and-out revolutionist or is militantly opposed to the political party that is in power. Conflict between parents and child is described in 30 per cent of the stories.

There are quarrels, wars, murders, and sudden deaths. No set of responses in our collections show so many repetitions of the thema of conflict between the two generations, the old and the young. In the Dramatic Production Test [26] Ingle creates the scene of a son in revolt against his father. The son is an agitator who leads a strike of workers in the firm of which the father is president. Finally the boy leaves his family and dies fighting in Spain. As an actual fact Ingle did want to fight with the Loyalists in the Spanish civil war but was dissuaded by his father.

The diagnosis of repressed aggression against the father typical of one side of the classical Oedipus complex also fits in with the castration complex inferred on the basis of the *TAT* findings and of certain facts in the childhood history. One *TAT* story may be cited as an illustration of what we have accepted as a sign of a deep-seated conflict between father and son.

> . . . the mother and father were people of very strong principles and very high standards . . . they finally had an only son . . . and they finally sent him away to school, a very strict Church school, and he became a terrific disappointment to them. He was very dissolute and very wild in his ways and he got mixed up with a radical group which his father disapproved of. His father was . . . a conservative and very, very set in his ways . . . (he) eventually died of disappointment. (The son) has this sort of obsession that his father is going to carry him off to Hell. . . . He not only has delirium tremens but all the rest of his miserable life he has this feeling that there is his father lurking behind the door, waiting *to tear him and tear him, and tear his soul away from his body* and draw him down to Hell.

There is not space here to present the whole array of supporting evidence, but it is sufficient, as we weigh it, to conclude that residual hostility against the father is still operating on the inner layer of Ingle's personality, and this tension gives a certain extra zest to his promotion of radical ideologies. On the conscious level his relationship with his father is stimulating and rewarding, probably better than it would be if there were no underlying negative sentiment. In this case, we would guess, the son's hostility has never been directed against the father as an individual personality but against the father as a Rôle standing between him and his mother, or between him and complete freedom.

On the Aphorisms Test [13] Ingle is tied for third place (with Grove) in his positive sentiments ad *Mother* and is first in his sentiments ad *Older Women*. The adjectives which he gives for *Mother* are "lovable, beloved, admirable, venerable" [14]. He is proud of his own mother, proud of her breadth of interests and her attainments.

> Mother had taken a degree at college and taught art in two colleges before her marriage. She knows a great deal about the history of art and has just written a book on hygiene in the tropics. She has bequeathed to me her interest in music as well as cooking [1].

Although we have detected a residual resentment against his mother for having left him for several months at one stage of his development, his love for her is deep and constant. He has always considered her a real companion.

> Hers is a very affectionate nature, and we have ever had the closest intimacy [1].

It appears that both parents took a part in disciplining their son, authority in the family being equally divided. At first they had their troubles for the boy was not easy to manage.

> I used to have temper tantrums when I was angry with my mother and was shut up in a closet as a punishment. On the advice of a pediatrician they took to spanking me when I was between seven and nine [12].
>
> When I was in the pre-school age I must have been a little hellion. My exasperated parents abandoned some of their scientific methods of child raising, and now and then whaled me. I doubt whether this gave me a neurosis. My mother has a very affectionate nature, and might easily have spoiled me if she had let her impulses overcome her good sense [1].

Ingle concludes with an impersonal judgment: "I doubt whether in the last analysis they made any serious mistakes in raising me" [1].

It would be difficult to find another family which combined to such a marked degree so many virtues. The parents have won and retained the trust and respect of their children but have never imposed an ideology. They have made of their home a democratic forum where the most diverse opinions are tolerated and discussed. Another exceptional feature is the amount of traveling they have done together, the number of unusual experiences they have shared. Because his parents have allowed, and even encouraged, a full measure of independence, Ingle has never felt the family bond as irksome, has never had reason to rebel. His history is striking also in the amount of praise and encouragement he has received from his parents and in the lack of rigid rules of behavior. The father and mother influenced their son mostly by affection and example; discipline was never capricious. There are no signs of family discord and, as far as we can see, these parents are outstanding in the harmony of their life together.

C. Summary and Conclusions

It is our impression that in the region of family relationships our subjects are about as representative of the American college population as any randomly selected group could be. At one extreme we have Ingle and his parents—it would be hard to find a better family structure (new style) than theirs—and at the other we have Couch with his absolute repudiation of both parents. To be sure, we have no broken homes. Statistics say that one out of every six or seven American marriages ends in divorce, but among our parents only Grove's father and mother have thought seriously of divorce. Family concord was relatively high. Also, all the parents are alive today, except Shea's father, who died only recently. And then we have no orphans and no delinquents in this group, although Yawl, who was once taken to a clinic as a behavior problem, might possibly qualify as a near delinquent. Finally, we have no neglected children. All of our parents are concerned in the welfare of their sons. But since only a small proportion of neglected or of delinquent children ever reach a university, we are inclined to think that these college men are fairly typical of the normal range, though possibly the High and Middle categories are more adequately represented than the Low. The average size of these families was 4.4, which is nearly typical for middle class urban families in their age range.

Only four (18 per cent) of the 22 parents were definitely disliked. The fathers of four (36 per cent) of the subjects (Ingle 1, Nack 2, Lake 3, Finch 4) were unambiguously liked and admired on the conscious level, although in two (Ingle 1, Nack 2) there were unmistakable evidences of deep (inner layer) infantile hostility. Four of the fathers were ambivalent objects, though mostly positive; and three were negatively cathected.

Of the mothers, four (36 per cent) were unambiguously loved and admired on the conscious level (Ingle 1, Nack 2, Lake 3, Grove 8), but there were detectable signs of some hostility in two (Ingle 1, Lake 3). The mother of one subject (Couch) was definitely disliked; the rest were ambivalent, though more strongly positive than negative. Here it is impossible to be categorical; so much depends on the rapport that is established. The average young man is more reluctant to criticize his mother than his father, and even when he makes a frank confession of his feelings it is not easy to judge their precise quality and intensity. Shea, with his Catholic scruples, was at pains to suppress any utterances that might be interpreted as disloyalty towards his mother; whereas Finch was a fountain of petty half-humorous complaints. The latter announced unprompted that he disliked his mother, but we did not take this statement very seriously after seeing

mother and son together and hearing the father's opinion that the son was, if anything, over-attached to his mother. Anyhow, each of these six men listed defects in their mother's character and complained of the way she attempted to control them.

In this group respect and affection for the father was a more reliable index of a satisfactory family relationship than respect and affection for the mother. The latter prevailed in two cases (Grove 8, Yawl 10) where the total family structure was disturbed by a good deal of father-son antagonism.

Most of the subjects were devoted to their parents not out of duty or piety but simply because their parents were sufficiently lovable or admirable to excite devotion. In only two subjects (Lake 3, Shea 9) did the moral precept, *Honor thy father and thy mother, carry much weight.* Finch's admiration for his father bordered on idolatry, as did Nack's and Grove's affection for their mothers. Ingle was unusually high in his estimation of both parents.

In this group the outstanding correlate of good family relations was the *admirability,* let us call it, of the parents. It is as if these subjects wanted parents whom they could respect even more than they wanted parents who were devoted to them. The fathers of our four top men, and the mothers of two of them, were still superior to their sons in most respects; whereas the remaining seven subjects in the rank order, with the possible exception of Grove, had already surpassed their fathers and mothers, intellectually, socially, and sometimes in strength of character. These men, for the most part, were looking for father-figures or examplars outside the family, their own fathers having taken them as far as they could along the road of their development. There were a few exceptions to this rule: Grove perceived that his father possessed certain virtues useful in his business—energy, concentration, optimism—and yet he hated him, because of his severity. Couch admitted that his father was admirable according to all middle class standards, but for this very reason he could not sympathize with his son's aims and so became an object of contempt.

Characteristic of most of these families was a pattern in which the father's opinion was decisive in settling the big issues that arose in the family but, since he was away most of the time occupied with his business and was seldom in a mood to institute disciplinary measures when at home, it was the mother whose power was felt close at hand day in and day out. By persistent efforts and relentless attention to details she had her way most of the time, the father holding what power he had in abeyance. In at least nine (82 per cent) of our subjects the mother not only did most of the punishing

but was more apt to use physical measures. Most of our fathers confined themselves to verbal punishments. The classical pattern set forth by Freud and other European analysts in which a tyrannical father towers over the son as a continuous threat of punishment standing between him and the hospitable arms of an ever cherishing mother does not approximate the conditions that actually prevailed in these families. It fits Grove's family and to some extent Nack's and Yawl's, although the fathers of the two last subjects practically never punished their sons.

There was no evidence of the prevailing importance of the Oedipus complex on the conscious level. Six (55 per cent) of the subjects consciously preferred their fathers. The Oedipus complex was overt in two subjects (Grove 8, Yawl 10) and covert in two (Ingle 1, Nack 2). The reversed Oedipus (love of the father and dislike of the mother) was clear in one (Finch 4). Covert residues of the Oedipus complex would doubtless have been found in others if our explorations had been pushed further, but in a culture where fathers have acquired maternal and mothers have acquired paternal tendencies there is less reason to expect the classical differentiation between father and mother and its dramatic consequences. Five of our subjects have found their fathers more sympathetic on the whole, as compared to three who received more understanding from their mothers.

In four cases the family pattern was that of a relatively passive tender-minded father who had been left behind in the economic competition that constitutes life in America for so many, spiritually ploughed under, in three cases, by the depression, and of a relatively energetic, dominant, and ambitious mother who had placed all her hopes for upward mobility in her son and consequently was driving him to ever greater exertions, in the belief that scholarship is the open avenue to success. This pattern has been well described by Mead in her *Keep Your Powder Dry* (14). Although there was a strong tendency for a mother of this type to show some contempt of her husband, as if saying to her son, "Now, don't be like your father," the son, in most cases, preferred the father. His affection, however, was tinged with pity and offset by reservations. York criticized his father for being impractical; Dunn complained that his father had been too passive, had taken his failure lying down. Shea lamented his father's moods of mute melancholy. Hawk had ceased to regard his father as an exemplar. The mothers, on the other hand, were criticized for their irrationality, their supervising overprotectiveness and their driving dominance, associated, as it was so often, with compulsive nagging.

In the choice of vocation the mother's influence was dominant. Only

one (Finch) of our subjects followed his father's example. Four were perhaps motivated to some extent by their fathers' interests; four (36 per cent) were influenced only negatively. Of the latter, three were resolved to avoid at all costs everything that reminded them of their fathers' point of view. On the other hand, four (35 per cent) of the subjects (Ingle 1, Nack 2, York 7, Grove 8) were specifically directed to their careers by their mother's occupation or predominant concern. Others (Lake 3, Hawk 5, Dunn 6, Yawl 10) were no doubt encouraged in choosing as they did; but two (Shea 9, Couch 11) seemed to have been governed only by their own aptitudes and inclinations.

Infantile complexes were apparently involved in the vocational choices of five or six of the men. Oral aggression in Ingle probably contributed a bias which led to dentition as the preferred field for research. The traumatic impression he received of his mother's suffering (sexual intercourse, surgical operation) had a good deal to do with inclining Nack towards medicine. Fantasies of cutting open his mother's body must have partially determined Lake's adolescent decision to be a surgeon. The interest in words manifested by Yawl and Couch seems to have been related to an oral complex, on the one hand, and their desire to become writers, on the other.

Four subjects were fair representatives of their parents' general attitude towards life. They were chips off the old block. In only two (Yawl 10, Couch 11) did we find an irreconcilable divergence between the two generations.

Conflict of dependence and autonomy was marked in five (45 per cent) of the subjects (Finch 4, Dunn 6, Grove 8, Couch 11). These men were still leaning on their parents and were superficially compliant, but inwardly they were in revolt and were waiting for the day of strength when they would do as they pleased regardless of their parents' wishes. Four of the subjects (Ingle 1, Nack 2, Lake 3, Shea 9) were not fighting their parents' discipline. Each had achieved self-reliance without the necessity of open revolt, the shift of authority having occurred so naturally and gradually that no break had occurred in the continuity of family relations. Shea, to be sure, chafed under his mother's iron ambition but he had never considered the possibility of defying her. Yawl had staged one rebellion after another and had largely extricated himself from the web of parental sovereignty; whereas Hawk had gradually become separated from his family as their fortunes had fallen and his had risen.

An imagined press of Rejection was found in the childhood history of five of our subjects (Dunn 6, York 7, Grove 8, Shea 9, Yawl 10). Couch,

an only child, did not feel rejected, but he felt that his parents could not appreciate his rare gifts.

According to our findings the three students with the *best* family relationships are characterized by the following variables: they are *low* in Basic Anxiety, Feelings of Insecurity, Inferiority Feelings, and Dejection with Pessimism. Conspicuously absent in their past histories are: Parental Discord, Capricious Discipline, Overprotection, Neurotic Symptoms. They are *low in imaginal press Insupport and press Deprivation; that is, they do not* anticipate being left to shift for themselves in an unstructured world or being deprived of their just deserts. The repressed need for Succorance (covert dependence) is low. Cathexis of the Mother is high and Mother Conflict low. One unpredictable finding is that in these subjects the infantile Mutilation Complex (fantasies of being cut, dismembered, disfigured) is high. This last is probably a residue of the Oedipus complex. All the other findings are common concomitants of family solidarity, often both causes and effects; they do not require comment.

The three subjects with the *least* satisfactory family relationships are among the four *highest* on the following variables: Emotionality, Narcism (egocentricity), *n* Rejection (contempt, tendency to repudiate and exclude), *n* Defendance (tendency to excuse and justify self), *n* Autonomy (independence and resistance to authority), *n* (verbal) Aggression (anger, tendency to engage in verbal arguments, to belittle, blame, criticize and curse others), Inferiority Feelings and Endocathection (preoccupation with feelings or ideas, high valuation of inner world of thought). This gives us the outline of a proud egotist with an inner life and some generalized resentment bred by painful feelings of inferiority. Childhood history is marked by Temper Tantrums. These subjects are highest in their sentiments ad Individuality and in Conflict of Sentiments. Of their inhibited needs the Cognizance drive (voyeurism) is outstanding. The press of Alien Objects (apperceiving others as being very different from the self, psychologically remote if not hostile) is also prominent. The men agree in having more ability than the average in the Observation of Detail, but there is probably no significance in this.

These subjects with poor family relationships are low in need for Deference (coöperation), and the need for Nurturance (pity, sympathy, helpfulness). In childhood, Parental Encouragement was below average. At present *their sentiments ad Lower Dog (underprivileged) and ad Humanitarianism* are low.

It is hard to judge here which is cause and which is effect. One might

say that lack of Parental Encouragement led to Inferiority Feelings and self-encouragement (Narcism) as a necessary compensation, and from this core of intraverted egocentricity and pride the other traits naturally developed: hypersensitiveness, irritability, emphasis upon individuality, the hypothesis that all the world is alien, scorn with lack of respect and lack of compassion for others. Or, contrariwise, one might say that a youth with this personality could scarcely establish a satisfactory relationship with anyone, even with his parents. From the start, perhaps, he was a nervous difficult child, prone to temper tantrums, and although the parents did their best to encourage him, his hunger for attention and applause was boundless. Consequently, although he actually received more encouragement than most children he tells us now that he received very little since he was never satisfied.

The commonest error of the mothers of our subjects is that of regarding their sons as agents of their own importunate urge for upward mobility, an urge that is often shot through with materialism and a vulgar concern for external symbols of success. This is enough to make some young men forever incapable of appreciating real worth when they see it.

VII. SENTIMENTS TOWARDS SEX

A. Introduction

The case histories reported in this chapter are no more than brief summaries of a large bulk of collected material pertaining to the sex development of our 11 subjects.

In studying these men as individuals, we included in our survey the whole gamut of possible sentiments in the sphere of sex, taking account of fantasies as well as acts of deviate patterns of activity as well as the normal pattern, of the cathexis of young men as well as the cathexis of young women. But in rank ordering our subjects according to strength of sentiment, we did not distinguish types; we considered only the intensity and frequency of erotic feelings and behavior, regardless of the preferred pattern of activity and the nature of the desired object.

We took into account the incidence of: (*a*) Pre-pubertal and pubertal activity—curiosity and explorations in the realm of sex, playing "doctor" and "post-office," voyeurism and exhibitionism. (*b*) Masturbation—age at which this practice was begun, periodicity, guilt feelings, and conflict. (*c*) Affectionate interpersonal relationships marked by an unmistakable accent of erotic feeling, regardless of whether the object was a boy or a girl. (*d*) Physical relations—anything from promiscuous intercourse to a love affair of some duration—with a male or female. (*e*) Mental preoccupation with the topic of sex—fantasies, speculation, reading. (*f*) Overtly expressed opinions favorable to sex activity, to women, to marriage.

Since none of the subjects was married, the only form of physical sexuality that conforms to ideal cultural patterns was not included in making our calculations. This is a fact which should be borne in mind when reading the following case histories.

B. The Subjects

1. *Subject No. 11: Nack*

In the Aphorisms Test [13] Nack shows that he has highly positive sentiments toward Marriage. He is one of two subjects who respond "Yes" to the statement, *A man should keep himself pure for his future wife.* However, he thinks of Necking as "pleasant, dangerous, controlled, desirable," and of Sexual Intercourse as "common, pleasant, exciting, desirable, nightly" [14]. These responses suggest that neurotic inhibitions are not at the bottom of his sentiments in favor of abstinence. Although sex is desirable and exciting, he believes in self-control.

Nack gives himself a rating of *2* on Focal Sexuality but thinks that it should ideally be *4*. The fact that he has never been in love perhaps accounts for this low mark, as he has shown himself capable of focalization in other realms. He gives himself *1* for Sexual Promiscuity and is satisfied that this is the ideal [34].

Characteristic of Nack are the reasons which he brings forward against Free Love:

> The woman will get a raw deal, the morality will go down, and there is no particular desire for it. The women couldn't take care of herself and the child. The woman couldn't take care of herself before the child is born and afterwards [37].

This emphasis on the woman's inability to take care of herself suggests that Nack has a nurturant feeling towards woman and a belief that she should be protected. Underlying this belief lies a Rescue fantasy originating in the Oedipus situation which is openly revealed in a *TAT* story of a young man who rescues a princess from an evil Prime Minister.

That Nack fantasies himself as dominant in relation to women, judging them as frail both in body and will, is manifest in several of his *TAT* stories. None of his women characters have the power to sway man from his purpose. Not even the mother whom the hero deeply loves can dissuade him from marrying the girl of his choice.

Of his sexual development Nack says,

> My sex life has been very uneventful. When very small, 5 or 6, I became curious about little girls, but this curiosity soon passed. Later, about the seventh or eighth grade, I became curious about the anatomy of older women and was not averse to peeping. I got no sex training from home. Most of it I got on the streets, and the rest on the farm, which didn't leave much to the imagination. I got more of a practical nature when I was on the summer cruises with the navy. Masturbation started when I was fifteen. The year I went to college my mother took me aside, but she found that I probably knew more than she did [1].

Besides his strong mother cathexis, an important factor in determining Nack's sentiments is his having witnessed the primal scene as a child, this trauma being further accentuated by the mother's subsequent illness, which he believed was the result of maltreatment by the father. One outcome of this shock was the development of a strong *n* Nurturance as reaction formation to his own aggressive impulses. He has, however, been able to identify himself sufficiently with his father to have achieved a definite masculine attitude.

Nack has been placed at the bottom of the rank order because he gives no history of early pubertal activity, because he has never gone out with girls, because he has never had sexual intercourse, and because he is very little preoccupied with sexual thoughts. The whole matter has been postponed until the day when he is able to get married and he meets his ideal.

2. *Subject No. 10: York*

York has few tensions and little anxiety. He is able to relegate his sexuality to an unimportant place in his life, which is due, not to repression, but to a low sex drive and to low emotionality in general. He has no idealism about women. Not for him the wonder of love or the compelling charm of woman. In his responses to the *TAT* there is a marked absence of stories dealing with erotic love. When speaking of women, he is given to cynicism and wisecracking. He does not trust them far and feels that they are trouble-makers [32]. He believes that, *To show any woman reverence is extremely ridiculous,* and he marks as negative the aphorism, *No man can attain to wisdom or understanding without the aid of a woman* [13]. In these responses he and one other subject are the most extreme for the group.

York has such firm ego structure that sexuality is never out of control and he is able to take on an affair or break it off at will. His sentiments, however, are against this tendency in himself. He rates himself *2* on Focal Sexuality but believes that for the ideal man it should be *5*.

> Love is a strange thing with me. Besides being 75 per cent physical or more, I seem to be able to decide with whom I shall fall in love, because I take on and drop an affair with equal facility. About five girls have been the objects of my affection until now. They have run the gamut from a Jewess to a minister's daughter. I can always break it off if it gets too unpleasant without much pain [1].

York thinks it strange that he can so easily terminate an affair and that his erotic feelings are controllable—"you can stop all along the way whenever you want" [12]. He admits that he is terribly disappointed after all that he has read about love. He doesn't find kissing "terribly exciting but the girls do, so I keep it up"; and he describes his single experience with intercourse in the same fashion. He tells us that in his relations with girls he is always "very egotistical" [14]. York's ambitiousness, his *n* Achievement, and his *n* Recognition are so insistent that he is disinclined to give himself to a woman, to lose himself in love.

York wants his wife to be "physically attractive but not too intelligent, not the same education as me" [14]. This frank admission that he prefers

to marry someone who is mentally inferior to himself is unusual for a college man and shows how little psychological need he has of woman and also how fearful he is of being dominated by a woman. He says that his "greatest aversion is woman taking over men's jobs and wearing slacks" [14].

York is in favor of marriage as a "necessary social convention" [1], and is against Free Love because it "disrupts family life and the general codes of everything" [37], but he also thinks of marriage as a hindrance to his ambition, believing more strongly than any subject that, *A man who has a wife and children has given hostages to fortune; for they are a great impediment to great enterprises* [13].

York seems to have experienced no difficulties in his sexual development.

> My family has always been understanding and helpful about sex, to the extent that sometimes the neighbors were shocked by what their children learned from us. No shock accompanied the imparting of any of this information since it was given at an early enough time to forestall any false conceptions [1].

The main determinants of this subject's sentiments are to be found in the family constellation. His basic cynicism and distrust of women appear to have originated in his negative cathection of his dominant mother, while his mother's ambition for him and his father's inferior rôle, both socially and within the family, have been instrumental in the creation of such a strong *n* Achievement and Ego Ideal that sexuality is outbalanced. The early and satisfactory sexual instruction that he received from his parents served to quiet his curiosity.

3. *Subject No. 9: Shea*

Having an objective, extraceptive, scientific mind, Shea is both ignorant and suspicious of the deeper sources from which his currents run; he relies on will power and stern repression to rule all wayward impulses and desires out of his life.

> A man should master his will. That's one of my most treasured things,—to have the mind and will supreme. It's a partially accomplished ambition. The most obvious way it manifests itself is that I feel perfectly in control of sexual impulses. I work that out fine. Before I go somewhere, I allow myself just so much, and thus I don't offend myself [18].

He is content to rest in the Jesuit teachings of sexual morality and values. These matters, he believes, have been settled once and for all. And so when we examine Shea's sentiments ad sex as revealed in the Aphorisms Test

[13], we are not surprised to find that they faithfully reflect the teachings of the Church. He is strongly against sexual experience outside of marriage, and with one other subject is the most positive in affirming that, *Sexual relations are not infrequently the death of spiritual aspiration.*

Shea is strict with himself and acts upon the sentiments which he professes. He has never experienced sexual intercourse, disapproving of it from the religious point of view. Having a strong objection to masturbation, he practices it only very rarely. The only word which he associates with sexual intercourse is "necessary." Necking seems to be permitted by his strict moral code, for he gives as response to this word, "spasmodic, all right if you can get it" [14]. However in spite of the fact that this explicitly permissible, he says that "emotions of anxiety and ebulition have followed such experiences," which shows that even this much freedom arouses some feeling of guilt.

Shea has a great curiosity about sexual matters, which he believes is the reason why he wished to concentrate in the biological sciences. In spite of his sexual curiosity, he says that his greatest aversion is "a public display of sex" [14]. This can probably be explained by the fact that his own rigid repressions lead him to resent any free expression in others. He does, however, confess to an interest in the female body if this interest is strictly on an aesthetic level.

> I have always had a good appreciation of the nude. I have always been convinced of the great beauty of the female body, especially delicately formed feet, almost to the point of a mild foot fetish [1].

He quickly regretted this admission, however, saying that his autobiography was colored by the mood of the moment, and he urged the examiner not to take seriously his "foolish remarks about a foot fetish" [12]. Whether this complex is actually alive in him or not we have no way of knowing. But with such strong repressive forces at work in his personality it is certainly a possibility. He is high on striction and in his intellection he exhibits a marked emphasis on detail and on inability to organize wholes.

Shea's furious ego drive, coupled with his rigid repressions, has led to a poverty of emotional and imaginal development. His sex fantasies are largely repressed through an undue degree of sex guilt. His *TAT* stories are distinguished by their lack of any erotic themes. He dislikes to talk about this aspect of life and attempts to turn away any questions with such statements as "My gonad tension is low today and I am not interested in love" [15]. No romantic or idealistic imagery about woman has been built up, and he tends to regard woman as an inferior being. He is one of the two

subjects who affirm most positively that, *"Most women are inconstant, variable, and cruel, and lack the spirit of counsel"* [13].

He is cynical and pessimistic about marriage. He strongly believes that, *Wife and children are a great impediment to great enterprises,* and that, *Marriage is a sacrament by virtue of which each imparts nothing but vexations to the other,* and he is the only subject to mark as negative the aphorism, *A successful marriage is more to be admired than the greatest business success* [13].

Shea's autobiography, evasive as it is about his sexual development, conveys an impression of a dull and dreary childhood unillumined by love and happy memories. He rejected not only his own fantasies but all the stories that fascinate most children, preferring to spend his time fixing things around the house. No romances of love or shining deeds wrought their magic for him. This original dislike of the imaginative world was further aggravated by the fear of becoming somewhat unbalanced like his father. In short, Shea's psychosexual development has been warped by lack of love and security in his youth, by the repressions demanded by his upbringing and schooling, by his rejection of the imaginative life, and by the asceticism dictated by the necessity for great achievement.

4. *Subject No. 8: Lake*

In his autobiography Lake writes, "The problems which have commanded my greatest interest in recent years deal with morals—sex and drinking." In his sentiments ad sexual experience before marriage we find a peculiar contradiction. He condemns it more strongly than any of our subjects in three of his responses and yet he responds with a "No, 2" to the aphorism, *Any man who respects his mother and sister will try to keep himself pure for his future wife,* and he believes that, *Providing he does it quietly and hurts no one, a man is justified in enjoying sexual liberty.* When asked what his views are on this subject Lake answers,

> I have a vague feeling that it is wrong. It is one thing that I am uncertain about. So much has been written against it that is illogical —a propaganda campaign. I am not sure anything I have read is true. But I think it is wrong [18].

In High School Lake had one experience of sexual intercourse which left him with a feeling of shame and regret. In his response to the two aphorisms quoted above he is perhaps trying to achieve a more liberal point of view which would make this experience less regrettable in his own eyes. He has tried to adopt the attitude of his classmates, to believe with them that what

is written against sexual freedom can be dismissed as illogical, and yet it is clear that certain deep feelings militate against the full acceptance of these views. He is shy in discussing sex problems, and apt to be shocked by the sex behavior of others. In his stories for the *TAT* all love or sexual relationships, if illegal, end in unhappiness and punishment.

Although Lake is interested in dates, in kissing, in being acceptable to girls, he says that he avoids "circumstances which give rise to erotic excitement" [12]. He thinks of necking as "absurd, desirous, ridiculous," and of sexual intercourse as "desirous, sacred" [14]. Having fallen from grace once, Lake is going to be careful that it does not happen again, and though both may be desirous, he can be relatively safe if he can think of necking as ridiculous and intercourse as sacred. His concern over the question of drinking is also related to this, as he feels that his own unfortunate experience was due to drink, "which has a way of making wrong things appear right" [1]. He believes now that all liquor should be forbidden to high school students.

In the *TAT* stories the Lakian hero is a great defender of womanhood. This thema appears in eight stories out of twenty. With one other subject, Lake is the most extreme in not believing that, *To show any woman reverence is extremely ridiculous* [13]. He says that his standards for a girl are "idealistic" [1]. "For me to like a girl she has to have a high moral code, good taste, courtesy, cleanliness, and understanding" [12]. With his strong sex guilt, he tends to blame the woman for any lapse of virtue on man's part. It is the woman, he feels, who should be responsible for a high plane of sexual morality and lift the man up to her level. In the argument on conventional morality vs. experimentation in the Argument Completion Test [15], Lake leaves us in no doubt as to which side he is on.

> Fortunately *X* is a sensible girl. She comes from a good family and has a high idea of the sacredness of marriage She has a high moral code and standards which have been given to her by her able parents. So she says that he must marry her or it is all off.

Of the development of his sex knowledge Lake writes,

> As long as I can remember I've known that a baby was conceived in the mother. My mother told us this quite naturally. Sexual intercourse and conception didn't enter my head in the same thought. Dirty jokes in a crowd of boys were the source of my early information in the former. When I was twelve one of my friends gave me the explanation of conception. His talk was filthy and degrading to me and I wanted to forget it.
>
> When I was fourteen I realized the amount of sex that went into

> marriage. It was a great shock to me to find contraceptives in my aunt's bureau drawer. Fortunately the whole thing as it went through my mind related solely to my aunt and uncle. When my thoughts passed to my parents I had reasoned things out into a natural state [1].

In spite of his statement that "he had reasoned things out into a natural state," realization of his parents' sex activity was a great shock to him. There are nine stories in Lake's *TAT* in which occur collisions or encounters which might be taken as symbolic of aggressive intercourse. The hypothesis that in his youth Lake oversaw sexual relations was later confirmed in the course of an interview. This experience, we suppose, had a traumatic effect which is still influencing his attitude toward sex.

Not only in college but also in high school Lake's sentiments were not those of his contemporaries.

> Our crowd used to talk about girls in no mild terms. I don't think I enjoyed it much. My friends tore around with fast girls but I preferred to be seen with girls who commanded more local respect due to their family background. But I doubt that these girls were any better or any worse morally than the fast girls [1].

This touch of skepticism is undoubtedly a recent acquisition.

> Shortly before graduation I let myself be persuaded that premarital relations were O.K. I took out a girl who was known never to refuse. My reactions were shame for myself and for the girl. I never had a date with her again because all my respect for her had disappeared [1].

Many of Lake's fantasies as revealed in the *TAT* are full of bizarre deviate cruelty rather than of outspoken sexual desire. Corpses are mutilated, bodies torn open. There is a trunk murder and a Caesarian operation. Not infrequently such themes are derived from early fantasies of sadistic ingression into, and exploration of the mother's body. There is no reason to suppose, however, from what we know of Lake that these imaginings are other than isolated residua of his early development which are not actively influencing his sexuality at the present time.

5. *Subjects No. 7: Hawk*

Hawk's avowed sentiments are definitely pro Sex. Indeed, he is the most positive of any of our subjects on the aphorisms which favor sexual gratification. But his behavior has been consistently at variance with the opinions he professes, a fact which Hawk himself concedes when he gives himself the low mark of *1* on need Sex (Diffuse) and raises it to a *4* for the ideal man (34). In his autobiography he writes,

> I am sure I would hesitate to have sexual intercourse for a long time, being deterred by fear of disease, and of accidently bringing a child into the world. I have never indulged in sexual intercourse [1].

Hawk thinks of sexual intercourse as "unrespectable, sensual, unavoidable, sensual" [14], admits that it is still somewhat repulsive to him although this feeling is changing. He describes one of his finger paintings as "the conflict between spirit and flesh fighting together for man who is in the middle." These responses suggest that sexuality was once associated with a feeling of shame and indecency and that it has not yet fused with love.

Hawk's attitude toward marriage is ambivalent. He regards it as "respectable" and as "a happy prospect to be looked forward to," but he thinks of it also as a bondage which will interfere with the freedom which he so cherishes. He is the only subject who believes that, *Marriage is a sacrament by virtue of which each imparts nothing but vexations to the other* [13], and he writes,

> It would not surprise me if I were to marry late, because I have always regarded family ties as a terrific handicap to satisfaction of all youthful experiences which belong to a young man, such as travel and adventure [1].

Since press Claustrum, and the themes of marital infidelity on the part of the hero and of insane unfounded jealousy occur as prominent features in Hawk's *TAT* stories, we may venture the prediction that he will find the restraints of marriage difficult to endure and projecting his own desires onto his wife, jealousy may well become a real problem for him.

When we consider Hawk's sentiments towards women and erotic love, we again find contradictions. Though he believes that, *Most women are inconstant, variable, and cruel,* no other subject is so certain as Hawk that, *No man can attain to wisdom or understanding without the aid of a woman* [13]. He says that since he was thirteen he has always had a succession of girls. Each of these affairs, lasting about a year and a half, settled into an unexciting companionship which he ceased to value and so found easy to terminate, regretting the time, which he counted wasted. In spite of this, he gives himself the highest mark for Focal Sexuality [34]. Much of Hawk's sexual fantasy has been repressed, not only through guilt, but also through a strong negative cathexis for the irreal and the irrational. It is his inability to project the repressed sexual fantasies of the deeper layers of his personality which makes his affairs with girls so unrewarding to him.

Hawk is at present contemplating marriage. "I have never been in love until now," he says, "but even now there is a great question as to whether

I know what love is and if I have actually found it" [1]. "The whole subject of sex," he confesses, "has always been a baffling one to me" [1].

There is nothing unusual in Hawk's sex history other than the fact that he stopped masturbation completely after being told by a friend that it would lead to insanity and sterility. He himself attributes his lack of romantic feelings toward girls to the fact that he was put on his own so early and had so much responsibility that he had no chance to develop the poetic side of life.

The truth is that Hawk is so narcistically preoccupied with his own personal ambition that he is incapable at present of giving himself wholeheartedly to anything but this.

6. *Subject No. 6: Dunn*

Dunn's responses are pallid and lacking in intensity, as though he were distrustful of his own nature. He seems to be aware of this insufficiency of affect in his personality as he says that his "greatest desire is to be able to feel things deeply" [32]. In the Aphorisms Test [13] he gives the lowest possible mark to all but two of the statements, half of which are positive and half negative. The balance is slightly in favor of Sex in General, Sexual Experience, Marriage, and Erotic Love.

Dunn says, "Sex experience has never been revolting to me although it has been fraught with both anxiety and at times remorse" [1] . The adjectives which he associates with Sexual Intercourse are "essential, not repugnant, uncommon" [14]. Why does he think of the words "revolting" and "repugnant" in connection with sex and then deny their application? Probably because he has *felt* that sex was revolting but now *thinks*, on rational grounds, that it is not. The presence of a purity complex is quite probable, for in the Harmavoidance Test [29], when at the conclusion he is asked to give all the obscene pornographic words that he can remember in two minutes, he is the only subject who is unable to give even one. In the *TAT* he has a decided sex shock when given the Picasso picture of the nude man and woman, saying that it violates his prejudices to have the man and woman stand there in such a way and that he cannot make up any story about them.

Consciously, however, Dunn thinks of himself as being broadminded and without any scruples about sex. He does not want to be considered an unsophisticated puritan.

> The other fellows spend a lot of time ramming around Boston, but that doesn't appeal to me for some reason or other. Not ethics, but

> expense. Not that I think there is anything wrong with it. There are things that I would rather do [33].

In the *TAT* stories, the world is set forth as a place devoid of enduring affection. Friendship and love are short-lived and disenchanting, nothing lasts. An underlying tone of depreciation or dejection permeates almost everything Dunn has to say about erotic love.

> If I thought and I generally didn't, that I was in love, three months usually disillusioned me [1].
>
> I do not ever expect to find the "perfect mate" nor will I ever believe anyone who calls me the same [1].

The theme of two of Dunn's *TAT* stories is that of the conflict of mother and son over a girl.

> The mother plans to use his own weaknesses against him. She knows that he is a boy of constantly changing tastes and that given enough of anything he tires of it, so she invites him to bring the girl to live with them. . . . The genius of her strategy was that his own nature tended to defeat the ends that he sought.

The ends that he sought were those of love and marriage. With Dunn it is not so much a matter of being defeated by his own changing tastes as it is an extreme susceptibility to disillusionment. In the Behavioral Questionnaire [34], he rates himself slightly above average, 3, on Focal Sexuality and feels that this is the right mark for the ideal man. And he rates himself very low, *1*, on Promiscuous Sexuality, dropping it even lower for the ideal man. Thus the frustration of his love is probably not due to sexual variability, but rather to the fact that when he approaches the point of infatuation, the anxiety connected with some early trauma becomes activated and he withdraws his love, fearing disillusionment or rejection. The fact that Dunn, according to his own statement, has never quarreled with any girl is an indication not only of his inability to express his aggression but also of his unwillingness to become emotionally involved. In his *TAT* stories we find a complete absence of need and press Aggression, a characteristic which distinguishes Dunn from all our other subjects.

Dunn asserts that his attitude toward marriage is "normal."

> I shall value it, I anticipate it, if not eagerly at least hopefully.

Dunn's response to the aphorism, *Nothing has higher claims to a man's full powers than marriage,* is "No, 2." This is one of the only two aphorisms to which Dunn gives other than the minimum mark. It is clear that although

he has the conventional sentiments in favor of marriage, he is not going to idealize its possibilities.

Dunn does not yet think of woman as the erotic complement to man, psychologically or even physically.

> My erotic fantasies are few and not too clear. My reveries of an ideal mate frequently seem upon analysis to be feminine counterparts of my own interests and ego [1].
>
> Generally the girl I picked was a fair athlete, rather tall and slight and a good conversationalist [1].

There is a perfect illustration of narcistic love choice, since Dunn himself, who is tall and slight, is an excellent conversationalist and has quite a record as an athlete.

Dunn tells us that:

> Sex training for me has always been rather well handled. When my curiosity about childbirth became articulate my parents answered many of my inquiries honestly and frankly [1].
>
> My mother conditioned my thinking, by idealizing certain patterns of conduct. As I grew up my mother had a great deal to do with the way I felt about asserting myself—this business about sex for instance [14].

His mother idealized sex. In his autobiography he writes:

> At fourteen years I became aware of my inability to lead an idealized life [1].

Dunn does not elaborate this last statement but in another part of his autobiography he tells us that "masturbation came into my life when I was fourteen." Although he does not point out the connection between these two statements, it is apparent that the act of masturbation engendered feelings of strong self-contempt.

Disgust associated with sexuality is often a sign that the drive has become associated in infancy with the excretory function, and in this case there are reasons to believe that this is true. Dunn's mother was extremely concerned about her children's defecations; for several years she kept a detailed record of their bowel movements. She also had what amounts to a compulsion in respect to germs and dirt. She was scrupulously neat and orderly; and her son manifests these same traits today to a marked degree. Striction and protectivity are unusually high, and his mental conflicts have an almost obsessional character. A slight purity complex would account for his insistence that sex is "not repugnant," but, taken alone, it is not sufficient

to explain his underlying mood of melancholy and his tendency to blame the world for failing to act in an ideal way.

In one *TAT* story he says:

> A man has heard rumors about his girl and tells her that he is through. She tries to persuade him to believe in her. . . . He will go away for a time, but then comes back having rationalized the situation. To the extent that it doesn't seem so important as it once did.

Two years ago the girl with whom Dunn was in love confessed to him that she had once had intercourse with another man. This was a profound shock and disillusionment to him and gave him the embittering expectation that love invariably ends in disappointment, that nothing endures, that the myth of an "ideal mate" is a snare and a delusion. His purity complex would explain his revulsion at the thought of the beloved woman's sensuality. Like the hero in his story, Dunn has tried to rationalize the situation "to the extent that it doesn't seem so important as it once did," but his heart is dead. Our first guess, of course, would be that Dunn was once profoundly shocked on seeing or hearing about parental intercourse though today he explicitly denies feeling any revulsion when this information was imparted to him. Another possibility is the birth of his younger brother, an event which might have given him an indelible impression, though now forgotten, of his mother's unfaithfulness.

As further explanation of his present paralysis of emotion, we would propose the hypothesis that the result of this early insult to his dependent and all-trusting love, as well as to his pride, was a fixed ambitendency, an Othello-like hate fused with disappointed love, the two, in a sense, being bound together as a unit. Thus, since hate must always be repressed, love is imprisoned. It comes out only as a rather weak impulse, bringing in its train the anticipation of another disillusionment. The aggression manifests itself indirectly as blaming, scorn, and skepticism.

As it happened, despite all these interferences—some deep, some superficial—in his character, Dunn has actually come nearer to the point of marriage than any of our subjects.

7. *Subject No. 5: Grove*

Grove's sentiments ad sex are fluid and unformulated. His nature is predominantly passive as though he were waiting to let experience work upon him. Having a strong feminine component in his nature, he is sympathetic to girls, enjoys their society, and drifts along in and out of warm attachments. One of his outstanding responses is the extreme negative

mark which he, with one other subject, gives for the aphorism, *Most women are inconstant, variable, cruel, and lack the spirit of counsel* [13]. Grove says that he has "never been truly in love, but there have been several infatuations" [1]. His attachments are transient; he cannot tolerate sameness, monotony, or prolonged effort. This is true of his general attitude, as well as of his attitude towards sexuality.

In his autobiography Grove writes:

> I have thus far failed to find a girl who has all the qualities that I think a woman should have. When I glance over these desired qualities I see that they are characteristics which I see in my mother. (Oedipus Complex) [1].

Grove's insight is entirely valid. His strong mother attachment, combined with his fear of insupport, has made it impossible for him to sever the "silver cord." His energies are still locked up in the early Oedipus conflict, and he has not yet been able to free them. For this reason woman holds for him something of the quality of backward longing, the return to the mother, the womb, death. He tells us that his thoughts often turn to death [1], and one of the *TAT* stories which he gives is that of a man who goes to the graveyard to talk to the dead. A young girl answers him from the grave and asks him to join her. The apparition of the young girl rising out of the tomb so overcomes him that he dies. As a child, Grove says, his favorite book was *The Black Arrow*, and his favorite incident in it that of the hero getting off his horse to embrace his love as she dies [2].

Grove believes that he is quite broadminded about premarital sex experience. In the Aphorisms Test [13] he is on the positive side. He says:

> I never condemn it. It's not my business. As far as I myself go, I'd have to be pretty positive of the girl and she would have to be pretty sure of me. I have no strong scruples about fornication, but illegitimate children—*that* would deter me [13].

When Grove says that he has "no strong feelings about fornication," he is expressing a very recent attitude. In his autobiography he writes:

> For a long time I felt that intercourse was something course and animalistic which truly civilized people should frown upon. In fact I wrote a paper vouching for this point of view in my freshman year. During the last two years this attitude has practically disappeared, and now I look upon sexual intercourse as something completely normal and far from ugly [1].

In another statement, however, he makes it clear that he is not quite free of his initial aversion.

> I used to have an antipathy for intercourse. I thought it animalistic, below the human race. That idea is now toned down quite a bit. I have more common sense. What the heck if there is something animalistic about it [18].

Grove thinks that his feelings of disgust with sexuality derive from "a traumatic experience of intercourse with a cheap girl when I was in High School. After this experience I was utterly revolted, wasn't able to eat or sleep normally for three days and lost eight pounds" [1]. This passing experience would not have produced such a strong reaction had not the ground been well prepared.

> When at the age of ten I learned about sexual matters from the other children in the neighborhood I was especially perturbed to learn that sexual intercourse was necessary in order to have a child. I found it hard to realize that I myself was the result of such a union which I considered filthy. I still hate to think that my parents indulge in such an act [1].

Grove's parents did not get along together; they quarreled frequently. In the son's eyes the father was a coarse and terrifying brute and the mother the incarnation of virtue. Unable to overcome his early Oedipus conflict, incapable of identifying himself with his father, brimming with idealistic love for his mother, Grove could scarcely act otherwise than as he did. He desperately needed to believe that his mother was above such animality. When he himself gave way to temptation we suppose that the degrading act not only aroused in him unconscious feelings of guilt connected with his love for his mother, but that he felt himself to be like his father and consequently was overcome with self-loathing. Had Grove been given more adequate sex instruction, it is possible that he might have outgrown these feelings which, though now consciously repudiated, may yet interfere with the fullest development of his erotic life.

8. *Subject No. 4: Finch*

Most of Finch's sentiments are variable, and though momentarily extreme, are relatively innocuous and do not carry over into actions or unpleasant consequences. But his sentiments connected with sex seem to be more basic and more fixed.

In his autobiography [1] he refuses to give any erotic fantasies, saying, "I am sorry, but like dreams my erotic fantasies pass quickly away." "For some reason," he continues, "there is a strong desire to hide and conceal my sex history. I suppose it is because I am ashamed of it and never speak

of it openly. It is a matter not discussed in polite circles." Then, after giving a few brief statements about his sexual development, he concludes by saying, "That is all there is to my sexual experiences. Now let us turn to higher, more delicate expressions of sex," and he goes on to tell of a little girl he once liked in dancing school. Whenever the topic of sex is raised, Finch's thought repeatedly becomes blocked, and he is unable to govern his confusion.

Finch is the only one of our subjects to evince such embarrassed reactions, such definite indications that the topic is fraught with very unpleasant emotions.

His strongest negative sentiments, which for him seem more important than his positive sentiments, are arrayed against Emotion, Sex, and Women. Generally he shows marked disgust towards unsublimated forms of sexuality generally. In the Pressey *XO* [36], he marks as unpleasant all the words that have any connection with sexuality, as well as all the oral and anal words. He tells us that he has never kissed a girl [3], and his response to the word "kiss" is, "kissing is unsanitary" [20]. Since he includes syphilis among his greatest worries, there is a possibility that he fears contamination, the idea being based, according to our evidence, on an early association between sexuality and the rectum.

There is in Finch no signs whatever of any overt heterosexuality. In all the tests he is unique in his indifference to girls, and he has a strong negative cathexis for erotic types of women. He shows scorn for his mother and sister and for women generally. He evaluates girls from the same standpoint as males, namely mental brilliance, sportive attitude, and muscular development.

Finch says that he is "tolerant of the sex life of others," but he adds, "I believe in abstinence, even mentally. It may be coldness. I just have no special interest" [33]. When he tells us that he believes in "mental abstinence" it suggests that he is troubled by unacceptable erotic fantasies.

> When I take girls out it is usually from a sense of duty. I don't like to go out with girls [4].
>
> I can talk to girls all right, but they always seem dull. I never get the kick that I get from talking to men. One girl seems to like me a lot but I can't seem to do anything about it. I realize that she would make a perfect wife for a minister but I just don't care really [15].

Finch does not seem to be entirely happy about this situation, recognizing that in this respect he is different from others, a painful realization for one whose chief desire is to "fit in." "Perhaps some day," he says, "I'll fall in love. I want to be normal and loving is the normal thing to do" [33].

In spite of his negative attitude toward sexuality, he has very strong positive sentiments in favor of marriage. "I am still an idealist about marriage," he affirms [33].

> Marriage will, I suppose, eventually come along. It is a matter of fate. I know two girls who would make me a good wife, either of them. But my whole way of looking at it is awfully cold-blooded [12].

Finch is content to let the whole matter of marriage rest in the hands of destiny. The less he has to think about it the better. When asked if he believed in an ideal relationship between man and women he answers,

> Gee, I don't know. I haven't had to face it and therefore put off considering it [18].

Finch's sexual development has been markedly retarded by oral and anal pregenital fixations. Though the usual syndromes of needs and traits associated with anal fixation are absent in his character, there are indications of one or more traumatic incidents in which his mother as aggressor in giving him an enema was associated with the anal region. This helps to explain his passive masochistic tendencies, as well as his marked disgust with sex and the negative cathexis of his mother. Her obsessive cleanliness, which is probably a reaction formation, also probably had its effect upon him. He received no sexual instruction of any kind from his parents. For a long time he held the urinary theory of intercourse and conception.

> When I was a child learning about it I had to keep it hidden. I had a disgust for the whole subject. My parents told me nothing. I considered it wrong, something to be fought against [1].

Conflict over masturbation was evidently severe.

> I learned about masturbation from evil little boys. I experimented with the practice and it became a habit. By making vows in church I have been gradually able to conquer the habit which has left me with a feeling of revulsion [5].

Thus it appears that Finch has some strong negative sentiments towards sex and to balance these nothing but a weak positive sentiment ad conventional marriage. This configuration, however, is superficial. The key to his condition, admitted in a final interview, is the fact that all his sexual fantasies are homosexual in nature (oral type) and consequently held secret.

Finch has been assigned fourth place in the rank order because he indulged in a relatively large amount of early pubertal activity (mutual masturbation), because his intense worship of his father has been tinged,

as he confesses, with erotic feeling, because he has had a long series of very affectionate relations with other young men, and because he devotes more than the usual amount of time to the entertainment of erotic fantasies. A wall of moral inhibition stands between these fantasies and their overt realization.

9. *Subject No. 3: Ingle*

Ingle is the only one among our subjects who believes that, *The whole question of sex should wisely be regarded as a humorous business* [13].

> We are pretty frank about sex within the family. Of course I don't tell them every dirty joke that I hear, but nobody in the family is a prude. A funny joke is about the height of humor as far as its effect on me is concerned [1].

To be able to regard sex as humorous is satisfying to Ingle. It implies an objectivity, an easy acceptance, an emancipation from any shame or guilt. He prides himself on taking sex in a detached unemotional manner as an enjoyable physical function like eating or urinating. In commenting on his first experience of sexual intercourse with a casual visitor at a summer camp, he says, "It was fun but I will be able to live without it" [1].

Ingle admits that he enjoys necking and that if he doesn't get it he feels "lonely and frustrated" [33], which suggests that he has some *n* Succorance which makes him dependent upon women, somewhat belying his professed humorous detachment.

The adjectives which he gives for Sexual Intercourse are "satisfying, marital, creative, passionate" [14]. Sexual love, he believes, will increase and deepen his nature.

> I know very well that love will put some of my capacities, both intellectual and aesthetic, into high gear again, and that I'd be living more deeply and sensuously that I do now. Wherever I am, these dormant joys and excitements will await some beloved, and will be resurrected when she comes into my ken [1].

One cannot dismiss the suspicion that Ingle has been reading ahead on the subject of ideal marriage and the perfect love life.

It is characteristic of Ingle that as soon as he has found a satisfactory ideology he is content, and this applies to sex as well as to other spheres of activity. He has already planned his married life.

> I expect to meet a girl at the age of 25 who is not more than 20, and I want to have four or five children before she is 30 in order that a healthy family life should be assured because the preservation of the superior genetic strain is the duty of educated people [33].

Many of Ingle's sentiments have been determined by the biological and sociological principles to which he subscribes. These, he believes, constitute the only sound basis for sexual morality.

> I think there is a practical justification for sexual purity in women simply as a protection against the disastrous effects of venereal disease on the female sex organs [1].

Some of his *TAT* stories portray the unfortunate social consequences of irresponsible sexuality, and his argument for traditional morality vs. experimentation [15] is unique in that man, not the woman, takes the side of caution and convention.

Ingle has a minimum of homosexuality and a high need for heterosexual affiliation, but his abounding restlessness and high need for Change serve to make his love affairs of short duration. He has no strong sentiments in favor of Focal Sexuality, giving this a mark of only 2 for the ideal man [34].

> I greatly enjoy a love affair. Last year I fell in love with a brilliant and sensitive girl. . . . When she broke off with me I was sort of disappointed and sort of moped around for a month. Then I went on the prowl again and got interested again [1].

Besides Ingle's positive cathexis for his mother and the example of his parents' happy marriage, the most important determinant in the development of his sentiments towards sex is his parents' lack of prudishness and their willingness to discuss sex matters and to satisfy his curiosity as it arose.

> I learned about sex intercourse when I was ten or eleven. The family got sex books out of the library for me when I asked them to, as the librarian refused to give them to me. The kids in the neighborhood then asked me about it and I was able to disseminate my book learning to my friends to their great edification. I used to sketch diagrams of the female genitalia, and lecture learnedly on menstruation to the neighborhood gang. I was surprised about sex, but not shocked. It was like calculus. You run into something—facts in the universe. No shame. When we undressed for mutual inspecton it was like being able to demonstrate a scientific principle in the lab [18].
>
> I learned to masturbate when I was about ten, and have never felt any guilt about it, any more than the voiding of urine or sneezing [1].
>
> I had sexual dreams of the usual kind even before my first emission and I have always enjoyed them. I envision myself in bed with a beautiful woman, with sexual play culminating in an orgasm.

It is possible that Ingle first adopted this attitude of scientific objectivity as a device to allay anxiety. We know that he developed a phobia when he

first began to masturbate; and it is possible that objectivity combined with the complete satisfaction of his curiosity by his parents was instrumental in eliminating his feelings of guilt, as well as of anxiety.

Ingle is ranked third among our subjects because he has practiced masturbation for a long time with enjoyment, because he has had several love affairs, one associated with intercourse, because he has read a good deal about sex, and because he looks forward to marriage as a state which will throw his capacities into "high gear."

10. *Subject No. 2: Couch*

Couch's sentiments are definitely positive towards sex in general and towards sex experience before marriage. Describing the qualities which he demands in girls whom he likes to take out, he says:

> My criteria regarding types of persons selected in this context concerns physical attractiveness, geographical proximity, and sexual emancipation [1].

The sentiment in favor of sexual emancipation is associated with Couch's scorn for middle class morality and his desire to be sophisticated.

Though Couch has a stronger than average sex drive, he is at present incapable of love.

> I have never been in love. There are several girls whom I take out although the romantic element is negligible or nil. Quarrels are very rare indeed, chiefly, I suppose, because the relationships mean so little to me emotionally [1].

It is clear from all his responses that for Couch woman is nothing more than a physical object. In his heart he despises her for her feeble intellectual attainments, her incapacity to provide him with the rarified and urbane companionship which he seeks in the society of men. He tends to debase her rather than to idealize her. His air of bored, supercilious condescension toward all the female examiners was striking. He shows no desire for focalization, one woman being as good for his purposes as another; he is entirely indifferent to them as personalities, asking nothing of them but sexual compliance.

> I encountered a young girl under ideal circumstances, who was astonishingly submissive erotically. Afterward I felt a great regret at not having taken more advantage of the situation, an emotion which virtually cancelled out the lingering sense of gratification.

Couch says that his emotions accompanying sexual experiences "vary from

elation, excitement, self-congratulation, to disgust and remorse," and then characteristically takes pains to say that this disgust and remorse are "on the grounds of wisdom and restraint, *not* morality" [1]. Actually, however, though not admitted by him, his disgust is connected with the erotic fantasies which accompany sexual activity.

To the word "necking" Couch gives the associations, "delightful, disturbing, possible, ambivalent" [14], but he does not think of sexual intercourse as delightful. For this he gives the adjectives, "necessary, unnecessary, possible, excruciating, lewd" [14]. Several of his responses show that he feels sexual intercourse between man and woman to be ridiculous. In the *TAT* he says of Picasso's picture of the nude man and woman:

> This is the incarnation of the spirit of life itself, as having been split or bifurcated into two poles, man and woman. The painter had this conception, but as he went along he became a bit ironic about the whole thing, and felt it to be on the absurd side.

The thema of erotic incompatibility is brought out in another *TAT* story of a ballet dancer who comes to visit his estranged wife.

> He is just on the border of insanity. He feels a strong ambivalence toward her, perfection and revulsion, the latter as the result of non-heterosexual impulses on his part. Emotionally he felt completely ungratified at the end of the marriage. Now he bursts into her room, does a few flying leaps and incredible turns. . . This is just a scene.

In this story non-heterosexual impulses lead to feelings of revulsion toward the woman and result in an insane and bizarre exhibitionism.

Couch has had no overt homosexual experiences and has repelled any advances which have been made to him. He reports homosexual dreams, however, and there are definite indications of homosexual fantasies in the *TAT*. He has been deeply attached to several young men but never to a woman. This notwithstanding, his most inviting erotic fantasies and his overt sexual experiences are connected with women.

In his present erotic fantasies Couch is the king who rules over a band of naked girls, and when he masturbates it is often the attitude of bold, unabashed exhibitionism on the part of a magnetic woman which is most exciting to him. This means that he has projected his own exhibitionism into her. The fact that he is able to do this suggests that there is a strong element of bisexuality in his nature, which is often found connected with a high degree of narcism as well as with creativity, both of which are notable in Couch. It is the interplay of the male and female elements in himself, indeed, which gives rise to his most ecstatic experiences. Actual woman does not appear

to him to be necessary to his creative life. In fact, she constitutes a direct threat to it, because it is only by the development of extreme narcism that he can heighten those aesthetic feelings which are to him the culmination of delight. This, as well as his homosexual tendencies and the exhibitionistic erotic fantasies of which he is ashamed, account for his devaluation of heterosexuality to the point where the act itself appears to him to be absurd.

Couch tells us that as a child he used to have fantasies of "capturing little girls, keeping them locked up in a cellar and making them undress" [2]. Only much later did he realize that there was any connection between these fantasies and the sex instinct.

> Sexual instruction on the part of my parents was nil [1].
> I knew that babies came from the body of their mother, but was of the opinion that conception was the result of the good life and sincere prayer of the parents. I discovered the fact of coitus when I was about ten or eleven through conversations with my contemporaries. I was partly shocked and partly amused [1].

At puberty he formed a succession of four passionate friendships with boys who were of his own age though far more sophisticated than he. With them began his intellectual development, which was culminated in his present philosophy in which aesthetic sensibility is to replace morality.

Couch's attitude toward women has certainly been partially determined by his attitude toward his mother. Since puberty any demonstration of affection on her part has appeared to him to be a direct threat to his development, and he has come to feel toward her "revulsion and disgust."

11. *Subject No. 1: Yawl*

Yawl has a strong sex drive ("My friends say that I am oversexed" [18]), and a strong need for heterosexual affiliation which he has made the central preoccupation of his life. An ideal relationship with a woman is the target of his philosophy. He has unusual capacity for intense erotic love, some of which may stem from counteraction against repressed homosexuality. There are indications of passive homosexuality not only in the *TAT* but in other fantasy material, showing that his evolution out of this phase is not yet complete.

No other subject believes so definitely as Yawl that, *Only in relationship to a woman can a man find his true individuality and distinct being,* and with one other subject Yawl is the most decided in disagreeing with the statement, *Sexual relations are not infrequently the death of spiritual aspiration* [13]. "I have a strong belief in man and woman," he says, "the man

part of man as opposed to the woman part of woman. I'm not sure just what this means. I believe they should supplement each other. The idea is nebulous but developing" [18]. Yawl has been greatly influenced by D. H. Lawrence, whose novel *Sons and Lovers* he speaks of as "the most striking book that I have ever read" [18].

Yawl is a strong advocate of the "natural man," of the untrammelled expression of instinct, especially sex. With such sentiments, the cult of Nature is often combined, as is the case here.

> My erotic day dreams are dreams centered around a pleasurable but not fantastic natural milieu, usually the way Rosseau would have approved of. A good deal of playing and enjoyment of Nature ("The world is too much with us") interspersed with sexual enjoyment [1].

Yawl used to believe in conventional morality, but soon, he explained, "I began to run into things to which I didn't want to conform, such as Society's view of the relation between the sexes." Asserting now that "there is no sin expect that which is contrary to your own nature" [20], Yawl has become something of a crusader.

> The children in our family have been inhibited about sex. So started a crusade in the family to the effect that there was a semi-sexual basis for boys and girls and that it wasn't just mental companionship. When I got kicked out of school I used to see this girl and would talk for hours about my ideas. I tried to show her the senselessness of social customs. She had inhibitions and I tried to break them down [18].

While not admitted by Yawl, this concern with his own sexual morality as opposed to conventional morality is undoubtedly reinforced by his necessity to express an attitude toward life which is in direct opposition to his father's. For his father, who is "full of Victorian repressions and inhibitions," Yawl feels nothing but contempt.

Although Yawl has the idea of man and woman in deep reciprocal relation to each other, he is still far from the possibility of realizing this in actuality. While he has had two love affairs which, from his description, appear to have approximated his dream, they are probably idealized in retrospect. Within a few months he passed without much resistance from the last "ideal" affair into a season of diffuse sexuality, a prominent feature of which was an underevaluation of woman. He describes his sex desire as urgent and says that it is now satisfied by "jaunts into Boston rather than by masturbation" [3]. In spite of his belief in the natural man, he is not able to condone entirely this phase of his career. He rates himself *5* on need Sex (Diffuse) but believes that for the ideal man it should be only *1*

[34]. Zestful whoring, however, has alternated with a vague longing for a mystical union with woman, "a oneness of silence where all is answered" [14]. The qualities which he wants in a wife are that she should be "sincere, something you can love, a sexual archetype" [14]. Yawl appears to be dominated by an image of woman, the incarnation of which has yet to cross his path.

He assures us that he has little or no guilt connected with intercourse.

> My emotions after sexual experience are those of pleasant satiety and relaxation, and very little worry of conception, and no feeling of shame [1].

Although he believes in marriage as an ideal, and gives the highest affirmative mark to the aphorism, *Nothing has higher claims to a man's full powers than marriage,* he is critical of marriages as he sees them.

> I feel that marriage is the best way to live with a woman after a certain length of time, but I have seen that most marriages were either apathetic or failures, and I believe that I will never get married in order that I may help myself not to commit the usual error of finding a nice sweet girl and marrying after I am fairly well settled financially and am lonely at night. In short, it should be best, but it is seldom even good, and one must be godawfully careful in making the step [1].

In Yawl's *TAT* stories we find that cruelty and destruction are often associated with sex. This is to be explained by the fact that with him a high *n* Aggression serves as a counteraction against *n* Passivity of which there are definite indications on the imaginal level. It was this counteractive tendency also that caused him to react to the usual infantile traumatic situations with Pride, Narcism, and *n* Rejection. His feeling, however, remained attached to the mother image. The longing to return to her, coupled with counteraction against his own passivity, has forced him to look elsewhere for his ideal. He is searching for a lost feeling connected with woman. This accounts for his interest in subjective values and for the particular emphasis which he puts on erotic love.

Yawl has a lively sexual curiosity which was never satisfied by his parents. From them he learned nothing about the mysteries. He says that he made a "sorry attempt at coitus" with his sister when he was eleven, and that masturbation began the same year [1]. Another factor, already mentioned, which has served to crystallize his sentiments is his antagonism to his father, and to his father's views on life.

In thought and action Yawl has displayed more interest in sex than has any of our other subjects. He has entertained fantasies of all sorts, devoured

the relevant literature, experimented on a high and low plane, and built up a philosophy with an ideal erotic relationship as its cornerstone.

C. Conclusions and Summary

As compared with college students of the era of World War I and earlier, our subjects, like the majority of their contemporaries, were, for the most part, capable, and often eager, to discuss their sexual sentiments and experiences in a relatively objective and sophisticated fashion. (Greater knowledge, honesty, and freedom about sexual matters have surely been among the traits that outstandingly distinguish recent generations of college students in America from those that have preceded them.) Seven (64 per cent) of the present group made a point of asserting that their attitude towards sex was free of any moralistic "prejudice," although it was clear that most of these emancipated souls had experienced guilt and remorse more than once in connection with their sexual practices. What is to be inferred from these facts is that in 1942 it is fashionable to assume that sex lies outside the realm of morals, instead of at its very center as the Puritans believed. Only four men in our series—precisely our most religious subjects—were not ashamed to bring moral principles to bear upon the management of their sexual behavior.

Six of our subjects (55 per cent—about the usual proportion of students at Harvard) had indulged in sexual intercourse, but two of these had done so only once. None of the six looked back on their experiences with unblemished satisfaction.

No more than four (36 per cent) of the 11 knew what it was to be in love. One other (Grove) admitted to several infatuations.

That marvel, the man who has never masturbated, was not found among our subjects, although one man stated that he had stopped "self-abuse" abruptly in adolescence after being told that it would lead to insanity. In every case, masturbation had been the occasion of some conflict, although not all were willing to admit this. Ingle was most conspicuously "modern" and "scientific" in holding that ejaculation was like eating or urinating, a simple and necessary physiological function.

Correlations

a. Subjects with strong sentiments ad sex. The three highest subjects in the rank order (Yawl, Couch, Ingle) are among the four *highest* subjects on the following variables of personality as rated independently by the Clinic staff: need for Autonomy (Independence), need for Autonomy (Re-

sistance), need for Aggression (Verbal), need for Dominance (Ideational), need for Recognition (Exhibition), need for Exposition (telling, explaining), and Verbal Achievement (at school). That is, as a class, they are self-reliant, resistant to authority, verbally articulate, assertive and critical, and inclined to hold the floor and speak dogmatically. They are also among the *highest* subjects in the need for Sentience (Aesthetic), in Aesthetic Ability (appreciation of beauty, taste), and in Endocathection (high valuation of fantasies or speculations). From this one gets the picture of an intellectual rebel with a well-developed aesthetic side, a product of the literature of the Twenties and the Thirties. This fits in with the finding that these three individuals are also among the *highest* on Ego-Superego Conflict and on Autonomy-Compliance Conflict. They are at odds with the conscience of their society. Furthermore, they were notable for sex Curiosity in youth and at present are high in repressed Exhibitionism. Finally, they are high in Ideational Translation (the ease with which ideas are actualized in behavior) and in Class Status.

These same subjects are among the four *lowest* in the need for Conformance, need for Deference (Compliance), and need for Order, Sameness (consistency, fixity of habits), and Conjunctivity of Thought. They showed little disgust when in youth they first became aware of man's sexual practices.

b. Subjects with weak positive sentiments ad sex, or with a preponderance of negative sentiments. The three lowest subjects in the rank order (Shea, York, Nack) are among the four highest *subjects* on the following variables: Ego strength, Conative Conjunctivity (organization of purposive behavior) and Direct Restriving (counteraction after failure). They are also *high* in Mathematical Aptitude and Mechanical Ability. On the other hand, they are among the four *lowest* subjects in Imaginal Productivity and the need for Sentience (Aesthetic). From this we get a picture of a man of strong character, with an objective mechanical mind that is obtuse to sensuous impressions and somewhat constricted in his imagination.

If we include Lake (fourth from the bottom in the rank order), we find that at least three of our lowest men are *high* in the need for Order, Repression, Reaction Formation, the need for Nurturance and the repressed need for Aggression (Sadism). They are *low* in Overprotection (during childhood), Feelings of Insecurity, Basic Anxiety, Neurotic Symptoms, and in all forms of Verbal Achievement (in school). These variables round out the portrait of a man with a character that is founded on a solid base of repression, with anxiety and aggression well under control.

After close examination of the personalities of the high and low members of this small group of subjects, we can find nothing to encourage the idea that premarital sexual intercourse under the conditions that prevail in America today is generally beneficial to a man. Under more favorable conditions, no doubt, erotic experiences in adolescence could be rewarding instead of punishing, and we may be on our way to the creation of such conditions, but today what the average young man gets out of his irresponsible adventures is rarely enlightening or enlivening, despite the material they provide for "bull" sessions. The subjects at the foot of our rank order were freer from neurotic symptoms and conflicts than were those at the top, but it is impossible here to separate cause and effect. Forced to prophesy, however, we would guess that among our 11 subjects Nack, the lowest man, had the best chance of achieving a satisfying marital relationship.

VIII. EPILOGUE

Since nothing would be gained by abbreviating still further the theoretical formulations set forth in Sections II and III, and since our clinical findings have already been summarized in the concluding parts of Sections IV to VII, little remains to be said here. The harvest would have seemed more plentiful if the necessary restriction of space had not compelled the omission of material bearing upon two important topics: the genesis (determinants) of sentiments and the configuration (functional relations) of sentiments within single individuals. In view of the general dearth of case histories in our professional literature, it seemed proper at this time to allot an uncommonly large amount of space to raw clinical data. We are content to regard this monograph as another partial exposition of the *multiform method* of studying personalities, as well as being a record of the sentiments of a small sample of collegemen during the critical early months of 1942.

The multiform method, which involves the contemporaneous observation of a large number of mutually dependent variables, should serve to promote the eagerly expected rapid growth after the war of a basic social science resulting from the active collaboration of sociologists, cultural anthropologists, psychologists, and psychiatrists. There is ground for anticipating the gradual development of a theoretical system—comprehensive, coherent, adequate—which will be based to a large extent upon empirical facts obtained by "task forces" of technical specialists drawn from different relevant disciplines. For a task force the object of concern might be a representative community or institution, or a designated class of individuals, or a critical social situation created by the interaction of such units. The sociologists would concentrate on the structure and operations of one or more groups, the psychologists on the nature and behavior of typical individuals. These investigations might be undertaken in the service of industry—with the aim, say, of improving labor relations—or in conjunction with certain Federal or State projects, as part of the medical services or health program of a district or organization, or under the auspices of a university or research institute. A strong common purpose would serve, as this war has shown, to bring to a focus the energies of men of thought and men of action, an experience which is certain to be rewarding to both parties. The effective collaboration of the two is an assurance on the one hand that the formulations of social scientists will be made to conform to the realities of life, and on the other that the actions of practical men will be guided by generalizations based on past experience and tested, as in any controlled experiment, by careful observations of their near and remote consequences. In Section I

we have indicated how scientists as scientists can contribute to the evaluation of values. Here is a conception to rally the enthusiasm of a new generation.

The multiform method of research calls for a variety of trained investigators using a variety of methods under a variety of conditions. The investigators should preferably be of different ages, different sexes, and different social classes. The program of techniques should include careful systematic observations of behavior in real and in controlled real-like situations, standardized tests of various sorts, and informal confidential interviews. The objects of concern should be observed over a period of several months or more, and if possible during a season of stress and change.

To contribute fully to such a program, psychology in its general outlook, teaching, and training must be reoriented, so that Man, the whole man, is prevailingly at the focus of attention. What is now called "the psychology of personality" together with some social psychology and clinical psychology (generally regarded as a minor specialty) belong at the very center of psychology. The ability to observe, interview, size up and understand human beings, to interpret their experiences and conduct, on a deep as well as on a superficial level, and to predict their reactions to certain circumstances might sensibly be adopted as a goal of undergraduate instruction, a goal which deserves a higher priority than knowledge, say, of certain quickly forgotten facts and theories about sense organs, or acquaintance with the activities of mice in a cage, or proficiency with statistics. The latter are interesting and important in themselves, they are avenues and instruments of research, and are often of value in explaining human reactions, but they do not constitute the core, or the essential material, of psychology. They are *means,* in the development of which we have lost sight of the *end*. Psychologists, we might say, in striving to be scientific, to be included in the exalted company of physicists, chemists, and physiologists, have surrendered their proper realm to untrained amateurs or to psychiatrists alert mostly to the abnormal and perverse features of human conduct. Thus, at present, only a small minority of psychologists are prepared to play with competence the part that society expects them to.

This monograph describes only a fifth part of a multiform investigation undertaken in the winter of 1942 by a company of psychologists unaided by sociologists. Properly the whole study should have been placed in the matrix of the structurally analyzed college community, because the daily life of each of our subjects is not intelligible to the reader of these case histories as they now stand. The individual's social status, the groups to which he belongs, the groups from which he is excluded, and the groups

which he rejects, the rôles he plays, and his relations with members of the faculty—none of these important facts have been revealed. This is a deficiency which can be remedied in future researches. Here the focus of interest has been the development of sentiments.

The Nature of Sentiments

As we conceive them, sentiments are integral elements of dynamic systems in the personality, but scientific thought can deal with them only by a preliminary analytical step which removes them from their contexts. Thus, a sentiment is an abstraction. It is a hypothetical concept of a psycho-physical structure, or intervening variable, the presence of which must be inferred on the basis of certain manifestations—observable affects, utterances and actions. These manifestations, or criteria, constitute the operational definition of a sentiment.

The psychologist, we have pointed out, should not confuse a sentiment and an assertion of a sentiment. The former is a diagnosis at which the psychologist arrives after examining all the pertinent data. Among the pertinent data, to be sure, are the assertions which the subject makes, but many of these are not valid, because of deficiency of insight or because of the operation of one or more deflecting variables. In our series of subjects, for example, the most common deflecting variable was the need to conform to a certain respected figure (idealego system), the need to be recognized as a man of this or that type. Normalcy was highly cathected by both Lake and Dunn, although the latter also had the antithetical tendency, the dread of appearing too conventional. Couch had someone like James Joyce in his mind's eye, whereas Yawl was apt to dramatize himself as the American D. H. Lawrence. An affective state of depression was the most deflecting variable in Dunn's case; whereas in Shea's it was a chronic negativistic trend accentuated by the fact that he was contemptuous of psychology and its unscientific methods. The sessions at the Clinic offered him the opportunity to prove that he could outwit and mislead the examiners.

On the basis of much evidence of this sort we have concluded that many assertions of sentiment are not indicative of enduring feelings about the object in question, but rather of sentiments in favor of the type of man who does possess such feelings, or of sentiments for or against the interrogator, or of sentiments in favor of non-conformity or conformity in general, or of a fleeting mood of depression or elation, or of a desire to create the proper impression so that the man to whom the subject is talking will facilitate rather than oppose the attainment of a purpose.

This is not to say that sentiments which are covert and secret, or possibly unconscious, are more important than those which are superficial and overt. As far as predicting behavior is concerned, the latter may be more useful. Many people live the greater part of their lives on the outer and outer-middle layers of their personalities. For them there may be nothing of much consequence beyond that region. We have stressed hidden and repressed sentiments because (*a*) they have been generally neglected, (*b*) they are parts of the total personality and as such determine many peculiar and superficially inexplicable samples of behavior, (*c*) they are important in the understanding and treatment of the psychoneuroses, and (*d*) it does not take a psychologist to discover overt and public sentiments, these are revealed to everyone.

In Section II reasons were given for selecting the term "sentiment" to stand for the enduring connection between a cluster of affects and an object, and for using the term "attitude," if necessary, to describe the apparent overt expression or assertion of such a connection. This expression or assertion, as we have pointed out, may or may not be a reliable index of a true sentiment. It may be an attitude adopted as a means to an end—to gain votes, to avoid punishment, to promote morale, to cure a patient. Thus an attitude is something that can usually be distinguished almost immediately by anybody, whereas the correct diagnosis of a sentiment often requires a good deal of knowledge about the individual.

Sentiments may be classified in different ways: merely as positive or negative; or according to the kinds of feelings or sensations evoked (hunger, lust, admiration, disgust, fear, anger, etc.); or according to types of foci (concrete person, class of objects, attribute, idea, etc.); or according to regions of activity (family region, vocational region, ideological region, etc.); or according to modes of genesis (direct experience, chance association, identification, reason, etc.).

According to the facts set forth in this paper, affects connected with a single object, or focus, are more numerous, more diverse, more conflicting and more variable in their intensities than they are generally assumed to be. We have pointed out, for example, that most entities have a variety of aspects each of which may be provocative of a different kind of feeling and that even one aspect may arouse contrary feelings, some uninhibited and conscious, others repressed and unconscious. We are forced to conceive, then, not of a single clean-cut entity connected with a certain affect, but of an ever-changing entity connected with a compound of more or less structured affects of different intensities. What is evoked at any one time is determined

by the total situation. Amidst this diversity, however, a prevailing current of feeling and action is usually discernible. Lacking this consistency of response, the concept of sentiment would have no ground to stand on.

Perhaps the commonest type of conflict among sentiments occurs when a man and the majority of his associates differ in their reactions to an object. For when the value system of the group to which the individual belongs strongly approves or disapproves of an entity (object, activity, idea) the individual will usually acquire, through suggestion and empathy, a conforming imperative sentiment which will facilitate his identification with and attachment to the group. This is the sentiment he will be inclined to express in public. Privately, however, the entity in question may actually arouse in him feelings of a contrary sort, which, so long as he enjoyingly participates in the group's activities, he will generally attempt to suppress and conceal even to himself. This conflict is accentuated in depth if the value system of the society conforms to the imbedded superego system of the individual. Another common determinant of endopsychic conflict is the idealego system, especially in those cases where it calls for an attitude of insurgent defiance to society.

Influenced by the imperative sentiment, "Honor thy father and thy mother," a component of their superego systems, several of our subjects were more conscious of their positive sentiments toward their parents than they were of their negative sentiments. The positive sentiments also had a higher degree of publicity. Two of the men, however, had an idealego modeled after the Romantic Genius figure, of which one of the characteristic elements is opposition to parents. Unlike the others, these two were quick to avow the negative feelings of which they were especially conscious, but were reluctant to confess the full extent of their obvious dependence on their parents.

Because of such complexities in the structuration of sentiments, their investigation requires a multiform approach, a program of procedure that includes at least two or three tests designed to expose covert and unconscious sentiments. Among the indirect methods used by us we would especially recommend the Argument Completion Test, the Picture Selection Test, the Sentence Completion Test (administered to only one subject in this group), a revised Similes Test and the Thematic Apperception Test.

Syndromes of Sentiments

Intercorrelations of our 70 major sentiments yielded 11 syndromes (or clusters) composed of three to five co-varying sentiments, each of which

correlated .25 or better with every other sentiment in the cluster. But a careful examination of these syndromes has persuaded us that although they exhibit certain connections typical of this series of subjects they have very little general validity. Consequently this appears to be material which can be omitted without appreciable loss.

Configuration of Sentiments

We have used the expression "configuration of sentiments" to denote the system of interrelationships among sentiments that exists within the personality of a single individual. To portray this we have found it helpful to draw a scheme or map, representing the objects that are positively cathected by a circle (O) and the objects that are negatively cathected by a square (□). Ambivalent objects are represented by half a square and half a circle (◨). The area of the circle or square indicates the intensity (1, 2, or 3) of the cathexis, and the thickness of the enveloping line indicates its stability (1, 2, or 3). Cathexes which are concordant (mutually reenforcing, logically consistent) are connected by a straight line (—), an arrow on the line (→—) indicating the direction of influence. (The arrow points to the subordinate, subsidiary or dependent cathexis.) Cathexes which are discordant (in conflict with each other), are connected by a wavy line (~). This schema is as satisfactory as anything we have been able to devise to depict the affective organization of an individual.

Determinants of Sentiments

We can very briefly set forth our present conclusions as to the genesis of sentiments by listing the chief determinants of positive and of negative cathexes.

1. *Positive Cathexes*

1. The Self is positively cathected (e.g., one's will, feelings, sentiments, aspirations, thoughts, ideas) and the Larger Self, i.e., everything that is accepted as belonging to the Self (e.g., one's body, possessions, children, objects which one has created or helped to create) and, finally, to a lesser extent, groups to which the Self belongs (e.g., family, community, State, the unit with which one has identified oneself).

2. Entities which have helped to increase one's status or prestige are positively cathected (e.g., parts of one's body or certain abilities which have been especially praised, activities at which one has been successful, instruments which have been indispensable in attaining success, leaders or associates who have helped to win renown for the group to which one belongs).

3. Entities which have served as direct satisfiers of positive needs (e.g., fresh air, cool water, foods, sex objects, objects of beauty, friends, admirers, teachers, followers, helpless objects, activities enjoyed for their own sake), or as direct satisfiers of negative needs (e.g., bed, safe refuge, exclusive area) are positively cathected.

4. Entities which have been of assistance in attaining the goals of positive and negative needs (e.g., parents, nurses, guides, teachers, helpers, rescuers, as well as useful tools and machines) are positively cathected.

5. Objects whose powers have excited respect are positively cathected (e.g., parents in the eyes of a young child, great performers and artists, heroes, God).

6. Entities which are positively cathected (or praised and advocated) by loved and/or respected persons, or by the cathected majority of persons, are positively cathected, especially if the cathection of these entities (values) is taken to be indicative of some sort of superiority—moral discrimination, good taste, intellectual judgment—and therefore customarily rewarded. (Here is where culture operates.)

7. Entities which seem to promise the satisfaction of one or more needs, but are, as yet, unattained and untested (e.g., a beautiful girl whose photograph one has seen, a distant country, the grass that seems greener on the other side of the fence, a new form of government) are positively cathected. (Here is where the imagination and the need for novelty operate.)

8. Entities the positive cathection of which follows logically upon the cathection (positive or negative) of other entities are positively cathected (e.g., having strongly cathected the general principle X one must, to be consistent, also cathect Y). (Here is where reason operates consciously.)

9. Entities which resemble, represent or symbolize positively cathected entities (e.g., someone who resembles a friend, photograph of a loved object, soldier of an allied army, man from one's home State, flag, crucifix), or which have been associated in any meaningful way with a positively cathected object (e.g., the birthplace of Shakespeare, a lock of Byron's hair, a man who knew Lincoln) are positively cathected.

10. Entities which have been fortuitously associated (by contiguity) with moments of satisfaction are positively cathected (e.g., anything that preceded or was observed as part of the setting of a very satisfying occurrence).

Thus the main factors are: (a) narcism and its extensions (No. 1, No. 2); (*b*) direct experience with an entity as satisfier or agent leading to satisfaction (No. 3, No. 4); (*c*) spontaneous admiration evoked by an object (No. 5); (*d*) emulation of an admired object instigated by example and

instruction and reënforced by rewards (No. 6); (*e*) an unsatisfied need seizing upon and magnifying the satisfactoriness of an entity (No. 7); (*f*) reason (No. 6); (*g*) symbolization and association (No. 9, No. 10).

2. *Negative Cathexes*

1. Other Selves who interfere with the complete freedom and sovereignty of the Self by asserting their own claims, especially if they vaingloriously exhibit or assert their unique superiority, are negatively cathected (e.g., people who are, or who are thought to be in some way superior to oneself, stronger, richer, more talented, superordinate; people who have defeated the Self in competition, rivals for future honors, exclusive organizations).

2. Entities which have served to decrease one's status or prestige are negatively cathected (e.g., parts of the personality which have given rise to ridicule or social censure, activities at which one has failed miserably, objects which have contributed to failure—ineffective tools—leaders or associates who have been responsible for the failure or disparagement of a group to which one belongs).

3. Entities which have acted as direct irritants of negative needs (e.g., objects that have caused pain or humiliation, excited fear or nausea) are negatively cathected (e.g., a high cliff, a biting dog, an insulting man, bad meat).

4. Entities which have opposed or frustrated the fulfillment of a need are negatively cathected (e.g., punishing parents, policemen, superior officers).

5. Objects whose defects or weaknesses have spontaneously excited scorn or disgust are negatively cathected (e.g., cowards, morons, drunken sots, dope addicts, perverts).

6. Entities which are negatively cathected by loved and/or respected persons, or by the cathected majority of persons, or are positively cathected by contemptible people, are negatively cathected, especially if the disapproval of these entities is taken to be indicative of some sort of superiority—moral discrimination, good taste, intellectual judgment, social status— and therefore customarily rewarded. (Here is where culture operates.)

7. Entities to which a man has never been exposed but which threaten to injure or in some way harm him, or threaten to frustrate one or more of his needs, are negatively cathected. Here is where imagination operates.)

8. Entities the negative cathection of which follows logically upon the intense cathection (negative or positive) of some other entity are negatively cathected (e.g., if a man stands by the rule *X* he cannot accept the activity Y).

9. Entities which resemble, represent or symbolize negatively cathected

entities (e.g., someone who resembles a former enemy, the photograph of a hated person, the swastika) or which have been associated in any meaningful way with a negatively cathected object, are negatively cathected.

10. Entities which have been fortuitously associated (by contiguity) with moments of intense dissatisfaction are negatively cathected (e.g., anything that preceded or was observed as part of the setting during a very traumatic occurrence).

It happens very often that the valuation of a single object has been affected by several of these determinants. A certain army general, for example, may be positively cathected because he is a fellow American (A1), because he has helped to win renown for the army of which you are a member (A2), because he has granted certain unusual satisfactions to his soldiers, you among them (A4), because his energy and tactical ability has excited your admiration (A5), because he is greatly praised by others whose judgment you respect (A6), and so forth. On the other hand, he may be negatively cathected because he stands in your light (B1), because one one occasion he reprimanded you unjustly (B3) and deprived you of certain privileges (B4), because at times he has shown a coarse vainglorіousness which evoked contempt in you (B5), because physically he resembles a man you have always detested and in civilian life represents a group with which you have no sympathy (B9), and so forth.

Uniformities of Sentiment Among Our Subjects

After re-reading the case records printed in this monograph the impression persists that in writing them we failed to do justice to many of the virtues, talents, and attainments of our subjects. The fact is that the men as portrayed here are less appealing than they are in actual life. This seems to be due in some measure to our selection of sentiments to be examined, especially to the omission, on the one hand, of sentiments towards personal achievement, and to the emphasis, on the other, upon sentiments towards war. The national emergency prompted us to pay particular attention to the latter and without doubt our own sentiments inclined us to underscore deploringly the intellectual confusion and emotional unpreparedness of these young men in the face of the most appalling crisis of world history.

In the case histories attention was drawn to the individuality of each man, to the features which distinguished him from the others. Using as instrument of analysis a conceptual scheme composed of more than a hundred variables, we found that every personality emerged as a distinct organization

of these variables, some of which were conspicuous for their strength, others for their weakness. Peculiarities not covered by any of the selected variables were highlighted by the free use of adjectives and metaphors. Thus, if we did not overstep the satiation limit of the reader's interest in uniqueness we must at least have reached it. Having given ample space to diversity, let us now attempt to pick out some of the uniformities which might impress an observer from another era or another culture.

Most of our subjects, as stated before, belonged to the scholarly upper seventh of high school graduates, were *intellectually ambitious,* and in the end succeeded in winning honors in their respective fields of concentration at Harvard. They came from middle class families. Most of them had suffered a little during a period of difficult adolescent adjustment at school because of physical timidity and *lack of athletic prowess. Aesthetic appreciation* was rather high in several of them. As a designation for the group, "college intellectuals" seems appropriate. One can hardly say that they were typical of American youth, or of American college men, or even of Harvard college men in 1942.

It seems fair to say that as a group our subjects embodied many of the sentiments which were fashionable among young American intellectuals during the Twenties and Thirties, sentiments which were expressed so repeatedly in books and magazines that an appreciable portion of the reading public had consciously or unconsciously accepted them.

One often makes the mistake of basing one's conceptions of a historical period on the ideas and sentiments of its leading writers, regardless of the well-known fact that many of the greatest artists have been out of sympathy with, if not in violent opposition to the accepted values of their age and their influence has not been appreciable until later.

In the Twenties and Thirties most of our artists were at odds with their culture, but their rejection of it was expressed not, for the most part, by solitariness and lonely flights of the imagination, but by reporting in detail, objectively, bitterly or ironically, the most offensive features of the American way of life. Not only were these writers unusually responsive to a variety of currents, largely antagonistic to their social surroundings, but they in turn did much to increase the force and spread of these currents, if not to initiate them. Among those influenced, in one way or another, were eight of our subjects. Nevertheless, since the bulk of the population remained as usual relatively unaffected, we cannot accept the passions of the articulate minority as typical of this period. Three of our subjects, for example, had scarcely been touched by the intellectual ferments of the day. Lake was an ex-

emplary Babbitt, Shea was a conventional product of Catholic indoctrination, Nack might have been plucked out of the Nineteenth Century.

All but one of our subjects had a strong *aversion to war;* none felt like fighting. A man from an earlier era or from China would have considered this quite natural. In China the soldier is ranked at the bottom of the social scale, and the scholar, enjoying as he does the highest status, is not expected to take an active part in warfare. In the West, also, up to the time of Napoleon and the advent of conscription, wars were largely the occupation of professional soldiers hired by emperors, feudal lords and princes. But compared to their contemporaries in Germany, Japan and Russia, and in England after the spring of 1940, our subjects were unusual. These young men, swayed by waves of pacifistic propaganda, believed that war was absolutely inexcusable. Nothing worthwhile could ever be gained, defended, or proved by armed force. The war to end wars had been a total failure. Within twenty years the armies of the aggressor nations were once more on the march. It was evident that wars were instigated by the ruling classes who were ever intent on conquering new territory, exploiting natural resources, acquiring markets. Only a small minority of profiteers stood to gain anything by war. For the masses it brought nothing but unadulterated misery. The present war, these young Americans believed, was not our war. It was just one more of those periodic European conflicts engendered by rival greeds. Through the subtle use of propaganda, the distribution of atrocity stories, and so forth, the British had persuaded Americans to participate in the last war in order to save the Empire's chestnuts from the fire. They had made suckers of us. This must never happen again. This war was merely another attempt on the part of the capitalists to divert attention from the class struggle, or postpone the scheduled revolution of the proletariat. The United States, indeed, was perhaps the rankest illustration of the irresponsibility, the final failure of the capitalistic system. We had no democracy to boast of: witness the forgotten man, our social class structure, the Southerner's attitude towards Negroes. The problem of unemployment had not been solved, our politics reeked with graft, our standards had been debased beyond redemption by Hollywood, the integrity of our language had been corrupted by the advertising men, the profit-motive permeated everything. What in all this deserved to be defended with one's blood? Nothing seemed so valuable as individual life. The war was an abrupt and overwhelming threat to the career which each man's personal ambition had designed for him. Several of the subjects conjured up images of violent death. Intolerable to them was the idea of the complete cessation of unfolding life. They wondered

whether they would be equal to the ordeal. Anxiety mounted. Dedication was not a pillar of their philosophy. Their parents, for the most part, opposed enlistment in combat units, suggested less dangerous assignments. The men were bewildered. At the very least, the draft meant loss of freedom, submission to authority, the abandonment of selfhood, identification with the mass, the abdication of the intellect. It meant the sacrifice of every ideal that had heretofore guided their best endeavors. The truth was that the youth of America had *no common enlivening ideology* to encourage and sustain them.

Fundamental to this general attitude was the *high valuation of individualism,* the need of these men to feel free, self-sufficient and uninfluenced, combined with a complementary tendency, the conscious *aversion to incorporation,* the feeling that whole-hearted membership in a group, that "team spirit," that devotion to a collective purpose were more or less degrading. Strong emotional attachments were proofs of weakness, sentimentality or stupidity. By allowing himself to be absorbed, a man lost his most precious possession, his selfhood, vantage point of criticism. Our subjects had an almost compulsive need for voicing criticism, for griping and debunking, which seemed to arise out of a deep barely-articulate *dissatisfaction with the ethos of American culture.* It was not that they preferred some other culture, or that they had lost faith in democracy as a system, but that they lacked abiding affection for American places, groups and customs. In the complex of underlying feelings, hatred and malice were not outstanding, but disillusionment and disgust were there, combined with an unhappy incapacity to admire anyone or anything whole-heartedly. Basic to this was the *conviction that man is motivated entirely by self-interest,* that the needs for self-maintenance, profit, property, power and prestige, on the one hand, and the need for sex, on the other, are all that is required to explain human action. This seemed to be the lesson to be learnt from Darwinian biology—the struggle for existence, the survival of the fittest—, from Nietzsche's will to power, from the economic interpretation of history, from Marxian materialism, from biography after Strachey, from psychoanalysis, from the cold scrutiny of the behavior of their fellowmen, as well as from introspection.

Determined not to become the dupes of get-rich-quick advertisers, scheming politicians or windy moralists, these men had become *adepts at debunking,* quick to snicker at the overflorid phrase, to squirm at the false note, to perceive the discrepancy between what a man preached and what he practiced. They had developed a pronounced *aversion to rhetoric, to lofty lan-*

guage, to the glorification of traditional institutions, largely because the great words as used by the leaders and spokesmen of their day were no longer founded on great deeds, on great endeavors or even on great intentions. In the mouths of the "big shots" they were empty of significance. Conceiving of themselves, in a sense, as disillusioned champions of truth, these young sophisticates armed with their analytic instruments, their little knowledge of semantics, were carrying on guerilla warfare against hypocrisy and cant, sentimentality and trash, against the words that referred to abstract principles but no deeds. They were fighting as an unorganized resistance group against the occupation of their country by a titanic tide of treacherous phrases—on the radio, in the movies and in the newspapers—phrases that were calculated to make suckers of them, to get them to buy something, to vote for someone, to support a cause—hokum, buncombe, bunk, bilge, ballyhoo, bull, eyewash, hot-air—, to win their goodwill as a prelude to further strategies—apple sauce, soft soap, banana oil, horse feathers—, or to pull all the stops and make them weep—drip, tear-jerker. As they saw it, all this was nothing but propaganda, sentences put together by technicians of language, by students of the psychology of advertising, familiar with all the tricks in *How to Make Friends and Influence People,* who did not believe in, or act on, what they said, but were employing words—the best words, the most inviting words—for an ulterior purpose. Insincerity had taken possession of the country. Swamped by the deluge, our subjects were hospitable only to the security of hard facts—facts and more facts, plain ungarnished facts, facts beyond suspicion, the dirty facts. They wanted the "low-down." Convinced that self-interest was at the bottom of everything, they were apt to believe that the utterance of a generous enthusiasm or elevated aspiration was nothing but an attempt, naïve or meretricious, to ennoble a base motive. It is worth noting, on the other hand, that these men were susceptible to rhetoric that ridiculed rhetoric, to propaganda against propaganda.

Being interested and practiced in exposing the selfish profit-and-prestige-directed drive behind the apparently worthy aims of reputable if not distinguished personages, our subjects were not inclined to cry out against baseness that openly declared itself. Hitler was merely an easy target for passing mockery. Their function was to challenge the unobvious falsehoods current among "respectable" people, rather than to attack brazen advocates of evil or refute lies that were patent to everybody. They were after the taint in the character of the individual or of the nation that pretended to virtue. They had become cynically *tolerant of out-and-out crime,*

Indeed, their sympathies were more apt to run with the adventurous gangster than with the police force. The moral difference between the two did not seem significant. Behind the criminal act they could detect a spark of humane feeling, and behind the enforcement of law, the third degree, a current of sadism. To their eyes, the surface was likely to be false, mere window dressing; the truth was to be found within. Thus, in their sentiments these young men were in many instances the enemies of the good as defined by their society.

Compared, we suppose, to children of other times and of other nations, most of our subjects had enjoyed during their development unusual freedom of movement and of choice. Regimentation had been minimal. The fact that some of them complained of occasional harsh treatment in the past or of supervision in the present may be taken as indicative of a widespread belief that strict discipline is not commendable. Implicit in the attitude of many of their parents was the Rousseau-derived theory of child-rearing and education, which is founded on the assumption of man's natural goodness, this having arisen as a reaction to the extreme Calvinistic doctrine of natural depravity. The child, it is held, only requires protection from deleterious insults and influences in order to achieve its rightful destiny in self-fulfillment. Spontaneity and enterprise should be encouraged; prudence and restraint, guilt and repentance are omens of mental illness. Parents of this era, fearing, on the one hand, to frustrate their children lest they engender complexes of hatred or anxiety, and lacking, on the other hand, the moral aspirations in terms of which frustration would be meaningful, generally adopted a tolerant *laissez-faire* attitude, hoping that the course of nature would be fortunate. They went along with the grain of the child, allowing him much free space for self-expression, up to or beyond the point of exhibitionism; not often did they set themselves against the grain. If this was not true of the parents, it was true of the teachers. The only philosophy which adults did impart with considerable unanimity was that of self-advancement and the morality that is integral to it: the necessity for ambition, competitive effort, initiative, persistence. As a corrective to unbridled egotism, self-aggrandisement and selfishness was the uncreative concept of adjustment to society, getting on with others. It pays to be polite, obliging and coöperative. An added ingredient, a realizable version of the Sermon on the Mount, was the ideal of humanitarianism, *sympathy for the underdog*, a sentiment that had taken root in the majority of our subjects. Every young man, according to the standard formula, should strive to better his condition, rise in the world, enlarge his acquaintanceship with influential people, and

having made his fortune, turn around and return the bulk of it to society, endow an institution, let us say, for salvaging those he left behind or outdistanced in ascending. Everything in the environment was conducive to the growth of a *high level of expectations,* which, in the case of our subjects, proved to be the worst possible preparation for the situations which the future had in store for them—the great depression and the great war. Many of these men were seriously affected by their parents' reaction to the first of these events, and, because of the collapse of all their own mounting dreams of endeavor and success, were shattered by the second. The extent of their bewilderment, anxiety and dejection can be taken as a rough measure of the height of their previous anticipations.

What had been generally left out of their education were, among other things, an adequate conception of the human situation, the essentially tragic nature of existence; respect for the achievements and wisdom of the past; loyalty to American traditions and institutions; gratefulness; social responsibility as a duty; the ideal of dedication to a common purpose. Only one or two of them seems to have been strongly invited by the idea of relinquishing his precious atom of selfhood in order to gain a molar social self, of balancing individuation with world loyalty, of losing his life to find it. The virtues they had acquired, in any event, were not those that would facilitate the realization of such an aim.

To explain all this, to identify the major determinants of these uniformities of sentiment, to account for the dissatisfactions of these young intellectuals, for their assets and liabilities as measured in this or that scale of values, it would be necessary to range far beyond the proper bounds of this monograph, to go back two thousand years or more, and set forth in historical sequence, as Mumford has done so brilliantly, the social forces and their effects—the environments, actions, arts, laws, discoveries, philosophies, and religion—, which led ultimately to the present state of society and this generation's reaction to it. For these subjects of ours were acting out or reacting against conceptions that were potent in ancient Egypt, Persia, Palestine or Greece, or were developed later in the course of European history. To explain, let us say, today's anarchy of sentiments and thought, one would have to examine the basic tenets of Western culture and trace the currents of hostility to its institutions that have arisen since the Middle Ages, the recurrent revolts against authoritarian theology, inherited kingship, and inherited wealth. It would be impossible, for example, to account for the absence of a common faith without referring to the recession of religion as a shaping power: the evaporation of belief in supernatural forces, places and

sanctions, in God and Devil, in heaven and hell, in sanctity and sinfulness, in revelation as ground for moral judgments; the Churches' increasing worldliness and subservience to Mammon—the loss of faith being due, in large measure, to the spread of the critical scientific attitude with its reliance on the sovereignty of facts and on reason built on facts, its invalidations of myth, its support of skepticism. Most of our subjects had a high regard for science.

Among the determinants one would certainly list the emergence and diffusion of the notion of individuation and of freedom as a right to be enjoyed by all: the concept of personality coming into consciousness with the Renaissance, the creed of democracy as it was formulated by British and French philosophers and put into practice in America, and the reaching of the limits of individuality in the artist's dissociated egocentricism, on the one hand, and the industrialist's implacable competitiveness, on the other.

It would be necessary to review next the rise of the commercial middle class with all its prejudices and pretensions, the marriage of Protestantism and Capitalism, of Morality and Respectability, and then to point to the significance of the incessant attacks leveled against this marriage during the last hundred and fifty years by indignant intellectuals. From Rousseau to the present day, the Romantic artist, outraged by the triumph of mediocrity with its utter disregard of the aesthetic element, has been the carrier of the satanic spirit, and the effect of this upon the imagination of youth has been incalculable. Several of our subjects were spiritual offsprings of the Romantics whose greatest works of art were in the nature of criticisms and damnations rather than of celebrations of their society. Consideration of the artist's attitude would lead to an account of the American expatriates who fled to Europe after World War I, and of the anti-Puritans and anti-Victorians who, assisted by the findings of psychoanalysis and by improved techniques of birth control, succeeded in liberating the sex instinct from its long imprisonment. Sex was the spearhead of a revolution of sentiment which ended by depreciating all forms and figures of authority, especially parents, the repositories and custodians of conventional taboos. Overboard with the parents went filial piety, the sanctity of marriage, and the cult of family solidarity. Because some moral judgments were shown to be baseless, the very notion of morality was repudiated as out of date. The parents of our subjects belonged to the same generation as did the rebels who laughed at the comradeship of Rotarians and made all group loyalties seem ridiculous, who irreverently pulled to pieces the myths that had enveloped the figures of our heroes, and who began the game of probing into people's private lives, of

peering into parlor, bedroom and bath in hopes of finding evidences of secret frailties or perversities. These voyeurists forged weapons that several of our subjects enjoyed using.

To understand the social idealism which was implicit in much that our subjects said, especially in their criticisms of the *status quo*, it would be necessary to review the rise and triumph of materialism, the all-pervasive influence of the profit motive, the general acceptance of the business man as standard for our culture. And to explain the unrest of the masses, with which most of our subjects were sympathetic, one would have to analyze the stresses and strains of the economic system, the ruthlessness of Big Business, the abuses of power, the hard lot of large sections of the population, the mechanical monotony of pent-up factory occupations, the insurgence of labor. The focussing of public attention upon the frustrations and afflictions of the underprivileged and the impossibility of living happily with this knowledge must be included as an important cause of this generation's discontent. And then, in addition, of course, one would mention the depression and the succeeding grievous years of widespread unemployment as indicative of the failure of the capitalistic system, and, more important still, the generally low level of political integrity, the public's cynical acceptance of graft as a natural and incurable ailment of local governments, the scandals of the Harding administration, and numerous other ugly evidences of corruption in high places. This is but a small sample of the many forces which operated to interfere with our subjects' whole-hearted acceptance of their culture. On top of all this came the war, which was the final fact they could not stomach.

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